An analysis I have made of my model:
My model's foundation is not mathematics but the list of potential
properties of things. The only mathematical like concepts I then use are
power set, incompleteness, and inconsistency and these are derived from
simply parsing the list. If my list is
My analysis continued:
Self awareness and consciousness:
If the All is just the set of reals with an assigned meaning for each then
undoubtedly some of these meanings would be kernels that contain sub
kernels describing Self Aware Structures [SAS]. Given the random nature of
the dynamic I
I have attached a revision to my model at (9) which makes the driver for
the evolution of the Somethings more explicit.
Definitions:
The list of all possibilities: The list of all the possible properties and
aspects of things. This list can not be empty since there is unlikely to
be less
-
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, December 26, 2004 1:23 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Below is a background for my model and a rewrite of the original post.
My concerns with a TOE which I am trying to resolve are:
I would like
Hi Stephen:
Since the Nothing has no information by definition and the boundary between
them - the Everything - has no potential to divide further [i.e. no
information] then the All must have no information if the system has no
information. I do not think the latter part is controversial. For
Hi John:
At 06:12 PM 12/26/2004, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
is there some draft seeable on the web?
Not yet. If the idea still looks good at the end of this thread I intend
to post something on my web page with visual aids etc.
I thought I am comfortable with your
terminology (whether I understand
Hi Jesse:
I think some confusion took place surrounding the posts on or about
12/10.
In my initial post I said:
xx
9) Notice that the All also has a logical problem. Looking at
the same meaningful question of its own stability it contains all
possible answers because just one would
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 11:41 PM 12/18/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
'The laws of logic need not be thought of as rules of discovery, they
can be thought of purely as expressing
Expressing seems to be a time dependent process.
I don't think it needs to be. When we say a certain set of symbols
John M wrote:
Dear Jesse,
ashamed for breaking my decision NOT to babble into this discussion with my
personal common sense, here is something to your position from my problems:
(First a bit of nitpicking, as an appetizer)
For example, in every world where X and Y are simultaneously true,
it
is
Hi Jesse:
I do not think the conversation re:
I can't think of any historical examples of new
mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to already
believe their premises in order to justify these premises,
has a valid place in this thread. Can you tell me why you do?
Hal
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I do not think the conversation re:
I can't think of any historical examples of new
mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to already
believe their premises in order to justify these premises,
has a valid place in this thread. Can you tell me why you do?
]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, December 18, 2004 11:41 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Snip, 2 quotes above included
Hi Bruno and Jesse:
At 10:23 AM 12/18/2004, you wrote:
At 21:48 17/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
Can a kernel of information be self inconsistent? From Bruno's last post
I think it is possible to impose this idea on the All.
I'm afraid I said the contrary (unless I misunderstand what you are
Hal Ruhl wrote:
As to the Laws of Logic with respect to information [and I think I said
this earlier] the information in a kernel is indeed static. The laws of
Logic are just our locally grown [and apparently sequential] way of
revealing it. The question I raise is the implicit inclusion of
At 21:48 17/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
Can a kernel of information be self inconsistent? From Bruno's last post
I think it is possible to impose this idea on the All.
I'm afraid I said the contrary (unless I misunderstand what you are
pointing at through the expression kernel of
At 20:39 17/12/04 -0800, Pete Carlton wrote:
As usual when I ask a question like this, if the answer is available in a
text on logic or elsewhere, please just tell me where to look.
..I'm also interested in the implicit use of time, or sequence, in many of
the ideas discussed here.
For
At 03:31 18/12/04 -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
I don't think Bruno's last post was really implying that everything
would be inconsistent, I thought his point was more that you can't
consider things like the collection of all possible sets to itself be a set.
Exactly. It is the machine which gives
Hi Jesse:
At 03:31 AM 12/18/2004, you wrote:
I think it would be simpler if you responded directly to quotes from my
previous post, rather than just making general statements about issues
raised in that post. For example, here you continue to *assert* that there
is something inherently
Hi Pete:
At 11:39 PM 12/17/2004, you wrote:
As usual when I ask a question like this, if the answer is available in a
text on logic or elsewhere, please just tell me where to look.
