2009/8/10 Bruno Marchal :
Bruno, I'm broadly in agreement with your comments, and merely
re-emphasise a few points below on which I'm being a stickler. Also,
I have some further comments and questions on step 8.
>> In this light
>> it becomes self-evident that any and all explanatory entities -
ove
> since you have no valid objection to physicalism.
> Your argument so far has been based on two dubious premises --
> that eliminativism and functonalism are the only physicalist options,
> and that functionalism is arbitrary and in-the-eye-of-beholder.
Again, callin
2009/8/7 Bruno Marchal :
If it isn;t RITSIAR, it cannot be generating me. Mathematical
proofs only prove mathematical "existence", not onltolgical
existence. For a non-Platonist , 23 "exists" mathematically,
but is not RITSIAR. The same goes for the UD
>>>
>>> Is an atom RITSI
t even an advanced fantasy kind of similar
> deficiencies can approach what we cannot: the unfathomable 'reality' of them
> all. It is not a 'higher inventory', it (if there is such an 'it' - I did
> not say: exists) is beyond anything we can imagine humanly. We
2009/8/1 Brent Meeker :
> Is the physics account of life incomplete or wrong?
I'm not claiming this.
> Do you consider "life" to have been
> eliminated?
No I dont. In my piece I defined computation as an arbitrary - though
humanly useful - interpretative model imposed on, but not tied to,
spe
I note that the recent posts by Peter Jones - aka the mysterious 1Z,
and the originator of the curiously useful 'real in the sense I am
real' or RITSIAR - occurred shortly after my taking his name in vain.
Hmm...
Anyway, this signalled the resumption of a long-running debate about
the validit
ut-not-vanishing-degree.
>> This is what my mother used to call 'having the courage of your lack
>> of convictions'. I like it.
>
> I am not sure I understand that remark.
Alas, we can no longer ask her what she meant.
David
>
> I comment on Rex's post
lightening.
David
>
> A further thought:
>
> On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 4:34 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> Of course a computational narrative may turn out
>> not to be the way to go, but I strongly suspect that we still await a
>> revolution in - well not physics,
Given the manifest presence rather than absence
of such existence, it is clearly necessary. Nevertheless, in some
counterfactual sense, it might have been absent and never present.
But this is possibly excessively Talmudic.
> Though for it to be a mystery would imply a hidden,
> unknown cause.
On 31 July, 11:43, 1Z wrote:
> There are many bad solutions too. Finding a good solution
> means having an exat grasp of the problem, not saying in some
> vague way that mind and matter are different things.
Do elaborate. It would be really helpful to have an exactly stated
exposition of the p
'primitive' awareness is
swamped in our memory by repeated re-presentation of dominant
higher-order themes. In fact, introspection reveals the constant
coming and going of 'awarenesses' of every type and degree, shading to
ultimate forgetfulness. IOW, 'consciousness' is
2009/7/30 1Z :
> Unless an argument is put forward for Platonism being
> preferable to materialism, it doesn't get off the ground.
But surely it's already up in the air?
David
>
>
>
> On 28 July, 00:34, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> AFAICS, until these 'u
ature of this conception feeds the intuition of a
'neutral' (perhaps not the best term) monism which could instantiate a
spectrum of states spanning a mental-material 'dichotomy' now more
apparent than real. Any better?
David
>
>
>
> On 28 July, 01:30, David Nym
2009/7/30 Rex Allen :
> It seems to me that the primary meaning of "to exist" is "to be conscious".
>
> But what causes conscious experience? Well, I'm beginning to think
> that nothing causes it. Our conscious experience is fundamental,
> uncaused, and irreducible.
>
> Why do we think that our c
2009/7/30 1Z :
> [[sound of footsteps]]]
>
> "Please allow me to introduce myself ..."
Avaunt, ye blood-sucking fiend!
Van Helsing (retd.)
>
>
>
> On 27 July, 14:17, David Nyman wrote:
>> On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones wrote:
>>
>> >
mething YOU just think about:
> it 'exists' in your mind (whatever we assign to that).
