Re: Interesting Feynman Quote
On 2/26/2012 12:26 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Folks, As I was reading an interesting paper, I ran across an equally interesting quote from Richard Feynman: ‘It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a region of spaces, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that be going on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?’ Bruno's idea explains this by showing that an infinite number of computations "run" though each and every event in space-time (please correct my wording!). Would Feynman be happy with this answer? Onward! Stephen Adding to my question: Could we equally say that an infinite number of physical processes are running each and every instance of a computation? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Interesting Feynman Quote
Hi Folks, As I was reading an interesting paper, I ran across an interesting quote from Richard Feynman: ‘It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a region of spaces, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that be going on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?’ Bruno's idea explains this by showing that an infinite number of computations "run" though each and every event in space-time (please correct my wording!). Would Feynman be happy with this answer? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Support for Panexperientialism
On Feb 24, 11:13 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: > Of course. They are the particular sense of epistemology which 'seems > like' the opposite of 'seems like'. Phenomena are reduced to their > wireframe invariance - a skeleton which seems as if it 'simply is' > because it represents the most common overlap and discards all nuanced > underlap. Didn;t understand that. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On Feb 24, 11:02 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Feb 24, 7:40 am, 1Z wrote: > > > Which only underscores how different consciousness is from > computation. We can't share the exact same software, but computers > can. We can't re-run our experiences, but computers can. By default > humans cannot help but generate their own unique software, but the > reverse is true with computers. We have to work to write each update > to the code, which is then distributed uniformly to every (nearly) > identical client machine. AIs can generate their own software. That is the point of AI. > > > By default, > > > everything that a computer does is mechanistic. We have to go out of > > > our way to generate sophisticated algorithms to emulate naturalistic > > > human patterns. > > > which could mean humans transcend computation, or > > could mean humans are more complex than current computers > > Complexity is the deus ex anima of comp. There is no reason to imagine > that a complex arrangement of dumb marbles adds up to be something > which experiences the universe in some synergistic way. THat;s a more plausible reason for doubting CT0M. > > >Human development proves just the contrary. We start > > > out wild and willful and become more mechanistic through > > > domestication. > > > You think mechanisms can't be random or unpredictable? > > That's not the same thing as wild and willful. Isn't it? Is there any hard evidence of that? >There is agency there. > Intentional exuberance that can be domesticated. Babies are noisy > alright, but they aren't noise. Randomness and unpredictability is > mere noise. > > > > Altenatively, they might > > > > just be illogical...even if we are computers. It is a subtle > > > > fallacy to say that computers run on logic: they run on rules. > > > > Yes! This is why they have a trivial intelligence and no true > > > understanding. > > > Or current ones are too simple > > Again - complexity is not the magic. Again..you can;t infer to all computers from the limitations of some computers. > > > Rule followers are dumb. > > > You have no evidence that humans are not following > > complex rules. > > We are following rules too, but we also break them. Rule-breaking might be based on rules. Adolescents are predictably rebellious. > > >Logic is a form of > > > intelligence which we use to write these rules that write more rules. > > > The more rules you have, the better the machine, but no amount of > > > rules make the machine more (or less) logical. Humans vary widely in > > > their preference for logic, emotion, pragmatism, leadership, etc. > > > Computers don't vary at all in their approach. It is all the same rule > > > follower only with different rules. > > > > > They have no guarantee to be rational. If the rules are > > > > wrong, you have bugs. Humans are known to have > > > > any number of cognitive bugs. The "jumping" thing > > > > could be implemented by real or pseudo randomness, too. > > > > > > Because of 1, it is assumed that the thought experiment universe > > > > > includes the subjective experience of personal value - that the > > > > > patient has a stake, or 'money to bet'. > > > > > What's the problem ? the experience (quale) or the value? > > > > The significance of the quale. > > > You mean apparent significance. But apparent significance *is* a > > quale. > > Apparent is redundant. All qualia are apparent. Significance is a meta > quale (appears more apparent - a 'signal' or 'sign'). Apparent significance, you mean. > > > > Do you know the value to be real? > > > > I know it to be subjective. > > > Great. So it's an opinion. How does that stop the mechanistic- > > physicalistic show? > > Mechanism is the opinion of things that are not us. Says who? > > > > Do you think a computer > > > > could not be deluded about value? > > > > I think a computer can't be anything but turned off and on. > > > Well, you;'re wrong. It takes more than one bit (on/off) to > > describe computation. > > you forgot the 'turning'. That does't help. > > > > > Because of 2, it is assumed > > > > > that libertarian free will exists in the scenario > > > > > I don't see that FW of a specifically libertarian aort is posited > > > > in the scenario. It just assumes you can make a choice in > > > > some sense. > > > > It assumes that choice is up to you and not determined by > > > computations. > > > Nope. It just assumes you can make some sort of choice. > > A voluntary choice. > > Craig Some sort of "voluntary" -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 25, 6:32 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Feb 24, 8:22 am, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Feb 23, 10:24 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > You are > > > > > thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that the > > > > > observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation > > > > > I don't know what you mean by "subject to". They may well not > > > > be able to arrive at the actual facts beyond the simulation at all. > > > > Which is why they can't call them actual facts. To them, the > > > simulation is the only facts. They do not exist outside of the > > > simulation. > > > But they are wrong about all that, or there is no sense > > to the claim that they are sims ITFP > > They are right about that. If I am a sim running on a computer > somewhere, it doesn't matter to me at all where that is because I can > never get our of this sim here to get to the world of the computer out > there. That certain things don'tn matter to you doesn't change any facts. > I am not a sim to myself of course, but if someone can pause > the program, put horns on my head and start it again, it is because to > them, I am a simulation. > > > > > > > But that is an observation that *depends* on truth having a > > > > transcendent and objective nature. If truth is just what seems > > > > to you to be true, then they have the truth, as does every lunatic. > > > > You could make a simulation where the simulation changes to fit the > > > delusions