Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/9/5 Brent Meeker :
>
>
>>> http://www.edge.org/q2006/q06_9.html#dawkins
>>>
>> It seems foolish to beat Basil's car because (1) we know the beating
>> will not improve it's function and (2) we know that is must be possible
>> to fix it (since we built it
2009/9/5 Brent Meeker :
>> http://www.edge.org/q2006/q06_9.html#dawkins
> It seems foolish to beat Basil's car because (1) we know the beating
> will not improve it's function and (2) we know that is must be possible
> to fix it (since we built it in the first place). However neither of
> these
On Sat, Sep 5, 2009 at 1:04 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Of course the easiest, and 100% effective way to reduce crime is to
> repeal laws. About 1/3 of our prison population is there because of
> non-violent drug use crimes.
Indeed, I'm on board with that. But, I don't see that happening
anytime
On Sat, Sep 5, 2009 at 1:04 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> But again, Dennett is mainly interested in pushing his "Bright"
>> agenda...showing that Atheists are just like everybody else.
>
> Seems like you're mainly interested in picking a fight with Dennett. I
> don't recall him mentioning either "B
On Sat, Sep 5, 2009 at 12:43 AM, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> Obviously nobody is "pro-poverty", but I think framing the issue in
> terms of "personal responsibility" and "free-will" incorrectly pushes
> the debate away from systemic solutions towards an excessive focus on
> individuals.
Or, another way
Rex Allen wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 4, 2009 at 2:54 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> Furthermore we have no idea how to "fix" the person in a mechanistic way
>> - and if we did would it be ethical (c.f. "Clockwork Orange").
>>
>
> A further thought: the solution to crime in A Clockwork Orange has
On Fri, Sep 4, 2009 at 2:54 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Furthermore we have no idea how to "fix" the person in a mechanistic way
> - and if we did would it be ethical (c.f. "Clockwork Orange").
A further thought: the solution to crime in A Clockwork Orange has a
similar problem...it's singular foc
On Fri, Sep 4, 2009 at 2:54 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> It seems foolish to beat Basil's car because (1) we know the beating
> will not improve it's function and (2) we know that is must be possible
> to fix it (since we built it in the first place). However neither of
> these is true in the case
Rex Allen wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 1:43 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 6:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Dennett didn't invent compatibilism. It has a long history and
>>> extensive literature.
>>>
>>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
>
On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 1:43 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 6:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> Dennett didn't invent compatibilism. It has a long history and
>> extensive literature.
>>
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
>
Dawkins has some good things to say
On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 6:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Dennett didn't invent compatibilism. It has a long history and
> extensive literature.
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
I was aware of these facts. But a good SEP article nonetheless, thanks!
--~--~-~--~-
On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 3:59 AM, Flammarion wrote:
>> Dennett's main goal is not to show that determinism is compatible with
>> free will (which it isn't),
>
> actually it is, although I don't find it very convincing
Asking whether free will is compatible with determinism is like asking
whether un
On 2 Sep, 18:03, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Flammarion wrote:
>
> > On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> >> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> >>> I think his exploration of
> >>> the constraints on our actions in "Freedom Evolves" is pretty much on
> >>> the money.
>
> >> So I
Flammarion wrote:
>
> On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>
>>> I think his exploration of
>>> the constraints on our actions in "Freedom Evolves" is pretty much on
>>> the money.
>>>
>> So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves
2009/9/2 Rex Allen :
>
> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> I think his exploration of
>> the constraints on our actions in "Freedom Evolves" is pretty much on
>> the money.
>
> So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I
> have read some of his articl
On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> > I think his exploration of
> > the constraints on our actions in "Freedom Evolves" is pretty much on
> > the money.
>
> So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I
> have read so
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> I think his exploration of
> the constraints on our actions in "Freedom Evolves" is pretty much on
> the money.
So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I
have read some of his articles and seen him debate and give
in
On 31 Aug, 20:51, Rex Allen wrote:
> > "If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for
> > everything."
> >--- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room
>
> Yeah, Dennett just redefines words in new ways so that he can say
> something like that and have it mean something entirel
On 1 Sep, 03:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > For instance: Bits of matter in particular configurations "cause"
> > conscious experience. Fine. So what deeper meaning can we draw from
> > this? None.
>
> Maybe not meaning, but engineering. That's why I think the "hard problem"
> will eventually
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 2:17 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> "Redefine"? You haven't defined it at all - you just assert examples
> and assert that they are common usage.
Pshaw. You asked for an operational definition, and I gave you one.
Perhaps you should reread my email. You may have missed it.
Rex Allen wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 12:37 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> Rex Allen wrote:
>>
>>> In this case, I am not responsible (common usage) for the fortune or
>>> misfortune that has befallen those who I have stumbled into as a
>>> result of the universe's constant pushiness.