>
> Self? (May I refer to the ONE and only Koan in Oriental Science I ever heard
> about: the one handed clapping.) I made a second one? (just for the fun of
> it): the "SELF" whic
to follow.
So when I ask your brain a question it's your hands that reply? That
might explain a lot!
David ;-)
>
> On 29 Jul 2009, at 19:15, David Nyman wrote:
>
>>
>> On 29 July, 17:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Gosh, David, you are a champion for th
se, in the
limit. However, I find that the problems in adequately expressing a
(moderately) non-standard view involves so many burdens of extraneous
sense attaching to nearly all the terms available to hand as to make
the task itself very taxing. There is I suppose the option of
inventing a totally
French claret (cask), 1707; of honey (a cask), 1585; of pork (a cask),
1800; of soldiers (a band or company); of tobacco, 1886; of wine (a
cask).
Fascinating. Is any of the above relevant to your meaning?
David
> On 29 Jul 2009, at 16:09, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> >
nk beyond Physix Textbook 101).
> 5. Is a "thought" a product of the mind-process? if so, where does it settle
> to become consciously acknowledged for us... (for WHOM???)
>
> I really do not expect from you to give adequate replies to all these
> questions - it would make
ically) through your state.
> And here the mystery is that the apparent physical worlds seem computable.
> How could a sum on an infinity of computations be computable? (it is the
> white rabbit problem).
OK, I said it was wacky, so it's probably wrong (or not even that).
But, as a las
justify why 'qualia' must exist, and
why 1-person experience must occur in terms of them, it remains
(necessarily) mysterious - in the Wittgensteinian sense - on what they
*are*.
David
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/7/27 Brent Meeker
>>
>>> That's a bit of a stra
incomplete) opinions on
her physics and therefore make reasonable bets on her duplicability?
> If a universal machine bet that God create earth and heaven in
> six days and that she is not duplicable, well, it becomes hard to even argue
> if the AUDA physics will change or not.
And what
t
retentive enough to retain the pivotal elements of the narrative
whilst we charge off on the next - no doubt essential - safari into
the logical-mathematical jungle. But could we try grandma's version
again? Even heroic failure would teach us something.
David
>
>
> On 27 Jul
candidate for such a synthesis. Actually, I haven't yet seen any
others (oops - pace Colin).
David
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and
>>&g
n-mind relation as a simplistic
functional identity remains pure materialist prejudice, and on the
basis of the above, flatly erroneous. To say the least, any such
relation is moot, absent a radically deeper insight into the mind-body
problem.
David
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> &g
On 27 July, 09:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> ... yet, the shadows of braids and links(*) appear somehow in the two
> matter hypostases, and this in a context where space (not juts time)
> has to be a self-referential context, in that weak sense, such work
> seems to go in the right direction. Of co
On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones wrote:
> >> Could somebody kindly tell me/explain to me what "RITSIAR" means? I
> >> cannot find any explanation of this in the threads which mention it.
On a (slightly) more serious note, to the best of my recollection the
expression 'real in the sense I am real' w
parts in my own intuitive history) the
more they exercise my intuitions in helpful directions. I feel that
there is something intuitively necessary in this generative approach,
and specifically in the way it seeks to resolve the 0-1-3-person
conundrums that - even if it turns out to be unsupportabl
On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones wrote:
> Hopefully, by the end of this "conversation
> without end" I will know in what sense I am real!!
Don't count on it ;-)
D
> On 27/07/2009, at 11:40 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
>
>
> > Hi Kim,
>
> > RITSIAR means real in the sense that I am real.
>
> > Ch
ame issues head on - as of course your own approach
attempts to do. Sorry for any confusion, but I think we're still
broadly in agreement, as before :-)
David
> David Nyman wrote:
> > Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and
> > machines. Natur
Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and
machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your
helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis of
my understanding of the main points that have emerged thus far. I
hope this will be helpful f
g which can't help itself
> to reinvent hitself again and again and again, and this in an atemporal,
> aspatial frames.