of a lunatic. You could even make them all lunatics and make > > > their consciousness completely solipsistic. > > > So? > > To in that simulated universe, lunacy would be truth. Luncacy might be believed. Not the same thing. > > > > I recommend using publically accessble language > > > > to enhance communication, not to discover new > > > > facts. > > > > I would rather enhance the content of the communication than the form. > > > If the form renders the content inaccessible, what's the point? > > > > > > Because comp hasn't been around long enough to have traditions. > > > > > That doesn't answer the question. You are proceding as if the meaning > > > > of > > > > a word *always* changes in different contexts. > > > > It does > > > Says who? > > Why do you think it doesn't? Don't shift the burden. You are making the extraordinary claim. > Do you mean the same thing today when you > talk about having 'fun' as you did when you were in third grade? I am not disputing that some meanings change in some contexts. > > > > > It;s true outside the game as well. Whatever you are trying > > > > to say. it is a poor analogy. You might try asking if you are > > > > really the top hat in Monopoly, or Throngar the Invincible in > > > > D&D > > > > Those make the same point as well. Is it true that you are the top hat > > > in Monopoly? If not then Monopoly is not a very strong simulation - > > > which it isn't. A full immersion virtual D&D campaign? That would be a > > > stronger simulation and you could not so easily say that you aren't > > > Throngar. Especially if you played him for a living...and changed your > > > name legally...and got plastic surgery. At what point do you become > > > Throngar? > > > If there is any meaning to the word "simulation", then it is never > > actual. > > That's simplistic. The whole point of a simulation is that is is as if > it were actual in some sense. A flight simulator provides an actual > experience that can seem like flying an actual plane. If you are on a > plane where the pilot dies, do you ask the guy who has logged 1 > hours on flight simulators to fly the plane or do you say they have no > actual experience? That's irrelevant. > > The problem we keep running into is that you assume something... > > simulations exist...and then refuse to follow throught the > > consequences. > > No, you just aren't getting the overall concept of relativism. I understand it, but don;t agree with it. > Comp > claims that computation is all that is required for consciousness. > This is what opens up a nonsense thesis about simulations having > relative reality. I understand that is not the way it works. > Consciousness is not emulable, only extendible. There is no simulation > of red. Red is only red. Who we are is like that. Us-ness. > > > > > > Are you 1Z? Figurative is the word to focus on. Subjectivity > > > is figurative. Meaning, perception, sensation...all figurative. > > > Literal is the antithesis that is objectivity. > > > > But not actually supernatural at all, if he is a geek with BO and > > > > dandruff. > > > > That is the point you are missing. > > > > But the simulated beings can never access that information about their > > > creator, so how can it be true for them? > > > It can be true because it is true. > > Without some way to sense it or it's true that means nothing to us. It means something to non-relativists > > You have already assumed > > soemthing like that when you made the initial assumpt
Re: UD* and consciousness
On 2/25/2012 7:15 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 6:20 PM, acw wrote: Pain - immediate actions, random or not, to specific dangerous stimuli. Aversion/avoidance in more complex organisms (such as those capable of expecting or predicting painful stimuli). Pleasure - reduced or repeated same actions, to specific pelasurable stimuli. Pleasure seeking behavior in more complex organisms (such as those capable of expecting or predicting pleasurable stimuli). Stimuli can be both internal (emotion) or external (senses). Obviously for beings as complex as humans the nature of certain emotions can be much more complex than that because they are mixed in with many others, but I think that's what the simplest behavioral characterization of pain/pleasure that I know of. Just a quick response acw, to say thanks for your responses. I basically agree with everything you've said, it makes total sense to me. And yet, I am not doing a very good job of expressing myself (to myself even) because I'm still not satisfied. There's an intuitive sense I have of a problem that's deeper than anything I've been able to express so far... and it may turn out to be something else, but I won't know until I can communicate it. You might ask yourself, "What form would a satisfactory answer to my problem take?" Brent I also won't have much time in the next week for anything so didn't want to leave you hanging. So I will reflect on what you and Bruno have said... thanks again. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function (errata)
On 2/25/2012 2:01 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2012, at 22:59, acw wrote: On 2/24/2012 12:59, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2012 11:52, acw wrote: I look at it like this, there's 3 notions: Mind (consciousness, experience), (Primitive) Matter, Mechanism. Those 3 notions are incompatible, but we have experience of all 3, mind is the sum of our experience and thus is the most direct thing possible, even if non-communicable, matter is what is directly inferred from our experience (but we don't know if it's the base of everything) and mechanism which means our experience is lawful (following rules). By induction we build mechanistic (mathematical) models of matter. We can't really avoid any of the 3: one is primary, the other is directly sensible, the other can be directly inferred. However, there are many thought experiments that illustrate that these notions are incompatible - you can have any 2 of them, but never all 3. Take away mind and you have eliminative materialism - denying the existence of mind to save primary matter and its mechanistic appearence. (This tends to be seen as a behavioral COMP). Too bad this is hard to stomach because all our theories are learned through our experiences, thus it's a bit self-defeating. Take away primitive matter and you have COMP and other platonic versions where matter is a mathematical shadow. Mind becomes how some piece of abstract math feels from the inside. This is disliked by those that wish matter was more fundamental or that it allows too many fantasies into reality (even if low-measure). Take away mechanism and you get some magical form of matter which cannot obey any rules - not even all possible rules Nice summary. You say "Mind becomes how some piece of abstract math feels from the inside", which is essentially how Bruno puts it. However, this must still fall short of an identity claim - i.e. it seems obvious that mind is no more "identical" to math or computation than it is to matter, unless that relation is to be re-defined as "categorically different". Math and mind are still distinct, though correlated. Do you think that such a duality can still be subsumed in some sort of neutral monism? Obviously not all computations have minds like ours associated with them. I'm not sure if identity is the right claim, but I'm not sure there's much to gain by adding extra "indirection layers" - it's not that consciousness is associated with some scribbles on a piece of paper, it's associated with some abstract truths and we could say that 3p-wise those truths look like some specific structure we can talk about (using pen and paper or computers), but at the same time, that that abstract structure does have some sensory experience associated with it. Other structure might represent some machines implementing some partial local physics. In that way it's neutral