..I'm also interested in the implicit use of time, or sequence, in many of
the ideas discussed here.
For instance
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I think it would be simpler if you responded directly to quotes from my
previous post, rather than just making general statements about issues
raised in that post. For example, here you continue to *assert* that there
is something inherently time-based about logical statements,
Hi Jesse:
I think I respond to most earlier questions and comments below:
As to the Laws of Logic with respect to information [and I think I said
this earlier] the information in a kernel is indeed static. The laws of
Logic are just our locally grown [and apparently sequential] way of
As usual when I ask a question like this, if the answer is available in
a text on logic or elsewhere, please just tell me where to look.
..I'm also interested in the implicit use of time, or sequence, in many
of the ideas discussed here.
For instance you might say that some of your Somethings
At 23:12 12/12/04 -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 09:35 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Godel's theorem would also apply to infinite axiomatic systems whose
axioms are recursively enumerable (computable). But sure, if you allow
non-computable axiomatic systems, you could have one that was
Hi Jesse and Bruno:
To consolidate my response:
Yes indeed. Most books give different definition of axiomatic and
recursively enumerable, but there is
a theorem by Craig which shows that for (most) theories, the notion are
equivalent. (See Boolos and Jeffrey for
a proof of Craig's theorem).
Hi Jesse:
I will go over the thread and try to clear things up but I am having eye
surgery in the morning and ran out of time.
Why would mathematics be the only thing in the All? Is that not a selection?
At 07:38 PM 12/13/2004, you wrote:
It is controversial that mathematics contains any
At 07:28 PM 12/11/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
You wrote:
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of evolving
Somethings, not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Just the reverse. The evolving
Hi Jesse:
At 04:46 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said
something more general, like you're justifying the idea that the All is
inconsistent in terms of your own theoretical framework, not in terms of
inconsistent
Hi Jesse:
At 09:35 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl:
Hi Jesse:
At 04:46 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said
something more general, like you're justifying the idea that the All
is inconsistent in terms of your own
Hal Ruhl wrote:
OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said
something more general, like you're justifying the idea that the All is
inconsistent in terms of your own theoretical framework, not in terms of
inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Do you grant that the All which
Hal Ruhl:
Hi Jesse:
At 04:46 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said
something more general, like you're justifying the idea that the All is
inconsistent in terms of your own theoretical framework, not in terms of
Hi Jesse
You wrote:
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of evolving
Somethings, not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Just the reverse. The evolving Somethings inevitably encompass the
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, December 11, 2004 11:56 AM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Hi Jesse
You wrote:
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of evolving
Somethings
]
Sent: Saturday, December 11, 2004 11:56 AM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Hi Jesse
You wrote:
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of evolving
Somethings, not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic
Hal Ruhl wrote:
You wrote:
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of evolving
Somethings, not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Just the reverse. The evolving Somethings inevitably encompass the
To continue:
As I said attach no significance to the little thought pictures I am using
to illustrate various aspects of my system. They illustrate little chunks
and then break down.
The system has no net information.
The Nothing has no internal information.
The Everything is the boundary of
Hal Ruhl wrote:
A kernel of information is the that information constituting a particular
potential to divide.
The All contains all such kernels.
The All is internally inconsistent because it contains for example a
complete axiomatized arithmetic as well as an infinity of other such
kernels
Hi Jesse:
Meaning can not be assigned as an inherent component of the All. That
would be a selection. Meaning can only be assigned if at all within the
wave of physical reality associated with an evolving Something. Evolving
Somethings will eventually encompass pairs of counterfactual and
At 20:08 07/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
I believe we discussed this and you agreed that a complete arithmetic
would be inconsistent. I have not found the applicable posts.
If by arithmetic you mean an axiomatizable theory, then indeed, by
incompleteness it follows that such an arithmetic, if
At 16:29 08/12/04 +0100, I wrote:
Before axiomatic set theories like
Zermelo-Fraenkel, ... Cantor called the collection of all
sets the Inconsistent. But this does make sense for
me. Only a theory, or a machine, or a person can be inconsistent, not
a set, or a realm, or a model.
