Re: Emulation and Stuff
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer : >> > >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a >> > >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The >> > >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that >> > >> *any* human concept is *eliminable* >> > >> > > No, reducible, not eliminable. That is an important distinction. >> > >> > Not in this instance. The whole thrust of the paraphrase argument is >> > precisely to show - in principle at least - that the reduced concept >> > can be *eliminated* from the explanation. You can do this with >> > 'life', so you should be prepared to do it with 'computation'. >> >> Showing that a word can be removed from a verbal formulation >> by substitution with s synonym is not *ontological* elimination. > > Of course it is--*according to the Quinean definition of ontology*. The > strange thing about your mode of argument is that you talk as though a word > like "existence" has some single true correct meaning, and that anyone who > uses it differently is just wrong--do you disagree with the basic premise > that the meaning of words is defined solely by usage and/or definitions? If > so, do you agree that there are in fact different ways this word is defined > by real people, even if we restrict our attention to the philosophical > community? > Provided you agree with that, your posts would be a lot less confusing if > you would distinguish between different definitions and state which one you > meant at a given time--for example, one might say "I agree numbers have > Quinean existence but I think they lack material existence, or > existence in the sense that intelligent beings that appear in mathematical > universes are actually conscious beings > with their own qualia". We might call these three notions of existence > Q-existence, M-existence and C-existence for short. My argument with you has > been that even if one wishes to postulate a single universe, M-existence is > an unnecessary middleman and doesn't even seem well-defined, all we need to > do is postulate that out of all the mathematically possible universes that > have Q-existence, only one has C-existence. So someone else noticed Peter dodging the consequences of what he originally claimed with respect to Quinean paraphrase! Thanks. David > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote: > > Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process at > all. I don't see any evidence for that I am explaining this right now. > Only Bruno thinks computation trancends matter. The notion of computation and computability have been discovered by Mathematicians working around the foundation crisis of math after the discovery by Cantor and others of paradoxes in set theory. The idea is that computation should be redefined as physical computation is a very recent one, and is due to people like David Deustch and Landauer. And it does not really work as such. Deutsch "reconstruction" of the Post-Church-Turing thesis is really a different thesis. > > CTM *implies* materialism, and the MGA doesn't work. CTM is neutral on materialism, even if many materialist use incorrectly comp to put the mind body problem under the rug. UDA, including MGA, shows why this fails. What is in MGA which does not work? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
2009/8/19 Flammarion : > > > > On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman wrote: > >> It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it >> is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language >> - then this demands that it be *capable* of prior justification by >> rigorous spelling out in physical terms for every conceptual >> reduction. MGA claims to show that this is impossible for the >> conjunction of CTM and PM. Of course, CTM on the basis of >> arithmetical realism is not spelled out either, but is immunised from >> physical paraphrase by making no appeal to PM for justification. > > Err. yeah. The hard part is reducing mentation to computation. > The physical paraphrase of computation is just engineering, > >> I understand both your discomfort with arithmetical realism and your >> defence of PM, but this discussion hinges on "CTM +PM = true". >> Couldn't we try to focus on the validity or otherwise of this claim? > > OK. It's invalid because you can't have computaiton with zero phyiscal > activity. But that is **precisely** the conclusion of the reductio that MGA proposes. MGA claims precisely that - as you say - since it is implausible to justify the ascription of computation to zero physical activity, if you still want to claim that there is computation 'going on', then it can't be attached to physical activity. Are you questioning that MGA constitutes a valid instantiation of a physical TM? What about Olympia? David > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
2009/8/19 Flammarion : >> >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a >> >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The >> >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that >> >> *any* human concept is *eliminable* >> >> > No, reducible, not eliminable. That is an important distinction. >> >> Not in this instance. The whole thrust of the paraphrase argument is >> precisely to show - in principle at least - that the reduced concept >> can be *eliminated* from the explanation. You can do this with >> 'life', so you should be prepared to do it with 'computation'. > > Showing that a word can be removed from a verbal formulation > by substitution with s synonym is not *ontological* elimination. > Substituting H2O for water does not show that water is non-existent, > just that > is is non-fundamental. Please make your mind up. Do you agree with the Quinean approach, as you said you did, or not? If you do, please stop dodging its clear consequences. > >> >> (my original point) after such >> >> reduction to primary physical processes. So why should 'computation' >> >> escape this fate? How would you respond if I said the brain is >> >> conscious because it is 'alive'? Would 'life' elude the paraphrased >> >> reduction to physical process? >> >> > I don't see your point. Either claim may or may not be true >> > and may or may not be paraphraseable. >> >> My point is that claiming - *a priori* - that 'life' caused >> consciousness would shed as little light as saying that computation >> did so. > > I don't think anyone is doing that. For one thing, there is quite > a body of research on computationalism. For another, it is being > discussed as a hypothesis, which is different from assuming its > truth. Yes, but it's not being researched in terms of any underlying physical processes. So it can't be making any coherent claims about physical causation, which would be the only justification open to it per Quine. So what precisely - as a 'physical' hypothesis - is it saying? >> In either case, a successful paraphrase must be capable of >> pointing out precisely *which* specific physical entities - in >> precisely *what* relation - to precisely *which* other specific >> physical entities - are deemed responsible for the paraphrased concept >> in any specific case. I freely concede that - *if* it turned out a >> posteriori that a reduced physical theory capable of explicitly >> attaching specific mental descriptions to specific physical processes >> could be shown, in all cases FAPP, to be equivalent to some explicitly >> specifiable program interpreted purely in terms of functional >> relations of its physical instantiation - I would indeed be impressed. >> But this would be a world away from a brute a priori assumption. >> IOW, the justification for any paraphrased concept is posterior, not >> prior. > > Err...yeah. I'm not particularly commited to the CTM as a categorical > truth. > I just don't think it has the implications Bruno thinks. Do you believe that CTM is a coherent hypothesis on the assumption of PM? > >> In the context of the foregoing, MGA makes a direct attack on "CTM + >> PM = true" via reductio: i.e. by demonstrating at least one class of >> physical reduction of a computation where any physical attachment >> theory must evaporate. To emphasise: it isn't per se an attack on PM, >> only on the a priori conjunction of PM and CTM. At what step do you >> say it is invalid? > > Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process at > all. I don't see any evidence for that > >> >> BTW, let's be clear: I'm not saying that physicalism is false >> >> (although IMO it is at least incomplete). I'm merely pointing out one >> >> of its consequences. >> >> > Which is what? >> >> That PM theory isn't justified in making an a priori claim to a >> 'computational' theory of mind, > > No-one has maintained that CTM is an implication > of PM > >>or indeed *any* a priori claim to >> organising principles transcending > > Only Bruno thinks computation trancends matter. > >>the underlying physical processes. >> All conceptual overlays in this context must be, and indeed - with the >> outstanding exception of CTM - in practice always are, accepted as >> requiring justification a posteriori. > > Have you read *any* of the literature on the CTM? Please recall that we're discussing the implications of the Quinean reductive paraphrase approach you said you agreed with. In this context, a posteriori implies that - once something has been explicated exclusively in terms of underlying physical processes - it can be thereafter subsumed under some category - such as 'life' - that then serves effectively as a shorthand reference to the physical processes themselves. I've never seen any attempt to justify the hypothesis that there is an identifiable class of physical processes which 1) plausibly account for consciousness
Re: Emulation and Stuff
2009/8/19 Bruno Marchal : >> 1) What motivates the assumption of different theoretical postulates >> of primitiveness, contingency and necessity? > > Is that question really important? It is a bit a private question. > Typical motivation for comp, are that it is very plausible under a > large spectrum of consideration, and it leads naturally to the use of > Computer science, which is full of interesting result which put light > on those question. In the process you try to find the faithful > representations to reason correct at the relevant level of your inquiry. > The advantage of comp is that you can get a lot, without theoretical > assumptions (other that yes doctor and some high school math, and then > Church thesis, virtually accepted by everybody, curiously enough) I don't know if the question is important, but it interests me. It's kind of you to answer, though as I said I didn't expect one here and now. > 2) How do explanations of physical and mental phenomena diverge on the >> basis of these different assumptions? > > Hmm... It depends of the future. If UDA leads to a refutation of > comp, it will lead to non computationalist theory of mind, perhaps > coherent with physicalism (I don't know, I doubt this actually). If > UDA leads to a empirically correct physics, it will leads to > Pythagorean second birth and probably the slow, or not so slow, > explorations of the matrix. I dunno. > >> 3) What kind of non-computational theories of mind might be viable, >> assuming "CTM + PM = false"? > > It is a bit vexing that you assume the result of a an argument! You > are assuming UDA is valid. Thanks! Perhaps I phrased this ambiguously. I meant: if one *assumes* (does this word carry some additional meaning beyond the hypothetical in French?) that CTM + PM is indeed false, but one is also prepared to relinquish CTM, what other theories of mind might be available? I'm sorry if this question vexes you ;-) > UDA shows that CTM + PM -> false. Equivalently, it shows this: CTM -> > not PM, or this: PM -> ~CTM. > > Non computational theory of mind? There are three kinds. But it needs > even more mathematical logic. Sorry. > 1) Those for which AUDA still works completely and soundly, at the > propositional level. Most self-referentially correct "angels", that is > non turing emulable entities still obeys to the AUDA hypostases. > 2) Those for which AUDA