Colin Hales writes:
the fact that
intelligent behaviour is third person observable but consciousness is
not.
Stathis Papaioannou
OK. Let me get this straight. Scientist A stares at something, say X,
with consciousness. A sees X. Scientist A posits evidence of X from a
third
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it up,
tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
then maybe it is just
Colin, list,
I've looked back over your previous posts. It seems like scientists (I'm not
one) talk about consciousness in two different senses, in two different roles
-- consciousness for clear and sure apprehension of logic evidence, and
consciousness as a phenomenon, an appearance. It's
Colin Hales wrote:
Most of the time I'm observing something else. When I try to observe
consciouness, I
find I am instead thinking of this or that particular thing, and not
consciousness
itself. Consciousness can only be consciousness *of* something.
Got that?
Brent Meeker
Absolutely.
(a) I know I'm conscious
(b) I know that you are intelligent, unless my senses are tricking me
(c) I assume that you are conscious but I don't know this, even if I can
be sure
my senses are not tricking me, in the same way as I know (a) and (b).
To give another example, we know that many
culture and discipline blindness.
Is seeing visible? What does it look like?
Brent Meeker
Seeing.
Keep trying...you'll 'see it' It'll sink in eventually! It took a long
time for me and I'm nowhere near as bright as all you folks.
Colin Hales
Colin, list,
huge snip
But, past a certain point, going over all these generalities stops
advancing the point and makes me sound fuddy-duddy. It sounds like you
have some further, and more-specific, ideas, which are the real energy
source behind your argument.
Best, Ben Udell
Wow! Can
Russell Standish writes:
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true
random
number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the
former
could possibly be
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Russell Standish):
This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to
avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why
wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying
to exploit randomness?
In
Brent Meeker writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
just a working
assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
that if we dig into
quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial there at all, but solid
Le 25-août-06, à 02:31, 1Z a écrit :
Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.
It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put
explicitly actual infinite in the bare substrate, an then attach your
mind to it (how?).
If it
were impossible to attach
Le 25-août-06, à 10:09, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
You would if it were the non-miraculous branches that were selectively
pruned, although I guess that it is just this sort of pruning people
would
be asking of God (you would hardly need to pray that your coffee remain
coffee).
John,
Interesting, but from the point of view of the interview, this would be
cheating. If such sophisticated form of comp is justified, then by the
UDA reasoning, it has to be justified by the lobian machine. If it is
the case that such move is proposed by the lobian machine, I will let
you
Le 25-août-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
of the UD.
It is you who come up with a notion of real existence. You are reifying
I don't know which theory.
AR as a
Le 26-août-06, à 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Peter Jones writes:
That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
have to believe any old programme is conscious.
It might be the case that only an indeterministic
one will do. A deterministic programme could
be exposed as a programme
Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit :
And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily
complex way, because any physical
system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate
mapping rules,
That is not a fact.
It would make sense, indeed, only if the map
Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :
I understand Peters objection to regarding a mere bundle of
properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a
propertyless
substrate. Why not just say that some bundles of properties are
instantiated and
some aren't.
I
Le 26-août-06, à 17:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
A non-computationalist will believe that the Multiverse contains
conscious processes (if they believe in a Multiverse at all). However,
they may disagree that the Multiverse is Turing emulable.
No. A computaionalist has no reason to
I have the feeling that we are discussing words. Everybody tries how to
'make sense' of them, in a personal taste.
Colin expressed it in his usual sophisticated ways, Ben more
comprehensively, in many more words. The fact is: we observe the observer
(ourselves) and want to describe it to others.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 25-août-06, à 02:31, 1Z a écrit :
Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.
It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put
explicitly actual infinite in the bare substrate,
I don't see why.
an then attach your
mind to it
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a
true random
number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
a) The belief in a fictional 'objective view'. This is a view that is
never had by anyone.
I don't think the view metaphior is very helpful.
There are more or less objective beliefs. What is
subjective about 2+2=4 ?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it
up,
tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
then maybe
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
just a working
assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
that if we dig into
quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 25-août-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
of the UD.
It is you who come up with a notion of real existence.
I am starting with the reality my
Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Aug 25, 2006 at 04:48:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The UD is
quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of
where
Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious
processes.
Of course a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Come on, I have already insist on this. Understanding what really means
surviving through the yes doctor = understanding that, in *that*
case, we survive without doctor.
Without the doctor is computationalism+Platonism, not
computationalism.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Russell Standish):
This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to
avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why
wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying
to exploit
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
just a working
assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out that
if we dig into
quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial there at
- Original Message -
From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 12:14 PM
Subject: Re: evidence blindness
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
a) The belief in a fictional 'objective view'. This is a view that is
never
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Brent Meeker everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 7:52 AM
Subject: RE: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has
1Z wrote:
AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
of the UD.
It is you who come up with a notion of real existence.
I am starting with the reality my own existence.
That is an *empirical*
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
- Original Message -
From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 12:14 PM
Subject: Re: evidence blindness
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
a) The belief in a fictional 'objective
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
We all (excuse me to use 1st pers form) are well educated smart people and
can say something upon everything. It is a rarity to read:
I was wrong you are right - period.
John
You're right! Every time I post on these topics I *know* I'm wrong: I
just don't know how
On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious is
assumed to be
preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could have acted
differently even with
identical environmental inputs, which is
Hi Folks,
I have been reading Bruno's wonderful Elsavier paper and have been
wondering about this notion of a Uncertainty measure. Does not the
existence of such a measure demand the existence of a breaking of the
perfect symmetry that is obvious in a situation when all possible outcomes
Bruno Marchal writes:
Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a
true random
number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only
the former
could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possible, but I see no
reason to believe
that it
Bruno marchal writes:
Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit :
And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily
complex way, because any physical
system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate
mapping rules,
That is not a fact.
It would
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