At 16:05 14/11/03 -0200, Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
When you said earlier that:
In a materialistic framework, ' I ' am a bunch of atoms.
These atoms
happen to constitute a system that has self-referential
qualities that we call
At 14:21 12/11/03 -0800, Pete Carlton wrote:
Greetings;
this reply has taken some time...
I don't quite agree with your point of view, and the reason is maybe
similar to our disagreement in my statement: It is not useful to talk
about 1st person experiences in 3rd person terms, since when we do
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
When you said earlier that:
In a materialistic framework, ' I ' am a bunch of atoms. These atoms
happen to constitute a system that has self-referential
qualities that we call consciousness.
I would say I *own* a bunch of
Hi,
- Original Message -
From: Pete Carlton [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Greetings;
this reply has taken some time...
I don't quite agree with your point of view, and the reason is maybe
similar to our disagreement in my statement: It is not useful to talk
about 1st person experiences in
, 10 November 2003 6:40 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: Quantum accident survivor
I'm trying to define identity...
Let's write x~y if SAS's x and y (possibly in different universes) have the
same identity. I propose that this relation must be reflexive, symmetric
and transitive. This neatly
Hi,
- Original Message -
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Eric Cavalcanti, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes:
In the case of non-destructive-copy experiment, the copy is
made in a distinct place/time from the original. They could as well be
done
100,000 years in the future and in the
Hi,
- Original Message -
From: Eric Cavalcanti [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, November 05, 2003 8:41 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor
Hi,
- Original Message -
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Eric Cavalcanti, [EMAIL PROTECTED
I'm trying to define identity...
Let's write x~y if SAS's x and y (possibly in different universes) have
the same identity. I propose that this relation must be reflexive,
symmetric and transitive. This neatly partitions all SAS's into
equivalence classes, and we have no ambiguity working out
Hi,
I disagreed with some points in your argumentation...
- Original Message -
From: David Barrett-Lennard [EMAIL PROTECTED]
I'm trying to define identity...
Let's write x~y if SAS's x and y (possibly in different universes) have
the same identity.
You did not yet 'define'
Hi,
I just have one question to clarify your position.
- Original Message -
From: Eric Cavalcanti [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, November 05, 2003 6:06 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor
But suppose you just stepped outside the Paris duplicator
: RE: Quantum accident survivor
I'm trying to define identity...
Let's write x~y if SAS's x and y (possibly in different universes) have
the same identity. I propose that this relation must be reflexive,
symmetric and transitive. This neatly partitions all SAS's into
equivalence classes
Hi,
I believe one main issue here is the state of one's surviving consciousness.
There is no reason to believe that having consciousness is an on/off thing.
So if you do accept quantum immortality thinking, in a typical
death-scenario (a severe heart attack, say) we could imagine a survivalrate
Eric Cavalcanti, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes:
In the case of non-destructive-copy experiment, the copy is
made in a distinct place/time from the original. They could as well be done
100,000 years in the future and in the Andromeda galaxy, and you should
as well expect to have the subjective
-Original Message-
From: Matt King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, 8 November 2003 3:37 AM
To: David Barrett-Lennard
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor
Hello David,
David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
Please note that my understanding of QM is rather lame
Here is the question I wonder about. Is it meaningful for Eric01 to
consider the concept of precisely the one Eric that he is?
Or would you say that it is fundamentally impossible for a system
(e.g. Eric01) to accurately conceive of the concept of itself as a
completely specified and single
Hi,
I found this post really thoughtful, but I didn't quite agree. Let's see if
I can argue on it:
Doesn't this part:
In a materialistic framework, ' I ' am a bunch of atoms. These atoms
happen to constitute a system that has self-referential qualities that
we call consciousness. If it
Saibal Mitra wrote:
To get the effect you were suggesting would require another type of
SSA, about which I have complete failure of imagination.