remains sound, but no more complete, but that > you can effectively complete (example: true in all transitive models > of ZF). G and G* are still sound for such a "divine" entity, but no > more complete. You have to add a formula to characterize them. > 3) Those for which AUDA could apply soundly, but can no more be > completed. > 4) Those for which AUDA does no more apply at all. I suspect they are > very "near" the "0-person" ONE itself, but the math are hard, if not > collapsing actually. > >> 4) And my original question: does the notion of "emulation = >> substitution" have any force outside CTM? > > I have too many interpretations for "emulation = substitution". I am > not sure what you refer to. I refer to the next sentence. Patience! > >> IOW if I believe I'm made >> of primitive matter, what does this imply in terms of evaluating >> proposals from the doctor? > > If the doctor proposes a digital machine, and you accept, it means you > will either become zombie, or a non working zombie, or a dead person. > If he propose a non digital machine coherent with your non comp theory > of mind, it will be OK, but such theory have not yet been proposed in > any rationalist frame. Except in a sense Roger Penrose, and precursors > (the QM-Copenhagen). > > >> >> and so forth. >> >> Anyway, it would be nice to get past an impasse which has plagued the >> discussions interminably whilst continually failing to be resolved. > > If Peter is really interested in the subject he could search for the > point where he has trouble in the UDA. But he seems to defend PM and > CTM a priori, so we can't help. He want believe that the problem is in > step 0, where I would assume Platonism at the start. But he is > ambiguous about what he means by Platonism. In some post it means > Arithmetical Realism (the banal believe that classical logic can be > applied to the number realm), and in some post it means the falsity of > CTM+PM, like if I was assuming at the start that only numbers exists. > UDA would loss its main purpose! > > I have met other similar person. They believe so much in CTM+PM that > they does not take the time to study the argument that PM+CTM is > false. (well "is false OR eliminate consciousness and the person": it > *is* an epistemological contradiction). > > Too bad for them. OK? The rationalist loves to search errors and > criticize reasoning. I have decompose the reasoning in step to provide > helps, but dogmatic person seems not to take the opportunity. I guess > CTM+PM is a sort of "religious" dogma, for them. > > And they are never clear on P
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:59, Flammarion wrote: > > > > On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>> On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman wrote: >> Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are compatible). Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form - seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic currently generating so much heat. UDA-8 sets out to be provable or disprovable on purely logical grounds. >> I for one am unclear on what basis it could be attacked as invalid. Can anyone show strong grounds for this? >> >>> Of course, no argument can validly come to a metaphysical >>> conclusion-- >>> in this >>> case, that matter does not exist --without making a single >>> metaphysical assumption. >> >> I completely agree with that point, but I don't see the relevance. >> Comp, alias CTM, > > CTM does not have Platonism tacked on as a sub-hypothesis > > Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical Computationalism, or just > comp, is the conjunction of the following three sub-hypotheses: > > 1) The yes doctor hypothesis: It is the assumption, in cognitive > science, that it exists a level of description of my parts (whatever I > consider myself to be[2]) such that I would not be aware of any > experiential change in the case where a functionally correct digital > substitution is done of my parts at that level. We call that level the > substitution level. More simply said it is the act of faith of those > willing to say yes to their doctor for an artificial brain or an > artificial body graft made from some description at some level. We > will see such a level is unknowable. Note that some amount of folk or > �grand-mother psychology� has been implicitly used under the > granting > of the notion of (self) awareness[3]. > > 2) Church Thesis. A modern version is that all digital universal > machines are equivalent with respect to the class of functions (from > the natural numbers to the natural numbers) they can compute[4]. It > can be shown that this entails such machines compute the same > functions, but also they can compute them in similar ways, i.e. > following similar algorithm. So, the thesis says, making abstraction > of computation time, all digital universal machine can simulate each > other exactly (I will say emulate each other). > > 3) Arithmetical Realism (AR). This is the assumption that > arithmetical proposition, like �1+1=2,� or Goldbach conjecture, > or the > inexistence of a bigger prime, or the statement that some digital > machine will stop, or any Boolean formula bearing on numbers, are true > independently of me, you, humanity, the physical universe (if that > exists), etc. It is a version of Platonism limited at least to > arithmetical truth. It should not be confused with the much stronger > Pythagorean form of AR, AR+, which asserts that only natural numbers > exist together with their nameable relations: all the rest being > derivative from those relations. Thanks for quoting my sane2004 definition of comp, and showing that indeed platonism is not part of it. Just arithmetical realism without which CT has no meaning at all. This should be made clear in the seventh step series thread. You told us that you are OK with AR some post ago, but now I have no more clue at all about what do you assume or not. Get the feeling you have change your mind on AR. You believe that a proposition like the statement that there is no biggest prime number has something to do with physics. In which physical theory you prove that statement, and how? Actually the most you go deep in fundamental physics, the more you need deep results in number theory. The most amazing example is the evaluation of the mass of the photon in string theory. You get that the mass of the photon is given by two terms. The first one can be evaluated into -1/12, the second one get evaluated into 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+ ... Again an infinity, but lucklily enough number theorist knew that on the complex plane there is a sense to say, like Ramanujan found by himself in India, that the infinite sum 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+ ... is actually equal to -1/12, which gives zero for the mass of the photon, as expected. 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+ ... is zeta(-1) which analytical definition is defined on -1 and equal to -1/12. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to thi
Re: Emulation and Stuff
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer : >> >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a >> >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The >> >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that >> >> *any* human concept is *eliminable* >> > >> > No, reducible, not eliminable. That is an important distinction. >> >> Not in this instance. The whole thrust of the paraphrase argument is >> precisely to show - in principle at least - that the reduced concept >> can be *eliminated* from the explanation. You can do this with >> 'life', so you should be prepared to do it with 'computation'. > Well, not if you believe there are objective truths about computations that > are never actually carried out in the physical world, like whether some > program with an input string a googolplex digits long ever halts or not. Yes, but here - in connection with Peter's apparent support for the Quinean concept-reduction argument - I was specifically commenting on the status of 'computation' **if** you assume primitive matter. In that case, I'm not sure what "never actually carried out in the physical world" would mean. David > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The seven step series
On 19 Aug 2009, at 23:03, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 19, 2009 at 12:12 PM, Bruno Marchal > wrote: >> >> Hi, >> >> Just a reminder, for me, and perhaps some training for you. In >> preparation to the mathematical discovery of the universal machine. >> >> exercises: > ... >> >> >> 4) Be sure that you have been convinced by Brent that there is a >> bijection between N and NxN, and between N and NxNxN, and etc. That >> is >> be sure there is a bijection between N and N^m for each N. > > Don't you mean "for each m"? Yes. Sorry. I type too much quickly. I made other mistakes of that type. Hope you can see them and make the correction. In case of doubt ask, like Brent. Some people seems afraid asking questions, please, do. Nobody judge you. We have different baggages. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The seven step series
On Wed, Aug 19, 2009 at 12:12 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Hi, > > Just a reminder, for me, and perhaps some training for you. In > preparation to the mathematical discovery of the universal machine. > > exercises: ... > > > 4) Be sure that you have been convinced by Brent that there is a > bijection between N and NxN, and between N and NxNxN, and etc. That is > be sure there is a bijection between N and N^m for each N. Don't you mean "for each m"? Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug 2009, at 19:23, David Nyman wrote: > > On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> I am sorry Peter, but CTM + PM just does not work, and it is a good >> news, because if we keep CTM, we get a sort of super generalization >> of >> Darwin idea that things evolve. > > We still don't have a definite response from Peter as to whether "CTM > + PM = true" is central to his argument. I am not sure I understand. Peter seems to defend, like many both CTM and PM. So he assumes, without showing, there is an error in UDA, which is a proof that CTM + PM is epistemologically inconsistent. > On the basis of some of the > things he's said in reply to me recently, I think it may not be. If > we could resolve this key point, perhaps it would cast fresh light on > some of the issues thrown up e.g. (BTW I'm not expecting answers to > these questions here and now): > > 1) What motivates the assumption of different theoretical postulates > of primitiveness, contingency and necessity? Is that question really important? It is a bit a private question. Typical motivation for comp, are that it is very plausible under a large spectrum of consideration, and it leads naturally to the use of Computer science, which is full of interesting result which put light on those question. In the process you try to find the faithful representations to reason correct at the relevant level of your inquiry. The advantage of comp is that you can get a lot, without theoretical assumptions (other that yes doctor and some high school math, and then Church thesis, virtually accepted by everybody, curiously enough) > 2) How do explanations of physical and mental phenomena diverge on the > basis of these different assumptions? Hmm... It depends of the future. If UDA leads to a refutation of comp, it will lead to non computationalist theory of mind, perhaps coherent with physicalism (I don't know, I doubt this actually). If UDA leads to a empirically correct physics, it will leads to Pythagorean second birth and probably the slow, or not so slow, explorations of the matrix. I dunno. > 3) What kind of non-computational theories of mind might be viable, > assuming "CTM + PM = false"? It is a bit vexing that you assume the result of a an argument! You are assuming UDA is valid. Thanks! UDA shows that CTM + PM -> false. Equivalently, it shows this: CTM -> not PM, or this: PM -> ~CTM. Non computational theory of mind? There are three kinds. But it needs even more mathematical logic. Sorry. 