Read instead: But
Hi Hal,
In my questions about truth etc I was not really looking for a response
but was rather trying to demonstrate the need for additional information
in your theory.
I don't have a theory. Just an argument showing that if we are machine then
eventually physics is derivable from machine
Hi Bruno:
At 06:40 AM 12/7/2004, you wrote:
Hi Hal,
In my questions about truth etc I was not really looking for a response
but was rather trying to demonstrate the need for additional information
in your theory.
I don't have a theory. Just an argument showing that if we are machine
then
At 06:37 PM 12/7/2004, you wrote:
To clarify - the All contains all information simultaneously [see the
definition in the original post] - including ALL Truing machines with ALL
possible output tapes - so it contains simultaneously both output tapes
re your comment below.
But if there is a fact
Hi Jesse:
At 09:23 PM 12/7/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
To clarify - the All contains all information simultaneously [see the
definition in the original post] - including ALL Truing machines with
ALL possible output tapes - so it contains simultaneously both output
tapes re your comment
Maybe this will help:
The All contains all possible output states of all Turing machines [among
all manner of other info such as states of really messy universes]
simultaneously. These states are given Physical reality by evolving
Somethings in random order over and over. Some such sequences
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 22:19:02 -0500
Hi Jesse:
At 09:23 PM 12/7/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
To clarify - the All contains all information simultaneously [see the
definition
Hi Jesse:
The All contains inconsistent FAS [we have no issue here as far as I can
tell] and thus all of the theorems of such FAS as some of the kernels of
information simultaneously. [Do we have an issue here?] This content
makes the All inconsistent. [OK?] The All does not output anything
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 22:41:45 -0500
Maybe this will help:
The All contains all possible output states of all Turing machines [among
all manner of other info such as states of really messy
At 17:15 03/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Bruno:
I assume your theory is intended to give the range of descriptions of worlds.
The All in my model contains - well - ALL so it includes systems to which
Godel's theorem applies.
Your theory has problems for me.
What is truth?
Truth is a queen who
Hi Bruno:
In my questions about truth etc I was not really looking for a response but
was rather trying to demonstrate the need for additional information in
your theory. Your responses made my point I think. It is this issue I
struggle with. I seek a TOE that has no net information. Though
Hal Ruhl wrote:
To answer these questions it seems necessary to inject information into
your theory beyond what may already be there - the sentences - ...
Right. This indeed follows from Goedel's incompleteness.
Here you appear to me to be saying that your theory is indeed subject to
random
Hi Jesse:
My originating post appeals only to the result of Turing to the effect that
there is in general no decision procedure.
As a result FAS in general can not be both complete and consistent.
Since my All contains all FAS including the complete ones then the All is
inconsistent. That is
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Jesse:
My originating post appeals only to the result of Turing to the effect that
there is in general no decision procedure.
There's no single decision procedure for a Turing machine, but if you
consider more general kinds of machines, like a hypercomputer that can
check an
Hi Jesse:
I think you miss my point. The All contains ALL including Turing machines
that model complete FAS and other inconsistent systems. The All is
inconsistent - that is all that is required.
Godel's theorem is a corollary of Turing's.
As you say a key element of Godel's approach to
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Jesse:
I think you miss my point. The All contains ALL including Turing machines
that model complete FAS and other inconsistent systems. The All is
inconsistent - that is all that is required.
You mean because the All contains Turing machines which model axiomatic
systems
of dicussion. Nevertheless I submit them FYI: I quote
and reply below.- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, December 01, 2004 3:49 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
(Hal: BrunoJM: blank lines)
Hi Bruno
Dear Bruno,
How is the trueness of members of this theory (of all true
arithmetical sentences) given? By fiat?
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, December 03, 2004 8:03 AM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing
Hi Bruno:
I assume your theory is intended to give the range of descriptions of worlds.
The All in my model contains - well - ALL so it includes systems to which
Godel's theorem applies.