> Sri Aurobindo made once a nice summary:
> What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?
> And it is this ...
> Existence that multiplied itself
> For sh
bers, functions,
> sets and mathematical structures, that arithmetic, simple elementary
> arithmetic, already describes that universal thing which can't help itself
> to reinvent hitself again and again and again, and this in an atemporal,
> aspatial frames.
> Sri Aurobindo made once a
On 19 July, 20:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You are close to the UDA, which we discuss since years here ...
> All the problem is there.
> But once you look closely, you can see the beginning of the reason why
> "law-and-order" realities win against "dream-logic" realities. This is
> eventually com
On 23 July, 05:38, Brian Tenneson wrote:
> You have written about it, and at least two of its properties, and so it
> is not completely ineffable, yes?
> So I think it is "effable" even if it is exceedingly difficult to
> describe fully. What I'm having trouble believing is that it is unknowabl
ndational personal presence. This is what, I think, rescues the
intuition of the One from a mere functionless substrate: it stands for
the foundational intuition of a continuously present and personal
whole, prior to any notions of differentiation whatsoever.
David
> David Nyman wrote:
>
inescapable. I am seeking
consequently to collapse at their foundations all divisibility between
knowing and being, and between perceiving, intending and acting (I've
left the scare quotes out this time, but inevitable these terms often
carry associations that are extraneous to my meaning here).
hard time seeing how "I" could ever
be. You see, "I" don't need to be 'really real' in the sense I think
you mean; but I *do* need to be *as* real - 'real' in the same sense -
as the background from which "I" emerge. RITSIAR cuts both ways:
of the One. In other
words, we can't dispense with either theology or science: which is
just fine!
>> Easy, eh?
>
>
> I didn't expect this one.
We call this irony!
> Sure, nice post. You still seem to reify a bit the third hypostase,
> the universal self, the
On 22 July, 16:01, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Ma connection at home is again functioning. I am happy to have solved
> the problem rather quickly.
>
> On 22 Jul 2009, at 13:54, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> > 2009/7/22 Bruno Marchal :
> You thought you could make fu
2009/7/19 Rex Allen :
> In your view, Bruno (or David, or anyone else who has an opinion),
> what kinds of things actually "exist"? What does it mean to say that
> something "exists"?
This is naturally the $64k question for this list - or any other, for
that matter (pun intended). I don't know
2009/7/22 Bruno Marchal :
> Ma connection at home is no functioning.
As a linguistic aside, Bruno has cleverly expressed the above
statement in perfect Glaswegian (i.e. the spoken tongue of Glasgow,
Scotland - my home town). Other well-known examples are: "Is'arra
marra on yer barra Clarra?" (Is
ry
> arithmetic, already describes that universal thing which can't help itself
> to reinvent hitself again and again and again, and this in an atemporal,
> aspatial frames.
> Sri Aurobindo made once a nice summary:
> What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?
> And it is
'language of the dreaming machines', towards
which any explicit version can gesture only partially and
indicatively.
David
> On Thu, Jul 16, 2009 at 8:38 PM, David Nyman wrote:
> > In COMP, the 'mechanism and language of dreams' is
> > posited to be those element
With Bruno and his mighty handful engaged in the undodgeable (though
constantly dodged) task of working towards an elementary grasp of the
technical underpinnings of COMP, and patently lacking the fortitude of
these valorous Stakhanovites, I have been spending my time lurking,
reading and musing.
e notion that
we can draw conclusions (a la Bostrom) about measure from the OM we
happen to be experiencing? IOW, the fact that I am "a human OM of a
particular age in the 21st century on Earth" is of no particular
significance in determining whether this represents some point of
maximal consc
Forgive me in advance if this has been covered adequately before in
the list, but the following occurs to me with respect to 'Bostrom'
style assessments of where I should expect my 'current' OM to be
situated with respect to the total population of OMs in which I exist.
Presumably, I should expec
On Apr 24, 4:39 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Any content of consciousness can be an illusion. Consciousness itself
> cannot, because without consciousness there is no more illusion at all.
