Re: On a peculiar blind spot in materialists

2013-05-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Sun, May 26, 2013 at 10:08 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
 On a peculiar blind spot in materialists

 Materialists have a peculiar blind spot
 in that they do  not understand what is meant by
 the subject/object distinction.  The difference
 between subjective and objective being.

 That is the ddiference between mind and brain in that
 mind is a subjective state and brain is purely objective.

 brain is object
 consciousness or mind is subject + object.

 Leibniz makes this clear in his concept of monads.


 Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 5/26/2013
 See my Leibniz site at
 http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough

There's obviously a difference between the subjective and the
objective. Eliminative materialists say that the subjective does not
really exist because only those entities which can be defined
objectively exist. This strikes me as a way of using language
differently rather than a substantive position.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person

2013-05-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 May 2013, at 19:08, John Clark wrote:


On Sun, May 26, 2013  Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

 Materialism fails to account for the first person

Can non-materialism do better and if so how?


Yes, by using the mathematical theory of self-reference. The only  
problem is that eventually matter has to be redefined through  
coherence conditions on machine's dreams/computations.
The details of this explains that the knower (Bp  p) makes sense  
thanks to incompleteness which makes both Bp and (Bp  p) equivalent,  
(they prove the same arithmetical sentences) but not provably so by  
the machine, and this makes it obeying to a knowledge logic, unlike  
provability which obeys a belief logic.


Bruno






  John K Clark



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Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ...

2013-05-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote:



Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe is  
immaterial.  If the universe is infinitely large or infinitely  
varied, we each reappear an infinite number of times.  There are  
a countably infinite number of programs, and for any given level  
of complexity, there is a finite number of possible programs  
shorter than some length.  Any consciousness we simulate is the  
consciousness of something that exists somewhere else in the  
infinitely varied/infinitely large universe, and if the universe  
is really this big, then someone else far away could simulate you  
perfectly without having  
toextract a record of  
you.  Just running Bruno's UDA for a long enough time  
ressurects everyone, we are all contained in that short program.



To which, one is tempted to respond: So what?  If there is all  
this simulation going on, what reason is there to suppose it is  
being done by being anything like us or that the worlds in which  
the simulations take place (the real ones, if there are any) are  
anything like this one.


Because the FPI makes this one a statistical sum on all possible  
one.


What do you mean by a statiscal sum?  FPI must still pick out some  
kind of unity; not just an average.


Why? How so?










You are simply led back to trying to discover what are possible  
worlds, where possible can be anything from familiar enough I  
can understand it to nomologically possible to not containing  
contradictions.


Possible means livable from a first person point of view in such a  
way that you would not see the difference above the substitution  
level.


So all simulations must look just like this??


Yes. When done at the right level (if it exists). By definition, I  
would say.






Below the substitution level, everyone (humans, alien, numbers ..)  
see the same average on all computations, which, due to the  
constraints of self-reference and theoretical computer science is a  
well structured, highly complex,  mathematical object.


So what? So physics is reduced to arithmetic, or to machine  
theology... and this in a way which saves humans from   
reductionism.


I didn't know reductionism endangered us. :-)


It eliminates the person, in theory first, in camp, slavery, our  
gulag, after. It is a constant in human history, and it is what gives  
to religions (including materialist and atheist one) their bad  
reputation. Read La Mettrie and Sade to learn more on this.


Bruno





Brent

It makes also comp into science and out of philosophy. All this  
leads to a different, platonist and non aristotelian, view on  
reality. It makes Matter into a failed hypothesis (Matter  
=primitive matter).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness

2013-05-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 May 2013, at 01:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, May 26, 2013 at 05:05:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 May 2013, at 13:29, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an
organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence
indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical,
neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious
states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors.
Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not
unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate
consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds,
and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these
neurological substrates.

http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf


Always a pleasure, if not some relief, to hear that.

My opinion, for what is worth, is that all animals are conscious,
and the one described above are already self-conscious, and
potentially Löbian (meaning: like you, me, and Peano Arithmetic).

Are plants conscious? I don't know.



The Cambridge Declaration strikes me as a political statement, rather
than a scientific one. Just because certain neurological states are
correlated with affective states (wants or desires of the animal) does
not entail that the animal is aware of that emotion, or genuinely
experiencing qualia of any sort.


I agree. It is more theology than politics. It is like agreeing to  
attribute a sort of soul to animals.
It is interesting you say politics as indeed this is what theology  
has become nowadays (since 1500 years in occident).







I would not be suprised if some non-human species are genuinely
conscious - eg most of the apes, some cetaceans, pachyderms, corvids  
and

quite possibly cephalopods, but I'm not convinced by the above that we
really have the means of establishing that beyond reasonable doubt.


But we cannot attribute, beyond reasonable doubt, consciousness to any  
human different from oneself, also.


Woman votes since recently!

Bruno






Cheers

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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ...

2013-05-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 May 2013, at 05:05, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

Understood, Jason. I became familiar with this digital universe  
concept, first, through Hans Moravec, in Mind Children. I wonder how  
possible it is to discover that we are part of an ancestor simulation?



By reasoning, taking the FPI into consideration. We cannot discover  
this, but evaluate the probability, which might be high indeed. By the  
FPI, our consciousness relied on all computations (infinity) which is  
going through you state. In a sense, you are both in the simulations  
by ancestors (which exist in arithmetic) and all the other  
simulations, which exist also in arithmetic.