1) Those for which AUDA still works completely and soundly, at the propositional level. Most self-referentially correct "angels", that is non turing emulable entities still obeys to the AUDA hypostases. 2) Those for which AUDA remains sound, but no more complete, but that you can effectively complete (example: true in all transitive models of ZF). G and G* are still sound for such a "divine" entity, but no more complete. You have to add a formula to characterize them. 3) Those for which AUDA could apply soundly, but can no more be completed. 4) Those for which AUDA does no more apply at all. I suspect they are very "near" the "0-person" ONE itself, but the math are hard, if not collapsing actually. > 4) And my original question: does the notion of "emulation = > substitution" have any force outside CTM? I have too many interpretations for "emulation = substitution". I am not sure what you refer to. > IOW if I believe I'm made > of primitive matter, what does this imply in terms of evaluating > proposals from the doctor? If the doctor proposes a digital machine, and you accept, it means you will either become zombie, or a non working zombie, or a dead person. If he propose a non digital machine coherent with your non comp theory of mind, it will be OK, but such theory have not yet been proposed in any rationalist frame. Except in a sense Roger Penrose, and precursors (the QM-Copenhagen). > > and so forth. > > Anyway, it would be nice to get past an impasse which has plagued the > discussions interminably whilst continually failing to be resolved. If Peter is really interested in the subject he could search for the point where he has trouble in the UDA. But he seems to defend PM and CTM a priori, so we can't help. He want believe that the problem is in step 0, where I would assume Platonism at the start. But he is ambiguous about what he means by Platonism. In some post it means Arithmetical Realism (the banal believe that classical logic can be applied to the number realm), and in some post it means the falsity of CTM+PM, like if I was assuming at the start that only numbers exists. UDA would loss its main purpose! I have met other similar person. They believe so much in CTM+PM that they does not take the time to study the argument that PM+CTM is false. (well "is false OR eliminate consciousness and the person": it *is* an epistemological c
RE: Emulation and Stuff
> Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700 > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > > > > On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman wrote: > > 009/8/19 Flammarion : > > > > >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a > > >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The > > >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that > > >> *any* human concept is *eliminable* > > > > > No, reducible, not eliminable. That is an important distinction. > > > > Not in this instance. The whole thrust of the paraphrase argument is > > precisely to show - in principle at least - that the reduced concept > > can be *eliminated* from the explanation. You can do this with > > 'life', so you should be prepared to do it with 'computation'. > > Showing that a word can be removed from a verbal formulation > by substitution with s synonym is not *ontological* elimination. Of course it is--*according to the Quinean definition of ontology*. The strange thing about your mode of argument is that you talk as though a word like "existence" has some single true correct meaning, and that anyone who uses it differently is just wrong--do you disagree with the basic premise that the meaning of words is defined solely by usage and/or definitions? If so, do you agree that there are in fact different ways this word is defined by real people, even if we restrict our attention to the philosophical community? Provided you agree with that, your posts would be a lot less confusing if you would distinguish between different definitions and state which one you meant at a given time--for example, one might say "I agree numbers have Quinean existence but I think they lack material existence, or existence in the sense that intelligent beings that appear in mathematical universes are actually conscious beings with their own qualia". We might call these three notions of existence Q-existence, M-existence and C-existence for short. My argument with you has been that even if one wishes to postulate a single universe, M-existence is an unnecessary middleman and doesn't even seem well-defined, all we need to do is postulate that out of all the mathematically possible universes that have Q-existence, only one has C-existence. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Emulation and Stuff
Seems like this post didn't go through, so I'll resend it: > Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700 > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > > > > On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman wrote: > > 009/8/19 Flammarion : > > > > >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a > > >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The > > >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that > > >> *any* human concept is *eliminable* > > > > > No, reducible, not eliminable. That is an important distinction. > > > > Not in this instance. The whole thrust of the paraphrase argument is > > precisely to show - in principle at least - that the reduced concept > > can be *eliminated* from the explanation. You can do this with > > 'life', so you should be prepared to do it with 'computation'. > > Showing that a word can be removed from a verbal formulation > by substitution with s synonym is not *ontological* elimination. Of course it is--*according to the Quinean definition of ontology*. The strange thing about your mode of argument is that you talk as though a word like "existence" has some single true correct meaning, and that anyone who uses it differently is just wrong--do you disagree with the basic premise that the meaning of words is defined solely by usage and/or definitions? If so, do you agree that there are in fact different ways the word "existence" is defined by real people, even if we restrict our attention to the philosophical community? Provided you agree with that, your posts would be a lot less confusing if you would distinguish between different definitions and state which one you meant at a given time--for example, one might say "I agree numbers have Quinean existence but I think they lack material existence, or existence in the sense that intelligent beings that appear in mathematical universes are actually conscious beings with their own qualia". We might call these three notions of existence Q-existence, M-existence and C-existence for short. My argument with you has been that even if one wishes to postulate a single universe, M-existence is an unnecessary middleman and doesn't even seem well-defined, all we need to do is postulate that out of all the mathematically possible universes that have Q-existence, only one has C-existence. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug, 13:48, David Nyman wrote: > On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion wrote: > > > > > > Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM > > > and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also > > > argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think > > > is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are > > > compatible). Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form - > > > seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this > > > argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic > > > currently generating so much heat. UDA-8 sets out to be provable or > > > disprovable on purely logical grounds. > > >I for one am unclear on what > > > basis it could be attacked as invalid. Can anyone show strong grounds > > > for this? > > > Of course, no argument can validly come to a metaphysical conclusion-- > > in this > > case, that matter does not exist --without making a single > > metaphysical assumption. > > The argument is therefore invalid, or not purely logical > > Again, with respect, you appear to assume that MGA I was refering to the UDA >argues that matter > doesn't exist. In fact it argues that CTM + PM = false, which is not > the same thing at all. It is possible to retain matter as primitive > (which I for one don't rule out, dependent on a more complete > understanding of mind-body) whilst relinquishing an a priori hypothetical :>CTM. > What would be needed, as I've said elsewhere, would be an alternative > theory of mind which - like any other 'transcendent' a posteriori > analysis - would be capable of direct elucidation in terms of of > primary physical processes. Bruno has argued separately against the > plausibility of finding such a theory, but this isn't implicit in MGA, > AFAICS. > > David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman wrote: > It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it > is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language > - then this demands that it be *capable* of prior justification by > rigorous spelling out in physical terms for every conceptual > reduction. MGA claims to show that this is impossible for the > conjunction of CTM and PM. Of course, CTM on the basis of > arithmetical realism is not spelled out either, but is immunised from > physical paraphrase by making no appeal to PM for justification. Err. yeah. The hard part is reducing mentation to computation. The physical paraphrase of computation is just engineering, > I understand both your discomfort with arithmetical realism and your > defence of PM, but this discussion hinges on "CTM +PM = true". > Couldn't we try to focus on the validity or otherwise of this claim? OK. It's invalid because you can't have computaiton with zero phyiscal activity. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A Possible Mathematical Structure for Physics
On 19 Aug 2009, at 18:41, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> Bruno:
> the Plotinus paper is the first one on your list of publications on
> your website?
Yes.
It is also the "pdf" on my home page, at the right of
A Purely Arithmetical, yet Empirically Falsifiable, Interpretation of
Plotinus’ Theory of Matter
Or this:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf
It has been published since, I should decide to update my web page.
You may have some idea of the idea, but this is really AUDA and the
math part presupposes some mathematical logic. It was a congress in
logic and computer science.
Bruno
>Ronald
>
> On Aug 18, 10:46 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Ronald,
>>
>> On 18 Aug 2009, at 14:14, ronaldheld wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> I have heard of Octonians but have not used them.
>>> I do not know anything about intelligible hypostases
>>
>> Have you heard about Gödel's provability (beweisbar) predicate
>> bew(x)?
>>
>> If you have, define con(x) by ~bew ('~x') (carefully taking into
>> account the Gödel numbering). Con is for contingent, or consistent.
>>
>> Then the logic of the intelligible matter hypostases are given by the
>> predicate Bew(x) & Con(x)
>>
>> (The sensible, non intelligible, hypostases, cannot be defined by a
>> predicate, and some detour in Modal logic is necessary, but for each
>> arithmetical propositions p, you can define them by Bp & Dp & p. (Dp
>> is ~B ~p, Bp is bew('p'))
>> Note that Bp & Dp & p is "obviously" equivalent to p, for any correct
>> machine, but no correct machine can see that equivalence, and this is
>> a consequence of incompleteness).
>>
>> You can read my Plotinus paper for more, if interested.
>>
>> You can also read Plotinus II, 4: "On Matter". Plotinus took
>> Aristotle
>> not quite Platonist theory of matter, and recasted it in
>> "his" (neo)Platonist doctrine.
>>
>> Basically, matter, for Aristotle---Plotinus is what is indeterminate.
>> If fits well with comp where matter is the indeterminate computations
>> which exist below the comp substitution level (by step 7).
