Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/24/2017 7:49 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 07:12:38PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 4/24/2017 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

This world is 'objective' in the sense that there is
intersubjective agreement about it.

That happens in multi-user video games, and all the multi-user
games are implemented by all universal numbers, with all players
in arithmetic. The only problem is the relative measure, but we
have already that the measure one obeys a quantum logic.

How do we "have" that?  Can you derive, from computationalism, that
the description of the world must be in terms of vectors in a
complex Hilbert space?


I looked into that claim, so maybe I can offer a different
perspective. Quantum logics are the logic of events in a complex
Hilbert space that have probability 1, ie the logic of Hilbert
subspaces. For example, if x is the statement that the system is in
subspace X and y the statement that the system is in subspace Y, we
can speak of x∧y being the statement that the system is in the
subspace X∩Y, and x∨y being the statement that the system is in X⊕Y
(X∪Y is not a subspace). It turns out that these logics (apparentally
a family of them, all quite distinct from classical logic) satisfy the
same axioms as Z and X, modal logics describing two of Bruno's hypostases
(that of the believer and the observer IIRC).


If you can explain why the state of systems should be described by 
vectors in a complex Hilbert space, the derivation of Born's rule might 
follow from Gleason's theorem.


Brent



The significance of all of this? Bit hard to say - it would be nice to
handle the more usual QM statements where probability is less than
1. Also, it is open whether Z describes exactly Birkhoff and Neumann's
quantum logic, or merely something like it.

Nevertheless an intriguing result.



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/23/2017 5:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


We can detect physical worlds, but we can't detect *primary* physical 
worlds, nor can be detect if we dream or awake, nor if the dreams is 
due to a brain in vat, or a brain emulated by Robinson Arithmetic.


You can't detect Robinson Arithmetic either.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/23/2017 5:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


And the conclusion is not a logical contradiction indeed, but then you 
are like the guy who would say that despite thermodynamics explains 
how a car move we keep the right to believe in invisible horses.


But you say the car both moves and exists because of infinite natural 
numbers and arithmetic and because "belief" == "proof". Those are 
invisible horses too.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/23/2017 5:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Sure, but the question is not about the need to have a physical brain 
to met people with physical brain, no one doubt that, but on how to 
explain such physical brain without just saying "God made it", or 
"Matter made it".


No the problem, for computationalism,  is why we don't meet people 
/*without*/ a physical brain.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/23/2017 5:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


No contradiction has been demonstrated.


You have to explain how your Matter select the computations on which 
you are conscious.


But:

"Consciousness is an 1p notion
Computation is a 3p notion.
So with computationalism, consciousness IS NOT a computation. "

So how is a 1p notion "on" a 3p notion?


Computationalism explains instead why there is an illusion of matter 
and why it remains stable.


Does it?  I'd like to hear that explanation.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/23/2017 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Telmo was a bit short. The full proof relies on the fact that the 
computations are realized in arithmetic, 


That's not a fact.  It's Platonist metaphysics.

and that a universal machine cannot use primary matter in a magical 
(non Turing emulable, and non FPI-recoverable) to select computations.


The universal machine is an abstract hypothetical.  It is rather 
hypocritical to say primary matter is invoking magic while you are 
hypothesizing infinite machines.  What does it mean "to select 
computations".


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/23/2017 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 22 Apr 2017, at 06:10, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 4/21/2017 1:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But computations does not need matter, no more than the number 2 
needs two bottles of milk to make sense.


The number 2 needs two instances of SOMETHING to make sense.


Yes, for example two unities.

Your point would be granted if 2 needs two instances of primary pieces 
of matter, but that would beg the question.


Primary or not it needs two instances of something.  My point is that if 
we lived in some crazy would where given anything x there was nothing y 
that could be conceptually paired with x , then there would be no number 
two.   This tends to be hidden in the axiomatic definition by using the 
word "successor", but there has to be something in common between x and 
y that allows y to be the successor to x.


Brent



There are no evidence for primary matter. If the logic X1* would 
differ significantly from the logic of the observable quanta or 
sensible qualia, *that* would be an evidence for some primary matter 
hypothesis. But today, we have not yet found such evidences. Much more 
work needs to be done. Both computationalism and QM give until now 
evidences that there is no "scientifically meaningful" notion or 
primary matter.


Bruno





Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, 
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/23/2017 4:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


This is your thought experiment.  Is it significant that it's 
nomologically impossible?  Two different places, even quite close 
together, will experience different cosmic ray bombardment,


That is why I have used the virtual environment above: to guaranty  
the numerical identity of the computations.



I understand why you did it.  But the question was whether the 
nomological impossibility invalidates the argument (as logical 
impossibility certainly would)?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/24/2017 10:02 AM, David Nyman wrote:



On 24 Apr 2017 7:32 a.m., "Brent Meeker" > wrote:


I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist,
like chess and insurance and computations.  The question was
whether the assumption that computations can instantiate a mind,
i.e. the possibility of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction
of something.  The "something" having to do with physics, is part
of what I would like eulicidated.  Bruno says it reverses the
relationship of physics and psychology...but that's more of a
polemic slogan than entailment of a contradiction.


I don't think so. Here's the way I see it. Let's say we accept as a 
hypothesis a computational ontology. Since this requires no more than 
the natural numbers with +  and * this amounts to an ontology of 
arithmetic. Platonism be damned, our interest at this point is merely 
in seeing where the hypothesis can take us. So, computationalism leads 
us to the extension of the UD, which in turn gives us the digital 
machine, aka the fully fungible universal computational device. The 
reversal then is between role of the "psychology" of that universal 
machine and the subset of the trace of the UD assumed to implement 
physics.


The UD doesn't have a "psychology".  Bruno talks about the "beliefs" of 
a universal theorem prover in arithmetic...but that's not a UD. And was 
is "the trace of the UD".  To talk of taking a "subset of the trace" 
sounds to me like handing waving: We'll make a machine that writes all 
possible sentences and then there's a subset that describes the world.


The former is now required to play the role of filter or selector on 
behalf of the latter; it's what distinguishes​ it from the much more 
general computational background. Of course that "filtration", by 
assumption, essentially equates to the extremely high probability of 
that very subset being required to support its own self-selection.


Are you saying this "subset of the trace" must have a high probability 
of existing, or it has, by some measure, a high probability relative to 
other stuff not in the trace.  If the latter, and if the measure can be 
defined, that would be an interesting result; but when I've asked about 
this in the past Bruno has just said it's a hoped for result.


I understand that Bruno wants to take thoughts as fundamental and the 
wants to identify thoughts with provable or computable propositions in 
arithmetic.  He thinks that the modality of "provable" is somehow a good 
model of "believes" or "thinks".  But even if that were true (I don't 
think it is) it fails to account for the physical world which one thinks 
about and acts in.


IOW it's selection by observation, with the part of "universal point 
of view" falling to the suitably programmed digital machine. It from 
bit really, but without the prior commitment to physics as the 
unexplained (aka primitive) assumption. OK?


You don't seem to have even mentioned a contradiction.

Brent



David

He also says it entails the non-existence of "primary
matter"but what is "primary matter".  I've studied physics for
many years and primary matter was never mentioned. But it is said
to be logically contrary to the assumption that computations can
instantiate a mind...whatever that means.

Brent


On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract
mathematical notion.

Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett"
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> a
écrit :

On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett"
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> a écrit :

But that does not prove that the computation does not
run on a physical computer. I take JC's point to be that
your assumption of the primacy of the abstract
computation is unprovable. We at least have experience
of physical computers, and not of non-physical
computers. (Whatever you say to the contrary, 



You're making an ontological commitment and closing any
discussion on it...


All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction
that you all claim exists between computationalism and
physicalism -- a contradiction that does not simply depend on
a definition of computationalism that explicitly states
"physicalism is false". In other words, where is the
contradiction?  A demonstration that does not just beg the
question.

Bruce



-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google

Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegr

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/24/2017 8:42 AM, John Clark wrote:

2) That event did NOT have a cause and thus was random and not computable.