monist. We could try to keep experience separate and supervening on arithmetical truth, but I'm not sure if there's anything to gain by introducing such a dualism - it might make epistemological sense, but I'm not sure it makes sense ontologically. I'm rather unsure of such a move myself, I wonder what Bruno's opinion is on this. I think that we don't have to introduce an ontological dualism, because the dualism is unavoidable from the machine points of view, if you agree to 1) model belief (by ideally arithmetically and self-referentially correct machine) by Gödel's provability. I can provide many reason to do that, even if it oversimplifies the problem. The interesting things is that it leads to an already very complex "machine's theology". We might take it as a toy theology, but then all theories are sort of toys. 2) to accept that S4 (or T, = S4 without Bp -> BBp) provides the best axiomatic theories for knowledge. Then it can be shown that the modality (Bp & p) gives a notion of knowledge, i.e. (Bp & p) obeys S4, even a stronger S4Grz theory. The relevant results here are that G* proves that Bp is equivalent with Bp & p, but G does not prove that, and so, this is a point where the "divine intellect" (G*), the believer (G) and the kower (soul) Bp & p, will completely differ, and this will account for a variety of dualism, unavoidable for the machine. So yes, this is neutral monism. The TOE is just arithmetic, and the definition above explains why, at the least, the machine will behaves as if dualism was true for her ... until she bet on comp and understand the talk of her own G*, without making the error of taking that talk for granted (because she cannot know, nor believe, nor even explictly express that she is correct). Hope this might help, but if you want I can explain more on G, G*, S4Grz, and the Z and X logics. Those are not logic invented to solve problems, like in analytical philosophy, but unavoidable nuances brought by the provably correct self-reference logi
Re: The free will function
On 2/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2012, at 22:59, acw wrote: On 2/24/2012 12:59, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2012 11:52, acw wrote: I look at it like this, there's 3 notions: Mind (consciousness, experience), (Primitive) Matter, Mechanism. Those 3 notions are incompatible, but we have experience of all 3, mind is the sum of our experience and thus is the most direct thing possible, even if non-communicable, matter is what is directly inferred from our experience (but we don't know if it's the base of everything) and mechanism which means our experience is lawful (following rules). By induction we build mechanistic (mathematical) models of matter. We can't really avoid any of the 3: one is primary, the other is directly sensible, the other can be directly inferred. However, there are many thought experiments that illustrate that these notions are incompatible - you can have any 2 of them, but never all 3. Take away mind and you have eliminative materialism - denying the existence of mind to save primary matter and its mechanistic appearence. (This tends to be seen as a behavioral COMP). Too bad this is hard to stomach because all our theories are learned through our experiences, thus it's a bit self-defeating. Take away primitive matter and you have COMP and other platonic versions where matter is a mathematical shadow. Mind becomes how some piece of abstract math feels from the inside. This is disliked by those that wish matter was more fundamental or that it allows too many fantasies into reality (even if low-measure). Take away mechanism and you get some magical form of matter which cannot obey any rules - not even all possible rules Nice summary. You say "Mind becomes how some piece of abstract math feels from the inside", which is essentially how Bruno puts it. However, this must still fall short of an identity claim - i.e. it seems obvious that mind is no more "identical" to math or computation than it is to matter, unless that relation is to be re-defined as "categorically different". Math and mind are still distinct, though correlated. Do you think that such a duality can still be subsumed in some sort of neutral monism? Obviously not all computations have minds like ours associated with them. I'm not sure if identity is the right claim, but I'm not sure there's much to gain by adding extra "indirection layers" - it's not that consciousness is associated with some scribbles on a piece of paper, it's associated with some abstract truths and we could say that 3p-wise those truths look like some specific structure we can talk about (using pen and paper or computers), but at the same time, that that abstract structure does have some sensory experience associated with it. Other structure might represent some machines implementing some partial local physics. In that way it's neutral monist. We could try to keep experience separate and supervening on arithmetical truth, but I'm not sure if there's anything to gain by introducing such a dualism - it might make epistemological sense, but I'm not sure it makes sense ontologically. I'm rather unsure of such a move myself, I wonder what Bruno's opinion is on this. I think that we don't have to introduce an ontological dualism, because the dualism is unavoidable from the machine points of view, if you agree to 1) model belief (by ideally arithmetically and self-referentially correct machine) by Gödel's provability. I can provide many reason to do that, even if it oversimplifies the problem. The interesting things is that it leads to an already very complex "machine's theology". We might take it as a toy theology, but then all theories are sort of toys. 2) to accept that S4 (or T, = S4 without Bp -> BBp) provides the best axiomatic theories for knowledge. Then it can be shown that the modality (Bp & p) gives a notion of knowledge, i.e. (Bp & p) obeys S4, even a stronger S4Grz theory. The relevant results here are that G* proves that Bp is equivalent with Bp & p, but G does not prove that, and so, this is a point where the "divine intellect" (G*), the believer (G) and the kower (soul) Bp & p, will completely differ, and this will account for a variety of dualism, unavoidable for the machine. So yes, this is neutral monism. The TOE is just arithmetic, and the definition above explains why, at the least, the machine will behaves as if dualism was true for her ... until she bet on comp and understand the talk of her own G*, without making the error of taking that talk for granted (because she cannot know, nor believe, nor even explictly express that she is correct). Hope this might help, but if you want I can explain more on G, G*, S4Grz, and the Z and X logics. Those are not logic invented to solve problems, like in analytical philosophy, but unavoidable nuances brought by the provably correct self-reference logic of machines in theoretical computer science.