Bruno





-Original Message-
From: meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sat, May 25, 2013 10:00 pm
Subject: Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to  
function suggests its ...


On 5/25/2013 11:03 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:




 On Thu, May 23, 2013 at 10:35 AM,  
lt;spudboy...@aol.comgt;   wrote:


Interesting Jason,

   My issue with the multi-generated clones  
created  either by the actions of a multiverse or  
the actions  of hypercomputers, my concern is that,  
its such a  waste (in my opinion) that a Jason who  
belongs to an  identical Earth, but humans all have  
elephant tricks  instead of noses. Or a Jason Resch,  
belonging to a  species that has rectangular crystal  
panels built in  their stomachs and backs (see  
thru). I am shooting for  ridiculous incarnations of  
J. Resch, in order to  illustrate the unlikeliness,  
of this method of  producing the actual person- 
thoughts feelings  memories. The memory thing as a  
blue print, to me,  seems, essential, for  
resurrection. I could be totally  wrong, but I am  
merely trying to simplify this for  myself, if  
nobody else.  Thanks, Jason.



  Mitch,


   Consider a few points:  First, roughly 100  
billion  humans have ever lived in this history of  
humans, the life  expectancy of humans over most of that  
time was 10 years,  so roughly there have been 1  
trillion years worth of human  experience.  Second, if  
transhumanism is correct and we  transcend our  
biological limits we could not only live  much longer  
but generate experiences at greatly  accelerated rates.   
It would take the then current  population of people  
(say it is 10 billion) only 100 years  to generate the  
same total amount of experience of all  humans going  
back millions of years.  Even if only 10% of  the  
population, spends only 1% of their time  simulating/ 
experiencing alternate lives or histories, it  would  
take a mere 100,000 years for most of human   
experiences to be generated artificially by our   
descendents.  This ignores the acceleration that is   
possible.  Electricity flows through wires about a  
million  times faster than neurotransmitters conduct  
signals in the  brain.  This implies that without any  
miniaturization,  human thought could be accelerated by  
about a factor of a  million times, so it could take  
only a month (rather than  100,000 years) for these  
accelerated humans spending only  0.1% of their  
collective time simulating ancestors for the  bulk of  
human experience to be artificially generated.   Now  
consider that such a civilization could live for   
billions of years.  If each post-human experiences a  
few  thousand or a few million ancestor lives, or  
alternate  species, etc., then odds quickly become  
overwhelming that  your current moment of awareness is  
not explained by that  of some biological being on a  
physical planet but that of  some advanced being  
conducting a simulation on some  advanced computational  
substrate.



  Jason



  -Mitch


-Original Message-
  From: Jason Resch lt;jasonre...@gmail.comgt;
   To: Everything List lt;everything-list@googlegroups.com 
gt;

  Sent: Thu, May 23, 2013 11:10 am
   Subject: Re: That the mind works even after  
the   brain ceases to function suggests its ...






   On Fri, May  
17,  2013 at 4:57 PM, lt;spudboy...@aol.com 
gt; wrote:
   

Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ...

2013-05-27 Thread meekerdb

On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote:




Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe is 
immaterial. If
the universe is infinitely large or infinitely varied, we each reappear an
infinite number of times.  There are a countably infinite number of 
programs,
and for any given level of complexity, there is a finite number of possible
programs shorter than some length.  Any consciousness we simulate is the
consciousness of something that exists somewhere else in the infinitely
varied/infinitely large universe, and if the universe is really this big, 
then
someone else far away could simulate you perfectly without having to 
extract a
record of you.  Just running Bruno's UDA for a long enough time ressurects
everyone, we are all contained in that short program.




To which, one is tempted to respond: So what?  If there is all this simulation going 
on, what reason is there to suppose it is being done by being anything like us or 
that the worlds in which the simulations take place (the real ones, if there are 
any) are anything like this one.


Because the FPI makes this one a statistical sum on all possible one.


What do you mean by a statiscal sum?  FPI must still pick out some kind of unity; not 
just an average.


Why? How so?


If not, then I don't know what FPI means.  I thought it referred to one's experience of 
being a person, but the is a unity to that experience.  I experience being Brent Meeker.  
I don't experience being Bruno Marchal.













You are simply led back to trying to discover what are possible worlds, where 
possible can be anything from familiar enough I can understand it to 
nomologically possible to not containing contradictions.


Possible means livable from a first person point of view in such a way that you would 
not see the difference above the substitution level.


So all simulations must look just like this??


Yes. When done at the right level (if it exists). By definition, I would say.


How does that then comport with everything happens, because it's NOT the case that 
everything happens here.


Brent







Below the substitution level, everyone (humans, alien, numbers ..) see the same 
average on all computations, which, due to the constraints of self-reference and 
theoretical computer science is a well structured, highly complex, mathematical object.


So what? So physics is reduced to arithmetic, or to machine theology... and this in a 
way which saves humans from reductionism.


I didn't know reductionism endangered us. :-)


It eliminates the person, in theory first, in camp, slavery, our gulag, after. It is a 
constant in human history, and it is what gives to religions (including materialist and 
atheist one) their bad reputation. Read La Mettrie and Sade to learn more on this.