One of those two must be true for everything but I don't see how that 
second possibility could have much relevance if you're interested in 
the study of intelligent behavior.


Randomness is often useful in strategic events and in cryptography.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/24/2017 3:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Apr 2017, at 08:31, Brent Meeker wrote:

I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist, 
like chess and insurance and computations.  The question was whether 
the assumption that computations can instantiate a mind, i.e. the 
possibility of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction of 
something.  The "something" having to do with physics, is part of 
what I would like eulicidated. Bruno says it reverses the 
relationship of physics and psychology...but that's more of a polemic 
slogan than entailment of a contradiction.  He also says it entails 
the non-existence of "primary matter"but what is "primary 
matter".  I've studied physics for many years and primary matter was 
never mentioned.


Indeed. It is not a physical notion. It is a metaphysical or 
theological notion, introduced mainly by Aristotle. Physics do not 
rely on it. Only physicalism relies on it. Sometimes I define "primary 
matter" by what is supposed to exist when we adopt physicalism.





But it is said to be logically contrary to the assumption that 
computations can instantiate a mind...whatever that means.



It is, epistemologically contradictory. If you grasp that all 
computations are instantiated in the arithmetical reality, to predict 
the future, you need to know (in principle) all computations going 
through your current state,


First, I know what a logical contradiction is, e.g. (x and not-x), and I 
know what a nomological contradiction is, e.g. signaling faster than 
light, but I don't know what an epistemological contradiction is ( the 
same evidence supports x and not-x?).


 And what is one's "current state".  That seems to invoke an concept of 
time which is antithetical to arithmetical realism.  And I certainly 
don't know my current state and if I did I still wouldn't know how to 
compute my next state.  So I don't know what it has to do with 
epistemology.


Brent

and making one of them, or a subset of them, more real by invoking a 
metaphysial assumption, is similar to invoking god to avoid solving a 
problem in math. If the measure on all computations (all dreams 
actually, that is computation + self-reference) does not fit what we 
observe then we can say that we have reason to believe in some 
God-Matter, or God-special-oracles, or God-malevolent simulator.


I have to go, best,

bruno






Brent

On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a 
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract 
mathematical notion.


Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett" > a écrit :


On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett"
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>
a écrit :

But that does not prove that the computation does not run
on a physical computer. I take JC's point to be that your
assumption of the primacy of the abstract computation is
unprovable. We at least have experience of physical
computers, and not of non-physical computers. (Whatever you
say to the contrary, 



You're making an ontological commitment and closing any
discussion on it...


All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that
you all claim exists between computationalism and physicalism --
a contradiction that does not simply depend on a definition of
computationalism that explicitly states "physicalism is false".
In other words, where is the contradiction?  A demonstration
that does not just beg the question.

Bruce




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, 
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.

Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 
an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.

Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 

Re: What are atheists for?

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 07:12:38PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
> 
> On 4/24/2017 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>This world is 'objective' in the sense that there is
> >>intersubjective agreement about it.
> >
> >That happens in multi-user video games, and all the multi-user
> >games are implemented by all universal numbers, with all players
> >in arithmetic. The only problem is the relative measure, but we
> >have already that the measure one obeys a quantum logic.
> 
> How do we "have" that?  Can you derive, from computationalism, that
> the description of the world must be in terms of vectors in a
> complex Hilbert space?
> 

I looked into that claim, so maybe I can offer a different
perspective. Quantum logics are the logic of events in a complex
Hilbert space that have probability 1, ie the logic of Hilbert
subspaces. For example, if x is the statement that the system is in
subspace X and y the statement that the system is in subspace Y, we
can speak of x∧y being the statement that the system is in the
subspace X∩Y, and x∨y being the statement that the system is in X⊕Y
(X∪Y is not a subspace). It turns out that these logics (apparentally
a family of them, all quite distinct from classical logic) satisfy the
same axioms as Z and X, modal logics describing two of Bruno's hypostases
(that of the believer and the observer IIRC).

The significance of all of this? Bit hard to say - it would be nice to
handle the more usual QM statements where probability is less than
1. Also, it is open whether Z describes exactly Birkhoff and Neumann's
quantum logic, or merely something like it.

Nevertheless an intriguing result.

-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 11:42:44AM -0400, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 11:42 PM, Russell Standish 
> wrote:
> 
> 
> > ​> ​
> > If we
> > ​ ​
> > take the usual (mathematical) meaning of computation, then I can point
> > to a potential counter-example: beta-decay. Recording the arrival
> > times of electrons from beta decay using a clock and electron detector
> > gives a time series that to our best knowledge is random and hence
> > uncomputable. It is an undeniable physical process that is not a
> > computation.
> >
> 
> ​I think you're right although Bruno would disagree, he has said from the
> point of view of somebody who could observe the entire multiverse (a point
> of view that can not exist) everything is deterministic. However what can't
> be denied is there are only 2 possibilities: ​
> 
> 
> ​1) That event DID have a cause and thus is computable (it may be a very
> long computation ​but it is finite).
> 
> 2) That event did NOT have a cause and thus was random and not computable.
> 
> One of those two must be true for everything but I don't see how that
> second possibility could have much relevance if you're interested in the
> study of intelligent behavior.
> 

I happen to think that random sources will prove to be rather
important to intelligent behaviour, or rather creative behaviour,
which of course is not quite the same thing. Having an IQ of 180
doesn't make you a genius.

But be that as it may, I was responding to a claim by Bruce that all
physical processes are computations to point out that is not
compatible with the usual definition of computation, at least as we
understand physics today. I wasn't commenting on intelligent
behaviour.

Cheers

-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/24/2017 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This world is 'objective' in the sense that there is intersubjective 
agreement about it.


That happens in multi-user video games, and all the multi-user games 
are implemented by all universal numbers, with all players in 
arithmetic. The only problem is the relative measure, but we have 
already that the measure one obeys a quantum logic.


How do we "have" that?  Can you derive, from computationalism, that the 
description of the world must be in terms of vectors in a complex 
Hilbert space?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/24/2017 1:07 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 6:08 AM, Russell Standish  wrote:

On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 11:49:51AM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Ok, so you are rejecting computationalism. Computationalism is the
hypothesis that our mind supervenes on computations (sorry Bruno, it's
easier to write for the purpose of this discussion :). You are
declaring that mind supervene on the physical brain.

That is not it at all. We've clarified with Bruno many times that
computational supervenience is compatible with physical
supervenience. Which is just as well, as otherwise it would be so much
the worse for computationalism.

I have no doubt that the brain is a physical computer, and that
computations performed by the brain are no different from any other
computations.

We are discussing physicalism and computationalism, and if they are
compatible or not, correct?

Bruce repeatedly makes variation of the claim: "look, the brain is
physical and the brain generates consciousness, these are the facts".
This is what I am replying to. It's an argument from authority that
leaves no space for debate or reasoning.
It's not an argument from authority.  It is well supported, I can 
attest, by drinking tequila.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/24/2017 1:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Apr 2017, at 13:38, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 23/04/2017 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a 
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract 
mathematical notion.


A computation with physics is what is happening in the computer I am 
currently working on. I can describe this in mathematical notation if 
you wish, but the process is not the notation. Any process that takes 
input and produces output is a computation. All physical objects do 
this. And physical objects do not know any mathematics.



You assume that there are primary physical object.


Bruce's post refers to physical objects (one of which he perceives 
immediately), but nothing he says depends on the physical objects being 
"primary".  In fact I'm not even sure what "primary" means in this 
context.  Is it simply the ontology of any theory we adopt?  Or is it 
the bottom of some chain of explanation (which I think can be circular)?


That is not an assumption in physics, but in metaphysics, and it is 
incompatible with digital mechanism,


Sure, if "digital mechanism" is the assumption that everything is made 
of computations.


for reasons which have already been explained, but which can be sum up 
in: what role does the primary character of matter plays in a physical 
computation to make it supporting consciousness? The usual answer 
(like the one given by Peter Jone), like "to make it real", is 
equivalent with "God invocation in an explanation".