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 24, 8:22 am, 1Z wrote: > On Feb 23, 10:24 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > You are > > > > thinking that because you know it's a simulation it means that the > > > > observers within are subject to truths outside of the simulation > > > > I don't know what you mean by "subject to". They may well not > > > be able to arrive at the actual facts beyond the simulation at all. > > > Which is why they can't call them actual facts. To them, the > > simulation is the only facts. They do not exist outside of the > > simulation. > > But they are wrong about all that, or there is no sense > to the claim that they are sims ITFP They are right about that. If I am a sim running on a computer somewhere, it doesn't matter to me at all where that is because I can never get our of this sim here to get to the world of the computer out there. I am not a sim to myself of course, but if someone can pause the program, put horns on my head and start it again, it is because to them, I am a simulation. > > > > But that is an observation that *depends* on truth having a > > > transcendent and objective nature. If truth is just what seems > > > to you to be true, then they have the truth, as does every lunatic. > > > You could make a simulation where the simulation changes to fit the > > delusions of a lunatic. You could even make them all lunatics and make > > their consciousness completely solipsistic. > > So? To in that simulated universe, lunacy would be truth. > > > > I recommend using publically accessble language > > > to enhance communication, not to discover new > > > facts. > > > I would rather enhance the content of the communication than the form. > > If the form renders the content inaccessible, what's the point? > > > > > Because comp hasn't been around long enough to have traditions. > > > > That doesn't answer the question. You are proceding as if the meaning > > > of > > > a word *always* changes in different contexts. > > > It does > > Says who? Why do you think it doesn't? Do you mean the same thing today when you talk about having 'fun' as you did when you were in third grade? Did that meaning change specifically at some point? Are meanings hovering around somewhere unchanging until some dictionary is updated? > > > > > Not a bad thing, just not my thing. I don't do word definitions. I > > > > don't believe in them. > > > > Have you never seen a dictionary? > > > I believe in dictionaries, but not definitions. I believe in movie > > critics but I don't believe that their opinions about movies are > > objectively true. I might agree with them, but that doesn't mean that > > it is possible for an opinion to be authoritatively definitive. > > Again, that is disbelief in a certain kind of definition. That's your opinion of the definition of definition. > > > > It;s true outside the game as well. Whatever you are trying > > > to say. it is a poor analogy. You might try asking if you are > > > really the top hat in Monopoly, or Throngar the Invincible in > > > D&D > > > Those make the same point as well. Is it true that you are the top hat > > in Monopoly? If not then Monopoly is not a very strong simulation - > > which it isn't. A full immersion virtual D&D campaign? That would be a > > stronger simulation and you could not so easily say that you aren't > > Throngar. Especially if you played him for a living...and changed your > > name legally...and got plastic surgery. At what point do you become > > Throngar? > > If there is any meaning to the word "simulation", then it is never > actual. That's simplistic. The whole point of a simulation is that is is as if it were actual in some sense. A flight simulator provides an actual experience that can seem like flying an actual plane. If you are on a plane where the pilot dies, do you ask the guy who has logged 1 hours on flight simulators to fly the plane or do you say they have no actual experience? > The problem we keep running into is that you assume something... > simulations exist...and then refuse to follow throught the > consequences. No, you just aren't getting the overall concept of relativism. Comp claims that computation is all that is required for consciousness. This is what opens up a nonsense thesis about simulations having relative reality. I understand that is not the way it works. Consciousness is not emulable, only extendible. There is no simulation of red. Red is only red. Who we are is like that. Us-ness. > > > Are you 1Z? Figurative is the word to focus on. Subjectivity > > is figurative. Meaning, perception, sensation...all figurative. > > Literal is the antithesis that is objectivity. > > > But not actually supernatural at all, if he is a geek with BO and > > > dandruff. > > > That is the point you are missing. > > > But the simulated beings can never access that information about their > > creator, so how can it be true for them? > > It can be true because it is true. Without some way to sense it or it's truth, that
Re: UD* and consciousness
On Sat, Feb 25, 2012 at 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 24 Feb 2012, at 21:51, Terren Suydam wrote: > >> On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 3:30 PM, Terren Suydam >> wrote: >>> >>> On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 2:27 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/24/2012 10:26 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: I certainly will. In the meantime, do you have an example from Damasio (or any other source) that could shed light on the pain/pleasure phenomenon? Terren http://www.hedweb.com/bgcharlton/damasioreview.html >>> >>> >>> I think emotions represent something above and beyond the more >>> fundamental feelings of pleasure and pain. Fear, for example, is >>> explainable using Damasio's framework as such, and I can translate it >>> to the way I am asking the question as above: >>> >>> Question: What kind of organization arose during the evolutionary >>> process that led directly to the subjective experience of fear? >>> Answer: A cognitive architecture in which internal body states are >>> modeled and integrated using the same representational apparatus that >>> models the external world, so that one's adaptive responses >>> (fight/flight/freeze) to threatening stimuli become integrated into >>> the organism's cognitive state of affairs. In short, fear is what it >>> feels like to have a fear response (as manifest in the body by various >>> hormonal responses) to some real or imagined stimuli. >>> >>> You can substitute any emotion for fear, so long as you can identify >>> the way that emotion manifests in the body/brain in terms of hormonal >>> or other mechanisms. But when it comes to pain and pleasure, I don't >>> think that it is necessary to have such an advanced cognitive >>> architecture, I think. So on a more fundamental level, the question >>> remains: >>> >>> What kind of organization arose during the evolutionary process that >>> led directly to the subjective experience of pain and pleasure? >>> >>> Or put another way, what kind of mechanism feels pleasurable or >>> painful from the inside? >>> >>> Presumably the answer to this question occurred earlier in the >>> evolutionary process than the emergence of fear, surprise, hunger, and >>> so on. >>> >>> Terren >> >> >> To go a little further with this, take sexual orgasm. What is >> happening during orgasm that makes it so pleasurable? >> >> Presumably there are special circuits in the brain that get activated, >> which correlate to the flush of orgasmic pleasure. But what is special >> about those circuits? From a 3p perspective, how is one brain circuit >> differentiated from another? It can't be as simple as the >> neurotransmitters involved; what would make one neurotransmitter be >> causative of pain and another of pleasure? It's shape? That seems >> absurd. >> >> It seems that the consequence of that neural circuit firing would have >> to achieve some kind of systemic effect that is characterized... how? >> >> Pain is just as mysterious. It's not as simple as "what it feels like >> for a system to become damaged". Phantom limbs, for example, are often >> excruciatingly painful. Pain is clearly in the mind. What cognitive >> mechanism could you characterize as feeling painful from the inside? >> >> Failure to account for this in mechanistic terms, for me, is a direct >> threat to the legitimacy of mechanism. > > > Failure to account for this in *any* 3p sense would be a direct threat to > the legitimacy of science. > > I am not sure only mechanism is in difficulty here, unless you have a reason > to believe that "infinities" could explain the pain quale. > > On the contrary mechanism explains that there is an unavoidable clash > between the 1p view and the 3p view. The 1p view (Bp & p, say) is the same > as the 3p view (Bp), but this is only "known" by the divine intellect (G*). > It cannot be known by the correct machine itself. So mechanism (or weaker) > *can* explain why the 1p seems non mechanical, and in some sense is not > 1p-mechanical, which explains why we feel something like a dualism. This > dualism really exist epistemologically, even if the divine intellect (G*) > knows that is an illusion. It is a real self-referentially correct > "illusion". > > Bruno > Hi Bruno, I'm with you... See my response to acw... I need to think some more on it. Thanks for your replies. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UD* and consciousness
