Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi John Clark IMHO Since it is inextended, intelligence (needed for design or change or life, etc.) is omnipresent in the universe to various degrees It always has been, is now, and ever shall be. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/3/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-02, 12:09:41 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com Wrote: > There are greath differences between evolutionary designs and rational design. Yes there are big differences, rational designs are, well, rational, but evolutionary designs are idiotic. Mother Nature (Evolution) is a slow and stupid tinkerer, it had over 3 billion years to work on the problem but it couldn't even come up with a macroscopic part that could rotate in 360 degrees! Rational designers had less difficulty coming up with the wheel. The only advantage Evolution had is that until it managed to invent brains it was the only way complex objects could get built. I can think of a few reasons for natures poor design: 1) Time Lags: Evolution is so slow the animal is adapted to conditions that may no longer exist, that's why moths have an instinct to fly into candle flames. I have no doubt that if you just give them a million years or so, evolution will give hedgehogs a better defense than rolling up into a ball when confronted by their major predator, the automobile. The only problem is that by then there won't be any automobiles. 2) Historical Constraints: The eye of all vertebrate animals is backwards, the connective tissue of the retina is on the wrong side so light must pass through it before it hits the light sensitive cells. There's no doubt this degrades vision and we would be better off if the retina was reversed as it is in squids whose eye evolved independently, however It's too late for that to happen now because all the intermediate forms would not be viable. Once a standard is set, with all its interlocking mechanisms it's very difficult to abandon it completely, even when much better methods are found. That's why we still have inches and yards even though the metric system is clearly superior. That's why we still have Windows. Nature is enormously conservative, it may add new things but it doesn't abandon the old because the intermediate stages must also work. That's also why humans have all the old brain structures that lizards have as well as new ones. 3) Lack of Genetic Variation: Mutations are random and you might not get the mutation you need when you need it. Feathers work better for flight than the skin flaps bats use, but bats never produced the right mutations for feathers and skin flaps are good enough. 4) Constraints of Costs and Materials: Life is a tangle of trade offs and compromises. 5) An Advantage on one Level is a Disadvantage on Another: One gene can give you resistance to malaria, a second identical gene will give you sickle cell anemia. 6) Evolution has no foresight: This is the most important reason of all. A jet engine works better than a prop engine in an airplane. I give you a prop engine and tell you to turn it into a jet, but you must do it while the engine is running, you must do it in one million small steps, and you must do it so every one of those small steps immediately improves the operation of the engine. Eventually you would get an improved engine of some sort, but it wouldn't look anything like a jet. If the tire on your car is getting worn you can take it off and put a new one on, but evolution could never do something like that, because when you take the old tire off you have temporally made things worse, now you have no tire at all. With evolution EVERY step (generation), no matter how many, MUST be an immediate improvement over the previous one. it can't think more than one step ahead, it doesn't understand one step backward two steps forward. And that's why there are no 100 ton supersonic birds. Yes I know, such a creature would use a lot of energy, but if we can afford to do so why can't nature? Being slow, weak, and cheap is not my idea a an inspired design. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi meekerdb The world is contingent and therefore not perfect. I don't see the problem. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/3/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-02, 15:28:15 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary On 9/2/2012 9:09 AM, John Clark wrote: > 6) Evolution has no foresight: This is the most important reason of all. > A jet engine works better than a prop engine in an airplane. I give you a > prop engine and tell you to turn it into a jet, but you must do it while > the engine is running, you must do it in one million small steps, and you > must do it so every one of those small steps immediately improves > the operation > of the engine. Eventually you would get an improved engine of some > sort, but it > wouldn't look anything like a jet. Good exposition. But it's not the case every small step must be an improvement. It's sufficient that it not be a degradation. Brent "What designer would put a recreational area between two waste disposal sites?" --- Woody Allen, on Intelligent Design -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi meekerdb IMHO nature contains life and life is intelligence. There may be random forces, and no dojubt natural selection plays a role, but I can't help but keep thinking that the intelligence of nature is a big part of guiding evolution. If life is intelligent, one can hardly avoid the phnomenon of guided evolution. BTW Saint Augustine believed that nature was full of "seeds" of intelligence. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/31/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-30, 23:04:16 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary On 8/30/2012 6:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, August 30, 2012 9:00:12 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 8/30/2012 5:39 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, August 30, 2012 8:19:32 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: If morals didn't exist, why would we choose to invent them? What possible purpose could be served by some additional qualitative layer of experience on top of the perfectly efficient and simple execution of neurochemical scripts? Don't you see that the proposed usefulness of such a thing is only conceivable in hindsight - after the fact of its existence? We didn't invent them. They evolved. Evolution has no foresight, it's random. Randomness is not omnipotence. It doesn't matter how many words I write here, they will never evolve into something that writes by itself. Exactly. Randomness is more likely to kludge up an adaptation than create an efficient design from scratch. Your words don't evolve because they don't move around and recombine randomly - except in your head. Are you suggesting that if I add a randomizer that the words being spit out will eventually learn to become an author? That would be necessary but not sufficient. You'd need an editor (or natural selection) to find something coherent. Are you an Intelligent Design creationist? Of course not. Then why can't you accept that living systems are not designed, don't 'need' be they way they are, are just formed by random variation and natural selection. It takes advantage of what is available. Feeling sick at your stomach after eating rotten food is a good adaptation to teach you not eat stuff like that again. No, it isn't a possible adaptation at all. There would not be any such thing as 'feeling' or 'sick' - only memory locations and branching tree algorithms. This is what I am saying, feeling makes no sense as a possibility unless you are looking back on it in hindsight after the fact. Sure, to you it seems like nausea is a good adaptation, but that's naive realism. You assume nausea is possible because you have experienced it. That's not an assumption - that's empiricism. An assumption would be that a brain can't instantiate feelings. Ok, then you know nausea is possible because you have experienced it. That doesn't change the fact that nausea has no business being possible in a universe driven only by bottom up evolution. IT'S RANDOM! Having business assumes a goal, foresight. You would have to use evolution to explain the possibility of feeling in the first place, and it cannot. So what feeling would work to guide you not harm a child? - how about that 'sick at your stomach' feeling. That implies that T-cells need a feeling to guide them not to kill friendly cells. No it doesn't. T-cells are not social animals who need to care for their young. T-cells are social organisms who need to care for the other cells of the body. What's the difference? For one the T-cells don't have young. Their 'feelings' are simple and don't need to rise to level of being expressible or to be resolved with conflicting feelings. You are again asking why some biological system 'needs' to be the way it is, as though there is a designer who can explain his choice. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Craig Weinberg Where today is Regressivism and Dystopianism ? Or maybe that was just an ironic comment. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/31/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-31, 08:43:41 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary On Friday, August 31, 2012 5:57:54 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Progressivism is another word for Utopianism. Their utopias sound good but as of yet have never worked, or worked for long. Has Regressivism and Dystopianism fared much better? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/VYEIpZZfmq8J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
On Friday, August 31, 2012 5:57:54 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > > > Progressivism is another word for Utopianism. > Their utopias sound good but as of yet have never worked, > or worked for long. > > Has Regressivism and Dystopianism fared much better? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/VYEIpZZfmq8J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Progressivism is another word for Utopianism. Their utopias sound good but as of yet have never worked, or worked for long. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/31/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-30, 14:23:33 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary On Thursday, August 30, 2012 2:01:45 PM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: I think that there are many tries to separate moral from ethics: indiividual versus social, innate versus cultural, emotional versus rational etc. The whole point is to obviate the m*** world as much as we can, under the impression that moral is subjective and not objetive, or more precisely that there is no moral that can be objective. An there is such crap as the separation of facts and values (as if values (and in particular universal values) where not social facts). Well, this is a more effect of positivism which is deeply flawed in theoretical and practical terms. It is a consequence also of modern gnosticism, called progressivism of which positivism is one of the phases, that believes possible in a certain future a society with a perfect harmony of individual desires and social needs, making moral unnecessary. I have never heard anyone who expresses progressive, liberal, or left wing opinions state that they believe in a future society with a perfect anything or that morals were unnecessary. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/yrAKTPjoVJcJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Bruno Marchal I would answer by saying that even unconscious entities, such as an immune system, can enhance life, and so IMHO are good (moral) while cancer, which tends to deminish life, is bad or evil. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/31/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-30, 15:03:20 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Hi Roger On 29 Aug 2012, at 17:44, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Alberto G. Corona Seeming to be aware is not the same as actually being aware, just as seeming to be alive is not the same as actually being alive. And my view is that comp, since it must operate in (objective) code, can only create entities that might seem to be alive, not actually be alive. Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies, which seem to be alive but are not actually so. The problem is that you cannot know that. In case of doubt it is ethically better to attribute consciousness to something non conscious, than attributing non consciousness to something conscious, as that can generate suffering. There is japanese engineer who is building androids, that is robot looking very much like humans. An european journalist asked him if he was not worrying about naive people who might believe that such machine is alive. He answered that in Japan they believe that everything is alive, so that they have no problem with such question. As I said often, the "real" question is not "can machine think", but "can your daughter marry a machine" (like a man who did undergone a digital brain transplant). When will machine get the right to vote? When the Lutherans will baptize machines? Etc. Universal machines are sort of universal babies, or universal dynamical mirror. If you can't develop respect for them, they won't develop respect for you. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:19:59 Subject: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary I say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that it's functionality is computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona Awareness = I see X. or I am X. or some similar statement. There's no computer in that behavior or state of being. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content ----- From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Roger, I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation. like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona What sort of an output would the computer give me ? It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no way to hook it to my brain. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Hi: Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters". The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking struct
Re: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 11:45:16 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > > > Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies, > which seem to be alive but are not actually so. > > Exactly. I don't call them zombies though, because zombie implies a negative affirmation of life. They are puppets. They have no pretensions to being alive, that is our conceit - a Pinocchio fallacy. When we act on the assumptions of that fallacy, we have been warned about the two possibilities: Frankenstein or HAL (Golem or demon). Frankenstein is the embodiment of physicalism or material functionalism, the functional inversion of body as re-animated corpse. HAL is the embodiment of computationalism or digital functionalism, the functional inversion of mind as disembodied self. Both are the result of our confusion in trying to internalize externalized appearances. We wind up with the false images - an outsiders view of interiority. It's a category error. Cart before the horse. I agree with Brent as far as an empirical approach to consciousness (robots building models from environmental test results) is superior to a rational approach (front loading logical models to be adapted to fit real environments) but both ultimately fail to locate awareness of any kind. There is awareness in a robot or computer, but it is the awareness of inanimate matter (which is what makes us able to script and control it in the first place). We exist on that level too - we are matter also, but the particular matter that we are has a different history which gives it the capacity to send and receive on a much broader spectrum of sense than just the inorganic spectrum. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/zevWLAq0pYgJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi meekerdb By "words" I include "computer code." My position is that nothing implemented or carried out in computer code can be conscious, since consciousness is subjective, meaning personal, unexpressed in code or words. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:47:46 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words. That's why something having human like intelligence and consciousness must be a robot, something that can act wordlessly in it's environment. Evolutionarily speaking, conscious narrative is an add-on on top of subconscious thought which is responsible for almost everything we do. Julian Jaynes theorized that humans did not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in inter-tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie. Brent On 8/29/2012 8:40 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive".. >From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived. For example, consider: "I see the cat."Here: I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived. When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjective states and all experiences. However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experience into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into a publicly accessible statement. All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are objective. Any statement is then objective. Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective, so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. Hi Albert, Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be." in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you. That's why this uniqueness is not essential But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this! This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content -
Re: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona What I say about what I see is a separate problem. How I interpret what I see is peculiar to me, is indeterminate to you. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 12:02:39 Subject: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary You said that you perceive. Now you mean that you reflect on yourself. And I must believe so. It is theoretically possible to do a robot that do so as well in very sophisticated ways. I agree with you that robots are zombies, but some day, like in the novels of Stanislav Lem, they may adquire political rights and perhaps they could demand you for saying so. ;) Note that all the time, like in any normal conversation we are obviating deep statements of faith: Are you a person? a robot? an Lutheran robot? . An atheist robot that is trying to persuade us that intelligent robots don't exist?. A The conclusions are very very different depending of which of these possible alternatives we choose. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona A grizzly bear, which seemingly has no moral code (other than "when hungry, kill and eat"), can still perceive perfectly well enough, or else he would starve. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:26:29 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary It appears that subjectivity, has everithing to do with morality. This is not only evident for any religious person, but also for mathematics and game theory. It appears that without moral individuality, social collaboration is impossible, except for clones. I exposed the reasoning here. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is simply the private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it is experience. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 09:08:43 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Craig: I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list. I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy. Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings. 2012/8/29 Craig Weinberg On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking consciousness only. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more awkward position than the other, etc). 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
You said that you perceive. Now you mean that you reflect on yourself. And I must believe so. It is theoretically possible to do a robot that do so as well in very sophisticated ways. I agree with you that robots are zombies, but some day, like in the novels of Stanislav Lem, they may adquire political rights and perhaps they could demand you for saying so. ;) Note that all the time, like in any normal conversation we are obviating deep statements of faith: Are you a person? a robot? an Lutheran robot? . An atheist robot that is trying to persuade us that intelligent robots don´t exist?. A The conclusions are very very different depending of which of these possible alternatives we choose. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > Hi Alberto G. Corona > > A grizzly bear, which seemingly has no moral code (other than "when > hungry, kill and eat"), can still perceive > perfectly well enough, or else he would starve. > > > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > - Receiving the following content - > *From:* Alberto G. Corona > *Receiver:* everything-list > *Time:* 2012-08-29, 11:26:29 > *Subject:* Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary > > It appears that subjectivity, has everithing to do with morality. This > is not only evident for any religious person, but also for mathematics and > game theory. > > It appears that without moral individuality, social collaboration is > impossible, except for clones. I exposed the reasoning here. > > 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > >> Hi Alberto G. Corona >> Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is >> simply the private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it >> is experience. >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 8/29/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> *From:* Alberto G. Corona >> *Receiver:* everything-list >> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:08:43 >> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary >> >>Craig: >> >> I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality >> exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical >> laws). I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list. >> I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy >> of the naturalistic fallacy. >> >> Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich >> it appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an >> exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be >> considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore >> unexistent, if there were no moral beings. >> >> 2012/8/29 Craig Weinberg >> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: >>>> >>>> the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has >>>> memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. >>>> therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits >>>> with others. >>> >>> >>> What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream >>> whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be >>> intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think >>> you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about >>> consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking >>> consciousness only. >>> >>> >>>> This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life >>>> of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made >>>> accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. >>>> We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created >>>> clones. Although this probably will never happen. >>>> >>> >>> In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider >>> themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. >>> They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on >>> the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more >>> awkward position than the other, etc). >>> >>> >>&