- just catching up with the thread, but I feel compelled to comment
that this is beautifully and clearly put
obsicek a écrit :
>
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> Title: SUMMARY (was: OM = SIGMA_1)
> >>
> >> I send to David Nyman (the 06 Nov 2007) a little planning:
> >>
> >> 1) Cantor's diagonal
> >> 2) Does the universal digital mach
On Nov 20, 4:40 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Conclusion: 2^N, the set of infinite binary sequences, is not
> enumerable.
>
> All right?
OK. I have to try to catch up now, because I've had to be away longer
than I expected, but I'm clear on this diagonal argument.
David
> Hi,
On 20/11/2007, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> David, are you still there? This is a key post, with respect to the
> "Church Thesis" thread.
Sorry Bruno, do forgive me - we seem destined to be out of synch at
the moment. I'm afraid I'm too distracted this week to respond
adequately -
On Nov 6, 2:37 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I have almost finished the posts on the lobian machine I have promised.
> I have to make minor changes and to look a bit the spelling. I cannot
> do that this week, so I will send it next week. Thanks for your
> patience.
Thanks - I'l
On Oct 26, 8:30 am, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Ever read the short story of 'Green Magic'?
No I hadn't, but thanks for the link, marc - it's a neat little tale,
delightfully told. I'm tempted to try a little more of Jack Vance
after this - any suggestions?
David
On Oct 26, 8:30 am, [EMAIL PRO
On Oct 19, 2:26 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> David, do you mind if I send next week your solution (which were
> correct) of the exercises I gave online once to the list? I am sure
> it could help some other. All that is needed to get Church's thesis
> eventually right. Recall
On 02/09/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> You could have chosen a better moment because next week I have exams
> and will not be in my office, but the week after I will try to explain
> this. It is necessary to get the UDA, and even more for the AUDA (the
> lobian interview).
Hi Br
elements and B has m elements? Answer: m^n. Can you see that?
Yes, I can see it now I understand the notation better.
> By "proof" here, I mean an argument which convinces you,
> or better, an argument which you have the feeling that it can be used
> to convince your "little s
tery is *that*,
rather than how, the world is.
> "One cannot guess the real difficulties of a problem before
> having solved it."
> --- Carl Ludwig Siegel
Indubitably true.
David
>
> David Nyman wrote:
> > On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
on as mere intuitive
prejudice?
David
>
> David Nyman wrote:
> > On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >> I think you're setting up an impossible standard of "explaining".
> >> You're asking that it produce a certai
27;. Whereas a third person model
of 'mind' may (for all I know) indeed be capable of being mapped to
physics (pace Bruno), the subjective experience of such a mind, by its
very nature, must perforce elude any direct third person
categorisation.
David
>
> David Nyman wrote
On 27/08/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation
> was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that
> the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits,
> but the circulatory sy
ide the original enumerable set (as distinct from the larger set
of *all* sequences)?
> A bit more difficult: can you show that for any set A, the set of
> functions from A to {0,1} is bigger than A?
Could you please elucidate "functions from A to {0,1}" ?
David
>
>
> Le
x27;ve got plenty of bed-time
reading :-)
David
>
>
> Le 15-août-07, à 17:00, David Nyman a écrit :
>
>
> >
> >> What comp (by UDA+FILMED-GRAPH) shows, is that, once the digitalness
> >> of
> >> your local relative description is taken seriousl
On 15/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> David, please recall that one half of the propositions I assert are
> false.
Yes, but which half?
> Also, my "s" spelling seems to be uncomputable.
In that case it must lie outside comp reality! :-)
David
>
> Hi David, and all,
>
>
>
>
ost which I send to
> Lennart?
Yes, thanks.
> Did this post helped? I want you to understand Church thesis, before
> the description of some formal language. This will economize work, and
> help you disentangle the rigorous from the formal. In our setting,
> "formal" wil
t is called "classical propositional
> calculus", the truth table method? Do you need some refreshing?