>>
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 12:37 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Rex Allen wrote:
>> In this case, I am not responsible (common usage) for the fortune or
>> misfortune that has befallen those who I have stumbled into as a
>> result of the universe's constant pushiness.
>>
>> I AM responsible if we use Den
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 1:17 AM, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> SO, with that in mind...what were you implying when you added that
> quote? What was your motivation? What were you accusing me of?
>
> In short...why did you introduce that Dennett quote into this thread?
Probably I should have started with
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 12:32 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Right. And Dennett is choosing his words carefully, so as to advance
>> his social re-engineering agenda. He want's to keep the idea of
>> responsibility for utilitarian reasons..it's hard to keep a society
>> going without it, and so he re
Rex Allen wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 12:12 AM, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 10:52 PM, Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> "If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for
>>> everything."
>>>--- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room
>>>
>> If
Rex Allen wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 10:52 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> Rex Allen wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 4:01 PM, Brent Meeker
>>> wrote:
>>>
Where are you trying to get? to an immortal soul?
a ghost-in-the-machine? What's wrong with my
mind is
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 12:12 AM, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 10:52 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> "If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for
>> everything."
>> --- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room
>
> If determinism is true, then there is no responsibilit
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 10:52 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Rex Allen wrote:
>> On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 4:01 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> Where are you trying to get? to an immortal soul?
>>> a ghost-in-the-machine? What's wrong with my
>>> mind is what my brain does?
>>
>> Where I'm trying to get
Rex Allen wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 4:01 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Where are you trying to get? to an immortal soul?
>> a ghost-in-the-machine? What's wrong with my
>> mind is what my brain does?
>
> Where I'm trying to get is that there is no explanation for our
> conscious experience.
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 4:01 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>Where are you trying to get? to an immortal soul?
> a ghost-in-the-machine? What's wrong with my
> mind is what my brain does?
Where I'm trying to get is that there is no explanation for our
conscious experience. It just is.
So all that we
Rex Allen wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:37 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> Either way, there is only the epiphenomenal experience of making my
>>> mind up...not the actuality of doing so.
>> I'd say there was the epiphenomenal experience of making up your mind AND
>> the actuality of
>> doing so
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:37 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Either way, there is only the epiphenomenal experience of making my
>> mind up...not the actuality of doing so.
>
> I'd say there was the epiphenomenal experience of making up your mind AND the
> actuality of
> doing so. Your formulation di
Rex Allen wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:30 PM, Flammarion wrote:
If you can't see into the future, you are going to have to
make your mind up in the present
>>> Assuming physicalism, my brain will make my mind up for me,
>> Asssuming physcialism, your brain is you and not some exter
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:30 PM, Flammarion wrote:
>>> If you can't see into the future, you are going to have to
>>> make your mind up in the present
>
>> Assuming physicalism, my brain will make my mind up for me,
>
> Asssuming physcialism, your brain is you and not some external force
> pulling
Rex Allen wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 1:58 PM, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen wrote:
>>> On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer
considerable advantage.
>>> If that's what the f
On 31 Aug, 19:15, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 1:58 PM, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen wrote:
> >> On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meeker
> >> wrote:
>
> >> > If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer
> >> > considerable advantag
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:10 PM, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11 Aug, 16:38, David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/8/11 Rex Allen :
>
>> Standard physicalism, on the other hand, by banishing self-access from
>> its fundamental notions of causal adequacy (though arrogating the
>> right to whisk a mysteriousl
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 1:58 PM, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen wrote:
>> On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>> > If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer
>> > considerable advantage.
>>
>> If that's what the future held for me, t
On 11 Aug, 16:38, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/11 Rex Allen :
> Standard physicalism, on the other hand, by banishing self-access from
> its fundamental notions of causal adequacy (though arrogating the
> right to whisk a mysteriously powerless ghost of it back later by
> sleight of intuition)
On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> > If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer
> > considerable advantage.
>
> If that's what the future held for me, then that's exactly what I
> would do. Otherwise, I wouldn't d
On 26 Aug 2009, at 05:26, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 9:50 AM, David Nyman
> wrote:
>>
>> Recalling your interest in Chalmers: I was re-reading "Facing Up to
>> the Problem of Consciousness" recently, and I realised - I think for
>> the first time - that his own "double-aspec
On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 9:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> Recalling your interest in Chalmers: I was re-reading "Facing Up to
> the Problem of Consciousness" recently, and I realised - I think for
> the first time - that his own "double-aspect theory of information" is
> effectively a reformulation
On 17 Aug, 01:02, Rex Allen wrote:
Hi Rex
Recalling your interest in Chalmers: I was re-reading "Facing Up to
the Problem of Consciousness" recently, and I realised - I think for
the first time - that his own "double-aspect theory of information" is
effectively a reformulation, in less 'profes
On Mon, Aug 17, 2009 at 5:20 PM, John Mikes wrote:
> Rex,
> (I guess the unsigned text below came from you)
> thanks for your "one-liner" gemstone of a definition on
> "Conscious Experience"!