Bruno





Brent

It makes also comp into science and out of philosophy. All this leads to a different, 
platonist and non aristotelian, view on reality. It makes Matter into a failed 
hypothesis (Matter =primitive matter).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



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Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ...

2013-05-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/5/27 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

  On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote:

  On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote:



  Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe is
 immaterial.  If the universe is infinitely large or infinitely varied, we
 each reappear an infinite number of times.  There are a countably infinite
 number of programs, and for any given level of complexity, there is a
 finite number of possible programs shorter than some length.  Any
 consciousness we simulate is the consciousness of something that exists
 somewhere else in the infinitely varied/infinitely large universe, and if
 the universe is really this big, then someone else far away could simulate
 you perfectly without having to extract a record of you.  Just running
 Bruno's UDA for a long enough time ressurects everyone, we are all
 contained in that short program.



 To which, one is tempted to respond: So what?  If there is all this
 simulation going on, what reason is there to suppose it is being done by
 being anything like us or that the worlds in which the simulations take
 place (the real ones, if there are any) are anything like this one.


  Because the FPI makes this one a statistical sum on all possible one.


 What do you mean by a statiscal sum?  FPI must still pick out some kind
 of unity; not just an average.


  Why? How so?


 If not, then I don't know what FPI means.  I thought it referred to one's
 experience of being a person, but the is a unity to that experience.  I
 experience being Brent Meeker.  I don't experience being Bruno Marchal.


Because it is a statistical sum on the infinity of computation going
through *your current state*. FPI means First Person Indeterminacy... so if
it was not based on first person it would cleary not means anything... but
as it is in its definition, you're just looking too far from what Bruno
said.

Quentin











  You are simply led back to trying to discover what are possible worlds,
 where possible can be anything from familiar enough I can understand it
 to nomologically possible to not containing contradictions.


  Possible means livable from a first person point of view in such a way
 that you would not see the difference above the substitution level.


 So all simulations must look just like this??


  Yes. When done at the right level (if it exists). By definition, I would
 say.


 How does that then comport with everything happens, because it's NOT the
 case that everything happens here.

 Brent





  Below the substitution level, everyone (humans, alien, numbers ..) see
 the same average on all computations, which, due to the constraints of
 self-reference and theoretical computer science is a well structured,
 highly complex, mathematical object.

  So what? So physics is reduced to arithmetic, or to machine theology...
 and this in a way which saves humans from reductionism.


 I didn't know reductionism endangered us. :-)


  It eliminates the person, in theory first, in camp, slavery, our gulag,
 after. It is a constant in human history, and it is what gives to religions
 (including materialist and atheist one) their bad reputation. Read La
 Mettrie and Sade to learn more on this.

  Bruno




 Brent

  It makes also comp into science and out of philosophy. All this leads to
 a different, platonist and non aristotelian, view on reality. It makes
 Matter into a failed hypothesis (Matter =primitive matter).

  Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person

2013-05-27 Thread John Clark
On Mon, May 27, 2013  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  Can non-materialism do better and if so how?

  Yes, by using the mathematical theory of self-reference.


I've never heard of  the mathematical theory of self-reference. And it's
no great mystery, the only difference between you and me is that we each
can access memories that the other can not, and we process information in
slightly different ways, in other words we have different personalities.
The only difference between objective and subjective is that in one case
information is universally available and in the other case the information
only exists in 3 pounds of grey goo inside one particular bone box.

The details of this explains that the knower (Bp  p)


Yet another of your homemade anagrams, this time it sounds like a oil
company not what a baby does to a diaper. I could probably figure out what
you mean if I thought about it enough, but if you don't take the effort to
make yourself understood I don't see why I should make an effort to
understand you.

 John K Clark

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Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ...

2013-05-27 Thread meekerdb

On 5/27/2013 10:19 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2013/5/27 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote:




Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe is
immaterial. If the universe is infinitely large or infinitely varied, we
each reappear an infinite number of times.  There are a countably 
infinite
number of programs, and for any given level of complexity, there is a
finite number of possible programs shorter than some length. Any
consciousness we simulate is the consciousness of something that exists
somewhere else in the infinitely varied/infinitely large universe, and 
if
the universe is really this big, then someone else far away could 
simulate
you perfectly without having to extract a record of you.  Just running
Bruno's UDA for a long enough time ressurects everyone, we are all
contained in that short program.




To which, one is tempted to respond: So what?  If there is all this 
simulation
going on, what reason is there to suppose it is being done by being anything
like us or that the worlds in which the simulations take place (the real 
ones,
if there are any) are anything like this one.


Because the FPI makes this one a statistical sum on all possible one.


What do you mean by a statiscal sum?  FPI must still pick out some kind of
unity; not just an average.


Why? How so?


If not, then I don't know what FPI means.  I thought it referred to one's 
experience
of being a person, but the is a unity to that experience.  I experience 
being Brent
Meeker.  I don't experience being Bruno Marchal.


Because it is a statistical sum on the infinity of computation going through *your 
current state*.


But my question was what does a statistical sum mean?  It doesn't help to explain that 
it is a statistical sum.  But now you also use another term that is not really clear to 
me: your current state Is this a state of my experience?  My experience doesn't consist 
of discrete states, so I'm not clear on what this refers to.  Is it only my 
*consciousness that counts as my state?