On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 6:20 PM, acw wrote: > Pain - immediate actions, random or not, to specific dangerous stimuli. > Aversion/avoidance in more complex organisms (such as those capable of > expecting or predicting painful stimuli). > Pleasure - reduced or repeated same actions, to specific pelasurable > stimuli. Pleasure seeking behavior in more complex organisms (such as those > capable of expecting or predicting pleasurable stimuli). > Stimuli can be both internal (emotion) or external (senses). > Obviously for beings as complex as humans the nature of certain emotions can > be much more complex than that because they are mixed in with many others, > but I think that's what the simplest behavioral characterization of > pain/pleasure that I know of. Just a quick response acw, to say thanks for your responses. I basically agree with everything you've said, it makes total sense to me. And yet, I am not doing a very good job of expressing myself (to myself even) because I'm still not satisfied. There's an intuitive sense I have of a problem that's deeper than anything I've been able to express so far... and it may turn out to be something else, but I won't know until I can communicate it. I also won't have much time in the next week for anything so didn't want to leave you hanging. So I will reflect on what you and Bruno have said... thanks again. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
Thanks, I'll give it another shot. All the best, marty a. From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sat, February 25, 2012 5:05:35 AM Subject: Re: The free will function Hi Marty, On 25 Feb 2012, at 01:51, marty684 wrote: >> >>Why should probability depend on us; on what we 'know or cannot know' ? On >>what >>is 'observable' to us? It seems to me that you are defining probability by >>that >>which is relative to our 'actual states'. Why can't we >>inhabit a seeminglyprobablistic part of an infinite, determined universe ? But that is the case. If you define the reality by a tiny part of arithmetic (equivalent with the UD), you have a deterministic structure, which from our points of view will look indeterministic. The probability are relative to us, because we are the one doing the experience. Suppose you decide to throw a coin. To predict what will happen to you you have to look at all the computation accessing the computational state you have when throwing the coin, and infer what will happen from a measure on the continuations. I'm delighted to learn that I understood you after all. Thanks for this further clarification. You are welcome. > > > > Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in case of >problem, so we might single out the precise point where you don't succeed to >grasp why comp put probabilities, or credibilities, uncertainties, in front >of >everything. UDA1-7 is enough to get this. UDA-8 is needed only for the more >subtle immateriality point implied by computationalism. > >> >> >> >>My attempts to read UDA were never successful. Sorry. >> >>May be you have a problem with my english. Please, begin by the step one, on >>page 4 of sane04, read it, and tell me precisely what you don't understand in >>the step 1. I might need to re-explain comp to you, or you can glance its >>definition on page 2. When you will grasp step 1, we will be able to go to the 2th step, and so one. Bruno I don't have a problem with your english. I have a problem with the logical complexity of your work. It is not simple, but not *that* difficult either (I mean UDA, AUDA needs a background in logic which is not so well taught). Also I no longer remember where to find the text you're referring to. Warmest wishes, marty You can find the paper, and the unique slide to easily remember the different steps here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
Hi Marty, On 25 Feb 2012, at 01:51, marty684 wrote: Why should probability depend on us; on what we 'know or cannot know' ? On what is 'observable' to us? It seems to me that you are defining probability by that which is relative to our 'actual states'. Why can't we inhabit a seeminglyprobablistic part of an infinite, determined universe ? But that is the case. If you define the reality by a tiny part of arithmetic (equivalent with the UD), you have a deterministic structure, which from our points of view will look indeterministic. The probability are relative to us, because we are the one doing the experience. Suppose you decide to throw a coin. To predict what will happen to you you have to look at all the computation accessing the computational state you have when throwing the coin, and infer what will happen from a measure on the continuations. I'm delighted to learn that I understood you after all. Thanks for this further clarification. You are welcome. Read UDA, and ask question for each step, in case of problem, so we might single out the precise point where you don't succeed to grasp why comp put probabilities, or credibilities, uncertainties, in front of everything. UDA1-7 is enough to get this. UDA-8 is needed only for the more subtle immateriality point implied by computationalism. My attempts to read UDA were never successful. Sorry. May be you have a problem with my english. Please, begin by the step one, on page 4 of sane04, read it, and tell me precisely what you don't understand in the step 1. I might need to re-explain comp to you, or you can glance its definition on page 2. When you will grasp step 1, we will be able to go to the 2th step, and so one. Bruno I don't have a problem with your english. I have a problem with the logical complexity of your work. It is not simple, but not *that* difficult either (I mean UDA, AUDA needs a background in logic which is not so well taught). Also I no longer remember where to find the text you're referring to. Warmest wishes, marty You can find the paper, and the unique slide to easily remember the different steps here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On 25 Feb 2012, at 01:21, meekerdb wrote: On 2/24/2012 3:05 PM, John Mikes wrote: People have too much time on their hand to argue back and forth. Whatever (theory) we talk about has been born from human mind(s) consequently only HALF _ TRUE max (if at all). Almost all our theories are not only probably false, they are *known* to be false. But that doesn't mean they should be discarded or they are not useful. It means they have limited accuracy and limited domains of validity. "I" imagine te doctor, "I" imagine the numbers (there are none in Nature) "I" imagine controversies and matches, arithemtics, calculus and bio. Project the "I"-s into 3rd person "I"-s and FEEL justified to BELIEVE that it is T R U E . "True" means different things in different theories. Yes. Unlike computability, truth, but also probability, definability, etc. is highly dependent of the theory or machine used. With Church thesis, computability is the same for machines, alines, Gods, every possible "one". All the rest is relative. In ordinary, declarative speech it means correspondence with a fact. In science it's the goal of predictive accuracy over the whole range of applications and consilience with other all other 'true' theories. In logic it's an attribute "t" of propositions that are axioms and that's preserved by the rules of inference. How 'universal' is a universal