>>
>> I have not really the time to say much more for now, and this is in
>> AUDA, and it is better to get UDA straight before. I think.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote: > > > > > > > On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman wrote: > > >> Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM > >> and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also > >> argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think > >> is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are > >> compatible). Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form - > >> seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this > >> argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic > >> currently generating so much heat. UDA-8 sets out to be provable or > >> disprovable on purely logical grounds. > > >> I for one am unclear on what > >> basis it could be attacked as invalid. Can anyone show strong > >> grounds > >> for this? > > > Of course, no argument can validly come to a metaphysical > > conclusion-- > > in this > > case, that matter does not exist --without making a single > > metaphysical assumption. > > I completely agree with that point, but I don't see the relevance. > Comp, alias CTM, CTM does not have Platonism tacked on as a sub-hypothesis Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical Computationalism, or just comp, is the conjunction of the following three sub-hypotheses: 1) The yes doctor hypothesis: It is the assumption, in cognitive science, that it exists a level of description of my parts (whatever I consider myself to be[2]) such that I would not be aware of any experiential change in the case where a functionally correct digital substitution is done of my parts at that level. We call that level the substitution level. More simply said it is the act of faith of those willing to say yes to their doctor for an artificial brain or an artificial body graft made from some description at some level. We will see such a level is unknowable. Note that some amount of folk or �grand-mother psychology� has been implicitly used under the granting of the notion of (self) awareness[3]. 2) Church Thesis. A modern version is that all digital universal machines are equivalent with respect to the class of functions (from the natural numbers to the natural numbers) they can compute[4]. It can be shown that this entails such machines compute the same functions, but also they can compute them in similar ways, i.e. following similar algorithm. So, the thesis says, making abstraction of computation time, all digital universal machine can simulate each other exactly (I will say emulate each other). 3) Arithmetical Realism (AR). This is the assumption that arithmetical proposition, like �1+1=2,� or Goldbach conjecture, or the inexistence of a bigger prime, or the statement that some digital machine will stop, or any Boolean formula bearing on numbers, are true independently of me, you, humanity, the physical universe (if that exists), etc. It is a version of Platonism limited at least to arithmetical truth. It should not be confused with the much stronger Pythagorean form of AR, AR+, which asserts that only natural numbers exist together with their nameable relations: all the rest being derivative from those relations. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The seven step series
Hi,
Just a reminder, for me, and perhaps some training for you. In
preparation to the mathematical discovery of the universal machine.
exercises:
1) count the number of bijections from a set A to itself. (= card{x
such that x is bijection from A to A})
2) describe some canonical bijection between 2^A and the powerset of A.
3) I say that a set S is a proper subset of A if it is a subset of A,
and different from A.
We have seen that there is a bijection between N and 2N = {0, 2,
4, 6, ...}. (see below *)
2N is a proper subset of N.
So we see that an infinite set can have a bijection with a proper
subset.
The question is, could that be possible for a finite set?
The bijection between N and 2N is the set {(0,0), (1,2), (2, 4), (3,
6), (4, 8), ...}. More schematically, if you remember the ropes:
N 2N
0 --- 0
1 2
2 4
3 6
4) Be sure that you have been convinced by Brent that there is a
bijection between N and NxN, and between N and NxNxN, and etc. That is
be sure there is a bijection between N and N^m for each N.
5) Key exercise for the sequel. First a definition. An alphabet A is a
non empty finite set. I call its elements letter.
Exemple. A = {a, b, c},, B = {0, 1}.. By A+ I mean the set of finite
words on the alphabet A. A word is a finite sequence of letters, from
some alphabet, like, on the alphabet A, aaabab, acbababcccacab, etc.
IA+ is obviously infinite, it contains *notably* a, aa, aaa, ,
a, aa, aaa, ...
The word "word" has a larger meaning in math than in natural language.
On the usual alphabet {A, B, ... Z}, an expression like
HHYUJLIFSEFGXWKKODENN is a fully respectable word.
Show that for any alphabet A, there is a bijection between N and A+
Soon (asap, though) the proof of many theorems found by Cantor.
Notably that there is NO bijection from N to N^N.
Then Cantor proof will be done again and again, and again, ... in
deeper and deeper and deeper contexts.
Please ask any questions. It is not too late before we go in the
*very* interesting matter, and very illuminating with respect to the
question of the existence of universal machines, languages and numbers.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman wrote: > 009/8/19 Flammarion : > > >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a > >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The > >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that > >> *any* human concept is *eliminable* > > > No, reducible, not eliminable. That is an important distinction. > > Not in this instance. The whole thrust of the paraphrase argument is > precisely to show - in principle at least - that the reduced concept > can be *eliminated* from the explanation. You can do this with > 'life', so you should be prepared to do it with 'computation'. Showing that a word can be removed from a verbal formulation by substitution with s synonym is not *ontological* elimination. Substituting H2O for water does not show that water is non-existent, just that is is non-fundamental. > >> (my original point) after such > >> reduction to primary physical processes. So why should 'computation' > >> escape this fate? How would you respond if I said the brain is > >> conscious because it is 'alive'? Would 'life' elude the paraphrased > >> reduction to physical process? > > > I don't see your point. Either claim may or may not be true > > and may or may not be paraphraseable. > > My point is that claiming - *a priori* - that 'life' caused > consciousness would shed as little light as saying that computation > did so. I don't think anyone is doing that. For one thing, there is quite a body of research on computationalism. For another, it is being discussed as a hypothesis, which is different from assuming its truth. > In either case, a successful paraphrase must be capable of > pointing out precisely *which* specific physical entities - in > precisely *what* relation - to precisely *which* other specific > physical entities - are deemed responsible for the paraphrased concept > in any specific case. I freely concede that - *if* it turned out a > posteriori that a reduced physical theory capable of explicitly > attaching specific mental descriptions to specific physical processes > could be shown, in all cases FAPP, to be equivalent to some explicitly > specifiable program interpreted purely in terms of functional > relations of its physical instantiation - I would indeed be impressed. > But this would be a world away from a brute a priori assumption. > IOW, the justification for any paraphrased concept is posterior, not > prior. Err...yeah. I'm not particularly commited to the CTM as a categorical truth. I just don't think it has the implications Bruno thinks. > In the context of the foregoing, MGA makes a direct attack on "CTM + > PM = true" via reductio: i.e. by demonstrating at least one class of > physical reduction of a computation where any physical attachment > theory must evaporate. To emphasise: it isn't per se an attack on PM, > only on the a priori conjunction of PM and CTM. At what step do you > say it is invalid? Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process at all. I don't see any evidence for that > >> BTW, let's be clear: I'm not saying that physicalism is false > >> (although IMO it is at least incomplete). I'm merely pointing out one > >> of its consequences. > > > Which is what? > > That PM theory isn't justified in making an a priori claim to a > 'computational' theory of mind, No-one has maintained that CTM is an implication of PM >or indeed *any* a priori claim to > organising principles transcending Only Bruno thinks computation trancends matter. >the underlying physical processes. > All conceptual overlays in this context must be, and indeed - with the > outstanding exception of CTM - in practice always are, accepted as > requiring justification a posteriori. Have you read *any* of the literature on the CTM? > >> > It's prima facie possible for physicalism to be true > >> > and computationalism false. That is to say that > >> > the class of consciousness-causing processes might > >> > not coincide with any proper subset of the class > >> > of computaitonal processes. > > >> Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's > >> the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism "the class of > >> consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper > >> subset of the class of computational processes". Physicalist theory > >> of mind urgently required. QED > > > I am arguing with Bruno about whether the eliminaiton of matter > > makes things easier for the MBP. I think it just give you less to work > > with. > > MBP?? Mind body problem >At this stage, I'm really unclear on the basis of the above > whether or not you actually wish to defend "CTM + PM = true" on a > priori grounds. Would you please clarify? CTM *implies* materialism, and the MGA doesn't work. CTM might still be false though. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subsc
RE: Emulation and Stuff
> From: david.ny...@gmail.com > Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:03:39 +0100 > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > > 009/8/19 Flammarion : > > >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a > >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The > >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that > >> *any* human concept is *eliminable* > > > > No, reducible, not eliminable. That is an important distinction. > > Not in this instance. The whole thrust of the paraphrase argument is > precisely to show - in principle at least - that the reduced concept > can be *eliminated* from the explanation. You can do this with > 'life', so you should be prepared to do it with 'computation'. Well, not if you believe there are objective truths about computations that are never actually carried out in the physical world, like whether some program with an input string a googolplex digits long ever halts or not. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal wrote: > I am sorry Peter, but CTM + PM just does not work, and it is a good > news, because if we keep CTM, we get a sort of super generalization of > Darwin idea that things evolve. We still don't have a definite response from Peter as to whether "CTM + PM = true" is central to his argument. On the basis of some of the things he's said in reply to me recently, I think it may not be. If we could resolve this key point, perhaps it would cast fresh light on some of the issues thrown up e.g. (BTW I'm not expecting answers to these questions here and now): 1) What motivates the assumption of different theoretical postulates of primitiveness, contingency and necessity? 2) How do explanations of physical and mental phenomena diverge on the basis of these different assumptions? 3) What kind of non-computational theories of mind might be viable, assuming "CTM + PM = false"? 4) And my original question: does the notion of "emulation = substitution" have any force outside CTM? IOW if I believe I'm made of primitive matter, what does this imply in terms of evaluating proposals from the doctor? and so forth. Anyway, it would be nice to get past an impasse which has plagued the discussions interminably whilst continually failing to be resolved. Just wondering, of course :-) David > > read more » --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