The usual answer has the advantage of agreeing with the evidence that 
(1) some things are real and some aren't and (2) unlike "God did it" it 
does NOT posit an explanation where none is known.




Mechanism is simpler. You are right when you say that the process is 
not the notation, but the math shows that the process is in the truth 
relating the "notations", or the "information" or the numbers. Such 
truth are NOT notations, they are arithmetical facts, which are 
presupposed to be true in every corner of physics.


No, they are not.  Arithmetical facts are facts only in arithmetic - 
whether they are facts in physics depends on the mapping and 
interpretation, e.g. If there are two people on the tennis team and 
there are two people on the chess team, there are not necessarily four 
people at a meeting to the chess and tennis teams.


So, once we have to assume them, why assuming more, given that it only 
makes the mind-body problem unsolvable?


How do you know it makes the problem unsolvable?  Maybe you've mistaken 
the problem?




You must understand that we know today that the arithmetical truth is 
beyond all system of "notation + effective relation between the notation".


Because we postulate the natural numbers as infinite.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: R: Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/24/2017 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Apr 2017, at 09:18, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:




  "Quentin Anciaux":
How can you justify logic from physics if logic is primary to
prove anything? You're building your lower layer upon an higher
layer... It's contradictory.

# David Finkelstein wrote interesting papers about the "physics
of logic" (and also about "introspective measurements")

streaming.ictp.trieste.it/preprints/P/68/035.pdf




That is a rather good introduction to quantum logic. Although I 
disagree with Putnam and his idea that quantum mechanics makes logic 
empirical. It shows that some logic are empirical, but as 
computationalism illustrates, there are deep classical logical reason 
why some logic are empirical, others are psychological, etc.


But Finkelstein is always very interesting and clear, it is a pleasure 
to disagree with him. Logic is shown empirical here, but only in the 
physicalist context.


Then why doesn't the application of Occam's razor make computationalism 
otiose?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 24/04/2017 7:31 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Apr 2017, at 01:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

We  an easily obtain intersubjective agreement about the existence of 
an external physical world. You seem to want 'direct' experience, and 
refuse to admit the possibility of evaluating the experienced 
evidence to reach some conclusion.


Not at all. We can infer laws from observation, and accept observation 
can refute a theory. It is even, before computationalism, the main 
reason why I do not believe in a primary physical universe: the 
absence of evidences for it.


I was talking about the existence of an objective external physical 
world. I said nothing about "primary matter", the question as to whether 
matter -- in the form of quarks and electrons, etc. -- is primary, or 
emergent from something more fundamental, still a matter of active research.


You say there is no evidence for a primary physical universe, but my 
claim is that there is ample evidence for the existence of a physical 
universe.


On the other hand, there is absolutely no concrete evidence for the 
truth of computationalism. In fact, it fails the most elementary tests 
because it cannot explain even the most basic features of the physical 
universe. It does not "explain" consciousness, it merely describes it as 
supervening on computations.


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 24/04/2017 6:07 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 6:08 AM, Russell Standish  wrote:

On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 11:49:51AM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Ok, so you are rejecting computationalism. Computationalism is the
hypothesis that our mind supervenes on computations (sorry Bruno, it's
easier to write for the purpose of this discussion :). You are
declaring that mind supervene on the physical brain.

That is not it at all. We've clarified with Bruno many times that
computational supervenience is compatible with physical
supervenience. Which is just as well, as otherwise it would be so much
the worse for computationalism.

I have no doubt that the brain is a physical computer, and that
computations performed by the brain are no different from any other
computations.

We are discussing physicalism and computationalism, and if they are
compatible or not, correct?

Bruce repeatedly makes variation of the claim: "look, the brain is
physical and the brain generates consciousness, these are the facts".
This is what I am replying to. It's an argument from authority that
leaves no space for debate or reasoning.


First, it is not an argument from authority, it is an argument made on 
the basis of all the available evidence -- consciousness supervenes on 
the physical brain.


Second. An argument from authority is not necessarily a reason to reject 
that argument. Because life is short and we cannot be experts in 
absolutely everything, we frequently have to rely on authorities -- 
people who are recognized experts in the relevant field. I am confident 
that when I drive across this bridge it will not collapse under the 
weight of my car because I trust the expertise of the engineers who 
designed and constructed the bridge. In other words, I rely on the  
relevant authorities for my conclusion that this bridge is safe. An 
argument from authority is unsound only if the quoted authorities are 
themselves not reliable -- they are not experts in the relevant field, 
and/or their supposed qualifications are bogus. There are many examples 
of this -- like relying on President Trump's assessment of anthropogenic 
global warming, etc, etc.


Third, since it is now clear that the term "physicalism" refers to the 
belief in primary matter, I have never ascribed to "physicalism". I do 
not know what "primary matter" is supposed to mean, and it certainly has 
never been a subject of study that I have encountered in my lifetime of 
work in physics. What I have argued for is the existence of an external, 
objective, physical world about which there is intersubjective 
agreement. Whether the matter in this world is primary or emergent from 
something more fundamental is an open question, and still the subject of 
active debate in the physics community: I have no commitment to either 
side of this argument. Likewise, there is an ongoing debate among 
physicists about realist or anti-realist interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, alongside more general debates about realism in the 
philosophy of physics in general.


So I do not take kindly to attempts to silence me, or put me down, by 
categorizing my views in simplistic terms, or in ways that I have never 
entertained.


My problems with computationalism arise from the fact that I do not 
believe in mathematical platonism, and the fact that computationalism 
has not produced any concrete results about the physical world -- it is 
all speculative -- there is not even a proof of the existence of an 
acceptable physical solution. When you have derived Newton's laws from 
computationalism, then we might have something to talk about.


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>> ​
>> In every experiment ever performed when the physical brain changes
>> ​consciousness changes, and whenever consciousness changes a change in the
>> brain can be found. What more evidence do you need, what more evidence
>> could there even be??
>
>
> ​> ​
> You have to explain what is primary matter
>

​What?! If a matter particle is primary then the question "​
what is
​that ​
primary matter
​ particle made of?" is ridiculous!  If it's primary then that means the
chain of "what is that made of?" questions is not infinite but ends at the
primary level.

John K Clark   ​



>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[David Nyman]

On 24 Apr 2017 7:32 a.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:

I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist, like
chess and insurance and computations.  The question was whether the
assumption that computations can instantiate a mind, i.e. the possibility
of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction of something.  The
"something" having to do with physics, is part of what I would like
eulicidated.  Bruno says it reverses the relationship of physics and
psychology...but that's more of a polemic slogan than entailment of a
contradiction.


I don't think so. Here's the way I see it. Let's say we accept as a
hypothesis a computational ontology. Since this requires no more than the
natural numbers with +  and * this amounts to an ontology of arithmetic.
Platonism be damned, our interest at this point is merely in seeing where
the hypothesis can take us. So, computationalism leads us to the extension
of the UD, which in turn gives us the digital machine, aka the fully
fungible universal computational device. The reversal then is between role
of the "psychology" of that universal machine and the subset of the trace
of the UD assumed to implement physics. The former is now required to play
the role of filter or selector on behalf of the latter; it's what
distinguishes​ it from the much more general computational background. Of
course that "filtration", by assumption, essentially equates to the
extremely high probability of that very subset being required to support
its own self-selection. IOW it's selection by observation, with the part of
"universal point of view" falling to the suitably programmed digital
machine. It from bit really, but without the prior commitment to physics as
the unexplained (aka primitive) assumption. OK?

David

He also says it entails the non-existence of "primary matter"but what
is "primary matter".  I've studied physics for many years and primary
matter was never mentioned.  But it is said to be logically contrary to the
assumption that computations can instantiate a mind...whatever that means.

Brent


On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a computation
with physics first, without relying on abstract mathematical notion.

Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett"  a
écrit :

> On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett"  a
> écrit :
>
> But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a physical
> computer. I take JC's point to be that your assumption of the primacy of
> the abstract computation is unprovable. We at least have experience of
> physical computers, and not of non-physical computers. (Whatever you say to
> the contrary,
>
>
> You're making an ontological commitment and closing any discussion on
> it...
>
>
> All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that you all
> claim exists between computationalism and physicalism -- a contradiction
> that does not simply depend on a definition of computationalism that
> explicitly states "physicalism is false". In other words, where is the
> contradiction?  A demonstration that does not just beg the question.
>
> Bruce
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 5:23 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​
>> ​>> ​
>> In physics things happen, interactions DO stuff, things come into
>> physical existence that didn't exist before; but everything already exists
>> in your non-physical Platonic sense so nothing can DO anything. The best
>> definition of "nothing" I've ever heard of is infinite unbounded
>> homogeneity, and that pretty well defines platonic reality too.
>
>
> ​> ​
>  you think that relativity theory is false?
>

​NO.​



> ​> ​
> You disagree with "block-universe", or with Einstein when he said that
> "time is an illusion (albeit a persistent one)".
>

​Time may be an illusion but I don't think spacetime

​is​ and I'm sure as hell Einstein didn't think so either.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[PGC]

On Monday, April 24, 2017 at 12:02:56 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Apr 2017, at 06:08, Russell Standish wrote: 
>
> > On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 11:49:51AM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
> >> 
> >> Ok, so you are rejecting computationalism. Computationalism is the 
> >> hypothesis that our mind supervenes on computations (sorry Bruno,   
> >> it's 
> >> easier to write for the purpose of this discussion :). You are 
> >> declaring that mind supervene on the physical brain. 
> > 
> > That is not it at all. We've clarified with Bruno many times that 
> > computational supervenience is compatible with physical 
> > supervenience. 
>
> It should be if computationalism is correct, and if we are not deadly   
> wrong in physics. 
>

Russell is the pope of comp from this day onwards?

"Comp entraîne SUP-COMP" is no more. 

No more spare change weakening the notion of physical supervenience 
(states, possible proximity relations) as special cases of computational 
supervenience, because by hypothesis *we survive the computational capture 
of the same*. 

Comp entraîne whatever the boss prefers, and if it doesn't, then it "would 
be so much the worse for computationalism." Whoa-ho-ho-ho! PGC

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 4:54 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​
>> ​>> ​
>> Notions require intelligence and​intelligence requires matter that obeys
>> the laws of physics.​
>
>
> ​> ​
> In which theory?
>

​JOHN: Hey Bruno, will it be safe for me to walk across that bridge, is it
made strong enough to support my weight?

BRUNO: Well John that depends entirely on what theory of structural
engineering you decide to believe in while you're walking over the bridge.
  ​



> ​> ​
> You talk like an evangelist.
>

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

​>> ​
>> If the non-physical number manipulation 1+1=2 exists
>
>
> ​> ​
> It exists indeed.
>

​At last we agree on something​!


​>> ​
>> then the non-physical number manipulation 1+1=3 exists too.
>
>
> ​> ​
> It does not.
>

​If it doesn't exist then how was I able to just state it? I will even say
that untrue statements far ​outnumber true ones, that's why science is so
hard.

​> ​
> What exists are "dumb relative number asserting that this exists",
>

​
And dumb assertions far outnumber smart assertions, that's why intelligence
is so hard. The smart assertions produce no contradictions with the
physical
​world​
 and we call then "true"
​, the dumb assertions do produce contradictions with the physical world
and we call them "false".​

​

 J​ohn K Clark



>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2017, at 17:13, John Clark wrote:


Telmo Menezes  wrote:

​> ​I have no doubt that the brain is a physical computer,

​And I ​also have no doubt mind is what the brain does.

​> ​and that​ ​computations performed by the brain are no  
different from any other

computations.

​Good.​

​> ​We are discussing physicalism and computationalism, and if  
they are

compatible or not

​Of course they are compatible!




Of course you believe that. But that is due to the identity link 1p- 
mind with 3p-soul, that you use all the times, and when we show it to  
not work, you just eliminate the 1-3 difference.




​> ​Bruce repeatedly makes variation of the claim: "look, the  
brain is

physical and the brain generates consciousness, these are the facts".
This is what I am replying to. It's an argument from authority

Argument from authority​, what the hell are you talking about? In  
every experiment ever performed when the physical brain changes ​ 
consciousness changes, and whenever consciousness changes a change  
in the brain can be found. What more evidence do you need, what more  
evidence could there even be??


You have to explain what is primary matter (the object of study of  
physics when physicalism is assumed), and what role it has in enacting  
consciousness.






> Ok, so you are rejecting computationalism.

​I don't know about Bruce but I'm not rejecting ​ 
computationalism​ because I believe the mind ​is a information  
processing system. what I'm rejecting is "comp";  Bruno claims his  
silly homemade word means the same thing but clearly that's not true  
and the fact is I don't know what it means and I'm not sure Bruno  
does either.


Rhetorical tricks.

Bruno





 John K Clark



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2017, at 14:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 24/04/2017 8:05 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Apr 2017, at 06:53, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 24/04/2017 1:42 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 09:38:26PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 23/04/2017 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract
mathematical notion.
A computation with physics is what is happening in the computer  
I am

currently working on. I can describe this in mathematical notation
if you wish, but the process is not the notation. Any process that
takes input and produces output is a computation. All physical
objects do this. And physical objects do not know any mathematics.

That is the definition of a physical process, not a computation.  
If we
take the usual (mathematical) meaning of computation, then I can  
point

to a potential counter-example: beta-decay. Recording the arrival
times of electrons from beta decay using a clock and electron  
detector

gives a time series that to our best knowledge is random and hence
uncomputable. It is an undeniable physical process that is not a  
computation.


Which means that the physical universe is not Turing emulable. I  
thought the idea was that the physical world was not emulable  
because it relies on the statistics of the infinite processes  
running through our conscious state. Beta decay is not emulable  
because quantum randomness is not computable (pseudo-randomness  
will never do in the long run). I do not see that these reasons  
for non-computability are the same.


In any case, one could include beta decay as a computation --  
simply claim a violation of the Church-Turing thesis. That might  
not be such a bad idea.


Then all functions will be computable. By definition, if you can  
compute a function, you can provide a mean to get the result, and  
such that anybody will get the same result following that mean.  
That is not the case for the beta decay.


There are a number of things that are completely reproducible in  
beta decay: the lifetime of the nucleus, the statistics of the  
arrival times of electrons from a large sample of nuclei, etc. So  
beta decay does compute a number of things, not so different from a  
mathematical function , really-- a function only computes a limited  
number of things. You need different functions for different  
computations


I can use the universal function, which is the function phi_u, with u  
a universal number. That is the beauty of computer science: it has a  
string notion of universality.


Now the beta decay can compute things, but what I and others said is  
that the beta decay is not computable, in the usual sense of  
computable used in "computationalism".


Bruno





Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 11:42 PM, Russell Standish 
wrote:


> ​> ​
> If we
> ​ ​
> take the usual (mathematical) meaning of computation, then I can point
> to a potential counter-example: beta-decay. Recording the arrival
> times of electrons from beta decay using a clock and electron detector
> gives a time series that to our best knowledge is random and hence
> uncomputable. It is an undeniable physical process that is not a
> computation.
>

​I think you're right although Bruno would disagree, he has said from the
point of view of somebody who could observe the entire multiverse (a point
of view that can not exist) everything is deterministic. However what can't
be denied is there are only 2 possibilities: ​


​1) That event DID have a cause and thus is computable (it may be a very
long computation ​but it is finite).

2) That event did NOT have a cause and thus was random and not computable.

One of those two must be true for everything but I don't see how that
second possibility could have much relevance if you're interested in the
study of intelligent behavior.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 2:31 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

​> ​
> I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist, like
> chess and insurance and computations.
>

​All you're saying is that verbs and adjectives exist and not just nouns,
and I agree. ​C
hess and insurance and computations
​ are all about how physical objects interact.​


​ John K Clark​



>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

Telmo Menezes  wrote:

​> ​
> I have no doubt that the brain is a physical computer,


​And I ​also have no doubt mind is what the brain does.