machine (number)? it extends its universality till our imagination's end. Can we imagine what we cannot imagine? We have to build on what we have. Exactly. Brent You have to make the good out of the bad because that is all you have got to make it out of. --- Robert Penn Warren Not bad :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On 25 Feb 2012, at 00:05, John Mikes wrote: People have too much time on their hand to argue back and forth. Whatever (theory) we talk about has been born from human mind(s) consequently only HALF _ TRUE max (if at all). "I" imagine te doctor, "I" imagine the numbers (there are none in Nature) "I" imagine controversies and matches, arithemtics, calculus and bio. Project the "I"-s into 3rd person "I"-s and FEEL justified to BELIEVE that it is T R U E . How 'universal' is a universal machine (number)? it extends its universality till our imagination's end. Can we imagine what we cannot imagine? Yes. Universal machine can do that by using implicitly or explicitly the diagonalization technic. That is why the closure of the UMs for diagonalization is a very strong evidence for their universality. If you doubt about Church thesis, it is up to you to give an argument against it. We never "know" any truth in science. Only philosophers argue for the truth and falsity of proposition. In science we build theories, with the hope to see them wrong one day. That's the only way we can learn. Bruno JM On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 2:42 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Has someone already mentioned this? I woke up in the middle of the night with this, so it might not make sense...or... The idea of saying yes to the doctor presumes that we, in the thought experiment, bring to the thought experiment universe: 1. our sense of own significance (we have to be able to care about ourselves and our fate in the first place) 2. our perceptual capacity to jump to conclusions without logic (we have to be able feel what it seems like rather than know what it simply is.) Because of 1, it is assumed that the thought experiment universe includes the subjective experience of personal value - that the patient has a stake, or 'money to bet'. Because of 2, it is assumed that libertarian free will exists in the scenario - we have to be able to 'bet' in the first place. As far as I know, comp can only answer 'True, doctor', 'False, doctor', or 'I don't know, or I can't answer, doctor.' So, what this means is that in the scenario, while not precluding that a form of comp based consciousness could exist, does preclude that it is the only form of consciousness that exists, so therefore does not prove that in comp consciousness must arise from comp since it relies on non-comp to prove it. The same goes for the Turing Test, which after all is only about betting on imitation. Does the robot seem real to me? Bruno adds another layer to this by forcing our thought experimenter to care whether they are or not. What say ye, mighty logicians? Both of these tests succeed unintentionally at revealing the essentials of consciousness, not in front of our eyes with the thought experiment, but behind our backs. The sleight of hand is hidden innocently in the assumption of free will (and significance). In any universe where consciousness arises from comp, consciousness may be able to pass or fail the test as the tested object, but it cannot receive the test as a testing subject unless free will and significance are already presumed to be comp. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The thermodynamics of computation
On 20.02.2012 19:54 meekerdb said the following: ... I'm beginning to think you have never taken a class in statistical mechanics. There's a good online course here: http://farside.ph.utexas.edu/teaching/sm1/lectures/lectures.html Those particularly relevant to this thread start at http://farside.ph.utexas.edu/teaching/sm1/lectures/node61.html and go through the next six or seven. I wanted to study this text to understand the relationship between the entropy and information better. However, I cannot find information in there, say I guess "How can we obtain some information about the statistical properties of the molecules which make up air?" you do not mean the term information in this sentence. It seems that this is a normal course on statistical thermodynamics as I get used to where there is no notion of information in thermodynamics. Have I missed something? How this link helps us in our discussion from your viewpoint? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On 24 Feb 2012, at 23:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 23, 9:41 pm, Pierz wrote: Let us suppose you're right and... but hold on! We can't do that. That would be "circular". That would be sneaking in the assumption that you're right from the outset. That would be "shifty', "fishy", etc etc. You just don't seem to grasp the rudiments of philosophical reasoning. I understand that it seems that way to you. 'Yes doctor' is not an underhand move. Not intentionally. It asks you up-front to assume that comp is true in order then to examine the implications of that, whilst acknowledging (by calling it a 'bet') that this is just a hypothesis, an unprovable leap of faith. I think that asking for an unprovable leap of faith in this context is philosophically problematic since the purpose of computation is to make unprovable leaps of faith unnecessary. This is were you are the most wrong from a theoretical computer science pov. It is just an Aristotelian myth than science can avoid leap of faith. Doubly so for a (meta) theory like comp, where we bet on a form of reincarnation. Betting on a reality or on self-consistency gives a tremendous selective advantage, but it can never be 100% justified rationally. Comp meta-justifies the need of going beyond pure reason. Correct betting mechanism cannot be 100% rational. That'swhat is cute with incompleteness-like phenomena, they show that reason *can* see beyond reason, and indeed 99,9% of the self-referential truth belongs to the unjustifiable. You complain that using the term 'bet' assumes non-comp (I suppose because computers can't bet, or care about their bets), but that is just daft. Saying 'that is just daft' to something which is clearly the honest truth in my estimation doesn't persuade me in the slightest. You might as well argue that the UDA is invalid because it is couched in natural language, which no computer can (or according to you, could ever) understand. If we accepted such arguments, we'd be incapable of debating comp at all. That would be ok with me. I don't see anything to debate with comp, because I understand why it seems like it could be true but actually isn't. But, as you seem to believe yourself, it is just the case that the 1p cannot feel like comp is true. It is due to the clash between Bp and Bp & p I have just been talking about in my previous mail. Saying 'no' to the doctor is anyone's right - nobody forces you to accept that first step or tries to pull the wool over your eyes if you choose to say 'yes'. Having said no you can then either say "I don't believe in comp because (I just don't like it, it doesn't feel right, it's against my religion etc)" or you can present a rational argument against it. Or you can be rationally skeptical about it and say "It has not been proved" or "I see through the logic and understand the error in its assumptions". I will never been proved, for purely logical reason. Comp can only be refuted, or hoped. Comp remains science, at the meta-level, but saying "yes" to a doctor asks for a leap of faith. That is to say, if asked to justify why you say no, you can either provide no reason and say simply that you choose to bet against it - which is OK but uninteresting - or you can present some reasoning which attempts to refute comp. You've made many such attempts, though to be honest all I've ever really