Flammarion wrote: > > > On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker wrote: >> David Nyman wrote: >>> On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal wrote: Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive, assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation, and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent- contingent obeys laws. >>> AFAICS the essence of Bruno's dispute with Peter consists in: >>> 1) ***If you accept the computational theory of mind (CTM)*** then >>> matter can no longer be primitive to your explanations of appearances >>> of any kind, mental or physical. >>> 2) ***If you assert that matter is primitive to your explanation of >>> appearances of any kind, mental or physical (PM)*** it is illegitimate >>> to appeal to CTM. >>> Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM >>> and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also >>> argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think >>> is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are >>> compatible). Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form - >>> seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this >>> argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic >>> currently generating so much heat. UDA-8 sets out to be provable or >>> disprovable on purely logical grounds. I for one am unclear on what >>> basis it could be attacked as invalid. Can anyone show strong grounds >>> for this? >>> David >> I think you are right that the MGA is at the crux. But I don't know whether >> to regard it >> as proving that computation need not be physically instantiated or as a >> reductio against >> the "yes doctor" hypothesis. Saying yes to the doctor seems very >> straightforward when you >> just think about the doctor replacing physical elements of your brain with >> functionally >> similar elements made of silicon or straw or whatever. But then I reflect >> that I, with my >> new head full of straw, must still interact with the world. So I have not >> been reduced to >> computation unless the part of the world I interact with is also replaced by >> computational >> elements > > If you were a programme interacting with the world before, > you still will be after a function-preserving replacement is made. Yes, but my future experience will not have been reduced to the running of Turing-emulable program - it will depend on impinging effects not part of the program, unless the environment is also part of the emulation. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
Flammarion wrote: > > > On 18 Aug, 18:26, Brent Meeker wrote: >> Flammarion wrote: > >>> Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is >>> not about >>> explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts >>> contingency as the price >>> paid for parsimony. Pasimony and lack of arbitrariness are *both* >>> explanatory >>> desiderata, so there is no black-and-white sense in which >>> Everythingism wins. >> But parsimony in *theory* is what is desirable. > > Everythingists tend to think that, and their opponents tend > not to. > >> Almost any physics explanation of how the >> universe came to be is going to predict the existence of many universes. If >> it's based on >> QM is will be probabilistic. So then there is a tension with parsimony >> between an >> unparsimonious addition to the theory, i.e. "and just one thing happens", >> and keeping the >> theory parsimonious, but allowing an unparsimonious ontology in which "they >> all happen." > > Physical many-world theories are still constrained down to a subset of > the > the total of maths. Everythingist theories are not. > > > In that case you might as well call it "primary ectoplasm" or "primary asdfgh". > You might as well call "2" the successor of "0". All symbols are > arbitrary. My point was just that I think it's *misleading* to use the word "matter" which already has all sorts of intuitive associations for us, when really you're talking about something utterly mysterious whose properties are completely divorced from our experiences, more like Kant's "noumena" which were supposed to be things-in-themselves separate from all phenomenal properties (including quantitative ones). >>> I don't accept that characterisation of PM. (BTW, phenomenal >>> properties could be accounted for >>> as non-mathematical attributes of PM) >> I think this is a category mistake. Mathematical attributes belong to *the >> descriptions* >> or PM, not to PM. And the descriptions are necessarily mathematical simply >> to be precise >> and consistent. > > I think that is a bizzare statement. You mean I can;t say that a > cubic object is cubic, > because a "cube" is part of geometry, which is part of maths? If the > attributes belong to the > descriptions only, the descriptions are never going to be accurate at > all, since the descriptions > are attributing the attributes to the objects. No, what I mean is that when you describe something as cubic the description "cubic" is mathematical - not the object itself. > >> And the descriptions are necessarily mathematical simply to be precise >> and consistent. > > a) if they are not precise descriptions *of* something -- of > properties that things have -- what's the point? My point is that things can have mathematical properties and yet not be mathematical objects. An object can be triangular and yet not consist of three intersecting line segments. Brent > All you are going to achieve is a kind of fictive self-consistency, > like a set of cooked books. > > b) there is no apriori necessity why the world should be susceptible > to mathematical description > at all iTFP > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A Possible Mathematical Structure for Physics
Bruno:
the Plotinus paper is the first one on your list of publications on
your website?
Ronald
On Aug 18, 10:46 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Ronald,
>
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 14:14, ronaldheld wrote:
>
>
>
> > I have heard of Octonians but have not used them.
> > I do not know anything about intelligible hypostases
>
> Have you heard about Gödel's provability (beweisbar) predicate bew(x)?
>
> If you have, define con(x) by ~bew ('~x') (carefully taking into
> account the Gödel numbering). Con is for contingent, or consistent.
>
> Then the logic of the intelligible matter hypostases are given by the
> predicate Bew(x) & Con(x)
>
> (The sensible, non intelligible, hypostases, cannot be defined by a
> predicate, and some detour in Modal logic is necessary, but for each
> arithmetical propositions p, you can define them by Bp & Dp & p. (Dp
> is ~B ~p, Bp is bew('p'))
> Note that Bp & Dp & p is "obviously" equivalent to p, for any correct
> machine, but no correct machine can see that equivalence, and this is
> a consequence of incompleteness).
>
> You can read my Plotinus paper for more, if interested.
>
> You can also read Plotinus II, 4: "On Matter". Plotinus took Aristotle
> not quite Platonist theory of matter, and recasted it in
> "his" (neo)Platonist doctrine.
>
> Basically, matter, for Aristotle---Plotinus is what is indeterminate.
> If fits well with comp where matter is the indeterminate computations
> which exist below the comp substitution level (by step 7).
>
> I have not really the time to say much more for now, and this is in
> AUDA, and it is better to get UDA straight before. I think.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:58, Flammarion wrote: > I think *you* believe in magic. You believe that > if you write down hypothetical truths about what > an immaterial machine would believe, you can conclude > that everything has been conjured up by an immaterial machine. I don't proceed in that way at all. I propose a step by step reasoning which shows that CTM + PM leads to an epistemological contradiction, so that CTM has to justify the appearance of PM. (= UDA) Then I show that theoretical computer science is very promising to extract those appearance of PM. (= AUDA). > > It's like saying you can go from making a theoretical study of the > aerodynamics of Pegasus to taking a ride on Pegasus's back. Comparing mathematical objects with fairy tales objects can hardly help. > I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from contingent structures and still pretend that matter is primitive. >> >>> I am saying that material existence *is* contingent >>> existence. It is not a structure of anything. >> >> Plotinus says that too! Me too. >> With church thesis this is can be made more precise in term of not- >> computable or not-provable, or some relativizations. > > You're still not getting it. PM isn't a non-computable number. > It isn't mathematical at all. You really do think in a box.. If you believe that a deduction is not valid, you have to say where, and why. > Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the existence of primitive matter. >> >>> Well, at least I don't talk about immaterial machines dreaming each >>> other. >> >> In arithmetic, that happens all the time. More below. > > > > In arithemetic. people write down problems on blackboards and solve > them. If comp is assumed, some computation correspond to dream, and their existence can be proved in arithmetic. And the MGA argument shows that no machine can make the difference between "real", virtual and arithmetical. > > There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have > my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is. Meaning: UDA is non valid. I am still waiting your argument. >> >> You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used >> by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions, >> which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum). > > No. I don't have to deny their truth. I just have to deny that > mathematical > existence is ontological existence. I have no clue what you mean by "ontological existence", except "physical existence", but this beg the question. If you don't deny the arithmetical truth, you accept arithmetical realism, and you cannot deny the UD, so you should be able to follow the argument. And if you believe the conclusion is wrong, you should say where. > > Since it [UD] does not exist, it does not contain anything. UD exists like PI exists. The rest is taken into account in the argument that I am referring to. Don't say that PI and circle does not exists. Say that PI and circles does not exist physically. It is quite different. > >> It is hard to >> recognize Peter Jones or Bruno Marchal from the huge relation and >> huge >> numbers involved, in some emulations, but it is easy to prove there >> exists, from the information the doctor got when scanning your brain. > > Same mistake > All you can prove is that *if* the UD existed *then* it would > contain such-and-such. But it doesn't actually exist. What you mean is that UD does not physically exists. (Well I am not sure this is true, but OK). But MGA shows that the UD does not need to physically exist for my (non primary) physical existence. > > That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence. > You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is > ontological RITISAR existence. I still don't know if by RITSIAR you mean "real in the sense my first person is real" or "real as my body is real". You told me that the difference is epistemological, and I can accept this (for a while). But that makes a huge difference in the meaning of RITSIAR. I cannot doubt my first person, but I can doubt my body. After UDA+MGA, my first person appears to have an infinity of bodies (like in QM without collapse), and this makes the difference between those two forms of RITSIAR even bigger. > >> See "conscience & mécanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running >> mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented >> "materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too. > > So? It hasn't been. It has been implemented, and it has run for a week in 1991. This is anecdotical. Just to say that the UD is a concrete program. > > The way to prevent it is the same way that all sceptical hypotheses > are prevented. You just note that there is not a scrap of evidence > for them. The only upshot of scepticism is that there is no > certain