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona I have no problem with that. But the act of perceiving itself is personal and amoral. I see what I see. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:54:29 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Not only to lie. In order to commerce and in general to interact, we need to know what to expect from whom. and the other need to know what the others expect form me. So I have to reflect on myself in order to act in the enviromnent of the moral and material expectations that others have about me. This is the origin of reflective individuality, that is moral from the beginning.. 2012/8/29 meekerdb But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words. That's why something having human like intelligence and consciousness must be a robot, something that can act wordlessly in it's environment. Evolutionarily speaking, conscious narrative is an add-on on top of subconscious thought which is responsible for almost everything we do. Julian Jaynes theorized that humans did not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in inter-tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie. Brent On 8/29/2012 8:40 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive".. >From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived. For example, consider: "I see the cat."Here: I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived. When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjective states and all experiences. However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experience into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into a publicly accessible statement. All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are objective. Any statement is then objective. Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective, so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. Hi Albert, Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be." in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you. That's why this uniqueness is not essential But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this! This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense,
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona What functionality ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:41:42 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary sorry: What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY POSSIBL to create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side. 2012/8/29 Alberto G. Corona That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive".. >From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived. For example, consider: "I see the cat."Here: I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived. When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjective states and all experiences. However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experience into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into a publicly accessible statement. All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are objective. Any statement is then objective. Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective, so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. Hi Albert, Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be." in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you. That's why this uniqueness is not essential But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this! This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona If I can perceive, I simply know that I can. The problem only enters when I tell you what I perceived. There faith matters, you can trust my word or not. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:40:43 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive".. >From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived. For example, consider: "I see the cat."Here: I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived. When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjective states and all experiences. However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experience into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into a publicly accessible statement. All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are objective. Any statement is then objective. Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective, so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. Hi Albert, Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be." in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you. That's why this uniqueness is not essential But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this! This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inheren
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona A grizzly bear, which seemingly has no moral code (other than "when hungry, kill and eat"), can still perceive perfectly well enough, or else he would starve. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:26:29 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary It appears that subjectivity, has everithing to do with morality. This is not only evident for any religious person, but also for mathematics and game theory. It appears that without moral individuality, social collaboration is impossible, except for clones. I exposed the reasoning here. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is simply the private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it is experience. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 09:08:43 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Craig: I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list. I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy. Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings. 2012/8/29 Craig Weinberg On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking consciousness only. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more awkward position than the other, etc). 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp conten
Re: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona Seeming to be aware is not the same as actually being aware, just as seeming to be alive is not the same as actually being alive. And my view is that comp, since it must operate in (objective) code, can only create entities that might seem to be alive, not actually be alive. Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies, which seem to be alive but are not actually so. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:19:59 Subject: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary I say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that it's functionality is computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona Awareness = I see X. or I am X. or some similar statement. There's no computer in that behavior or state of being. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Roger, I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation. like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona What sort of an output would the computer give me ? It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no way to hook it to my brain. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Hi: Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters". The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation. The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem). Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above c
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
sorry: What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY POSSIBL to create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side. 2012/8/29 Alberto G. Corona > That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you > perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says > that he perceive".. > > From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith > > What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same > functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side. > > > 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > >> Hi Alberto G. Corona >> >> The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived. >> >> For example, consider: >> >> "I see the cat."Here: >> >> I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived. >> >> When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, >> as are all subjective >> states and all experiences. >> >> However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated >> the experience >> into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal >> experience into a >> publicly accessible statement. >> >> All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words >> are objective. >> Any statement is then objective. >> >> Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective, >> so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless >> (codeless). >> >> >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 8/29/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> *From:* Alberto