been able to glean from your arguments is a sort of impressionistic revulsion at the idea of humans being computers, That is your impressionistic revulsion at the idea of stepping outside the entrenched positions of the argument. I have no revulsion whatsoever at the idea of humans being computers. As I have mentioned several times, I have believed in comp for most of my life, for the same reasons that you do. I am fine with being uploaded and digitized, but I know now why that won't work. I know exactly why. Then you are not a machine. That's possible, but up to now, it is just a begging type of argument, given that you don't succeed to provide an argument for how and why you know that. The very fact that you feel obliged to mention that you know that can only make us suspicious that actually you don't have an argument, but only a feeling. Then such feeling are already explainable by machine. Machine also said that they (1p) knows that they are not any machine we could describe to them, and later, by deepening the introspection and the study of comp, they can understand that such a knowledge proves nothing. Bruno yet one which seems founded in a fundamental misunderstanding about what a computer is. I have been using and programming computers almost every day for the last 30 years. I know exactly what a computer is. You repeatedly mistake the mathematical construct for the concrete, known object you use to type up your posts. This has been pointed out many times, but you still make arguments like that
Re: The free will function
On 24 Feb 2012, at 22:59, acw wrote: On 2/24/2012 12:59, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2012 11:52, acw wrote: I look at it like this, there's 3 notions: Mind (consciousness, experience), (Primitive) Matter, Mechanism. Those 3 notions are incompatible, but we have experience of all 3, mind is the sum of our experience and thus is the most direct thing possible, even if non-communicable, matter is what is directly inferred from our experience (but we don't know if it's the base of everything) and mechanism which means our experience is lawful (following rules). By induction we build mechanistic (mathematical) models of matter. We can't really avoid any of the 3: one is primary, the other is directly sensible, the other can be directly inferred. However, there are many thought experiments that illustrate that these notions are incompatible - you can have any 2 of them, but never all 3. Take away mind and you have eliminative materialism - denying the existence of mind to save primary matter and its mechanistic appearence. (This tends to be seen as a behavioral COMP). Too bad this is hard to stomach because all our theories are learned through our experiences, thus it's a bit self-defeating. Take away primitive matter and you have COMP and other platonic versions where matter is a mathematical shadow. Mind becomes how some piece of abstract math feels from the inside. This is disliked by those that wish matter was more fundamental or that it allows too many fantasies into reality (even if low-measure). Take away mechanism and you get some magical form of matter which cannot obey any rules - not even all possible rules Nice summary. You say "Mind becomes how some piece of abstract math feels from the inside", which is essentially how Bruno puts it. However, this must still fall short of an identity claim - i.e. it seems obvious that mind is no more "identical" to math or computation than it is to matter, unless that relation is to be re-defined as "categorically different". Math and mind are still distinct, though correlated. Do you think that such a duality can still be subsumed in some sort of neutral monism? Obviously not all computations have minds like ours associated with them. I'm not sure if identity is the right claim, but I'm not sure there's much to gain by adding extra "indirection layers" - it's not that consciousness is associated with some scribbles on a piece of paper, it's associated with some abstract truths and we could say that 3p-wise those truths look like some specific structure we can talk about (using pen and paper or computers), but at the same time, that that abstract structure does have some sensory experience associated with it. Other structure might represent some machines implementing some partial local physics. In that way it's neutral monist. We could try to keep experience separate and supervening on arithmetical truth, but I'm not sure if there's anything to gain by introducing such a dualism - it might make epistemological sense, but I'm not sure it makes sense ontologically. I'm rather unsure of such a move myself, I wonder what Bruno's opinion is on this. I think that we don't have to introduce an ontological dualism, because the dualism is unavoidable from the machine points of view, if you agree to 1) model belief (by ideally arithmetically and self-referentially correct machine) by Gödel's provability. I can provide many reason to do that, even if it oversimplifies the problem. The interesting things is that it leads to an already very complex "machine's theology". We might take it as a toy theology, but then all theories are sort of toys. 2) to accept that S4 (or T, = S4 without Bp -> BBp) provides the best axiomatic theories for knowledge. Then it can be shown that the modality (Bp & p) gives a notion of knowledge, i.e. (Bp & p) obeys S4, even a stronger S4Grz theory. The relevant results here are that G* proves that Bp is equivalent with Bp & p, but G does not prove that, and so, this is a point where the "divine intellect" (G*), the believer (G) and the kower (soul) Bp & p, will completely differ, and this will account for a variety of dualism, unavoidable for the machine. So yes, this is neutral monism. The TOE is just arithmetic, and the definition above explains why, at the least, the machine will behaves as if dualism was true for her ... until she bet on comp and understand the talk of her own G*, without making the error of taking that talk for granted (because she cannot know, nor believe, nor even explictly express that she is correct). Hope this might help, but if you want I can explain more on G, G*, S4Grz, and the Z and X logics. Those are not logic invented to solve problems, like in analytical philosophy, but unavoidable nuances brought by the provably correct self-reference logic of machines in theoretical com
Re: UD* and consciousness
On 24 Feb 2012, at 21:51, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 3:30 PM, Terren Suydam > wrote: On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 2:27 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/24/2012 10:26 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: I certainly will. In the meantime, do you have an example from Damasio (or any other source) that could shed light on the pain/pleasure phenomenon? Terren http://www.hedweb.com/bgcharlton/damasioreview.html I think emotions represent something above and beyond the more fundamental feelings of pleasure and pain. Fear, for example, is explainable using Damasio's framework as such, and I can translate it to the way I am asking the question as above: Question: What kind of organization arose during the evolutionary process that led directly to the subjective experience of fear? Answer: A cognitive architecture in which internal body states are modeled and integrated using the same representational apparatus that models the external world, so that one's adaptive responses (fight/flight/freeze) to threatening stimuli become integrated into the organism's cognitive state of affairs. In short, fear is what it feels like to have a fear response (as manifest in the body by various hormonal responses) to some real or imagined stimuli. You can substitute any emotion for fear, so long as you can identify the way that emotion manifests in the body/brain in terms of hormonal or other mechanisms. But when it comes to