> ​> ​
> and that
> ​ ​
> computations performed by the brain are no different from any other
> computations.
>

​Good.​


>
​> ​
> We are discussing physicalism and computationalism, and if they are
> compatible or not
>

​Of course they are compatible!

>
​> ​
> Bruce repeatedly makes variation of the claim: "look, the brain is
> physical and the brain generates consciousness, these are the facts".
> This is what I am replying to. It's an argument from authority


Argument from authority
​, what the hell are you talking about? In every experiment ever performed
when the physical brain changes ​consciousness changes, and whenever
consciousness changes a change in the brain can be found. What more
evidence do you need, what more evidence could there even be??

>
> Ok, so you are rejecting computationalism.


​I don't know about Bruce but I'm not rejecting ​
computationalism
​ because I believe the mind ​is a information processing system. what I'm
rejecting is "comp";  Bruno claims his silly homemade word means the same
thing but clearly that's not true and the fact is I don't know what it
means and I'm not sure Bruno does either.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 24/04/2017 8:05 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Apr 2017, at 06:53, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 24/04/2017 1:42 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 09:38:26PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 23/04/2017 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract
mathematical notion.

A computation with physics is what is happening in the computer I am
currently working on. I can describe this in mathematical notation
if you wish, but the process is not the notation. Any process that
takes input and produces output is a computation. All physical
objects do this. And physical objects do not know any mathematics.


That is the definition of a physical process, not a computation. If we
take the usual (mathematical) meaning of computation, then I can point
to a potential counter-example: beta-decay. Recording the arrival
times of electrons from beta decay using a clock and electron detector
gives a time series that to our best knowledge is random and hence
uncomputable. It is an undeniable physical process that is not a 
computation.


Which means that the physical universe is not Turing emulable. I 
thought the idea was that the physical world was not emulable because 
it relies on the statistics of the infinite processes running through 
our conscious state. Beta decay is not emulable because quantum 
randomness is not computable (pseudo-randomness will never do in the 
long run). I do not see that these reasons for non-computability are 
the same.


In any case, one could include beta decay as a computation -- simply 
claim a violation of the Church-Turing thesis. That might not be such 
a bad idea.


Then all functions will be computable. By definition, if you can 
compute a function, you can provide a mean to get the result, and such 
that anybody will get the same result following that mean. That is not 
the case for the beta decay.


There are a number of things that are completely reproducible in beta 
decay: the lifetime of the nucleus, the statistics of the arrival times 
of electrons from a large sample of nuclei, etc. So beta decay does 
compute a number of things, not so different from a mathematical 
function , really-- a function only computes a limited number of things. 
You need different functions for different computations


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2017, at 08:31, Brent Meeker wrote:

I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist,  
like chess and insurance and computations.  The question was whether  
the assumption that computations can instantiate a mind, i.e. the  
possibility of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction of  
something.  The "something" having to do with physics, is part of  
what I would like eulicidated.  Bruno says it reverses the  
relationship of physics and psychology...but that's more of a  
polemic slogan than entailment of a contradiction.  He also says it  
entails the non-existence of "primary matter"but what is  
"primary matter".  I've studied physics for many years and  
primarymatter was never mentioned.


Indeed. It is not a physical notion. It is a metaphysical or  
theological notion, introduced mainly by Aristotle. Physics do not  
rely on it. Only physicalism relies on it. Sometimes I define "primary  
matter" by what is supposed to exist when we adopt physicalism.





But it is said to be logically contrary to the assumption that  
computations can instantiate a mind...whatever that means.



It is, epistemologically contradictory. If you grasp that all  
computations are instantiated in the arithmetical reality, to predict  
the future, you need to know (in principle) all computations going  
through your current state, and making one of them, or a subset of  
them, more real by invoking a metaphysial assumption, is similar to  
invoking god to avoid solving a problem in math. If the measure on all  
computations (all dreams actually, that is computation + self- 
reference) does not fit what we observe then we can say that we have  
reason to believe in some God-Matter, or God-special-oracles, or God- 
malevolent simulator.


I have to go, best,

bruno






Brent

On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a  
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract  
mathematical notion.


Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett"  
 a écrit :

On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett"   
a écrit :
But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a  
physical computer. I take JC's point to be that your assumption of  
the primacy of the abstract computation is unprovable. We at least  
have experience of physical computers, and not of non-physical  
computers. (Whatever you say to the contrary,


You're making an ontological commitment and closing any discussion  
on it...


All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that  
you all claim exists between computationalism and physicalism -- a  
contradiction that does not simply depend on a definition of  
computationalism that explicitly states "physicalism is false". In  
other words, where is the contradiction?  A demonstration that does  
not just beg the question.


Bruce



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2017, at 06:53, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 24/04/2017 1:42 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 09:38:26PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 23/04/2017 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract
mathematical notion.

A computation with physics is what is happening in the computer I am
currently working on. I can describe this in mathematical notation
if you wish, but the process is not the notation. Any process that
takes input and produces output is a computation. All physical
objects do this. And physical objects do not know any mathematics.

That is the definition of a physical process, not a computation. If  
we
take the usual (mathematical) meaning of computation, then I can  
point

to a potential counter-example: beta-decay. Recording the arrival
times of electrons from beta decay using a clock and electron  
detector

gives a time series that to our best knowledge is random and hence
uncomputable. It is an undeniable physical process that is not a  
computation.


Which means that the physical universe is not Turing emulable. I  
thought the idea was that the physical world was not emulable  
because it relies on the statistics of the infinite processes  
running through our conscious state. Beta decay is not emulable  
because quantum randomness is not computable (pseudo-randomness will  
never do in the long run). I do not see that these reasons for non- 
computability are the same.


In any case, one could include beta decay as a computation -- simply  
claim a violation of the Church-Turing thesis. That might not be  
such a bad idea.


Then all functions will be computable. By definition, if you can  
compute a function, you can provide a mean to get the result, and such  
that anybody will get the same result following that mean. That is not  
the case for the beta decay.


bruno




Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2017, at 06:08, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 11:49:51AM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote:


Ok, so you are rejecting computationalism. Computationalism is the
hypothesis that our mind supervenes on computations (sorry Bruno,  
it's

easier to write for the purpose of this discussion :). You are
declaring that mind supervene on the physical brain.


That is not it at all. We've clarified with Bruno many times that
computational supervenience is compatible with physical
supervenience.


It should be if computationalism is correct, and if we are not deadly  
wrong in physics.





Which is just as well, as otherwise it would be so much
the worse for computationalism.


But we must do the test, and indeed, if Z1* or X1* differ too much  
from Quantum Logic, we get evidences to doubt computationalism, or we  
save computationalism by assuming that we are in a malevolent  
emulation made by our descendants.


Bruno







--


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2017, at 05:56, Russell Standish wrote:


I think you understand, Bruce, that step 7 shows that any ontological
property beyond universal computation and robustness can have no
phenomenological entailment. It heavily relies on the CT thesis for
that. In this sense, ontology can be sliced away by Occam's razor,
applicable to primitive physics and arithmetical platonism in equal
measure. Bruno's appeal to arithmetical Platonism is that is supposed
to be uncontroversial - but endless debates and niggles indicate it
may not be.

But Bruce is right - this is not a contradiction as such, except to
ask the question "what is the use of a primitive physics that one
cannot measure or access in any way?".

Step 8 is the supposed contradiction - Olympia and Kara etc. I have a
paper on this argument, which I really must get around to addressing
the reviewer's concerns and get published. I tend to think that is
more of an argument by incredulity than a genuine logical
contradiction, though...


It is an argument by incredulity.

Once we apply a theory on "reality", we have only argument of  
incredulity. It is the reason why, once I get the thermodynamic right,  
I cease to believe in invisible horses, or, ... I still believe in  
them, but they have become more abstract and well hidden in the engine  
functioning.