I think it is similar. You have a set of all universes which we identify
with descriptions or programs. Embedded in these descriptions are
Russel,
If you view the "observer-moments" as transitions rather than states,
then there is no need for requiring a time dimension. Each
observer-moments carries with it its own subjective feeling of time.
Different observer-moments can form vast networks without any time
requirement.
Saibal
What do you mean by *entirely equal*?
- Original Message -
From: David Kwinter [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 5:19 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor
On Tuesday, November 4, 2003, at 10:47 AM, Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
Let me stress
PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 5:19 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor
On Tuesday, November 4, 2003, at 10:47 AM, Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
Let me stress this point: *I am, for all practical purposes,
one and only one specific configuration of atoms in a
specific
Hello David,
David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
Please note that my understanding of QM is rather lame... Doesn't MWI
require some interaction between branches in order to explain things
like interference patterns in the two slit experiment? What does this
mean for the concept of identity?
- David
Russell wrote:
The empirical problem with the ASSA is that under most reasonable
proposals for the absolute measure, observer moments corresponding to
younger people have higher measure than older people. Whilst the
reference class issue puts a lower bound on how old you would expect
to be,
Hi,
Doesn't this part:
In a materialistic framework, ' I ' am a bunch of atoms. These atoms
happen to constitute a system that has self-referential qualities that
we call consciousness. If it happened that these atoms temporarily
(like in a coma or anesthesy) or permanently (death) lose this
Pete Carlton writes:
Let's say that you were able to completely specify one Eric, by giving
a (possibly infinitely) long description. Let's call the entity you
have thus specified Eric01. Our point of difference seems to be
this: You believe that when Eric01 says I, he is referring
On Tuesday, November 4, 2003, at 10:47 AM, Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
Let me stress this point: *I am, for all practical purposes,
one and only one specific configuration of atoms in a
specific universe. I could never say that ' I ' is ALL the
copies, since I NEVER experience what the other copies
But I guess the problems in this discussion is the lack of precise
definition of the terms and of the philosophical framework.
This is where I most often feel like speaking up on this amazing list.
I don't have enough math to really understand things like the Speed
Prior, etc., but I do think
I have a feeling some of these points of view are not falsifiable (and
therefore somewhat meaningless). An individual that is about to
experience a QM immortality episode can't perform additional experiments
to answer (philosophical) questions about his identity. The only
observable is the
Not much, because of the effect of decoherence.
David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
I have a feeling some of these points of view are not falsifiable (and
therefore somewhat meaningless). An individual that is about to
experience a QM immortality episode can't perform additional experiments
to
This issue was canvassed under the name no cul-de-sac conjecture in
the list. Bruno claims to have proved this conjecture in his modal
world logic. I tried to do this using a more conventional formulation
of QM - it seemed to be related to unitarity of quantum processes -
but I have to say I
Hi,
Sorry for the late reply to this:
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can assume anything you like!
Seriously, we have had extensive and occasionally acrimonious debates
on this topic in the past, without much success or resolution. I think
that we have no good foundation
, 2003 9:47 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor
Hi,
Sorry for the late reply to this:
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can assume anything you like!
Seriously, we have had extensive and occasionally acrimonious debates
on this topic in the past, without much success
consistent with ''normal'' physics.
Saibal
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Verzonden: Sunday, November 02, 2003 05:45 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Quantum accident survivor
I disagree. You can only get
be discussed. Why?
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, November 03, 2003 7:27 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor
I have always found the RSSA rather strange. From
Not dualism per se - I'm sure Bruno would argue that he doesn't need
the hypothesis of a concrete universe with physial bodies in it.
However, I think you are correct in suggesting it does depend on an
independence of substrate, which is what Bruno means by COMP -
survivability of first person
Stephen Paul King, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes:
My problem is that COMP requires the existence of an infinite
computational system that is immune from the laws of thermodynamics. That
makes it HIGHLY suspect in my book.
First, I'm not sure that Bruno's COMP hypothesis (which is basically
Dear Hal,
Interleaving.