pain and pleasure, I don't think that it is necessary to have such an advanced cognitive architecture, I think. So on a more fundamental level, the question remains: What kind of organization arose during the evolutionary process that led directly to the subjective experience of pain and pleasure? Or put another way, what kind of mechanism feels pleasurable or painful from the inside? Presumably the answer to this question occurred earlier in the evolutionary process than the emergence of fear, surprise, hunger, and so on. Terren To go a little further with this, take sexual orgasm. What is happening during orgasm that makes it so pleasurable? Presumably there are special circuits in the brain that get activated, which correlate to the flush of orgasmic pleasure. But what is special about those circuits? From a 3p perspective, how is one brain circuit differentiated from another? It can't be as simple as the neurotransmitters involved; what would make one neurotransmitter be causative of pain and another of pleasure? It's shape? That seems absurd. It seems that the consequence of that neural circuit firing would have to achieve some kind of systemic effect that is characterized... how? Pain is just as mysterious. It's not as simple as "what it feels like for a system to become damaged". Phantom limbs, for example, are often excruciatingly painful. Pain is clearly in the mind. What cognitive mechanism could you characterize as feeling painful from the inside? Failure to account for this in mechanistic terms, for me, is a direct threat to the legitimacy of mechanism. Failure to account for this in *any* 3p sense would be a direct threat to the legitimacy of science. I am not sure only mechanism is in difficulty here, unless you have a reason to believe that "infinities" could explain the pain quale. On the contrary mechanism explains that there is an unavoidable clash between the 1p view and the 3p view. The 1p view (Bp & p, say) is the same as the 3p view (Bp), but this is only "known" by the divine intellect (G*). It cannot be known by the correct machine itself. So mechanism (or weaker) *can* explain why the 1p seems non mechanical, and in some sense is not 1p-mechanical, which explains why we feel something like a dualism. This dualism really exist epistemologically, even if the divine intellect (G*) knows that is an illusion. It is a real self-referentially correct "illusion". Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 24 Feb 2012, at 18:26, 1Z wrote: On Feb 22, 2:14 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: Contrarily to what Peter Jones (1Z) asserts frequently, we don't suppose Platonism, nor immateriality, we just suppose that we can use the excluded middle principle for the Sigma_1 arithmetical sentences. If you want to say I am being simulated on a UD, you need an existing UD. Yes, but elementary arithmetic prove that UDs exist, in the sense that the truth of Ex(x is a UD) does not depend of you, like the truth of Ex(x is prime) does not depend of you. It isn't in the material universe. Well, this confirms again that you have a problem only in UDA-step 8. Here you are just begging the question by defining existence by material existence. Let me ask you two questions. First I define a big-robust physical universe, by a universe which run some UD. Do you agree that comp +robust-universe entails the complete reduction of physics to computer science. If you say no, can you pinpoint the step in UDA1-6 you disagree with. If you say yes, then we might have to come back on MGA. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UD* and consciousness
On 24 Feb 2012, at 06:20, meekerdb wrote: On 2/23/2012 6:00 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Thu, Feb 23, 2012 at 7:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/23/2012 2:49 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: As wild or counter-intuitive as it may be though, it really has no consequences to speak of in the ordinary, mundane living of life. To paraphrase Eliezer Yudkowsky, "it has to add up to normal". On the other hand, once AGIs start to appear, or we begin to merge more explicitly with machines, then the theories become more important. Perhaps then comp will be made illegal, so as to constrain freedoms given to machines. I could certainly see there being significant resistance to humans augmenting their brains with computers... maybe that would be illegal too, in the interest of control or keeping a level playing field. Is that what you mean? There will be legal and ethical questions about how we and machines should treat one another. Just being conscious won't mean much though. As Jeremy Bentham said of animals, "It's not whether they can think, it's whether they can suffer." Brent That brings up the interesting question of how you could explain which conscious beings are capable of suffering and which ones aren't. I'm sure some people would make the argument that anything we might call conscious would be capable of suffering. One way or the other it would seem to require a theory of consciousness in which the character of experience can be mapped somehow to 3p processes. For instance, pain I can make sense of in terms of what it feels like for a being's structure to become "less organized" though I'm not sure how to formalize that, and I'm not completely comfortable with that characterization. However, the reverse idea that pleasure might be what it feels like for one's structure to become "more organized" seems like a stretch and hard to connect with the reality of, for example, a nice massage. I don't think becoming more or less organized has any direct bearing on pain or pleasure. Physical pain and pleasure are reactions built- in by evolution for survival benefits. If a fire makes you too hot, you move away from it, even though it's not "disorganizing" you. On the other hand, cancer is generally painless in its early stages. And psychological suffering can be very bad without any physical damage. I don't think suffering requires consciousness, ? Suffering is a conscious experience, I would say by definition. at least not human-like consciousness, All right then. Humans, I guess, add a strong emotional response to suffering, because its self-referential means allow them to interpret them as integrity and life threat. but psychological suffering might require consciousness in the form of self-reflection. Pain, and direct suffering, is only a build-in message, making an animal avoiding something threatening its life. This has to be unconscious and non voluntary. If not the animal response would not been made. But the integrated organism will be conscious of something global and easy to remember, so that it can anticipate it in similar situation. Basically, I think the difference between low level direct pain and high level reflexive emotions might occur at the threshold between non Löbianity and Löbianity, which technically is the difference between a six length program and an 8 length program. For the first pain is a sensation to avoid, here and now; for the later pain is a sensation to avoid in general. This difference might have appeared a very long time ago, with the invertebrates like octopi and spider, but perhaps earlier. This does not solve the question of the quale of pain, but this question needs a better understanding of consciousness, and will differ in the case we agree that a UMs is already conscious or not. I am not yet quite sure about this. I have thought for a long time that consciousness begin with Löbianity and is always related with a duration sensation, but I have changed my mind on this. I tend to think now that all UMs are conscious, and that Löbianity is needed only for the higher duration feelings and emotions. For UMs, shit can happen, but only LUMs makes it into a long term problem, eventually a religious/philosophical one. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
