On Feb 10, 4:06 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 9, 9:49 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
The problems with
On 2/10/2012 7:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 10, 4:06 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On 2/10/2012 7:49 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/2/10 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
mailto:stephe...@charter.net
On 2/10/2012 7:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 10, 4:06 am,
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
[SPK]
We must consider the entire range of possible observers and
technological abilities. We cannot limit ourselves to humans with their
current technological abilities. Therefore we cannot put a pre-set limit
on the upper bound. I agree that the machine must be
On 10 Feb 2012, at 13:47, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/10/2012 7:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 10, 4:06 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 9, 9:49 am, Quentin Anciaux
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
[SPK]
I do not see how this deals effectively with the concurrency problem!
:-( Using the Platonia idea is a cheat as it is explicitly unphysical.
But physics by itself does not explain consciousness either (as shown
by MGA). Maybe I just don't see what the
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
Another way to think of it would be in the terms of the Church Turing
Thesis, where you expect that a computation (in the Turing sense) to
have result and that result is independent of all your
implementations, such a result not being changeable in any way or by
On 2/10/2012 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2012, at 13:47, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/10/2012 7:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 10, 4:06 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
On 10 February 2012 14:08, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
No. Craig can be considered to be exploring the implications of
Chalmer's claim that consciousness is a fundamental property of the
physical, like mass, spin and charge, i.e. it is not emergent from matter.
His concept of
On 2/10/2012 9:24 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 February 2012 14:08, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
No. Craig can be considered to be exploring the implications of
Chalmer's claim that consciousness is a fundamental property of the
physical, like mass, spin and charge, i.e. it is
On Feb 10, 7:25 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.
Does putting a billion gears and levers together in an arrangement
2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 10, 7:25 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.
Does putting a
On Feb 10, 8:17 am, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
Hi,
How would your reasoning work for a virus? Is it alive? I
think that the notion of being alive is not a property of the
parts but of the whole.
Is it a question directed to craig or to me ?
Hi,
On Feb 10, 9:08 am, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
No. Craig can be considered to be exploring the implications of
Chalmer's claim that consciousness is a fundamental property of the
physical, like mass, spin and charge, i.e. it is not emergent from
matter. His concept of
On 2/10/2012 5:26 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Now we can
quibble about this and discuss how in Special Relativistic situations we
can indeed have situations there X caused Y is true for some frames of
reference and Y caused X for some other frame of reference, but this
dilemma can be resolved by
On 2/10/2012 12:51 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/10/2012 5:26 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Now we can
quibble about this and discuss how in Special Relativistic situations we
can indeed have situations there X caused Y is true for some frames of
reference and Y caused X for some other frame of
On 09.02.2012 00:44 1Z said the following:
On Feb 7, 7:04 pm, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru wrote:
Let us take a closed vessel with oxygen and hydrogen at room
temperature. Then we open a platinum catalyst in the vessel and
the reaction starts. Will then the information in the vessel be
On 08.02.2012 22:44 Russell Standish said the following:
On Wed, Feb 08, 2012 at 08:32:16PM +0100, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
What I observe personally is that there is information in
informatics and information in physics (if we say that the
thermodynamic entropy is the information). If you
On Thu, Feb 9, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
The rule book is the memory.
Yes but the rule book not only contains a astronomically large database it
also contains a super ingenious artificial intelligence program; without
those things the little man is like a naked
On 09.02.2012 07:49 meekerdb said the following:
...
There's an interesting paper by Bennett that I ran across, which
discusses the relation of Shannon entropy, thermodynamic entropy, and
algorithmic entropy in the context of DNA and RNA replication:
On Feb 10, 4:06 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Why simulated neurons couldn't have opinions at that same point ?
Vitalism ?
Yes, the only way Craig could be right is if vitalism is true, and its
pretty sad that well into the 21'st century some still believe in that
crap. What's
On Feb 10, 4:16 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Feb 10, 4:06 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Why simulated neurons couldn't have opinions at that same point ?
Vitalism ?
Yes, the only way Craig could be right is if vitalism is true, and its
pretty sad that well
On 2/10/2012 8:24 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 10, 4:16 pm, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Feb 10, 4:06 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com wrote:
Why simulated neurons couldn't have opinions at that same point ?
Vitalism ?
Yes, the only way Craig could be right is if
Dennett's Comp:
Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is an illusion
Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally
My view:
Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality
which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic
nestings.
Machine
On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 at 09:39:50PM +0100, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Let me ask you the same question that I have recently asked Brent.
Could you please tell me, the thermodynamic entropy of what is
discussed in Jason's example below?
Evgenii
If you're asking what is the conversion constant
On Feb 10, 3:52 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Feb 9, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
The rule book is the memory.
Yes but the rule book not only contains a astronomically large database it
also contains a super ingenious artificial intelligence program;
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
I think the idea of Platonia is closer to the fact that if a sentence
has a truth-value, it will have that truth value, regardless if you
know it or not.
Sure, but it is not just you to whom a given sentence may have the
same
exact truth value. This is like
Hi ACW,
Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!!
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion),
that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However,
let's try and see why that is and why someone would take
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