Brent

FPI means First Person Indeterminacy... so if it was not based on first person it would 
cleary not means anything... but as it is in its definition, you're just looking too far 
from what Bruno said.


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Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ...

2013-05-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/5/27 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

  On 5/27/2013 10:19 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




 2013/5/27 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

  On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote:

  On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote:



  Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe is
 immaterial.  If the universe is infinitely large or infinitely varied, we
 each reappear an infinite number of times.  There are a countably infinite
 number of programs, and for any given level of complexity, there is a
 finite number of possible programs shorter than some length.  Any
 consciousness we simulate is the consciousness of something that exists
 somewhere else in the infinitely varied/infinitely large universe, and if
 the universe is really this big, then someone else far away could simulate
 you perfectly without having to extract a record of you.  Just running
 Bruno's UDA for a long enough time ressurects everyone, we are all
 contained in that short program.



 To which, one is tempted to respond: So what?  If there is all this
 simulation going on, what reason is there to suppose it is being done by
 being anything like us or that the worlds in which the simulations take
 place (the real ones, if there are any) are anything like this one.


  Because the FPI makes this one a statistical sum on all possible one.


 What do you mean by a statiscal sum?  FPI must still pick out some kind
 of unity; not just an average.


  Why? How so?


  If not, then I don't know what FPI means.  I thought it referred to
 one's experience of being a person, but the is a unity to that experience.
 I experience being Brent Meeker.  I don't experience being Bruno Marchal.


  Because it is a statistical sum on the infinity of computation going
 through *your current state*.


 But my question was what does a statistical sum mean?  It doesn't help
 to explain that it is a statistical sum.  But now you also use another term
 that is not really clear to me: your current state  Is this a state of my
 experience?  My experience doesn't consist of discrete states, so I'm not
 clear on what this refers to.  Is it only my *consciousness that counts as
 my state?


Assuming computationalism, your conscious moment here and now can be
represented as a computational state of a running program. That state can
be reached by an infinity of computations. To predict your next moment from
that, you have to take all this infinity of computations and apply on it a
measure. The FPI occurs because you as you belongs to all this infinity, at
the next step these infinity of computations diverge, somehow a measure
must exists on that, which should correspond to the quantum measure to be
in accord with QM/MWI.

If you reject computationalism, then of course there is no state
representing you here and now, if you don't reject it, then it exists at
the correct substitution level by definition.

Quentin


 Brent


   FPI means First Person Indeterminacy... so if it was not based on first
 person it would cleary not means anything... but as it is in its
 definition, you're just looking too far from what Bruno said.


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Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ...

2013-05-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 May 2013, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote:



Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe  
is immaterial.  If the universe is infinitely large or  
infinitely varied, we each reappear an infinite number of  
times.  There are a countably infinite number of programs, and  
for any given level of complexity, there is a finite number of  
possible programs shorter than some length.  Any consciousness  
we simulate is the consciousness of something that exists  
somewhere else in the infinitely varied/infinitely large  
universe, and if the universe is really this big, then someone  
else far away could simulate you perfectly without having to  
extract a record of you.  Just running Bruno's UDA for a long  
enough time ressurects everyone, we are all contained in that  
short program.



To which, one is tempted to respond: So what?  If there is all  
this simulation going on, what reason is there to suppose it is  
being done by being anything like us or that the worlds in which  
the simulations take place (the real ones, if there are any)  
are anything like this one.


Because the FPI makes this one a statistical sum on all  
possible one.


What do you mean by a statiscal sum?  FPI must still pick out  
some kind of unity; not just an average.


Why? How so?


If not, then I don't know what FPI means.  I thought it referred to  
one's experience of being a person, but the is a unity to that  
experience.  I experience being Brent Meeker.  I don't experience  
being Bruno Marchal.


FPI = First Person Indeterminacy.

When you look at your body, or neighborhood, below your  level of  
substitution what comp predicts you will see, is the trace of the  
infinitley many computations which go through your state.  That's how  
the FPI makes this one resulting from a statistical sum.



















You are simply led back to trying to discover what are possible  
worlds, where possible can be anything from 
familiar enough I can understand it to nomologically  
possible to not containing contradictions.


Possible means livable from a first person point of view in such  
a way that you would not see the difference above the  
substitution level.


So all simulations must look just like this??


Yes. When done at the right level (if it exists). By definition, I  
would say.


How does that then comport with everything happens, because it's NOT  
the case that everything happens here.


Every possible subjective experience happens, , related to the many  
computations (in arithmetic) but with different relative probabilities.


Comp makes the physical reality more solid, as it show it to rely on  
eternal statistics on atemporal number relations.


Everything physical happens is really the p - BDp explained by  
the LUMs' theology, and it is more like shit happens, to be short.  
(I explain the math on the FOAR list if you are interested).


Bruno





Brent







Below the substitution level, everyone (humans, alien,  
numbers ..) see the same average on all computations, which, due  
to the constraints of self-reference and theoretical computer  
science is a well structured, highly complex, mathematical object.


So what? So physics is reduced to arithmetic, or to machine  
theology... and this in a way which saves humans from reductionism.