Bruno






On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 09:34:23AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a
mathematical notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce
to matter, computationalism is false by definition, as computation
as such is not a physical notion.


That is just word salad. A description of a physical process is not,
in itself, physical (unless it is written down or stored
physically). Similarly, computation is not physical in so far as it
is an abstract description of what a computer does. But the computer
is physical, and the computation does not exist absent the computer.

It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the thesis
that physicalism is false, and then claimed that the assumption of
computationalism contradicts physicalism. But that is logic chopping
of the basest kind.

Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is not,
of itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then attempts to argue
that the notion of abstract computations (platonia) renders the
physical otiose. There is still no contradiction. The best that
Bruno can achieve is something that seems absurd to him. But that is
merely a contradiction with his instinctive notions of what is
reasonable -- it is not a demonstrated logical contradiction.

Bruce




Regards,
Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 00:42, "Bruce Kellett" mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> a écrit :

  On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:

  On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker
  mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

  On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

  John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that
  you claim that
  there is some mysterious substance (he finally called
  it a "soul")
  that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I
  claim is this:
  under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied.
  The problem is
  that physicalism leads to a contradiction,


  I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell
  out what that
  contradiction is?

  Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
  If you assume computationalism, the computation that is  
currently

  supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space.
  Maybe
  your current computation happens in the original planet Earth
  but also
  in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized  
computer in a
  far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to  
assume

  that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the
  simulation
  argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as
  unique. It
  follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be  
spatially or

  temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.


  This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In
  fact, you examples are all completely consistent with the
  requirement that any computation requires a physical substrate --
  "a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
  far-away galaxy" is a completely physical concept.

  Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is
  a computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You
  have to add something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism,
  the idea that all computations exist in the abstract, in platonia,
  and do not require physical implementation. But that is merely the
  assumption that physicalism is 

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2017, at 05:42, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 09:38:26PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 23/04/2017 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract
mathematical notion.


A computation with physics is what is happening in the computer I am
currently working on. I can describe this in mathematical notation
if you wish, but the process is not the notation. Any process that
takes input and produces output is a computation. All physical
objects do this. And physical objects do not know any mathematics.



That is the definition of a physical process, not a computation. If we
take the usual (mathematical) meaning of computation, then I can point
to a potential counter-example: beta-decay. Recording the arrival
times of electrons from beta decay using a clock and electron detector
gives a time series that to our best knowledge is random and hence
uncomputable. It is an undeniable physical process that is not a  
computation.


Yes. This is not computable, but it is FPI recoverable, and that is  
indeed exactly how Everett recovers the phenomenology of the wave  
packet reduction together with the inter-subjective agreement. It is  
the reason of decoherence in physics.


Bruno




Back to my pop corn!


--


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Movie Argument ​

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2017, at 02:13, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 9:32 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​​>> ​John Clark understands the setup but not the question  
because a very odd word was used in it, "I". Not that predictions,  
correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with a sense of  
personal individuality ​​but John Clark predicts that John Clark  
will experience all ​of the above except for #0. John Clark will be  
able to narrow that down as soon as Bruno says which of the   
2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24​ John Clarks is Mr. I.


​> ​Because you forget again​ [...]​

​John Clark had not forgotten that Bruno Marchal used the personal  
pronoun "I" in the question and NOT the proper noun "John Clark";



I use "I" because there is no ambiguity, given the definition given,  
and it is useful to remind that the experience is on the future 1p.


I just refuse to use the proper noun, because it introduces the slope  
toward the 3_1 view, where what you say will be obviously correct, but  
non relevant.


I just refuse to help you in building your rhetorical trick.





and John Clark knows that makes a astronomically large difference if  
there are 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24 John Clarks.


​> ​that you have already agree that all John Clarks are the same  
person as the one before the experience


​Yes but Bruno Marchal​ ​has forgotten that although both the  
Moscow Man and the Washington Man are the Helsinki Man that does NOT  
mean the Moscow Man is the Washington man.


Not forgotten. It is the key to get the indeterminacy lived in Helsinki.






All ducks are birds but not all birds are ducks.​

​> ​the prediction asked was about the 1p experience,

​John Clark does not know what "THE​ 1p experience​" means if  
there are​ 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24 John Clarks.​ As  
said before, the setup is clear but the question is not.​


It is all experiences obtained, but seen from their own perspective.  
And all says I see only one city, so the H guy can predict "I will see  
one city", and as he accept that both will be him, he accept that he  
cannot predict which one in advance.







​> ​ we see that the prediction "I will see all movies" is  
falsified by all the Mr. I relevant here,


Who said  "I will see all movies"​? John Clark will see all  
movies. ​


To give the 3-1 description, and thus elude the question asked.






​> ​ "I" is not ambiguous at all,

​Good. Then you will have no difficulty ​in proving that simply  
by retiring the personal pronoun "I" and always using the proper  
noun instead in all future thought experiments!


I did, and will not repeat. Of course at some point, I was obliged to  
distinguish 1-John-Clark and 3-John Clark, to get the prediction, and  
its verification.


Your worry with "I" is akin to the worry of the materialist with the  
notion of consciousness, or soul, or first person, indeed. But it is  
ridiculous in the present setting, because we use only a third person  
notion of "I" (the content of the diary taken in the duplication box),  
and so anyone can verify the reasoning just by 3p logical derivation.


Bruno






​John K Clark​



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2017, at 01:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 23/04/2017 11:06 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Apr 2017, at 09:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 23/04/2017 5:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 23 avr. 2017 09:16, "Bruce Kellett"  
 a écrit :

On 23/04/2017 5:05 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

The only direct experience I have is me, not physics.


That is solipsism.

No that would be if i'd say only me is real... That's not what I  
said. It's a fact that the only *direct* experience I have is me.


And you are a physical being If you thereby deny the existence  
of the external objective world, that is most certainly solipsism.


Sure. But you can still deny the existence of a primary physical  
objective world.


Computationalism admits the existence of an external reality:  
arithmetic. And is hardly solipsist given that he accepts the  
existence of infinitely many "others" there.


But that begs the ontological question every bit as much as the  
assumption of the existence of an external, observer-independent,  
physical reality.


Not at all. That would beg the question if we were defending the truth  
of computationalism. But the point is only is incompatibility with  
physicalism.


To just assert computationalism, we need to accept x + 0 = x, and  
alike. Then with computationalism, we have all computations realized  
in arithmetic, as a theorem.


There are no evidence for a primary physical universe, yet. may be one  
day we will have some, I work exactly on that, but the first  
evidence are more in favor of computationalism.








Physics is an explanation of my experiences, not reality.


So your experiences are not real? If physics explains your  
experiences, then physics is primary --


No, physics as such use mathematics to explain, and rely on rules  
of mathematics to ascertain its explanations, as such it is  
dubious to make it primary. For it to be primary, physics should  
not rely on inference rules. You can't use an higher level to  
explain the lower feature, because if in the lower is primary,  
everything should reduce to it.


What basis do you have for claiming that the rules of inference  
are of a higher level? They are perfectly easily understood as  
deriving from experience -- i.e., from our experience of an  
objective external world.


You can experience an external world (like a physical reality or an  
arithmetical reality), but you cannot experience its  
"objectiveness". You need a theory, and the notion of objectiveness  
is relative to the choice of the theory.


We  an easily obtain intersubjective agreement about the existence  
of an external physical world. You seem to want 'direct' experience,  
and refuse to admit the possibility of evaluating the experienced  
evidence to reach some conclusion.


Not at all. We can infer laws from observation, and accept observation  
can refute a theory. It is even, before computationalism, the main  
reason why I do not believe in a primary physical universe: the  
absence of evidences for it.




As physicists are well aware, all observation is theory-laden, but  
so are 'direct' personal experiences -- they are just another form  
of observation.


I do not accept *any* experience as a definitive evidence, nor do I  
accept direct evidence, except for "consciousness here and now", but  
that one is not part of the theoretical discourse: it is just an  
important data to not hide.