Your theory has problems for me.
What is truth?
What is a sentence?
What is arithmetical?
As Stephen Paul
Hi Bruno:
At 09:38 AM 11/30/2004, you wrote:
At 13:40 26/11/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
What does logically possible mean?
In the above I meant in the context of the larger phrase of: logically
possible worlds.
In the following call an individual [Ai,Dj] pair logic system Ln where i,
j, and n can
: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Hi John:
I am trying to make the model independent of what might be the detail
structure of individual universes within it.
Hal
At 10:41 AM 11/21/2004, you wrote:
Hal:
how about this:
a 'concept' is THE part of ALL cut (limited?) by topical boundaries
. (I am not the
best in formulating).
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, November 20, 2004 11:32 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
I was asked about concepts.
I would define concept as any division
: Saturday, November 20, 2004 11:32 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
I was asked about concepts.
I would define concept as any division of the All into two sub
components, each of the sub components is a concept.
Usefullness of a concept as judged by a SAS [if they exist
I was asked about concepts.
I would define concept as any division of the All into two sub
components, each of the sub components is a concept.
Usefullness of a concept as judged by a SAS [if they exist] is not an issue.
Hal
: Wednesday, November 17, 2004 7:29 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
In my [is, is not] definitional pair the is not component is the All
minus the is component.
Thus the is not member is not simply unwinged horses or the like. In
most of these pairs I suspect the is not component
Hi John:
At 11:27 AM 11/18/2004, you wrote:
Hal:
makes sense to me - with one question:
I take: ALL stands for the totality (wholeness as I say) and your -- is
is confined to whatever we do, or are capable (theoretically) to know -
whether already discovered or not.
It is more than that. The All
I forgot to point out that the definitional information for the
[All,Nothing] pair cancels because the inverse definition i.e. the
[Nothing, All] pair is the same system.
Hal
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi George:
Hi Hal,
At 09:13 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
My use of these words is convenience only but my point is why should
existence be so anemic as to prohibit the simultaneous presence of an
All and a Nothing.
The prohibition does not come from an anemia of
AM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi George:
Hi Hal,
At 09:13 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
My use of these words is convenience only but my point is why should
existence be so anemic as to prohibit the simultaneous presence
All members of [is,is not] definitional pairs including the [All, Nothing]
pair have a conceptual foundation within the All. Why would the [All,
Nothing} pair be the only one denied a mutual and concurrent physical
expression?
Hal
Hal Ruhl wrote:
All members of [is,is not] definitional pairs including the [All,
Nothing] pair have a conceptual foundation within the All. Why would
the [All, Nothing} pair be the only one denied a mutual and concurrent
physical expression?
Well... It seems that we do not share the same
rmiller wrote:
This is starting to sound like discussion Hume must have had with himself.
Might be. And was Hume finally able to conclude something ?
Georges.
John Collins wrote:
There do exist consistent approaches to set theory where you do have a
universal set and can therefore consider taking complements to be a
sinle-argument operation. to bypass the obvious paradox (that any set can be
used to make a necessarily larger powerset) you need to
In my [is, is not] definitional pair the is not component is the All
minus the is component.
Thus the is not member is not simply unwinged horses or the like. In
most of these pairs I suspect the is not component has no apparent
usefulness [to most SAS [if they exist]]. Be that as it may
Hal Ruhl wrote:
[...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident
[once you notice it].
The problem with evidence is that on one side there is no other
known basis to
- Original Message -
From: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 4:26 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Hi, Hall, (to your post below and many preceding that):
I feel there is a semantic game going on. ALL we know
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries: I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I recall
in some earlier related threads defined information as a potential to
erect a boundary. So the All is chuck full of this potential. Actual
boundaries are the Everything and any evolving Something.
This is
On Wed, 2004-11-17 at 08:39, Georges Quenot wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
[...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident
[once you notice it].
The problem
At 05:39 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
[...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident [once
you notice it].
The problem with evidence is that on one side
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
On Wed, 2004-11-17 at 08:39, Georges Quenot wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
[...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident
[once you notice it].
