Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? For example the impedance model of a Li-ion battery http://www.unibw.de/eit8_2/forschung-en/projekte/battery/battery is not the Li-ion battery. Even the Newman model of a Li-ion battery http://www.cadfem.de/uploads/pics/EMobilitaet-01_w530.jpg is not the Li-ion battery. By the way, when you talk about a representation, you come to the territory of semiotics (the world of signs) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/ What we see here is Peirce's basic claim that signs consist of three interrelated parts: a sign, an object, and an interpretant. From such a viewpoint, simulation as such represents nothing. Evgenii 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter and energy? 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding* of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality? Thanks -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: QTI and eternal torment
On 08 Jun 2012, at 19:30, Johnathan Corgan wrote: On Fri, Jun 8, 2012 at 12:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence of) first person view? I think this is actually the point--calculations of expected future experiences based on now being in the neighborhood of D (which result in torment) should instead be calculated based on now being in the neighborhood of the transition from C-U, as D and U are indistinguishable. Calculating expectation on this basis results in much better anticipated outcomes, according to the paper. OK, that makes sense (in comp). I will look at the paper, when I found the time ... (exam period!). Given that very minimal change in the brain seems to be able to send someone in the amnesic arithmetical heaven, as illustrated by some drugs The changes you note may be minimal in the macro sense (small delta concentrations of receptor ligands in the synaptic cleft), but result in profoundly different trajectories of firing patterns at the systemic level. That might be a reason to expect such deep jump in the very actual conscious experience, when near death. Such experiences occur also at sleep where we can easily jump from normal mundane state of consciousness to quite altered one, and this seems most plausible for possible consistent continuations in extreme situation. That might have evolutionary advantage also, like the ability to continue some fight after big injuries, and there are evidences for this. The brain is more than a neural net, it is a sophisticated chemical drug factory. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: QTI and eternal torment
On Saturday, June 9, 2012 12:27:43 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: On 6/8/2012 7:02 PM, Pierz wrote: I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other what ifs. But I think I see a couple of flaws in this argument. Firstly, I am not sure about the equation of unconsciousness with death. Why should coma be any different from deep sleep - i.e. a state of minimal consciousness which one cannot remember in retrospect but which nevertheless is a legitimate 1p view? One does not miraculously avoid sleep each night (well, come to think of it, I do, but that's another story!). I think this is the point Bruno is making. But there's a deeper problem I think with the idea of avoiding the 'vicinity' of death. QI says you can never end up on a branch in which you are dead. That's clear enough - so long as you grant that death is 'no-point-of-view', i.e., there is no no afterlife. But *someone* ends up on all the branches, so long as there is a point of view associated wi th them. Even if there is a cul-de-sac branch in which the probability of death is 100%, some version of you goes down that track. So right up until the very brink of death, you should expect your experience to follow the probabilities given by normal physics and statistical expectations. You can't, by QI, 'foresee' that a branch is a cul-de-sac in advance and so trim it out of your possible futures. But because there is always a finite, if vanishingly small, probability of not dying, one might expect that one will always find oneself 'sliding along the edge of death' so to speak, always just barely avoiding oblivion. But this is reminiscent of Zeno's paradox. How can one's experience follow normal statistical rules right up until a certain limit, then diverge from them to an ever greater, more improbable extent? QI is another of the absurd paradoxes that arises when trying to reconcile objectivity and subjectivity. I think we'd be better adopting something analogous to Einst ein's assumption with regard to speed - namely that the laws of physics appear the same to us regardless of our velocity. By the same type of reasoning, we should assume that the laws of statistical probability (physics) will continue to apply at every point of our experience, even at liminal points like death. I personally favour the idea of primary consciousness, so I'm quite happy with the idea that 1p experience bridges death. If you don't swallow that, I suppose the onus is on you to explain away the paradox by some other means. Even if computation is fundamental and physics is derivative, that still leaves consciousness as derivative too and possibly derivative from physics. I don't see how comp allows consciousness to be derived from physics, since comp assumes consciousness supervenes on computations that Bruno shows must be defined purely mathematically. But that aside, I'm not entirely sold on comp. Logic won't prove it - I think we all accept that - so while I can't refute comp, neither do I see myself forced to accept it. I remain agnostic on ontological questions, but I incline to a view of consciousness (not arithmetic) as primary. The gulf between the subjective and the objective remains mysterious and unbridged - what does qualia are what computations feel like from the inside really mean? Why is there an inside at all? To me, it's all just a little too neat - a simple package that seals up the universe inside it and declares it solved, but in a way that amounts to little more than saying everything happens - a supremely permissive explanatory context! But anyway, that's all a well-eaten can of worms. The point I'm making above is about the logic of the cited paper and is talking about MWI not comp. If 'you' is identified with certain computations, some of which constitute your consciousness it is still the case that there are a great many threads of computation that are *not* you, so it is possible that all those threads that are 'you' stop being you, e.g. you're dead. Of course it may be that the threads constituting 'you' approach some simple state so that the closest continuation is the simple computational thread of a lizard, bacterium, or fetus. So you now can think of 'you' as continuing in this way - although it becomes rather arbitrary which lizard you will be. Sure. In comp, the cessation of 'you' is merely an abrupt change in the state of certain computational threads. Identity is merely the continuity of self reference, and there are many ways, death being one of them (possibly), in which such continuity might be disrupted. It's one solution to the paradox I mention. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit
Re: QTI and eternal torment
On 08 Jun 2012, at 20:52, Nick Prince wrote: On Jun 8, 8:45 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Nick, This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence of) first person view? I've drawn the branches so that they represent a 3p viewpoint of someone observing us over time - i.e. we are schrodingers cat! So U means observer sees us as unconsciouss and D means observer sees us as dead. The ist person view that we see would always be C according to the branches I've drawn, provided that you discard all branches that have death D preceded by U. I wish I could draw it but I'm limited on this user interface. ist branch is C - U or C then from the U of this branch, we get U or D or C I'm bothered by the fact that the observer would end up seeing zombies! If you have a C-U or C and then if the new branch from the U is U - D or U or C then 1p (cat) would see only C as expected. His route woud be C-C because the whole second branch is deleted. However the observer that goes down the U branch would see the cat go into some sort of scenario resulting in U or C or D. If it turns out that C occurs then the cat is seen as consciouss and yet it is disjoint from the conscioussness of the original cat. I'll have to really think about this one in terms of the early steps of your UDA. OK. In my opinion, based on the post, I would say that U and D are equivalent. There are no zombies, nor absolute bodies. Given that very minimal change in the brain seems to be able to send someone in the amnesic arithmetical heaven, as illustrated by some drugs, I am not sure we should worry about QM immortality, which arises itself from the comp immortality. It illustrates also that backtracking might be more probable. Technically this is difficult to compute, and if QM is true yet comp false, I would worry more on this. I do appreciate that people are aware that notions of after-life makes sense, and are hard to avoid with current theories. Yet, without handling the whole theology, and not just its physical aspects, we can come easily to weird conclusions. With comp there are too much open problems to decide on this in any quick way. Of course we can speculate. It is a fascinating subject. What do you mean by backtracking? Imagine that you decide to kill yourself with an atomic bomb, so as to maximize your annihilation probability. Then it might be that your probability of surviving in a world where you are just not deciding to kill yourself is bigger than surviving from some quantum tunnel effect through the bomb's released energy. In that sense, the effect of the bomb makes you backtrack up to a reality where you are just not using the bomb. To solve this is really a question of comparing the measure on the computational histories, including the one with partial amnesia (which makes things more difficult, but already more quantum like, because amnesia might explain the fusion of computations, from the first person point of view). Reports of dreams and drug experiences involving partial momentary amnesia suggest that such a backtracking is highly plausible, imo. And the existence of quantum erasing suggests that our first person plural sharable computations allows such a backtracking to occur in nature. Such a backtracking (proposed once by Saibal Mitra on this list) can also be used to defend the idea that there is only one person, and that personal identity is a relative illusory notion. We might be a God playing a trick to himself, notably by becoming amnesic on who and what he is. Bruno What, you ask, was the beginning of it all? And it is this ... Existence that multiplied itself For sheer delight of being And plunged into numberless trillions of forms So that it might Find Itself Innumerably (Aurobindo) Bruno On 08 Jun 2012, at 01:11, Nick Prince wrote: I’ve just read the following paper : http://istvanaranyosi.net/resources/Should%20we%20fear%20qt %20final.pdf which argues that it is possible to avoid the descent into decrepitude that seems to follow from the quantum theory of immortality (QTI). Aranyosi argues that this is plausible on the grounds that any death branch would be preceded by an unconsciousness branch. Under normal QTI circumstances, if we were Schrödinger’s cat we would come across the (3p) node (L= Lives, D= Dies): DD LLL LLL To see the cat’s (1p), view we discard the branch, but we will more than likely be harmed at each branch and therefore become more decrepit. If I understand it correctly, and keeping things simple, Aranyosi seems to be arguing that, by assuming that unconsciousness precedes a death branch, then for 3p we have two types of branching: (where C=Conscious, U = unconscious). First a triple branch: D DDDX U..UU