> Some refreshing is in Smullyan's FU, but I can do it, or focus on some
> difficulty (classical propositional calculus is not so simple indeed,
> even if simpler than m
On 13/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Question to David, and others who could be interested: is the notion
> of enumerable and non enumerable set clear? Can you explain why the set
> of functions from N to N is not enumerable?
Do please remind us. "Off the top of my head", do
gt; > time. But for now I rely on you to set the agenda of our more
> > structured modus operandi.
>
>
> Ok thanks.
Then for the rest, I'll wait for your next post.
David
>
>
> Le 10-août-07, à 14:26, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> >
> > On 09/08/07,
ime/consciousness. But from the ontic
> view, with the "block-all-computations" (alias UD*) there is no time.
> From the material (first person plural view) pov, it is an open problem
> if there is an "objective time".
I think we may have to come back later to this question of
experience is just given by the older definition of
> knowledge as true justified opinion (in platonism, but also in a lot of
> east and west rational account of mystical experiences). It is a gift
> that we arrive formally here at temporal-like logic of evolving first
> person knowledge.
hing) by artful persuasions: I wheedled a new car
out of my father.
-verb (used without object)
4. to use beguiling or artful persuasions: I always wheedle if I
really need something.
[Origin: 1655-65; orig. uncert.]
David
>
>
> Le 27-juil.-07, à 13:31, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> &
ot; This seems to be perhaps the fundamental
distinction between ontology and epistemology: the ontic 'origin'
self-manifests fleetingly within the first-person, and although this
is not *communicable* - even to the 'self' - communication can *refer*
to it.
> But then Art
s of the third person, this places severe limits on what can be
'relevant' in this sense.The disagreement, I think, comes from the
'soul's' intuition that no amount of such third person discourse seems
to yield an explanation of first person experience as such - only a
poss
Japanese Buddhism, Kuroda Institute,
University of Hawai'i Press, 1999, p. 179
(Excerpted from http://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm)
David
On 13/07/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Le 13-juil.-07, à 17:02, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> > But since the One is
One'. Maybe something like the 'primacy of the unnameable'?
On the other hand
"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen"
It doesn't seem to keep us quiet for long though :-)
David
>
>
> Le 13-juil.-07, à 17:02, David Nyman a écrit :
>
>
would be better. I wonder what?
David
>
>
> Le 12-juil.-07, à 16:27, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> >
> > On 12/07/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >> I try to avoid the words like "reflexive" or "reflection" in inform
On 13/07/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Brent, all that David is getting at is saying nothing "reflexively
> > exists" without being observed.
>
> Observed in what sense? Consciously, by a conscious being? Or decoherred
> into a quasi-classical state, as in QM? "Reflexive" wo
ame from not seeing this. Dualism is
clearly not relevant when everything is an aspect of the One, so that
the relations which constitute both mind and matter are
self-relations.
I said in an earlier post that this amounted to a kind of solipsism of
the One: IOW, the One would be justified in the view (i
ntuition, and as a result, in various ways,
you've either denied that you yourself are conscious, or postulated
'identical' universes which mysteriously lack this 'extra ingredient'.
I don't believe such claims make much sense.
David
>
> David Nyman skrev:
> On
in words (or for
that matter mathematically) 'exists'. My analysis is an attempt to
place a constraint on what can be said to exist in any sense strong
enough to have any discernible consequences, either for us, or for
any putative denizens of such 'worlds'. So I would argue that
back, it may be just because it isn't. So I would say that the
B-Universe as conceived by Torgny isn't specified reflexively: i.e.
its putative properties are characteristic of situations imagined in a
form abstracted from reflexivity. For this reason I would claim that
it could neve
there is no other;
reflexion: because there is no other relation.
David
PS - It occurs to me that 'tricky' - which just happens to be the way
these things strike me - seems quite consonant with the sort of
'reality gambles' that you (and Fuchs) propose.
> Le 05-juil.-07, à
onstrained in highly specific
ways. This, I think, is the point of Bruno's methodology. It's also
the point of my insistence on 'reflexivity'. The "gods' eye view" is
a just manner of speaking, not a manner of 'existing'.