G. Corona >> *Receiver:* everything-list >> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 10:39:37 >> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary >> >> >> >> 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King >> >>> On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >>> >>> the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has >>> memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. >>> therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits >>> with others. >>> >>> >>> Hi Albert, >>> >>> Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and >>> how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself >>> to be." >>> >>> >>> in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) >> operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes >> from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others >> see on me. >> >>> >>> This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life >>> of ourselves. >>> >>> >>> No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the >>> sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for >>> each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like >>> to be you. >>> >>> That′s why this uniqueness is not essential >> >>> >>> But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to >>> other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come >>> to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although >>> this probably will never happen. >>> >>> >>> Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. >>> There is something important to this! >>> >> >> This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of >> individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But >> probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate >> further >> >>> >>> >>> >>> 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King >>> On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - *From:* Craig Weinberg *Receiver:* everything-list *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently hav
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive".. >From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > Hi Alberto G. Corona > > The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived. > > For example, consider: > > "I see the cat."Here: > > I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived. > > When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, > as are all subjective > states and all experiences. > > However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated > the experience > into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal > experience into a > publicly accessible statement. > > All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words > are objective. > Any statement is then objective. > > Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective, > so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless > (codeless). > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > - Receiving the following content - > *From:* Alberto G. Corona > *Receiver:* everything-list > *Time:* 2012-08-29, 10:39:37 > *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary > > > > 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King > >> On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >> >> the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory >> because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it >> needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. >> >> >> Hi Albert, >> >> Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and >> how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself >> to be." >> >> >> in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) > operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes > from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others > see on me. > >> >> This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of >> ourselves. >> >> >> No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the >> sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for >> each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like >> to be you. >> >> That′s why this uniqueness is not essential > >> >> But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to >> other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come >> to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although >> this probably will never happen. >> >> >> Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. >> There is something important to this! >> > > This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of > individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But > probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate > further > >> >> >> >> 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King >> >>> On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>> >>> Hi Craig Weinberg >>> I agree. >>> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: >>> Cs = subject + object >>> The subject is always first person indeterminate. >>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable. >>> QED >>> >>> Hi Roger, >>> >>> It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted >>> to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the >>> object is possibly singular. >>> >>>Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>> 8/29/2012 >>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >>> everything could function." >>> >>> - Receiving the following content - >>> *From:* Craig Weinberg >>> *Receiver:* everything-list >>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 >>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary >>> >>> This sentence does not speak English. >>> >>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. >>> >>> s l u ,u s >>> >>> >>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help >>> illustrate that form is not inherently informative. >>> >>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as >>> ascertaining the origin of awareness. >>> >>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless >>> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation >>> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular >>> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. >>> >>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of >>> what Bruno includes) in
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived. For example, consider: "I see the cat."Here: I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived. When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjective states and all experiences. However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experience into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into a publicly accessible statement. All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are objective. Any statement is then objective. Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective, so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. Hi Albert, Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be." in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you. That's why this uniqueness is not essential But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this! This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