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote: > > > > On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman wrote: > >> Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM >> and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also >> argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think >> is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are >> compatible). Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form - >> seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this >> argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic >> currently generating so much heat. UDA-8 sets out to be provable or >> disprovable on purely logical grounds. > > >> I for one am unclear on what >> basis it could be attacked as invalid. Can anyone show strong >> grounds >> for this? > > Of course, no argument can validly come to a metaphysical > conclusion-- > in this > case, that matter does not exist --without making a single > metaphysical assumption. I completely agree with that point, but I don't see the relevance. Comp, alias CTM, is an hypothesis in cognitive science/philosophy-of- mind/metaphysics/theology. It is certainly not an hypothesis in mathematics. It relates the preservation of my consciousness through a substitution of my (generalized) brain ( a priori "material"). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:33, Flammarion wrote: > > > > On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a correct argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is material. The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. But then your reasoning has to be false too. The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not Turing-emulable, >> >>> Why can't I just say I'm not Turing emulated? It seems that your >>> argument uses MGA to >>> conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so Turing- >>> emulable=Turing-emulated. It >>> seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have >>> a correct argument >>> showing they are material. But this is already well known from >>> "brain in a vat" thought >>> experiments. >> >> OK. But this seems to me enough to render invalid any reasoning >> leading to our primitive materiality. >> If a reasoning is valid, it has to be valid independently of being >> published or not, written with ink or carbon, being in or outside the >> UD*. I did not use MGA here. > > That is false. You are tacitly assuming that PM has to be argued > with the full force of necessity -- I don't remember. I don't find trace of what makes you think so. Where? > although your own argument does > not have that force. If there is a weakness somewhere, tell us where. > In fact, PM only has to be shown to be more > plausible than the alternatives. It is not necessarily true because of > sceptical hypotheses like the BIV and the UD, but since neither of > them has much prima-facie plausibility, the plausibility og PM > is not impacted much ? Ex(x = UD) is a theorem of elementary arithmetic. I have been taught elementary arithmetic in school, and I don't think such a theory has been refuted since. You will tell me that mathematical existence = non existence at all. You are the first human who says so. Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion wrote: > > Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM > > and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also > > argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think > > is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are > > compatible). Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form - > > seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this > > argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic > > currently generating so much heat. UDA-8 sets out to be provable or > > disprovable on purely logical grounds. > >I for one am unclear on what > > basis it could be attacked as invalid. Can anyone show strong grounds > > for this? > > Of course, no argument can validly come to a metaphysical conclusion-- > in this > case, that matter does not exist --without making a single > metaphysical assumption. > The argument is therefore invalid, or not purely logical Again, with respect, you appear to assume that MGA argues that matter doesn't exist. In fact it argues that CTM + PM = false, which is not the same thing at all. It is possible to retain matter as primitive (which I for one don't rule out, dependent on a more complete understanding of mind-body) whilst relinquishing an a priori CTM. What would be needed, as I've said elsewhere, would be an alternative theory of mind which - like any other 'transcendent' a posteriori analysis - would be capable of direct elucidation in terms of of primary physical processes. Bruno has argued separately against the plausibility of finding such a theory, but this isn't implicit in MGA, AFAICS. David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
2009/8/19 Flammarion : >> Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's >> the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism "the class of >> consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper >> subset of the class of computational processes". Physicalist theory >> of mind urgently required. QED > > Why does it have to be spelt out? No-one in this discussion has > spelt out a CMT, it is taken off the shelf. It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language - then this demands that it be *capable* of prior justification by rigorous spelling out in physical terms for every conceptual reduction. MGA claims to show that this is impossible for the conjunction of CTM and PM. Of course, CTM on the basis of arithmetical realism is not spelled out either, but is immunised from physical paraphrase by making no appeal to PM for justification. I understand both your discomfort with arithmetical realism and your defence of PM, but this discussion hinges on "CTM +PM = true". Couldn't we try to focus on the validity or otherwise of this claim? OTOH, if you don't wish necessarily to defend the validity of CTM + PM, the discussion would then indeed appear to reduce straightforwardly (if that's the mot juste) to an elucidation of what is entailed by RITSIAR. Perhaps there's an opportunity here to clear the board a bit? David > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
009/8/19 Flammarion : >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that >> *any* human concept is *eliminable* > > No, reducible, not eliminable. That is an important distinction. Not in this instance. The whole thrust of the paraphrase argument is precisely to show - in principle at least - that the reduced concept can be *eliminated* from the explanation. You can do this with 'life', so you should be prepared to do it with 'computation'. >> (my original point) after such >> reduction to primary physical processes. So why should 'computation' >> escape this fate? How would you respond if I said the brain is >> conscious because it is 'alive'? Would 'life' elude the paraphrased >> reduction to physical process? > > I don't see your point. Either claim may or may not be true > and may or may not be paraphraseable. My point is that claiming - *a priori* - that 'life' caused consciousness would shed as little light as saying that computation did so. In either case, a successful paraphrase must be capable of pointing out precisely *which* specific physical entities - in precisely *what* relation - to precisely *which* other specific physical entities - are deemed responsible for the paraphrased concept in any specific case. I freely concede that - *if* it turned out a posteriori that a reduced physical theory capable of explicitly attaching specific mental descriptions to specific physical processes could be shown, in all cases FAPP, to be equivalent to some explicitly specifiable program interpreted purely in terms of functional relations of its physical instantiation - I would indeed be impressed. But this would be a world away from a brute a priori assumption. IOW, the justification for any paraphrased concept is posterior, not prior. In the context of the foregoing, MGA makes a direct attack on "CTM + PM = true" via reductio: i.e. by demonstrating at least one class of physical reduction of a computation where any physical attachment theory must evaporate. To emphasise: it isn't per se an attack on PM, only on the a priori conjunction of PM and CTM. At what step do you say it is invalid? >> BTW, let's be clear: I'm not saying that physicalism is false >> (although IMO it is at least incomplete). I'm merely pointing out one >> of its consequences. > > Which is what? That PM theory isn't justified in making an a priori claim to a 'computational' theory of mind, or indeed *any* a priori claim to organising principles transcending the underlying physical processes. All conceptual overlays in this context must be, and indeed - with the outstanding exception of CTM - in practice always are, accepted as requiring justification a posteriori. >> > It's prima facie possible for physicalism to be true >> > and computationalism false. That is to say that >> > the class of consciousness-causing processes might >> > not coincide with any proper subset of the class >> > of computaitonal processes. >> >> Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's >> the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism "the class of >> consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper >> subset of the class of computational processes". Physicalist theory >> of mind urgently required. QED > > I am arguing with Bruno about whether the eliminaiton of matter > makes things easier for the MBP. I think it just give you less to work > with. MBP?? At this stage, I'm really unclear on the basis of the above whether or not you actually wish to defend "CTM + PM = true" on a priori grounds. Would you please clarify? David > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
2009/8/19 Flammarion : >> > That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence. >> > You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is >> > ontological RITISAR existence. >> >> So you would accept to be turned into a program as long as you're >> running on a physical implementation... ok it's fair enough. My >> question is *in that precise case*... What are you ? the program >> written in whatever language it was written ? the functionnaly >> equivalent program written in brainfuck ? the same written in the >> machine language of the physical machine you're running on ? the >> bytecode that would be JIT in a VM ? the transistor of the physical >> machine ? >> >> What IS RITSIAR when you'll be digitalized ? > > Whatever combination of hardware and software I am in > fact running on. Juggling combinations of h/w and s/w is not > going to make me immaterial. If I'm reading the program and executing it in my head with a pencil and writing down the result on a sheet of paper... would you exists ? in my head ? on the paper ? on the pencil ? Would you cease to exists at the very moment I stop doing it ? > >> If you're running, and I suspend the program ? Do *you* still exists ? > > no > >> If I restart it ? Do you still exists ? > > yes > >> If I never restart it do you >> still exists ? > > no > >>If I destroy every copy of the program that is you do >> you still exists ? > > no > > >> >> See "conscience & mécanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running >> >> mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented >> >> "materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too. >> >> > So? It hasn't been. >> >> >> >> Fregean sense is enough to see >> >> >> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove >> >> >> that >> >> >> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they >> >> >> are not. >> >> >> > So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in >> >> > the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs >> >> > doesn't make us wrong >> >> > about anything. >> >> >> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct >> >> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us >> >> is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a correct >> >> argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is >> >> material. >> >> > So? If you develop a correct argument that you are running on a >> > computer >> > when actually you are a BIV, then the BIV you will come up with that >> > argument too. Any argument whatsoever can be undermined by a sceptical >> > hypothesis, and there are many. >> >> >> The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical >> >> reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. But >> >> then your reasoning has to be false too. >> >> The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not >> >> Turing-emulable, or that you just don't know if you are in the UD or >> >> not. >> >> > The way to prevent it is the same way that all sceptical hypotheses >> > are prevented. You just note that there is not a scrap of evidence >> > for them. The only upshot of scepticism is that there is no >> > certainty, and we have to argue for the position of the greatest >> > plausibility. >> >> >>At this stage. >> >> Then with step-8, you "know", relatively to the comp act of faith, >> >> that you are already there. If you say yes to the doctor, you can bet, >> >> from computer science that you are already in the (N,x,+) matrix. >> >> > I can't be "in" something that has merely mathematical existence, any >> > more than I can be "in" Nanrnia >> >> So you can't be a program... >> > > So I *can* be a runnign programme. I *can't* be abstract software. > > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug, 10:28, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > 2009/8/19 Flammarion : > > > There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have > > my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is. > > And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't. > > > > >> >> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your > >> >> "consciousness > >> >> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature. > > >> > No. I just have to deny immaterial existence. > > >> You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used > >> by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions, > >> which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum). > > > No. I don't have to deny their truth. I just have to deny that > > mathematical > > existence is ontological existence. As I have been > > Then you're missusing 'existence'. Because using your language > existence = no existence at all ! for mathemetical existence... Why > bother using the word existence when you don't even mean it. People do. People agree that Sherlock Holmes lived at 221b Baker Street even though he lived at all. If you want to start a project to eliminate metaphorical and other non-literla uses from langauge, you have a long way to go. > >> > You keep confusing the > >> > idea > >> > that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs > >> > with the > >> > actual existence of those entities and beliefs. > > >> You underestimate the dumbness of the DU, or sigma_1 arithmetic. It > >> contains the emulation of all the quantum states of the milky way, > >> with correct approximation of its neighborhood. > > > Since it does not exist, it does not contain anything. > > You say so, but you could repeat it ad infinitum, it