> John Mikes
Indeed! Thanks John, glad you liked it!
>
> On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 5:04 PM, Rex All
Rex,
(I guess the unsigned text below came from you)
thanks for your "one-liner" gemstone of a definition on
"Conscious Experience"!
John Mikes
On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 5:04 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nyman wrote:
> >
> > Here's what I think is the problem w
> I'm afraid you are solipsist.
Ha! Ouch! But it's not quite as simple as that. I don't deny that
there MAY be something that causes consciousness, BUT if there
is...this ultimately doesn't matter. In the final view, the
conclusion is the same...consciousness experience just is what it is.
F
On 17 Aug 2009, at 02:02, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 10:12 AM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>> "I exist" could be, perhaps, tautological. But "Reality"? I don't
>> think so. Certainly not from inside.
>
> What is reality, beyond our conscious experience of existence?
This is wh
2009/8/16 Rex Allen :
>
> On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 5:42 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> 2009/8/16 Rex Allen :
>>>
>>> On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nyman wrote:
Here's what I think is the problem with all this:
>>>
>>> H. I didn't see anything in your post that seemed like an a
On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 10:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> "I exist" could be, perhaps, tautological. But "Reality"? I don't
> think so. Certainly not from inside.
What is reality, beyond our conscious experience of existence?
> The conclusion will be that consciousness, or anything apprehended
On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 5:08 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> There seems to be a lot switching back and forth between cause and meaning
> and explanation
> as though were interchangable. And even those have different modes, e.g.
> first cause,
> effective cause, proximate cause,... Meaning=standin
On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 5:42 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> 2009/8/16 Rex Allen :
>>
>> On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>> Here's what I think is the problem with all this:
>>
>> H. I didn't see anything in your post that seemed like an actual
>> problem for my view.
>
>
2009/8/16 Rex Allen :
>
> On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> Here's what I think is the problem with all this:
>
> H. I didn't see anything in your post that seemed like an actual
> problem for my view.
But weren't you were arguing that your view of explanation and mea
On 16 Aug 2009, at 18:35, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 14 Aug 2009, at 09:11, Rex Allen wrote:
> ...
>
>>>
> Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are.
>
> So what causes the complexity and structure of the things that I
> am
> conscious of
On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> Here's what I think is the problem with all this:
H. I didn't see anything in your post that seemed like an actual
problem for my view.
As I think my "virtual-gas" example illustrated, meaning is
subjective, like conscious experience.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 09:11, Rex Allen wrote:
...
>>
Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are.
So what causes the complexity and structure of the things that I am
conscious of? Nothing. That's just the way my experience is.
>>> ? I can't acce
2009/8/16 Bruno Marchal :
>> So I lean towards the idea that only our conscious experiences are
>> "real". Things obviously exist as contents of conscious experiences.
>
> I deeply disagree here. Even to understand a word like "content" I
> have to believe in some more basic entities which are n
On 14 Aug 2009, at 09:11, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 1:53 PM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>>
>>> As such, I feel that it is reasonable to say that conscious
>>> experience
>>> itself is uncaused and fundamental.
>>
>> This has no meaning for me. It is like saying "don't ask".
>
2009/8/15 Rex Allen :
> 1) Physicalism has an explanatory gap
>
> 2) Platonism, which initially seemed better, also has an explanatory gap
>
> 3) Uncaused things cannot have meaning or explanations in an absolute sense
>
> 4) All causal explanations of consciousness ultimately lead to uncaus
Rex Allen wrote:
> Brent and 1Z (the "twins"...a dynamic duo of blunt skepticism):
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 2:43 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> Well, I think that's what I'm saying. Causal explanations are not
>>> really explanations, because you can never trace the causal chain back
>>> to i
Brent and 1Z (the "twins"...a dynamic duo of blunt skepticism):
On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 2:43 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> Well, I think that's what I'm saying. Causal explanations are not
>> really explanations, because you can never trace the causal chain back
>> to it's ultimate source.
>
> T
Rex Allen wrote:
> Brent,
>
> On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 3:02 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are.
>> Didn't anyone ever explain arithmetic or geometry to you? Not every
>> explanation needs to be a causal one.
>
> Well, I think that's what I'm saying. C
On 14 Aug, 09:51, Rex Allen wrote:
> Brent,
>
> On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 3:02 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >> Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are.