Bruno






In fact, where else could they come from? Do you have direct  
intuitive access to the higher realms of Platonia? What facility  
do you use for this direct intuition? And how do you verify its  
reliability? Inference rules, and mathematics, derive  
fundamentally from experience, and that is our experience of the  
physical world.


same ambiguity as above.

Bruno



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2017, at 01:10, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 8:11 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


>> ​Robinson​ showed that if you do certain activities in a  
certain sequence then you can produce correct mathematical  
calculations without producing any incorrect mathematical  
calculations. But without matter that obeys the laws of physics you  
can't "do" anything,


​> ​You beg the question​ ​.

​In physics things happen, interactions DO stuff, things come into  
physical existence that didn't exist before; but everything already  
exists in your non-physical Platonic sense so nothing can DO  
anything. The best definition of "nothing" I've ever heard of is  
infinite unbounded homogeneity, and that pretty well defines  
platonic reality too.



So you think that relativity theory is false? You disagree with "block- 
universe", or with Einstein when he said that "time is an illusion  
(albeit a persistent one)".


The universal dovetailing is everything but an unbounded homogeneity,  
and more so when viewed from inside by arithmetical creatures.









​> ​and just make an ontological commitment.

​Most of the posts on this list are about ontology one way or  
another.​


Yes, but we can't invoke them in the reasoning which explains why they  
cannot work, except for the reduction ad absurdo. It is like saying  
that the evolution theory explains a lot of things, but is obviously  
wrong as it fails to explain how god made it all in six days.


Bruno



 John K Clark ​





and just make an ontological commitment.



that's why a book by itself can't perform a calculation or "do"  
anything else either, not even a book on Robinson Arithmetic.


No one ever asked a book to compute anything, but a book on Robinson  
Arithmetic, if you read it carefully, should help you to understand  
that the notion of computation is not a physical notion at all.


Bruno




John K Clark  ​


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything- 
l...@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2017, at 01:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 23/04/2017 10:52 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Apr 2017, at 01:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a  
mathematical notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce  
to matter, computationalism is false by definition, as  
computation as such is not a physical notion.


That is just word salad. A description of a physical process is  
not, in itself, physical (unless it is written down or stored  
physically). Similarly, computation is not physical in so far as  
it is an abstract description of what a computer does.


This is an Aristotelian begging the question. And false.  
Computations have been discovered in mathematical logic, and they  
have been implemented in the physical realm after.


Descriptions of computations might have been discovered in  
arithmetic. But descriptions are not the thing itself -- map and  
territory all over again.


Description of computations have been discovered in arithmetic, but  
computations too.


Even RA can see the difference between a computation in arithmetic and  
a description of a computation in arithmetic.


You seem to ignore one century of metamathematics (alias mathematical  
logic). You confuse a computation and a description of a computation,  
and so you are the one confusing map and territory in arithmetic. It  
is the same confusion that you can have between s(s(0)) and "s(s(0))".









A platonist would say that a physical computer is not even a  
computer, it is a local terrestrial approximation of a universal  
number only.


That would also beg the question, so better not to commit ourselves  
in ontology when working on the mind body problem.


So it would be better for you not to commit to the ontology of the  
prior existence of arithmetic -- that would beg the question.


I do not. What is asked is to agree on simple relation like x + 0 = x.  
Some amount of arithmetic needs to be accepted, if only to assert  
Church-thesis, to define machine, or to define a wave.


Here, the problem is that you do not provide a clear-cut theory. If  
you can prove x + 0 = x, in physics, without assuming arithmetic, just  
give the proof. I am interested.








But the computer is physical, and the computation does not exist  
absent the computer.


It does not exist in the physical sense. Sure.


It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the  
thesis that physicalism is false, and then claimed that the  
assumption of computationalism contradicts physicalism. But that  
is logic chopping of the basest kind.


Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is not,  
of itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then attempts to  
argue that the notion of abstract computations (platonia) renders  
the physical otiose. There is still no contradiction. The best  
that Bruno can achieve is something that seems absurd to him. But  
that is merely a contradiction with his instinctive notions of  
what is reasonable -- it is not a demonstrated logical  
contradiction.


Yes, with the Movie Graph Argument, we still need Occam, but that  
is ridiculous to mention, given that the goal is to show we can do  
an experimental testing.


An experimental testing of what?


Of computationalism.


More precisely: computationalism or malevolent simulation (but that  
can be added to any experimental testing).






And the conclusion is not a logical contradiction indeed, but then  
you are like the guy who would say that despite thermodynamics  
explains how a car move we keep the right to believe in invisible  
horses. With such moves, there is no fundamental science at all.


All that my argument requires is that we accept the existence of an  
external (physical) world, with which we can interact.


I accept that, but do not see why the external physical world as not  
an external purely mathematical justification.




This world is 'objective' in the sense that there is intersubjective  
agreement about it.


That happens in multi-user video games, and all the multi-user games  
are implemented by all universal numbers, with all players in  
arithmetic. The only problem is the relative measure, but we have  
already that the measure one obeys a quantum logic.





I think you accept as much,


Yes, but unless you disagree with step 3, or perhaps step 7, I do not  
see how you will make physicalism coherent with computationalism.


Bruno




so the discussion can proceed from there. Ontology can be left to  
one side. (Or, as Brent would say, ontology is theory-dependent.)


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit thi

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2017, at 00:28, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 7:30 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​​>> ​Suppose just for ​​t​he sake ​of argument that  
non-physical computations did not exist, how would our physical  
world be different?


​> ​It would like if the number 2 does not exist.

​No it would not because if non-physical computations did not exist  
then one physical rock and another physical rock would STILL have  
the same effect on the physical universe as 2 physical rocks do..​



If the number 2 does not exist, you are the pope, and 2 physical rocks  
is the same as one physical rocks, with only one atom ...






​> ​Computation and "universal machine" are non physical notions,

​Notions require intelligence and ​intelligence requires matter  
that obeys the laws of physics.​


In which theory? You talk like an evangelist.






​> ​discovered independently by mathematicians

​And ​mathematicians​,​​ just like everybody else, are made  
of matter that obeys the laws of physics.​


I can agree, if you talk about human mathematicians. But even if true,  
that does not mean matter is not emerging from the computation already  
realized in elementary arithmetic. Even in pure arithmetic, human  
mathematicians are made of matter.






​> t​he fact that the physical reality can implement computations  
might suggest already that the physical reality might emerge from  
computations.


If the non-physical number manipulation 1+1=2 exists


It exists indeed.





then the non-physical number manipulation 1+1=3 exists too.


It does not. What exists are "dumb relative number asserting that this  
exists", but it does not make the computation of 1+1= 3 exists.





Physics can tell one from ​of ​manipulation from the other  
because in the physical world one rock and another rock will never  
behave like 3 rocks. How can pure mathematics do the same thing? You  
can talk about Robinson arithmetic all you want but there are a  
infinite number of ways numbers can be manipulated in pure  
mathematics and Robinson arithmetic is just one of those ways. But  
there is ​one and ​only one way numbers can be manipulated that  
is consistent with the physical world, and we call that one way of  
manipulation a ​"​calculation​"​.


It is a calculation, indeed a physical one. But the arithmetical  
reality explain the appearances of both consciousness and of physical  
calculations. The primary physical miss both consciousness and the  
appearances of the physical, for anyone not stuck in word salad, of  
course.


Bruno






 ​John K Clark​



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Apr 2017, at 23:27, John Clark wrote:


On Sun, Apr 23, 2017  Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

​> ​physics as such use mathematics to explain,

​Yes, mathematicians are always saying mathematics is a language  
and mathematics is the language that best describes physics. But as  
members of this list often say the map is not the territory and the  
word "car" is not a car, it is a word.​


​> ​For it to be primary, physics should not rely on inference  
rules.


​You say mathematics is primary, but mathematics relies on  
inference rules​. ​


Not really. Formal theories, and machines, relies on inference rules,  
but the mathematical reality is independent of the formal theories  
used to describe it. Even in logic, you can abandon the theories, and  
adopt a pure semantical approach (itself formalized or not) in which  
there is no inference rule.