won't render it truer. *If* it does not exist, it does not contain anything. Now show that it exists. > >>It is hard to > >> recognize Peter Jones or Bruno Marchal from the huge relation and huge > >> numbers involved, in some emulations, but it is easy to prove there > >> exists, from the information the doctor got when scanning your brain. > > > Same mistake > > All you can prove is that *if* the UD existed *then* it would > > contain such-and-such. But it doesn't actually exist. > > >> In computations enough similar than our own most probable current one, > >> it is a "theorem" that those entities have such or such beliefs, and > >> behave in such and such ways, developing such and such discourses. > > >> >> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that > >> >> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease > >> >> to > >> >> give referents to such "Peter Jones". > > >> > False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or AR. > >> > I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it, > >> > no-one can see it, so it ain't there. > > >> Standard comp says nothing about Plato's Platonism, but once you take > >> the digitalness seriously enough, and CT, it is just standard computer > >> science. > > > That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence. > > You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is > > ontological RITISAR existence. > > So you would accept to be turned into a program as long as you're > running on a physical implementation... ok it's fair enough. My > question is *in that precise case*... What are you ? the program > written in whatever language it was written ? the functionnaly > equivalent program written in brainfuck ? the same written in the > machine language of the physical machine you're running on ? the > bytecode that would be JIT in a VM ? the transistor of the physical > machine ? > > What IS RITSIAR when you'll be digitalized ? Whatever combination of hardware and software I am in fact running on. Juggling combinations of h/w and s/w is not going to make me immaterial. > If you're running, and I suspend the program ? Do *you* still exists ? no > If I restart it ? Do you still exists ? yes > If I never restart it do you > still exists ? no >If I destroy every copy of the program that is you do > you still exists ? no > >> See "conscience & mécanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running > >> mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented > >> "materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too. > > > So? It hasn't been. > > >> >> Fregean sense is enough to see > >> >> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove > >> >> that > >> >> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they > >> >> are not. > > >> > So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in > >> > the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs > >> > doesn't make us wrong > >> > about anything. > > >> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct > >> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us > >> is material, then the arithmetical
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman wrote: > 2009/8/18 Flammarion : > Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's > the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism "the class of > consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper > subset of the class of computational processes". Physicalist theory > of mind urgently required. QED Why does it have to be spelt out? No-one in this discussion has spelt out a CMT, it is taken off the shelf. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
2009/8/19 Flammarion : > There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have > my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is. And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't. > >> >> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your >> >> "consciousness >> >> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature. >> >> > No. I just have to deny immaterial existence. >> >> You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used >> by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions, >> which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum). > > No. I don't have to deny their truth. I just have to deny that > mathematical > existence is ontological existence. As I have been Then you're missusing 'existence'. Because using your language existence = no existence at all ! for mathemetical existence... Why bother using the word existence when you don't even mean it. > >> > You keep confusing the >> > idea >> > that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs >> > with the >> > actual existence of those entities and beliefs. >> >> You underestimate the dumbness of the DU, or sigma_1 arithmetic. It >> contains the emulation of all the quantum states of the milky way, >> with correct approximation of its neighborhood. > > Since it does not exist, it does not contain anything. You say so, but you could repeat it ad infinitum, it won't render it truer. >>It is hard to >> recognize Peter Jones or Bruno Marchal from the huge relation and huge >> numbers involved, in some emulations, but it is easy to prove there >> exists, from the information the doctor got when scanning your brain. > > Same mistake > All you can prove is that *if* the UD existed *then* it would > contain such-and-such. But it doesn't actually exist. > >> In computations enough similar than our own most probable current one, >> it is a "theorem" that those entities have such or such beliefs, and >> behave in such and such ways, developing such and such discourses. >> >> >> >> >> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that >> >> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease >> >> to >> >> give referents to such "Peter Jones". >> >> > False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or AR. >> > I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it, >> > no-one can see it, so it ain't there. >> >> Standard comp says nothing about Plato's Platonism, but once you take >> the digitalness seriously enough, and CT, it is just standard computer >> science. > > That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence. > You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is > ontological RITISAR existence. So you would accept to be turned into a program as long as you're running on a physical implementation... ok it's fair enough. My question is *in that precise case*... What are you ? the program written in whatever language it was written ? the functionnaly equivalent program written in brainfuck ? the same written in the machine language of the physical machine you're running on ? the bytecode that would be JIT in a VM ? the transistor of the physical machine ? What IS RITSIAR when you'll be digitalized ? If you're running, and I suspend the program ? Do *you* still exists ? If I restart it ? Do you still exists ? If I never restart it do you still exists ? If I destroy every copy of the program that is you do you still exists ? >> See "conscience & mécanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running >> mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented >> "materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too. > > So? It hasn't been. > >> >> Fregean sense is enough to see >> >> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove >> >> that >> >> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they >> >> are not. >> >> > So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in >> > the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs >> > doesn't make us wrong >> > about anything. >> >> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct >> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us >> is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a correct >> argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is >> material. > > So? If you develop a correct argument that you are running on a > computer > when actually you are a BIV, then the BIV you will come up with that > argument too. Any argument whatsoever can be undermined by a sceptical > hypothesis, and there are many. > >> The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical >> reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. But >> then your reasoning has to be false too. >> The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not >> Turing-emulable, or that you just don't know if y
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman wrote: > 2009/8/18 Flammarion : > > > > >> >> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting > >> >> a statement like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about > >> >> reality and thus being forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you > >> >> could instead paraphrase this in terms of what images and concepts are > >> >> in people's mind when they use the word "unicorn"; and if you're an > >> >> eliminative materialist who wants to avoid accepting mental images and > >> >> concepts as a basic element of your ontology, it might seem plausible > >> >> that you could *in principle* paraphrase all statements about human > >> >> concepts using statements about physical processes in human brains, > >> >> although we may lack the understanding to do that now. > > >> I presume that one could substitute 'computation' for 'unicorn' in the > >> above passage? If so, the human concept that it is 'computation' that > >> gives rise to consciousness could be "paraphrased using statements > >> about physical processes in human brains". So what may we now suppose > >> gives such processes this particular power? Presumably not their > >> 'computational' nature - because now "nous n'avons pas besoin de cette > >> hypothèse-là" (which I'm sure you will recall was precisely the point > >> I originally made). > > > That's completely back to front. Standard computaitonalism > > regards computation as a physical process taking place > > in brains and computer hardware. It doesn't exist > > at the fundamental level like quarks, and it isn't non-existent > > like unicorns. It is a higher-level existent, like horses. > > I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a > physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The > paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that > *any* human concept is *eliminable* No, reducible, not eliminable. That is an important distinction. > (my original point) after such > reduction to primary physical processes. So why should 'computation' > escape this fate? How would you respond if I said the brain is > conscious because it is 'alive'? Would 'life' elude the paraphrased > reduction to physical process? I don't see your point. Either claim may or may not be true and may or may not be paraphraseable. > BTW, let's be clear: I'm not saying that physicalism is false > (although IMO it is at least incomplete). I'm merely pointing out one > of its consequences. Which is what? > > It's prima facie possible for physicalism to be true > > and computationalism false. That is to say that > > the class of consciousness-causing processes might > > not coincide with any proper subset of the class > > of computaitonal processes. > > Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's > the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism "the class of > consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper > subset of the class of computational processes". Physicalist theory > of mind urgently required. QED I am arguing with Bruno about whether the eliminaiton of matter makes things easier for the MBP. I think it just give you less to work with. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote: > > > > > > > On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote: > > >>> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an > >>> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only > >>> some > >>> possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that > >>> is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further > >>> defined PM in *terms* of such contingency. > > >> That is actually very nice, because it follows the Plato-Aristotle- > >> Plotinus definition of matter which I follow in AUDA. > >> And this is enough for showing we don't have to reify matter (nor > >> numbers). > > > If you are not reifying anything. then there is nothing, hen there is > > no UD. > > I think you have a magical conception of reality. > I don't need to reify number to believe in them. > I just need to play with them. I think *you* believe in magic. You believe that if you write down hypothetical truths about what an immaterial machine would believe, you can conclude that everything has been conjured up by an immaterial machine. It's like saying you can go from making a theoretical study of the aerodynamics of Pegasus to taking a ride on Pegasus's back. > >> I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from contingent > >> structures and still pretend that matter is primitive. > > > I am saying that material existence *is* contingent > > existence. It is not a structure of anything. > > Plotinus says that too! Me too. > With church thesis this is can be made more precise in term of not- > computable or not-provable, or some relativizations. You're still not getting it. PM isn't a non-computable number. It isn't mathematical at all. You really do think in a box.. > >> Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the > >> existence of primitive matter. > > > Well, at least I don't talk about immaterial machines dreaming each > > other. > > In arithmetic, that happens all the time. More below. In arithemetic. people write down problems on blackboards and solve them. > >> All the Peter Jones which are generated by the UD, in the Tarski or > >> Fregean sense, (I don't care), will pretend that primitive matter > >> does > >> not exist, and if your argument goes through, for rational reason and > >> logic (and not by mystical apprehension), those immaterial Peter > >> Jones > >> will prove *correctly* that they are material, and this is a > >> contradiction. > > > It's not a contradiction of materialism. If there are no immaterial > > PJ's, nothing is believed by them at all. > > Once you say yes to the doctor, there are immaterial Peter Jones. All > your doppelganger emulating you, and being emulated at your level of > substitution and below relatively occuring in the proof of the Sigma_1 > sentences of Robinson Arithmetic. (The arithmetical version of the UD). There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is. > >> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your > >> "consciousness > >> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature. > > > No. I just have to deny immaterial existence. > > You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used > by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions, > which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum). No. I don't have to deny their truth. I just have to deny that mathematical existence is ontological existence. As I have been > > You keep confusing the > > idea > > that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs > > with the > > actual existence of those entities and beliefs. > > You underestimate the dumbness of the DU, or sigma_1 arithmetic. It > contains the emulation of all the quantum states of the milky way, > with correct approximation of its neighborhood. Since it does not exist, it does not contain anything. >It is hard to > recognize Peter Jones or Bruno Marchal from the huge relation and huge > numbers involved, in some emulations, but it is easy to prove there > exists, from the information the doctor got when scanning your brain. Same mistake All you can prove is that *if* the UD existed *then* it would contain such-and-such. But it doesn't actually exist. > In computations enough similar than our own most probable current one, > it is a "theorem" that those entities have such or such beliefs, and > behave in such and such ways, developing such and such discourses. > > > > >> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that > >> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease > >> to > >> give referents to such "Peter Jones". > > > False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or AR. > > I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it,
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman wrote: > Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM > and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also > argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think > is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are > compatible). Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form - > seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this > argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic > currently generating so much heat. UDA-8 sets out to be provable or > disprovable on purely logical grounds. >I for one am unclear on what > basis it could be attacked as invalid. Can anyone show strong grounds > for this? Of course, no argument can validly come to a metaphysical conclusion-- in this case, that matter does not exist --without making a single metaphysical assumption. The argument is therefore invalid, or not purely logical --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct > >> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us > >> is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a > >> correct > >> argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is > >> material. The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical > >> reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. > >> But > >> then your reasoning has to be false too. > >> The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not > >> Turing-emulable, > > > Why can't I just say I'm not Turing emulated? It seems that your > > argument uses MGA to > > conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so Turing- > > emulable=Turing-emulated. It > > seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have > > a correct argument > > showing they are material. But this is already well known from > > "brain in a vat" thought > > experiments. > > OK. But this seems to me enough to render invalid any reasoning > leading to our primitive materiality. > If a reasoning is valid, it has to be valid independently of being > published or not, written with ink or carbon, being in or outside the > UD*. I did not use MGA here. That is false. You are tacitly assuming that PM has to be argued with the full force of necessity -- although your own argument does not have that force. In fact, PM only has to be shown to be more plausible than the alternatives. It is not necessarily true because of sceptical hypotheses like the BIV and the UD, but since neither of them has much prima-facie plausibility, the plausibility og PM is not impacted much --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker wrote: > David Nyman wrote: > > On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no > >> doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive, > >> assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of > >> universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which > >> capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation, > >> and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent- > >> contingent obeys laws. > > > AFAICS the essence of Bruno's dispute with Peter consists in: > > > 1) ***If you accept the computational theory of mind (CTM)*** then > > matter can no longer be primitive to your explanations of appearances > > of any kind, mental or physical. > > > 2) ***If you assert that matter is primitive to your explanation of > > appearances of any kind, mental or physical (PM)*** it is illegitimate > > to appeal to CTM. > > > Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM > > and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also > > argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think > > is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are > > compatible). Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form - > > seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this > > argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic > > currently generating so much heat. UDA-8 sets out to be provable or > > disprovable on purely logical grounds. I for one am unclear on what > > basis it could be attacked as invalid. Can anyone show strong grounds > > for this? > > > David > > I think you are right that the MGA is at the crux. But I don't know whether > to regard it > as proving that computation need not be physically instantiated or as a > reductio against > the "yes doctor" hypothesis. Saying yes to the doctor seems very > straightforward when you > just think about the doctor replacing physical elements of your brain with > functionally > similar elements made of silicon or straw or whatever. But then I reflect > that I, with my > new head full of straw, must still interact with the world. So I have not > been reduced to > computation unless the part of the world I interact with is also replaced by > computational > elements If you were a programme interacting with the world before, you still will be after a function-preserving replacement is made. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 18 Aug, 18:26, Brent Meeker wrote: > Flammarion wrote: > > Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is > > not about > > explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts > > contingency as the price > > paid for parsimony. Pasimony and lack of arbitrariness are *both* > > explanatory > > desiderata, so there is no black-and-white sense in which > > Everythingism wins. > > But parsimony in *theory* is what is desirable. Everythingists tend to think that, and their opponents tend not to. > Almost any physics explanation of how the > universe came to be is going to predict the existence of many universes. If > it's based on > QM is will be probabilistic. So then there is a tension with parsimony > between an > unparsimonious addition to the theory, i.e. "and just one thing happens", and > keeping the > theory parsimonious, but allowing an unparsimonious ontology in which "they > all happen." Physical many-world theories are still constrained down to a subset of the the total of maths. Everythingist theories are not. > >> > > In that case you might as well call it "primary ectoplasm" or > >> "primary asdfgh". > > >>> You might as well call "2" the successor of "0". All symbols are > >>> arbitrary. > >> My point was just that I think it's *misleading* to use the word "matter" > >> which already has all sorts of intuitive associations for us, when really > >> you're talking about something utterly mysterious whose properties are > >> completely divorced from our experiences, more like Kant's "noumena" which > >> were supposed to be things-in-themselves separate from all phenomenal > >> properties (including quantitative ones). > > > I don't accept that characterisation of PM. (BTW, phenomenal > > properties could be accounted for > > as non-mathematical attributes of PM) > > I think this is a category mistake. Mathematical attributes belong to *the > descriptions* > or PM, not to PM. And the descriptions are necessarily mathematical simply > to be precise > and consistent. I think that is a bizzare statement. You mean I can;t say that a cubic object is cubic, because a "cube" is part of geometry, which is part of maths? If the attributes belong to the descriptions only, the descriptions are never going to be accurate at all, since the descriptions are attributing the attributes to the objects. > And the descriptions are necessarily mathematical simply to be precise > and consistent. a) if they are not precise descriptions *of* something -- of properties that things have -- what's the point? All you are going to achieve is a kind of fictive self-consistency, like a set of cooked books. b) there is no apriori necessity why the world should be susceptible to mathematical description at all iTFP --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct >> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us >> is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a >> correct >> argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is >> material. The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical >> reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. >> But >> then your reasoning has to be false too. >> The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not >> Turing-emulable, > > Why can't I just say I'm not Turing emulated? It seems that your > argument uses MGA to > conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so Turing- > emulable=Turing-emulated. It > seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have > a correct argument > showing they are material. But this is already well known from > "brain in a vat" thought > experiments. OK. But this seems to me enough to render invalid any reasoning leading to our primitive materiality. If a reasoning is valid, it has to be valid independently of being published or not, written with ink or carbon, being in or outside the UD*. I did not use MGA here. >> >> But if you are correct in your reasoning, the simulated you has to be >> correct to. It is the same reasoning. >> Or you have a special sense making you know that you are the "real" >> one, but either that special sense is Turing emulable and your >> doppelganger inherit them, or it is not Turing emulable, and you >> better should say "no" to the doctor, because you would loose that >> sense. > > Or it is a relation to the rest of the world and you can say yes so > long as the doctor > maintains your relations to the rest of the world - i.e. physically > instantiates your > emulation. This means, by definition of the "generalized brain", that you have not choose the right substitution level/context. You can say yes because the doctor substitute correctly a *part* of your brain, but you have to introduce a non computational element in the environment to prevent its appearance in the mathematical UD*. You do *seem* to have a sort of point here, though. You provide a situation where comp is false, yet we can say"yes" to the doctor. But in this case your survival is no more "qua computatio". Your survival comes from the fact that your consciousness supervene on some magical (non turing emulable) property of the material moon (say), and that your doctor did not give you an artificial brain, just an artificial part of your brain. This is no more comp or CTM. It is not different than saying yes to the doctor because you believe there is a God who will save your soul and put it back in the reconstitution. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