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always the case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer, there are possible exact model, like a digital brain and its corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those cannot be distinguished in any immediate way. If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Bruno For example the impedance model of a Li-ion battery http://www.unibw.de/eit8_2/forschung-en/projekte/battery/battery is not the Li-ion battery. Even the Newman model of a Li-ion battery http://www.cadfem.de/uploads/pics/EMobilitaet-01_w530.jpg is not the Li-ion battery. By the way, when you talk about a representation, you come to the territory of semiotics (the world of signs) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/ What we see here is Peirce's basic claim that signs consist of three interrelated parts: a sign, an object, and an interpretant. From such a viewpoint, simulation as such represents nothing. Evgenii 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter and energy? 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding* of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality? Thanks -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always the case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer, there are possible exact model, like a digital brain and its corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those cannot be distinguished in any immediate way. If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us assume comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that arithmetics - mind - physics Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always the case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer, there are possible exact model, like a digital brain and its corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those cannot be distinguished in any immediate way. If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us assume comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that arithmetics - mind - physics Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Quentin Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: QTI and eternal torment
On 9 June 2012 11:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Such a backtracking (proposed once by Saibal Mitra on this list) can also be used to defend the idea that there is only one person, and that personal identity is a relative illusory notion. We might be a God playing a trick to himself, notably by becoming amnesic on who and what he is. We seem to agree on this, at least some of the time! If we entertain such notions, the question then presents itself - assuming one doesn't accept, with Hoyle, that this similarly entails only one multiplexed stream of consciousness - how only one person can be conceived as being the subject of every experience simultaneously? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always the case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer, there are possible exact model, like a digital brain and its corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those cannot be distinguished in any immediate way. If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us assume comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that arithmetics - mind - physics Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in simulation, my simulated computer in front of simulated myself will not make simulated myself wet. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always the case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer, there are possible exact model, like a digital brain and its corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those cannot be distinguished in any immediate way. If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us assume comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that arithmetics - mind - physics Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in simulation, my simulated computer ?? No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the 1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as the simulated simulated you). Quentin in front of simulated myself will not make simulated myself wet. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On Friday, June 8, 2012 1:36:31 PM UTC-7, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jun 8, 3:00 pm, Pzomby htra...@gmail.com wrote: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. We can create models for ourselves, but nothing else in the universe reads them that way. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter and energy? If so that would mean that mathematics is either: a) encoded in something other than mathematics - if so, whatever it is that math can be encoded into (matter) makes encoding redundant and unexplainable. If you have something other than math, then why does math need to be encoded as it? b) encoded as some other mathematical formula - if so, then the appearance of the encoded non-math is redundant and unexplainable. 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding* of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality? They are a partial decoding. The modeling process allows our mind to recover some essential sense experience of the physics, thereby superimposing a supersignifying abstraction layer on our experience of it's reality. My view in a nutshell: Sense is not an emergent property of information. Significance is a recovered property* of sense. Thanks for your input. Some of what you state I follow, but some I do not, but I set that aside. To further clarify: The best analogy as to what I was considering is the role of DNA in biological processes. DNA is coded by/with classified amino acids that eventually through time and growth display the physical results of the coding. Interpreting the DNA code or *decoding* gives rise to theoretical mathematically described simulations, emulations or models, etc of a physical body containing a physical brain. DNA is a dimensional physical exemplification or instantiation that can be *decoded* and then be simulated or modeled as a complete body brain (if there is such a thing). If it is assumed the brain is a natural computer, the DNA should contain an encoded version of that same brain. This in turn gives rise to the questions of interpretations or maybe more importantly misinterpretations (beliefs) by the brain (natural computer) of what the 6 senses observe. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/ml2ND3NB_XAJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09.06.2012 18:07 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: ... Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in simulation, my simulated computer ?? No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the 1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as the simulated simulated you). This I do not quite understand. What does it mean simulated levels in simulation? After all my computer is simulated and I is simulated. Then what is difference between my computer that is simulated and myself that is simulated? Where the difference comes from? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 18:07 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: ... Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in simulation, my simulated computer ?? No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the 1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as the simulated simulated you). This I do not quite understand. What does it mean simulated levels in simulation? After all my computer is simulated and I is simulated. Then what is difference between my computer that is simulated and myself that is simulated? Where the difference comes from? You were talking about a 'you' being simulated inside a simulated computer (so that you is one level down from a simulated you in front of that simulated computer). So you have: real computer running a simulation. In that simulation a universal computer is built and on it (the simulated computer) a simulated being (part of the simulation at the level where the computer has been built) run another simulation, what is running on the simulated computer cannot affect the simulated being (which is in front of it, if the computer is a real simulation of a computer) but can affect simulated being running on the simulated world of that simulated computer. Quentin Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09.06.2012 20:00 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 18:07 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: ... Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in simulation, my simulated computer ?? No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the 1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as the simulated simulated you). This I do not quite understand. What does it mean simulated levels in simulation? After all my computer is simulated and I is simulated. Then what is difference between my computer that is simulated and myself that is simulated? Where the difference comes from? You were talking about a 'you' being simulated inside a simulated computer (so that you is one level down from a simulated you in front of that simulated computer). So you have: real computer running a simulation. In that simulation a universal computer is built and on it (the simulated computer) a simulated being (part of the simulation at the level where the computer has been built) run another simulation, what is running on the simulated computer cannot affect the simulated being (which is in front of it, if the computer is a real simulation of a computer) but can affect simulated being running on the simulated world of that simulated computer. No, I have meant a) simulated computer b) simulated myself (but not in a) Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed by some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would you define the difference then in this case? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 9 June 2012 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: No, I have meant a) simulated computer b) simulated myself (but not in a) Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed by some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would you define the difference then in this case? I agree with you that there is no difference if you are thinking in terms of a physical machine, and assume primitive physicality. In that case the very notion of computation itself is an unnecessary auxiliary assumption in explaining the machine's physical behaviour. But then how can you justify the computational theory of mind on which the whole notion of simulation of consciousness depends? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09.06.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following: On 9 June 2012 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru wrote: No, I have meant a) simulated computer b) simulated myself (but not in a) Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed by some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would you define the difference then in this case? I agree with you that there is no difference if you are thinking in terms of a physical machine, and assume primitive physicality. In that case the very notion of computation itself is an unnecessary auxiliary assumption in explaining the machine's physical behaviour. But then how can you justify the computational theory of mind on which the whole notion of simulation of consciousness depends? I am not sure if I want to justify something. I am rather in a mood for anarchy. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On Jun 9, 12:08 pm, Pzomby htra...@gmail.com wrote: Thanks for your input. Some of what you state I follow, but some I do not, but I set that aside. To further clarify: The best analogy as to what I was considering is the role of DNA in biological processes. DNA is coded by/with classified amino acids that eventually through time and growth display the physical results of the coding. Interpreting the DNA code or *decoding* gives rise to theoretical mathematically described simulations, emulations or models, etc of a physical body containing a physical brain. Not necessarily. All we really know is that genes code for protein. Protein synthesis, epigenetics, a whole universe of environmental interaction and top-down influence contribute to the overall development of a physical body. It's like saying that tcp/ip packets give rise to YouTube content. DNA is a dimensional physical exemplification or instantiation that can be *decoded* and then be simulated or modeled as a complete body brain (if there is such a thing). If it is assumed the brain is a natural computer, the DNA should contain an encoded version of that same brain. Our fingers are natural computers if we use them that way. Computation isn't necessarily a causally efficacious principle in the universe. I think that it's a sensory theme which is instrumental in maintaining solid objects through time, but that's about it. It has no feeling, meaning, power, or desire. The lowest, most common end of what we are looks like a brain, and computation is what goes on when we look at matter with matter. This in turn gives rise to the questions of interpretations or maybe more importantly misinterpretations (beliefs) by the brain (natural computer) of what the 6 senses observe. The brain computes, but it is also a collection of living organism. An electronic computer computes but it is not a living organism, and it is an inorganic assembly. The commonality is paper thin, and the difference extends back billions of years. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: QTI and eternal torment