I didn't know reductionism endangered us. :-)


It eliminates the person, in theory first, in camp, slavery, our  
gulag, after. It is a constant in human history, and it is what  
gives to religions (including materialist and atheist one) their  
bad reputation. Read La Mettrie and Sade to learn more on this.


Bruno





Brent

It makes also comp into science and out of philosophy. All this  
leads to a different, platonist and non aristotelian, view on  
reality. It makes Matter into a failed hypothesis (Matter  
=primitive matter).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2013.0.3343 / Virus Database: 3184/6358 - Release Date:  
05/25/13


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Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ...

2013-05-27 Thread Richard Ruquist
Bruno,
With MWI are some universes less probable than others.
I have difficulty understanding how a universe can be statistical.
I think I understand the frequency argument. But that does not make sense
either.
Richard


On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 27 May 2013, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:

  On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote:

  On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote:



  Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe is
 immaterial.  If the universe is infinitely large or infinitely varied, we
 each reappear an infinite number of times.  There are a countably infinite
 number of programs, and for any given level of complexity, there is a
 finite number of possible programs shorter than some length.  Any
 consciousness we simulate is the consciousness of something that exists
 somewhere else in the infinitely varied/infinitely large universe, and if
 the universe is really this big, then someone else far away could simulate
 you perfectly without having to extract a record of you.  Just running
 Bruno's UDA for a long enough time ressurects everyone, we are all
 contained in that short program.



 To which, one is tempted to respond: So what?  If there is all this
 simulation going on, what reason is there to suppose it is being done by
 being anything like us or that the worlds in which the simulations take
 place (the real ones, if there are any) are anything like this one.


  Because the FPI makes this one a statistical sum on all possible one.


 What do you mean by a statiscal sum?  FPI must still pick out some kind
 of unity; not just an average.


  Why? How so?


 If not, then I don't know what FPI means.  I thought it referred to one's
 experience of being a person, but the is a unity to that experience.  I
 experience being Brent Meeker.  I don't experience being Bruno Marchal.


 FPI = First Person Indeterminacy.

 When you look at your body, or neighborhood, below your  level of
 substitution what comp predicts you will see, is the trace of the
 infinitley many computations which go through your state.  That's how the
 FPI makes this one resulting from a statistical sum.














  You are simply led back to trying to discover what are possible worlds,
 where possible can be anything from familiar enough I can understand it
 to nomologically possible to not containing contradictions.


  Possible means livable from a first person point of view in such a way
 that you would not see the difference above the substitution level.


 So all simulations must look just like this??


  Yes. When done at the right level (if it exists). By definition, I would
 say.


 How does that then comport with everything happens, because it's NOT the
 case that everything happens here.


 Every possible subjective experience happens, , related to the many
 computations (in arithmetic) but with different relative probabilities.

 Comp makes the physical reality more solid, as it show it to rely on
 eternal statistics on atemporal number relations.

 Everything physical happens is really the p - BDp explained by the
 LUMs' theology, and it is more like shit happens, to be short. (I explain
 the math on the FOAR list if you are interested).

 Bruno




 Brent





  Below the substitution level, everyone (humans, alien, numbers ..) see
 the same average on all computations, which, due to the constraints of
 self-reference and theoretical computer science is a well structured,
 highly complex, mathematical object.

  So what? So physics is reduced to arithmetic, or to machine theology...
 and this in a way which saves humans from reductionism.


 I didn't know reductionism endangered us. :-)


  It eliminates the person, in theory first, in camp, slavery, our gulag,
 after. It is a constant in human history, and it is what gives to religions
 (including materialist and atheist one) their bad reputation. Read La
 Mettrie and Sade to learn more on this.

  Bruno




 Brent

  It makes also comp into science and out of philosophy. All this leads to
 a different, platonist and non aristotelian, view on reality. It makes
 Matter into a failed hypothesis (Matter =primitive matter).

  Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person

2013-05-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 May 2013, at 19:28, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, May 27, 2013  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Can non-materialism do better and if so how?


 Yes, by using the mathematical theory of self-reference.

I've never heard of  the mathematical theory of self-reference.


Have you heard about Gödel's theorem?


The mathematical theory of self-reference is the general theory,  
containing Löb theorems, many other fixed points theorem, and  
eventually axiomatized by Solovay who showed that the modal logic G  
and G* formalize respectively the provable and the true (but not  
necessarily provable) part about self-reference, provable by machine,  
or some more general entities.


Here is one non modal paper, three good textbooks, and a recreative  
introduction.


Smorynski, C., 1981, Fifty Years of Self-Reference in Arithmetic,  
Notre Dame Journal

of Formal Logic, Vol. 22, n° 4, pp. 357-374.

Smorynski C., 1985, Self-Reference and Modal Logic., Springer Verlag.

Boolos G., 1979, The Unprovability of Consistency, an Essay in Modal  
Logic,

Cambridge University Press.

Boolos, G. (1993). The Logic of Provability. Cambridge University  
Press, Cambridge.


The recreative introduction:

Smullyan R., 1987, Forever Undecided, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.




And it's no great mystery, the only difference between you and me is  
that we each can access memories that the other can not, and we  
process information in slightly different ways, in other words we  
have different personalities.


OK.


The only difference between objective and subjective is that in one  
case information is universally available and in the other case the  
information only exists in 3 pounds of grey goo inside one  
particular bone box.