In mathematics, like in any domain, we must distinguish the theories,  
and what the theories are supposed to talk about.
Gödel's incompleteness has killed not just logicism, but also the  
formalist position (not the use of formalism, but the idea that there  
is only formalism).







​> ​You can't use an higher level to explain the lower feature,

​Explanations require two ​things, somebody​ with enough  
intelligence to explain something and somebody with enough  
intelligence ​to understand something; and intelligence always  
requires matter that obeys the laws of physics.​ Explanations are a  
function of intelligence, the explanation for why a thing exist may  
or may not be correct but as far as the thing itself is concerned it  
doesn't matter, the thing will continue to exist regardless.


​> ​JC's argument that he has never seen a computation run  
without a

computational substrate is silly when assuming comp,

​And that is why JC does not assume this muddled thing that Bruno  
calls "comp", and like most of Bruno's homemade terms isn't ever  
sure what it means.


That is pure name-calling, and as someone just said that is boring,  
and actually a good evidence of lack of argument. To be precise, the  
definition of computationalism I have given is:


1) far more precise than any other in the literature, where it is  
confused with Putnam high level functionalism. In fact  
computationalism is Turing-Church functionalism at a substitution  
level. It functionalism preceded by a existential quantifier  
(Ex(functionalism works at level x).


2) It implies all other form of computationalism, making anything  
derived from it very general.


bruno







John K Clark​




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Telmo Menezes]

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 6:08 AM, Russell Standish  wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 11:49:51AM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> Ok, so you are rejecting computationalism. Computationalism is the
>> hypothesis that our mind supervenes on computations (sorry Bruno, it's
>> easier to write for the purpose of this discussion :). You are
>> declaring that mind supervene on the physical brain.
>
> That is not it at all. We've clarified with Bruno many times that
> computational supervenience is compatible with physical
> supervenience. Which is just as well, as otherwise it would be so much
> the worse for computationalism.

I have no doubt that the brain is a physical computer, and that
computations performed by the brain are no different from any other
computations.

We are discussing physicalism and computationalism, and if they are
compatible or not, correct?

Bruce repeatedly makes variation of the claim: "look, the brain is
physical and the brain generates consciousness, these are the facts".
This is what I am replying to. It's an argument from authority that
leaves no space for debate or reasoning.

Telmo.

>
> --
>
> 
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> 
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Apr 2017, at 13:38, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 23/04/2017 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a  
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract  
mathematical notion.


A computation with physics is what is happening in the computer I am  
currently working on. I can describe this in mathematical notation  
if you wish, but the process is not the notation. Any process that  
takes input and produces output is a computation. All physical  
objects do this. And physical objects do not know any mathematics.



You assume that there are primary physical object. That is not an  
assumption in physics, but in metaphysics, and it is incompatible with  
digital mechanism, for reasons which have already been explained, but  
which can be sum up in: what role does the primary character of matter  
plays in a physical computation to make it supporting consciousness?  
The usual answer (like the one given by Peter Jone), like "to make it  
real", is equivalent with "God invocation in an explanation".


Mechanism is simpler. You are right when you say that the process is  
not the notation, but the math shows that the process is in the truth  
relating the "notations", or the "information" or the numbers. Such  
truth are NOT notations, they are arithmetical facts, which are  
presupposed to be true in every corner of physics. So, once we have to  
assume them, why assuming more, given that it only makes the mind-body  
problem unsolvable?


You must understand that we know today that the arithmetical truth is  
beyond all system of "notation + effective relation between the  
notation".


Bruno







Bruce


Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett"  
 a écrit :

On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett"   
a écrit :
But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a  
physical computer. I take JC's point to be that your assumption of  
the primacy of the abstract computation is unprovable. We at least  
have experience of physical computers, and not of non-physical  
computers. (Whatever you say to the contrary,


You're making an ontological commitment and closing any discussion  
on it...


All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that  
you all claim exists between computationalism and physicalism -- a  
contradiction that does not simply depend on a definition of  
computationalism that explicitly states "physicalism is false". In  
other words, where is the contradiction?  A demonstration that does  
not just beg the question.


Bruce



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Apr 2017, at 11:49, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 10:32 AM, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:

On 23/04/2017 6:18 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 12:42 AM, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:


On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker >

wrote:


On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:


John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim  
that
there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a  
"soul")
that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is  
this:
under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The  
problem is

that physicalism leads to a contradiction,



I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell out  
what

that
contradiction is?


Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space.  
Maybe
your current computation happens in the original planet Earth  
but also

in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the  
simulation
argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as  
unique. It

follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.



This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In  
fact,

you
examples are all completely consistent with the requirement that  
any
computation requires a physical substrate -- "a Universal  
Dovetailer

running
on a Jupiter-sized computer in a far-away galaxy" is a completely
physical
concept.


Sure, how could I show a contradiction without assuming both
computationalism and physicalism?

Do you disagree that my argument shows that a computationalist mind
cannot be spatially or temporally situated?


Of course I disagree. Your argument requires that all the  
computations be
physically instantiated. SO even if there are many instantiations,  
each and

every one is spatially and temporally situated.


Yes, but there is no relationship between these instantiations and the
properties of my mind. You can change when or where you run these
computations and it doesn't matter.

What you are proposing is a magic step: that a computationalism mind
can only exist if the invocation is performed at least once (but it
doesn't matter how many times) on some physical substrate (but it
doesn't matter when or where).

If you don't, do you disagree that something that is not spatially  
or

temporally situated is incompatible with physicalism?



I certainly disagree because you have confused "having many  
locations" with

"having no location".


No, you have confused "having many locations" from "being independent
from location".


Many things are not physical, but are properties of,
or manifested by, physical objects or beings.


If you start by assuming physicalism. If your position is "physicalism
is obviously true, get over it", then there's no point in debating.


Values such as justice and
mercy are not physical, but are exhibited, or not, by physical  
beings.


Yes, they are abstractions. Abstractions are constructs of the mind.
We all agree that mind can conceive of non-physical things, but what
is mind? If you already take it as self-evident that the mind is
physical, then what are we discussing?


Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is a
computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You  
have to

add
something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism, the idea  
that all

computations exist in the abstract, in platonia, and do not require
physical
implementation. But that is merely the assumption that  
physicalism is

false.
So it may be the case that mathematical platonism does not  
require a

physical universe, but it does not contradict physicalism: it is
perfectly
possible that your consciousness is a computation, and that  
mathematical
platonism is true, but that there is still a primitive physical  
universe

and
that any actual computations require a physical substrate -- as  
JC keeps

insisting.


The scenario you propose would require the following:

- my mind supervenes on computation C;
- my mind exists if computation C is performed by at least one
physical substrate P;
- if the computation C is performed by several physical substrates  
P1,

P2, P3, nothing changes, my mind still exists as unique;

Suppose one of the physical realities, say P1, is what you call
primitive and C is running on P1. You would say I am experiencing  
the

primitive universe. But then P2 (the giant Jupiter computer) also
starts running the computation. In fact, at some point, the real  
earth

is destroyed but P2 continues.

So, if the physical substrate you propose exists, there is no way of
knowing if that is the physical reality that my mind perceives.

Re: R: Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Apr 2017, at 09:18, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:




  "Quentin Anciaux":
How can you justify logic from physics if logic is primary to prove  
anything? You're building your lower layer upon an higher layer...  
It's contradictory.


# David Finkelstein wrote interesting papers about the "physics of  
logic" (and also about "introspective measurements")


streaming.ictp.trieste.it/preprints/P/68/035.pdf




That is a rather good introduction to quantum logic. Although I  
disagree with Putnam and his idea that quantum mechanics makes logic  
empirical. It shows that some logic are empirical, but as  
computationalism illustrates, there are deep classical logical reason  
why some logic are empirical, others are psychological, etc.


But Finkelstein is always very interesting and clear, it is a pleasure  
to disagree with him. Logic is shown empirical here, but only in the  
physicalist context.


Bruno



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.