On 6/9/2012 3:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Imagine that you decide to kill yourself with an atomic bomb, so as to maximize your annihilation probability. Then it might be that your probability of surviving in a world where you are just not deciding to kill yourself is bigger than surviving from some quantum tunnel effect through the bomb's released energy. In that sense, the effect of the bomb makes you backtrack up to a reality where you are just not using the bomb. Or if you died of a heart attack you might backtrack to when you ate that cheeseburger in 1965. But with such large discontinuities in memory it emphasizes the point that since comp implies the possibility of duplication and forking, there is no well defined 'you'. It is at best a working approximation. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: QTI and eternal torment
On Jun 9, 11:17 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Jun 2012, at 20:52, Nick Prince wrote: On Jun 8, 8:45 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Nick, This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence of) first person view? I've drawn the branches so that they represent a 3p viewpoint of someone observing us over time - i.e. we are schrodingers cat! So U means observer sees us as unconsciouss and D means observer sees us as dead. The ist person view that we see would always be C according to the branches I've drawn, provided that you discard all branches that have death D preceded by U. I wish I could draw it but I'm limited on this user interface. ist branch is C - U or C then from the U of this branch, we get U or D or C I'm bothered by the fact that the observer would end up seeing zombies! If you have a C-U or C and then if the new branch from the U is U - D or U or C then 1p (cat) would see only C as expected. His route woud be C-C because the whole second branch is deleted. However the observer that goes down the U branch would see the cat go into some sort of scenario resulting in U or C or D. If it turns out that C occurs then the cat is seen as consciouss and yet it is disjoint from the conscioussness of the original cat. I'll have to really think about this one in terms of the early steps of your UDA. OK. In my opinion, based on the post, I would say that U and D are equivalent. There are no zombies, nor absolute bodies. Hi Bruno Yes I've re thought this one through and I agree - no zombies. Given that very minimal change in the brain seems to be able to send someone in the amnesic arithmetical heaven, as illustrated by some drugs, I am not sure we should worry about QM immortality, which arises itself from the comp immortality. It illustrates also that backtracking might be more probable. Technically this is difficult to compute, and if QM is true yet comp false, I would worry more on this. I do appreciate that people are aware that notions of after-life makes sense, and are hard to avoid with current theories. Yet, without handling the whole theology, and not just its physical aspects, we can come easily to weird conclusions. With comp there are too much open problems to decide on this in any quick way. Of course we can speculate. It is a fascinating subject. What do you mean by backtracking? Imagine that you decide to kill yourself with an atomic bomb, so as to maximize your annihilation probability. Then it might be that your probability of surviving in a world where you are just not deciding to kill yourself is bigger than surviving from some quantum tunnel effect through the bomb's released energy. In that sense, the effect of the bomb makes you backtrack up to a reality where you are just not using the bomb. Ok I'll look into this - I got a copy of Saibal's paper Can we change the past by forgetting I'll try to get round to reading it. I'm not sure whether this involves abandoning causality as we know it though? If such backtracking occurred though could we really be aware of it? To solve this is really a question of comparing the measure on the computational histories, including the one with partial amnesia (which makes things more difficult, but already more quantum like, because amnesia might explain the fusion of computations, from the first person point of view). Reports of dreams and drug experiences involving partial momentary amnesia suggest that such a backtracking is highly plausible, imo. And the existence of quantum erasing suggests that our first person plural sharable computations allows such a backtracking to occur in nature. Such a backtracking (proposed once by Saibal Mitra on this list) can also be used to defend the idea that there is only one person, and that personal identity is a relative illusory notion. We might be a God playing a trick to himself, notably by becoming amnesic on who and what he is. Bruno What, you ask, was the beginning of it all? And it is this ... Existence that multiplied itself For sheer delight of being And plunged into numberless trillions of forms So that it might Find Itself Innumerably (Aurobindo) Bruno On 08 Jun 2012, at 01:11, Nick Prince wrote: I’ve just read the following paper : http://istvanaranyosi.net/resources/Should%20we%20fear%20qt %20final.pdf which argues that it is possible to avoid the descent into decrepitude that seems to follow from the quantum theory of immortality (QTI). Aranyosi argues that this is plausible on the grounds that any death branch would be preceded by an unconsciousness branch. Under normal QTI circumstances, if we were Schrödinger’s cat we would come across the (3p) node (L= Lives, D= Dies): DD LLL LLL To see the cat’s (1p), view we