There are other important difference. You can doubt the whole  
objective part, but you can't doubt the whole subjective part. Also,  
the term information has many different meaning, from something you  
can measure (Shannon) to something interpreted by some machine, or  
other entities.






The details of this explains that the knower (Bp  p)

Yet another of your homemade anagrams, this time it sounds like a  
oil company not what a baby does to a diaper. I could probably  
figure out what you mean if I thought about it enough, but if you  
don't take the effort to make yourself understood I don't see why I  
should make an effort to understand you.


You need to read the book above, or to read my papers where I re- 
explain this from scratch, but concisely. It is computer science and  
mathematical logic. That is of course useful to reason when you assume  
computationalism.


Bp  p is for an arithmetical proposition asserting Beweisbar(p)   
p, with p some arithmetical proposition, and 'p', the Gödel number of  
the arithmetical sentence representing p.




Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ...

2013-05-27 Thread meekerdb

On 5/27/2013 11:16 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2013/5/27 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

On 5/27/2013 10:19 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2013/5/27 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote:




Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe is
immaterial. If the universe is infinitely large or infinitely 
varied,
we each reappear an infinite number of times.  There are a countably
infinite number of programs, and for any given level of complexity,
there is a finite number of possible programs shorter than some
length. Any consciousness we simulate is the consciousness of
something that exists somewhere else in the infinitely
varied/infinitely large universe, and if the universe is really this
big, then someone else far away could simulate you perfectly without
having to extract a record of you.  Just running Bruno's UDA for a
long enough time ressurects everyone, we are all contained in that
short program.




To which, one is tempted to respond: So what?  If there is all this
simulation going on, what reason is there to suppose it is being done by
being anything like us or that the worlds in which the simulations take
place (the real ones, if there are any) are anything like this one.


Because the FPI makes this one a statistical sum on all possible one.


What do you mean by a statiscal sum?  FPI must still pick out some 
kind of
unity; not just an average.


Why? How so?


If not, then I don't know what FPI means. I thought it referred to one's
experience of being a person, but the is a unity to that experience.  I
experience being Brent Meeker.  I don't experience being Bruno Marchal.


Because it is a statistical sum on the infinity of computation going 
through *your
current state*.


But my question was what does a statistical sum mean? It doesn't help to 
explain
that it is a statistical sum.  But now you also use another term that is 
not really
clear to me: your current state  Is this a state of my experience?  My 
experience
doesn't consist of discrete states, so I'm not clear on what this refers 
to.  Is it
only my *consciousness that counts as my state?


Assuming computationalism, your conscious moment here and now can be represented as a 
computational state of a running program.


So only conscious thoughts contribute to me.  The represented part I agree with, but 
Bruno seems to maintain that the computational state IS the conscious moment.  But I could 
very well say yes to the doctor, to believe that a portion (or all) of my brain could be 
replaced by a functionally identical mechanism and still maintain my stream of 
consciousness, and yet not believe that a conscious thought it a state.  In fact I think 
that if the functionally identical device was a digital one, it would have to go through 
many steps of computation to instantiate one conscious moment, i.e. one coherent thought 
or action.  And it would have to interact with the world outside my skull in a way similar 
to my biological parts too (my brain is insensitive to 60Hz magnetic fields for example) 
if my consciousness were to be unchanged. Because it takes many computational steps to 
instantiate a conscious moment, conscious moments can overlap and this produces continuity 
and time.


That state can be reached by an infinity of computations. To predict your next moment 
from that, you have to take all this infinity of computations and apply on it a measure.


There's the rub.

The FPI occurs because you as you belongs to all this infinity, at the next step these 
infinity of computations diverge, somehow a measure must exists on that, which should 
correspond to the quantum measure to be in accord with QM/MWI.


But it seems that on the UD generation of computations, the semi-classical sequence of 
brain states relative to a given conscious moment would be of measure zero.  In order to 
make the UD and QM measures comport, UD must incorporate decoherence, essentially it must 
recover stable matter.


Brent



If you reject computationalism, then of course there is no state representing you here 
and now, if you don't reject it, then it exists at the correct substitution level by 
definition.


Quentin


Brent



FPI means First Person Indeterminacy... so if it was not based on first 
person it
would cleary not means anything... but as it is in its definition, you're 
just
looking too far from what Bruno said.





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Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness

2013-05-27 Thread John Mikes
Bruno:
do you indeed exclude the other animals from being selfconcious? or -
having a logic on their own level? Or any other trait we assign (identify?)
for humans - in our terms?

A question about plants (rather: about being conscious):
you may feel free to define 'being conscious' in human terms,  or mammal
(etc.) terms, but the response plants exude to information
(circumstances, impact. etc.) shows reactivity we may appropriate to us
humans.

So do not deny consciousness from fellow DNA-bearing plants.

How about the DNA-not-bearing other creatures? (crystals, stones, water,
impact you may call energy, - whatever?)
Anthropocentric? zoocentric? phitocentric? what-CENTRIC?

JM

On Sun, May 26, 2013 at 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 26 May 2013, at 13:29, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

  The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from
 experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human
 animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological
 substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit
 intentional behaviors.  Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that
 humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that
 generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds,
 and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these
 neurological substrates.

 http://fcmconference.org/img/**CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciou**sness.pdfhttp://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf


 Always a pleasure, if not some relief, to hear that.