David
>
> David N
On 09/07/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> There can be no dynamic time. In the space-time, time is always
> static.
Then you must get very bored ;)
David
>
>
>
> On Jul 9, 7:47 pm, "David Nyman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
in the B-Universe in
order to make your claims plausible, but then the B-Universe could
hardly be claimed to be "exactly the same". However, Bruno doesn't
necessarily agree with me on this, so from a comp perspective, if you
say you're a zombie, I can only sympathise ;)
Davi
shareable information extracted by Lobian 'interventions'
can be empirically assessed. It's interesting that on my initial
skimming, he doesn't appear to be a 'naively realistic' Many-Worlder,
or Everettic (I like the tic :) - as in Tourettic?)
David
> Le 05-juil.-07, à
ence consciously.
> > How we would judge its 'justification' and 'honesty' is an interesting
> > question. For example, if a machine was a Huge Lookup Table, it might
> > be able to pass the test, but neither honestly nor justifiably, in my
> > terms.
istent with comp? For example, it
might seem that 'dovetailing' carries some implication of dynamism, or
at least sequentiality, with it from the outset.
Alternatively, if a static background is not granted, then in such a
view dynamism is already at the heart of self-relation, and with it,
the B-Universe is therefore
self-contradictory. As such, it can't exist self-relatively, and
consequently exists only relative to the A-Universe, in the form of a
misconception.
David
>
> David Nyman skrev:
> > You're right, we must distinguish zombies. The kind I have in mi
ng' - i.e. as an aspect of the 'physical brain' perceived
1-personally - can be behaviour in this sense. Platonic and static
relations between numbers are 0-personal, and - self-relative to the
One - this is perhaps structural or eternal. This is why I (and
perhaps Plotinus) don&#
e to ask for more if interested. From
what I understand about your intuition, you are quite close to the
"natural first person discourse" of the lobian machine. And the closer
you are, the more severe my comments will be on the details, so please
indulge my critical way of talking ..
independent of observation'. On
the contrary: it *entails* observation. And of course our existence as
observers in self-relation to the A-Universe demonstrates this 'dependency'
in precisely this critical sense.
David
>
> David Nyman skrev:
> > You have however drawn our atten
#x27;physical'? Or will
'yes doctor' remain always a gamble in the sense of "you picks your theory
and you takes your choice"?
David
>
>
> Le 02-juil.-07, à 18:12, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> >
> > After very kindly concurring with bits of my recent
horical -
existence as that possessed by events within the A-Universe: that of
participation, or self-relation.
David
David Nyman skrev:
>
> On 04/07/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> SP: We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes A
&
se.
David
> On 04/07/07, David Nyman < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > TT: This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe.
> >
> > DN: IMO your thought experiment might as well stop right here. No
> universe
> > can "look" like anything to an
On 03/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
TT: This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe.
DN: IMO your thought experiment might as well stop right here. No universe
can "look" like anything to anyone except a participant in it - i.e. an
'observer' who is an embedded sub
etation, yet empirically
falsifiable, of Plotinus' theory of Matter".
DN: I've read it, and must study it further. But, sorry to mention the
roadmap again, is there any way to help the interested enquirer, still
unsure of the technicalities, more generally to jump-start their
intuiti
After very kindly concurring with bits of my recent posts, Bruno
nonetheless quite reasonably questioned whether I followed his way of
proceeding. Having read the UDA carefully, I would say that in a
'grandmotherly' way I do, although not remotely at his technical
level. But I had been doing tho
On 01/07/07, George Levy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
GL: I do not accept as primitive an independent
mathematicalism/arithmetical realism. I think that math and logic are
co-emergent with the consciousness of the observer. In addition physics is
also co-emergent with the observer. So in a sense th
l tests
achievable by the first two types. I can't see that we possess even a
theory of how this could be done, and as somebody once said, there's nothing
so practical as a good theory. This is why I expressed doubt in the
empirical outcome of any AI programme approached in this manner
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