The
At 05:58 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries: I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I recall
in some earlier related threads defined information as a potential to
erect a boundary. So the All is chuck full of this potential. Actual
boundaries are the Everything
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 05:39 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
[...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident
[once you notice it].
The problem with evidence is
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 05:58 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries: I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I
recall in some earlier related threads defined information as a
potential to erect a boundary. So the All is chuck full of this
potential. Actual boundaries
At 08:48 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 05:39 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
[...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident
[once you notice
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 08:48 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Darwin seems to have felt this way about Origins [Stephen Gould's The
Structure of Evolutionary Theory, page 2] so why should my ideas be
special?
We agree here. Interesting reference.
Georges.
Hi George:
At 09:13 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 05:58 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries: I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I
recall in some earlier related threads defined information as a
potential to erect a boundary. So the All is chuck
Hi John:
At 05:46 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
snip
My Multiverse consists of universes unlimited in number and qualia
(process capability, whatever).
My All would be infinite and could contain multiple multiverses - multiple
Somethings - evolving all at once.
I see no restriction on the nature
This is starting to sound like discussion Hume must have had with himself.
RM
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 07:56 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I would appreciate comments on the following.
I placed the definitions at the end for easy group reference.
Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics
are the result of unavoidable definition and
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 08:16 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
4) A Something: A division of the All into two subparts.
That too, sounds bad to me. It might well be that the only something that
deserve the title of Something would be the All itself. Everything else
might
Georges Quenot wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 08:16 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
4) A Something: A division of the All into two subparts.
That too, sounds bad to me. It might well be that the only something that
deserve the title of Something would be the All itself.
I received the following comments from Eric Cavalcanti but did not see them
post on the Everything list.
It is the same idea as Godel's approach to showing the incompleteness of
arithmetic. The structure of arithmetic was asked a question [the
truth or
falseness of a grammatically valid
Hal,
I'm way out of my depth, but if I'm correctly interpreting what you are
saying, it looks to me that your multiverse model cannot be valid.
This is because it answers the question Why does anything exist? with the
answer Because it's not possible to conceive of Nothing, since the concept
Hi Norman:
My model has both a Nothing, the All, and a set of Somethings simultaneously.
Hal
At 06:10 PM 11/15/2004, you wrote:
Hal,
I'm way out of my depth, but if I'm correctly interpreting what you are
saying, it looks to me that your multiverse model cannot be valid.
This is because it answers
PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2004 6:10 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Hal,
I'm way out of my depth, but if I'm correctly interpreting what you are saying,
it looks to me that your multiverse model cannot be valid.
This is because it answers the question Why does anything
://www.something.com - Ben Udell.
- Original Message -
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2004 6:10 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Hal,
I'm way out of my depth, but if I'm correctly interpreting
To answer a few other comments/questions:
Boundaries: I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I recall in
some earlier related threads defined information as a potential to erect a
boundary. So the All is chuck full of this potential. Actual boundaries
are the Everything and any
To respond to comments on consistency.
I see no reason why components of the system need to be internally
consistent. And I have indicated that the All is not internally
consistent. Generally speaking evolving Somethings are also not
consistent. Actually evolving Somethings are a sequence
Hi Eric:
At 09:46 PM 11/15/2004, you wrote:
On Tue, 2004-11-16 at 10:13, Hal Ruhl wrote:
To respond to comments on consistency.
I see no reason why components of the system need to be internally
consistent. And I have indicated that the All is not internally
consistent. Generally speaking
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I would appreciate comments on the following.
I placed the definitions at the end for easy group reference.
Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics
are the result of unavoidable definition and logical incompleteness.
Justification:
1) Given
Hal Ruhl wrote:
4) A Something: A division of the All into two subparts.
That too, sounds bad to me. It might well be that the only something that
deserve the title of Something would be the All itself. Everything else
might appear so only in our minds (and/or in other types of minds).
Georges.
At 07:56 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I would appreciate comments on the following.
I placed the definitions at the end for easy group reference.
Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics are
the result of unavoidable definition and logical
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