 My opinion, for what is worth, is that all animals are conscious, and the
 one described above are already self-conscious, and potentially Löbian
 (meaning: like you, me, and Peano Arithmetic).

 Are plants conscious? I don't know.

 Bruno




 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person

2013-05-27 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 01:28:42PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
 The details of this explains that the knower (Bp  p)
 
 
 Yet another of your homemade anagrams, this time it sounds like a oil
 company not what a baby does to a diaper. I could probably figure out what
 you mean if I thought about it enough, but if you don't take the effort to
 make yourself understood I don't see why I should make an effort to
 understand you.
 

John - you are being disingenuous here. Bruno has explained this at
considerable length. Bp  p is not an anagram (or an abbreviation
even), but a formula, that captures the notion of Knowledge put
forward by Plato in Theatetus. Now there's plenty to argue with
there, to be sure, but suggesting that Bruno hasn't made the effort to
explain it is not one of them.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ...

2013-05-27 Thread spudboy100


In a way, professor, Marchal, you seem to be on the side of Stephen 
Wolfram, who once wrote about there being no need to ever do SETI, 
because, if we wanted to know advanced Extra Terrestrial technologies, 
it would be far, simpler to generate algorythems (sp) that contain 
these unknown civilizations. I tried to search and see if Dr. Wolfram 
eloborated on this strange, proposal, but seemingly, he did not. I am 
clueless, over what bit-stream one would run, and on what type of 
computer, we'd require to accomplish what Wolfram, once proposed. 
Perhaps Wolfram was just hand-waving, and merely exercising his 
imagination?


Mitch


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Mon, May 27, 2013 4:26 am
Subject: Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to 
function suggests its ...



On 27 May 2013, at 05:05, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:


Understood, Jason. I became familiar with this digital universe
concept, first, through Hans Moravec, in Mind Children. I wonder how
possible it is to discover that we are part of an ancestor simulation?



By reasoning, taking the FPI into consideration. We cannot discover
this, but evaluate the probability, which might be high indeed. By the
FPI, our consciousness relied on all computations (infinity) which is
going through you state. In a sense, you are both in the simulations
by ancestors (which exist in arithmetic) and all the other
simulations, which exist also in arithmetic.

Bruno





-Original Message-
From: meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sat, May 25, 2013 10:00 pm
Subject: Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to
function suggests its ...

On 5/25/2013 11:03 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:




 On Thu, May 23, 2013 at 10:35 AM,
lt;spudboy...@aol.comgt;   wrote:

Interesting Jason,

   My issue with the multi-generated clones
created  either by the actions of a multiverse or
the actions  of hypercomputers, my concern is that,
its such a  waste (in my opinion) that a Jason who
belongs to an  identical Earth, but humans all have
elephant tricks  instead of noses. Or a Jason Resch,
belonging to a  species that has rectangular crystal
panels built in  their stomachs and backs (see
thru). I am shooting for  ridiculous incarnations of
J. Resch, in order to  illustrate the unlikeliness,
of this method of  producing the actual person-
thoughts feelings  memories. The memory thing as a
blue print, to me,  seems, essential, for
resurrection. I could be totally  wrong, but I am
merely trying to simplify this for  myself, if
nobody else.  Thanks, Jason.


  Mitch,


   Consider a few points:  First, roughly 100
billion  humans have ever lived in this history of
humans, the life  expectancy of humans over most of that
time was 10 years,  so roughly there have been 1
trillion years worth of human  experience.  Second, if
transhumanism is correct and we  transcend our
biological limits we could not only live  much longer
but generate experiences at greatly  accelerated rates.
It would take the then current  population of people
(say it is 10 billion) only 100 years  to generate the
same total amount of experience of all  humans going
back millions of years.  Even if only 10% of  the
population, spends only 1% of their time  simulating/
experiencing alternate lives or histories, it  would
take a mere 100,000 years for most of human
experiences to be generated artificially by our
descendents.  This ignores the acceleration that is
possible.  Electricity flows through wires about a
million  times faster than neurotransmitters conduct
signals in the  brain.  This implies that without any
miniaturization,  human thought could be accelerated by
about a factor of a  million times, so it could take
only a month (rather than  100,000 years) for these
accelerated humans spending only  0.1% of their
collective time simulating ancestors for the  bulk of
human experience to be artificially generated.   Now
consider that such a civilization could live for
billions of years.  If each post-human experiences a
few  thousand or a few million ancestor lives, or
alternate  species, etc., then odds quickly become
overwhelming that  your current moment of awareness is
not explained by that  of some biological being on a
physical planet but that of

Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness

2013-05-27 Thread meekerdb

On 5/27/2013 2:18 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno:
do you indeed exclude the other animals from being selfconcious? or - having a logic 
on their own level? Or any other trait we assign (identify?) for humans - in our terms?


A question about plants (rather: about being conscious):
you may feel free to define 'being conscious' in human terms,  or mammal (etc.) terms, 
but the response plants exude to information (circumstances, impact. etc.) shows 
reactivity we may appropriate to us humans.


So do not deny consciousness from fellow DNA-bearing plants.

How about the DNA-not-bearing other creatures? (crystals, stones, water, impact you may 
call energy, - whatever?)

Anthropocentric? zoocentric? phitocentric? what-CENTRIC?