- Original Message -
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, November 03, 2003 9:10 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor
Stephen Paul King, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes:
My problem is that COMP requires the existence
At 09:05 31/10/03 -0800, Eric Hawthorne wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then I would like to underline some basic considerations. A universe where
the only weird thing is the fact to obtain number 6 any time you throw a
die doesn't violate any extremely possibility-constraining constraints.
A
There have been many replies to this. I would say that you wouldn't expect
to survive such accidents.
Assume that we are sampled from a probability distribution over a set of
possible states. E.g. in eternal inflation theories all possible quantum
states the observable universe can be in are all
get fucked
I disagree. You can only get an effect like this if the RSSA is
invalid. You've been on this list long enough to remember the big
debates about RSSA vs ASSA. I believe the ASSA is actually contrary to
experience - but never mind - in order to get the effect you want you
would need an SSA that is
David wrote:
Furthermore if I witness a crash where someone dies can I assume that
the victim will survive in their own world so far as at least one
quantum branch of survivability seems possible?
David Kwinter
In case, after the crash, there is somebody who is really dying
(and who does
- Measure on the dying subject, at the 'right' moment, that is to
say when he is 'really' dying, the projection operator on the state
'psi';
Of course this state 'psi' would be a superposition of the kind
1/sqrt2 (|live + |dead)
or, better,
1/sqrt2 (|live + exp(i phase)|dead)
Hello Hal,
Hal Finney wrote:
You can indeed choose to believe that as long as any version of yourself
continues in any universe, then you will consider yourself to still
be alive. You could also choose the contrary, that if the total measure
(ie. probability) of your survival is extremely
Hi Benjamin,
Benjamin Udell wrote:
Assume I survive a car/plane crash which we assume could have many different quantum outcomes including me (dead || alive)
Since I was the same person (entire life history) up until the crash/quantum 'branch' - then can't I assume that since there was at least
Yes, this is Quantum Immortality in a nutshell. If the MWI is
correct, it is impossible to die from a subjective point of view.
Hooray!
Yes but there can be no communication from one possible world to another
(thus no cross-world awareness), because, think
about it, if I could communicate
You are quite right in one point, Hal: ...probably a lot of
things!. But you should have written: Certainly
a lot of things, each one with high probability. If you pick
photons rather than, say, flying massive debris, you should
in all honesty, include photons along all the spectrum
including,
OK, what about heat? Heat fills low pressure areas uniformly so there
could be no bubble of non-vaporizing heat for the scientist to live
in. Isn't the heat an absolute killer?
On Friday, October 31, 2003, at 10:55 AM, Hal Finney wrote:
David Kwinter writes:
The concept of what makes a real
Joao Leao, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes:
You are quite right in one point, Hal: ...probably a lot of
things!. But you should have written: Certainly
a lot of things, each one with high probability. If you pick
photons rather than, say, flying massive debris, you should
in all honesty, include
Hello David,
David Kwinter wrote:
Another quickie:
Assume I survive a car/plane crash which we assume could have many
different quantum outcomes including me (dead || alive)
Since I was the same person (entire life history) up until the
crash/quantum 'branch' - then can't I assume that since
David Kwinter, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes:
Assume I survive a car/plane crash which we assume could have many
different quantum outcomes including me (dead || alive)
Since I was the same person (entire life history) up until the
crash/quantum 'branch' - then can't I assume that since there
Hi there,
Hal, one nitpick about your comments:
In the case of Quantum Immortality, I don't think it's a matter of taste, or
interpretation. It is a theory that every one of us can and ultimately will
test. Granted, we will only be aware of a positive result, but,
nevertheless...
cheers,
On Thursday, October 30, 2003, at 08:11 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Assume I survive a car/plane crash which we assume could have many
different quantum outcomes including me (dead || alive)
Since I was the same person (entire life history) up until the
crash/quantum 'branch' - then can't I
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