It appears that subjectivity, has everithing to do with morality. This is not only evident for any religious person, but also for mathematics and game theory. It appears that without moral individuality, social collaboration is impossible, except for clones. I exposed the reasoning here. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > Hi Alberto G. Corona > > > Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is simply > the private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it is > experience. > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > - Receiving the following content - > *From:* Alberto G. Corona > *Receiver:* everything-list > *Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:08:43 > *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary > > Craig: > > I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality > exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical > laws). I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list. > I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy > of the naturalistic fallacy. > > Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it > appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation > of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality > effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were > no moral beings. > > 2012/8/29 Craig Weinberg > >> >> >> On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: >>> >>> the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has >>> memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. >>> therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits >>> with others. >> >> >> What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream >> whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be >> intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think >> you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about >> consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking >> consciousness only. >> >> >>> This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life >>> of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made >>> accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. >>> We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created >>> clones. Although this probably will never happen. >>> >> >> In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider >> themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. >> They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on >> the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more >> awkward position than the other, etc). >> >> >>> 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King >>> On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - *From:* Craig Weinberg *Receiver:* everything-list *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for an
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Before you can have a computer, you need some kind of i/o. I think this is what comp ignores. It is my hypotheses that 'input' is afferent phenomenology and 'output' is efferent participation in all cases, however i/o does not automatically carry the full spectrum of possible phenomenological qualities. That was the point of my saying "These words do not 'refer' to themselves", because they are only words to us. The other layers of sense which are involved do not speak English - they speak tcp/ip, or machine language, or voltage flux, but there are no words there other than the ones which we infer through our fully human, English speaking range of sensitivity. Craig On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 11:16:09 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > Hi Alberto G. Corona > > Awareness = I see X. > or I am X. > or some similar statement. > > There's no computer in that behavior or state of being. > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > - Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Alberto G. Corona > *Receiver:* everything-list > *Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:34:22 > *Subject:* Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary > > Roger, > I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a > inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the > consequences of this inner computation. > > 锟斤拷锟斤拷like in the case of any relation of brain and mind,锟斤拷I do not say > that this IS 锟斤拷the experience of awareness, but given the duality between > mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way > when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness > > 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > > >> Hi Alberto G. Corona >> 锟斤拷 >> What sort of an output would the computer give me ? >> It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no >> way to hook it to my brain. >> 锟斤拷 >> 锟斤拷 >> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net >> 8/29/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> *From:* Alberto G. Corona >> *Receiver:* everything-list >> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 >> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary >> >> Hi: >> >> Awareness can 锟斤拷be functionally (we do not know if experientially) >> 锟斤拷computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do >> things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time >> status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called >> "interpreters". >> >> 锟斤拷The lack of 锟斤拷understanding, of this capability of metacomputation >> that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why 锟斤拷it is said >> that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. 锟斤拷We >> humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. >> The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a >> metacomputation. >> >> For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our >> intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. >> We can not know 锟斤拷our deep thinking structures because they are not >> exposed as metacomputations. When we use锟斤拷metaphorically锟斤拷the verb "to be >> fired" 锟斤拷to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can >> not be aware of it. 锟斤拷Only after research that assimilate mathematical >> facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness >> of it by means of an adquired metacomputation. >> >> The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman >> for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. >> In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process 锟斤拷of >> diagonalization by G锟斤拷del 锟斤拷makes the Hilbert program impossible, That >> same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a >> constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G锟斤拷del theorem). >> >> >> Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free >> will nor in any other existential question. >> >> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > >> >>> Hi Craig Weinberg >>> 锟斤拷 >>> I agree. >>> 锟斤拷 >>> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: >>> 锟斤拷 >
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
I say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that it´s functionality is computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > Hi Alberto G. Corona > > Awareness = I see X. > or I am X. > or some similar statement. > > There's no computer in that behavior or state of being. > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > - Receiving the following content - > *From:* Alberto G. Corona > *Receiver:* everything-list > *Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:34:22 > *Subject:* Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary > > Roger, > I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a > inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the > consequences of this inner computation. > > like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that > this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and > matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in > the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness > > 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > >> Hi Alberto G. Corona >> What sort of an output would the computer give me ? >> It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no >> way to hook it to my brain. >>Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 8/29/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> *From:* Alberto G. Corona >> *Receiver:* everything-list >> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 >> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary >> >> Hi: >> >> Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) >> computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things >> depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This >> is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters". >> >> The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that >> any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the >> brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage >> concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the >> result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. >> >> For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our >> intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. >> We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed >> as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to >> mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware >> of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the >> observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means >> of an adquired metacomputation. >> >> The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman >> for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. >> In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of >> diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same >> conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive >> mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem). >> >> >> Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free >> will nor in any other existential question. >> >> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough >> >>> Hi Craig Weinberg >>> I agree. >>> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: >>> Cs = subject + object >>> The subject is always first person indeterminate. >>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable. >>> QED >>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>> 8/29/2012 >>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >>> everything could function." >>> >>> - Receiving the following content - >>> *From:* Craig Weinberg >>> *Receiver:* everything-list >>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 >>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary >>> >>> This sentence does not speak English. >>> >>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. >>> >&
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona Awareness = I see X. or I am X. or some similar statement. There's no computer in that behavior or state of being. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Roger, I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation. like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona What sort of an output would the computer give me ? It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no way to hook it to my brain. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Hi: Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters". The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation. The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem). Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes th
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is simply the private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it is experience. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 09:08:43 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Craig: I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list. I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy. Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings. 2012/8/29 Craig Weinberg On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking consciousness only. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more awkward position than the other, etc). 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic. Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indetermi
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona The subject is the perceiver, not the perceived. The perceived is called the object, cs = subject + object This is a dipole. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 08:44:19 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic. Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all. As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta. Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality. Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onwar
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Roger, I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation. like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > Hi Alberto G. Corona > > What sort of an output would the computer give me ? > It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no > way to hook it to my brain. > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > - Receiving the following content - > *From:* Alberto G. Corona > *Receiver:* everything-list > *Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 > *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary > > Hi: > > Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) > computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things > depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This > is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters". > > The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any > turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the > brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage > concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the > result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. > > For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our > intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. > We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed > as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to > mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware > of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the > observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means > of an adquired metacomputation. > > The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman > for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. > In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of > diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same > conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive > mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem). > > > Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free > will nor in any other existential question. > > 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > >> Hi Craig Weinberg >> I agree. >> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: >> Cs = subject + object >> The subject is always first person indeterminate. >> Being indeterminate, it is not computable. >> QED >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 8/29/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> *From:* Craig Weinberg >> *Receiver:* everything-list >> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 >> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary >> >> This sentence does not speak English. >> >> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. >> >> s l u ,u s >> >> >> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate >> that form is not inherently informative. >> >> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as >> ascertaining the origin of awareness. >> >> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless >> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation >> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular >> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. >> >> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what >> Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp >> contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively >> assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G >> del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of >> course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be >> complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect >> that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, >> but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that >> this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining >> consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a >> priori and independently of any arithmetic logic. >> >> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertio
Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona What sort of an output would the computer give me ? It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no way to hook it to my brain. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Hi: Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters". The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation. The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem). Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic. Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all. As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta. Quanta, however, could and I think does f