I don't think consciousness is an all-or-nothing property.  You have to ask Consciousness 
of what?  There's consciousness of surroundings: sound, photons, temperature, chemical 
concentrations  There's consciousness of internal states. Consciousness of sex.  
Consciousness of one's location. Consciousness of one's status in a tribe.  I think 
human-like consciousness requires language of some kind.


Brent




JM

On Sun, May 26, 2013 at 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



On 26 May 2013, at 13:29, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from
experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that 
non-human
animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological
substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit 
intentional
behaviors.  Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans 
are not
unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate 
consciousness.
Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other 
creatures,
including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.

http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf


Always a pleasure, if not some relief, to hear that.

My opinion, for what is worth, is that all animals are conscious, and the 
one
described above are already self-conscious, and potentially Löbian 
(meaning: like
you, me, and Peano Arithmetic).

Are plants conscious? I don't know.

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



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Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ...

2013-05-27 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 07:42:11PM -0400, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
 
 In a way, professor, Marchal, you seem to be on the side of Stephen
 Wolfram, who once wrote about there being no need to ever do SETI,
 because, if we wanted to know advanced Extra Terrestrial
 technologies, it would be far, simpler to generate algorythems (sp)
 that contain these unknown civilizations. I tried to search and see
 if Dr. Wolfram eloborated on this strange, proposal, but seemingly,
 he did not. I am clueless, over what bit-stream one would run, and
 on what type of computer, we'd require to accomplish what Wolfram,
 once proposed. Perhaps Wolfram was just hand-waving, and merely
 exercising his imagination?
 
 Mitch
 

That was pretty much the gist of his weighty tome A New Kind of
Science. I must confess to not having read it - there's plenty to
criticise in it, but also some valuable gems too, from accounts of
people who have.


I would disagree with Wolfram on this point. To search the space of
computational algorithms (or cellular automata, being Wolfram's
favourite computational multiverse) would have to be at least as hard, if not
harder, than searching the physical space we live in. That is why I
wouldn't abandon the Large Hadron Collider in favour of a Supercomputer
costing the same amount of money.

Anyway - check it out if you're interested. There's also plenty
written about NKS - it was a rather controversial book, largely due to
the lack of citations, and the somewhat megalomaniacal way that SW
promoted it.

Cheers
-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness

2013-05-27 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 04:53:56PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 
 I don't think consciousness is an all-or-nothing property.  You have
 to ask Consciousness of what?  There's consciousness of
 surroundings: sound, photons, temperature, chemical
 concentrations  There's consciousness of internal states.
 Consciousness of sex.  Consciousness of one's location.
 Consciousness of one's status in a tribe.  I think human-like
 consciousness requires language of some kind.
 
 Brent

I would be happy with consciousness of surroundings. It seems to be
the most basic of all the ones you mention there.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness

2013-05-27 Thread meekerdb

On 5/27/2013 5:08 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 04:53:56PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

I don't think consciousness is an all-or-nothing property.  You have
to ask Consciousness of what?  There's consciousness of
surroundings: sound, photons, temperature, chemical
concentrations  There's consciousness of internal states.
Consciousness of sex.  Consciousness of one's location.
Consciousness of one's status in a tribe.  I think human-like
consciousness requires language of some kind.

Brent

I would be happy with consciousness of surroundings. It seems to be
the most basic of all the ones you mention there.


It is pretty basic, but I'd say consciousness of some internal states is more basic and 
occurred early in the evolution of life. Even a cell must know when to divide.


But that's a large class and is not all-or-nothing either.  We're conscious of light and 
it's phase relations which form images, but we don't see the polarization.  And we don't 
see very much of the spectrum.  We don't detect magnetic fields and our detection of 
chemicals in the air is almost non-existent compared to dogs.


Brent

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Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness

2013-05-27 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 05:44:57PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 On 5/27/2013 5:08 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
 On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 04:53:56PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 I don't think consciousness is an all-or-nothing property.  You have
 to ask Consciousness of what?  There's consciousness of
 surroundings: sound, photons, temperature, chemical
 concentrations  There's consciousness of internal states.
 Consciousness of sex.  Consciousness of one's location.
 Consciousness of one's status in a tribe.  I think human-like
 consciousness requires language of some kind.
 
 Brent
 I would be happy with consciousness of surroundings. It seems to be
 the most basic of all the ones you mention there.
 
 It is pretty basic, but I'd say consciousness of some internal
 states is more basic and occurred early in the evolution of life.
 Even a cell must know when to divide.
 

Why does that require consciousness? I'm not conscious of my body
repairing itself, or dogesting food.

 But that's a large class and is not all-or-nothing either.  We're
 conscious of light and it's phase relations which form images, but
 we don't see the polarization.  And we don't see very much of the
 spectrum.  We don't detect magnetic fields and our detection of
 chemicals in the air is almost non-existent compared to dogs.
 

You appear to be confusing sensory capability with consciousness. A
thermostat is capable of sensing temperature, but I doubt it is
conscious of the temperature.

Consciousness is an experiential quality. We are either conscious when
we experience something (called qualia), or we're not conscious at all.

Still seems all or nothing to me. People who claim consciousness comes
in different types, or comes in shades of grey, seem to be talking
about completely different things than the usual meaning of the term.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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