>
> > Didn't anyone ever explain arithmetic or geometry to you? Not every
> > explanation needs to be a causal one.
>
> Well, I think th
Rex Allen wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 3:21 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>> The living brain and the executing computer program both just
>>> represent the contents of my conscious experience, in the same way
>>> that a map represents the actual terrain.
>>>
>> When you set fire to a m
Brent,
On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 3:02 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are.
>
> Didn't anyone ever explain arithmetic or geometry to you? Not every
> explanation needs to be a causal one.
Well, I think that's what I'm saying. Causal explanations are not
r
On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 3:21 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>> The living brain and the executing computer program both just
>> represent the contents of my conscious experience, in the same way
>> that a map represents the actual terrain.
>
> When you set fire to a map the land doesn't burn.
>
If yo
Rex Allen wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 1:53 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>> As such, I feel that it is reasonable to say that conscious experience
>>> itself is uncaused and fundamental.
>>>
>> This has no meaning for me. It is like saying "don't ask".
>>
>
> Hm. You don't a
On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 1:53 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> As such, I feel that it is reasonable to say that conscious experience
>> itself is uncaused and fundamental.
>
> This has no meaning for me. It is like saying "don't ask".
Hm. You don't at all see what I'm trying to say?
Okay, how
2009/8/13 Rex Allen :
> Causality. Causality. Causalty. Hmmm.
>
> So really I am arguing against causal explanations. I think this the
> core of my current argument. The feeling that something is happening
> *NOW* is just another example of qualia I think. The certainty of
> feeling that *t
I owe Bruno and Brent a response also...it's in the works!
David:
On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 11:38 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> The standard view of physics is that things are causally closed
> 'out there', and this seems to rule out that such causation can
> in any sense be 'owned' by us.
Exactly.
On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 12:02:03PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Didn't anyone ever explain arithmetic or geometry to you? Not every
> explanation needs to be a causal one. And being uncaused doesn't
> prevent explanation - for example decay of an unstable nucleus is
> uncaused, i.e. it is ra
Rex Allen wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I don't see the theory. What do you ask us to agree on, if only for
>> the sake of the argument.
>>
>
> So, while the contents of my experience...the things that I'm
> conscious OF are complex and structured, my c
On 11 Aug 2009, at 07:13, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:50 PM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>> I don't see the theory. What do you ask us to agree on, if only for
>> the sake of the argument.
>
> So, while the contents of my experience...the things that I'm
> conscious OF are comp
It would be interesting to know a little about the
background you bring to your thinking.
David
~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
> This message is part of the topic "Against Physics" in the Google Group
> &q
On Mon, Aug 10, 2009 at 8:35 PM, David Nyman wrote
>
> What of course is striking
> about your proposals is that in reality nobody behaves as though they
> believe this sort of thing: which is not of course to say that this
> makes it uninteresting.
You speak as if though we have a choice as to h
On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I don't see the theory. What do you ask us to agree on, if only for
> the sake of the argument.
So, while the contents of my experience...the things that I'm
conscious OF are complex and structured, my conscious experience of
these things i
On 9 Aug, 07:41, Rex Allen wrote:
Rex, just a few general points on your posts. The various 'existence'
arguments I've been putting forward recently are intended precisely to
show how our first-person world of meaning and intention is embedded
in a more general environment that is congruent wit
On 09 Aug 2009, at 08:41, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> On Sat, Aug 8, 2009 at 6:12 PM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 08 Aug 2009, at 22:44, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>> So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that
>>> our conscious experience just exists. Why are my
On Sat, Aug 8, 2009 at 6:12 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 08 Aug 2009, at 22:44, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>> So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that
>> our conscious experience just exists. Why are my perceptions orderly
>> and why are my predictions about wh
his in mind in the future, if that is what is
> in your future.
>
>
> On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>> rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
>>> Against Physics
>>>
>>> Let me go through my full chain of reasoning here, before I draw my
wouldn't be in my
future.
Your advice is beneficial only to those who receive it and benefit
from it. Please keep this in mind in the future, if that is what is
in your future.
On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
>> Against Physics
rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
> Against Physics
>
> Let me go through my full chain of reasoning here, before I draw my
> conclusion:
...
> So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that
> our conscious experience just exists.
If you suffer epileptic
On 08 Aug 2009, at 22:44, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
> So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that
> our conscious experience just exists. Why are my perceptions orderly
> and why are my predictions about what will happen next usually
> correct? Because that's just th
Against Physics
Let me go through my full chain of reasoning here, before I draw my
conclusion:
So the world that I perceive seems pretty orderly. When I drive to
work, it's always where I expect it to be. The people are always the
same. I pick up where I left off on the previous day
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