Hi Brent, I have joined you last two posts,
Le 31-août-07, à 17:55, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Yes. I can accept that PA is a description of counting. But PA, per
se,
is not a description of PA. With your term: I can accept arithmetic is
a description of counting (and adding and
On Sep 1, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The description itself is an algorithm written in symbols.
Peano's axioms aren't an algorithm.
Er..you're right here of course. I'm getting myself a bit confused
again. Careful when thinking about these
On Aug 31, 6:21 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I *don't* think that mathematical
properties are properties of our *descriptions*
Le 30-août-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
? I don't understand. Arithmetic is about number. Meta-arithmetic is
about theories on numbers. That is very different.
Yes, I understand that. But ISTM the argument went sort of like this:
I say arithmetic is a
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I said to Brent,
Le 31-août-07, à 11:00, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It
seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory
with his intended
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Only a meta-theory *about* PA, can distinguish PA and arithmetical
truth. But then Godel showed that sometimes a meta-theory can be
translated in or by the theory/machine.
But is the meta-theory *about* PA, itself classified as
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 31, 6:21 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I *don't* think that mathematical properties are properties
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 30-août-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
? I don't understand. Arithmetic is about number. Meta-arithmetic is
about theories on numbers. That is very different.
Yes, I understand that. But ISTM the argument went sort of like this:
I
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I said to Brent,
Le 31-août-07, à 11:00, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It
seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory
with his intended model.
Brent, rereading your post I
On Aug 30, 1:37 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 29-août-07, à 12:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Any scientific theory (including Darwin's) *is* more accurate when
expressed in mathematical notation. You *can* draw a clear
distinction between the language used to express
Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I *don't* think that mathematical
properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I
think they are properties *of the thing itself*.
I agree with
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I *don't* think that mathematical
properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I
think they are properties *of the thing
On Aug 29, 1:10 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So are mathematics human creations (c.f. William S. Cooper, The Evolution of
Logic). There is no sharp distinction between what is expressed in words
and what is expressed in mathematical symbols. Darwins theory of evolution
Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I *don't* think that mathematical
properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I
think they are properties *of the thing itself*.
I agree with you. If you identify mathematical theories with
descriptions, then the
Le 29-août-07, à 12:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Any scientific theory (including Darwin's) *is* more accurate when
expressed in mathematical notation. You *can* draw a clear
distinction between the language used to express mathematical concepts
and the concept itself.
OK.
Pure
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I *don't* think that mathematical
properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I
think they are properties *of the thing itself*.
I agree with you. If you identify mathematical theories with
[EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev:
(7) From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real. But there
exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained
in terms of finite physical processes.
How can you prove that infinite sets exists?
--
Torgny Tholerus
On 28/08/07, David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation
was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that
the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits,
but the circulatory system as a
On Aug 28, 6:31 pm, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev:
(7) From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real. But there
exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained
in terms of finite physical processes.
How can you prove
On 28/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation
was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that
the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits,
but the circulatory
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 28, 12:53 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
On Aug 29, 4:20 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Thanks for spelling it out.
(1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of
reality.
So are grammatical concepts.
No they aren't. Grammatical concepts are human creations, which is
precisely shown by the
On Aug 29, 4:03 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is
left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information
is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be
perfectly reproduced by
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 29, 4:20 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Thanks for spelling it out.
(1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of
reality.
So are grammatical concepts.
No they aren't. Grammatical concepts are human creations, which is
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 22, 11:55 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
(stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word fundamental.
On Aug 27, 6:45 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't know whether you're hair splitting or speaking loosely, but the above
is off the point in a couple of ways. In the first place empirical science
is inductive not deductive; so there is a trivial sense in which you can't
Le 27-août-07, à 07:08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
On Aug 22, 10:14 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Comp is a short expression made for computationalism.
Computationalism, which I called also digital mechanism is Descartes
related doctrine that we are digitalisable machine.
On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
(stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word fundamental. The base
property seems to me more
On 27/08/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation
was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that
the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits,
but the circulatory system
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 27, 6:45 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't know whether you're hair splitting or speaking loosely, but the
above is off the point in a couple of ways. In the first place empirical
science is inductive not deductive; so there is a
David Nyman wrote:
On 27/08/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation
was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that
the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits,
but
On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think you're setting up an impossible standard of explaining. You're
asking that it produce a certain feeling in you, and then you're speculating
that after being given all the physics of conscious processes and even the
ability to
David Nyman wrote:
On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think you're setting up an impossible standard of explaining.
You're asking that it produce a certain feeling in you, and then
you're speculating that after being given all the physics of
conscious processes and even
On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But my point is that you're insisting that explanation is something that you
find satisfying. It's not that explanation fails in general, it fails
subjectively for you. Every explanation can fail in that way on any subject.
Well, it
David Nyman wrote:
On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But my point is that you're insisting that explanation is something that you
find satisfying. It's not that explanation fails in general, it fails
subjectively for you. Every explanation can fail in that way on any
On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'm prepared to remain agnostic. There is no 3rd person explanation of
consciouness that is anywhere near as complete as the explanation of gravity
or life. Maybe when I see one I'll consider it as complete as I do the
biochemical basis
On Aug 28, 12:53 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
(stubbornly, perhaps) is
On Aug 28, 5:18 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't find your arguments at all convincing. In fact I don't think you've
even given an argument - just assertions.
Here the points of a clear-cut argument. These are not 'just
assertions':
(1) Mathematical concepts are
On Aug 22, 10:14 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Comp is a short expression made for computationalism.
Computationalism, which I called also digital mechanism is Descartes
related doctrine that we are digitalisable machine. I make it often
precise by defining comp to be the
On Aug 22, 11:55 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
(stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word fundamental. The base
property seems to me
Le 21-août-07, à 07:24, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote
I thought I made it clear I wasn't trying reduce everything to
physics.
Yes. Nice. I did see that. I did just take the opportunity to criticize
both those who believe math IS reducible to physics and those (like you
up to now) who thinks
On 21/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here you are implicitly assuming that there is ONE fundamental level
of reality only. Why do you keep making this assumption? Property
Dualism says that there is more than one way to describe reality, and
each way is no more or less
On 21/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 20, 9:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with
the physics argument I gave
On Aug 21, 10:31 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Well, return to a concrete example. Yesterday, I thought red was the
best colour for my new car, but today I think blue is better. My
aesthetic values would seem to have changed. There must be some reason
for this, of
On Tue, Aug 21, 2007 at 11:23:01AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here you are implicitly assuming that there is ONE fundamental level
of reality only. Why do you keep making this assumption? Property
Dualism says that there is more than one way to describe reality, and
each way is no
On Aug 22, 11:26 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Marc, how does your property dualism differ from the account of
emergence I give in On Complexity and Emergence? (If indeed it does
differ!).
Cheers
I've only given your text a quick skim so far. As far as I can tell,
That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather
than just plain mysterious.
Cheers
On Tue, Aug 21, 2007 at 08:22:59PM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 22, 11:26 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Marc, how does your property dualism differ
On Aug 22, 4:41 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather
than just plain mysterious.
Cheers
The ida of property dualism is very simple:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism
It just means that the same
Still sounds like emergence to me.
On Tue, Aug 21, 2007 at 10:23:18PM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 22, 4:41 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather
than just plain mysterious.
Cheers
The ida
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months.
No. That's because after the terrible insults levelled at me by some...
Surely not on this list!
--
Stathis
On Aug 20, 9:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months.
No. That's because after the terrible insults
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with
the physics argument I gave above).
*Consider an agent with a set of motivations A
*Consider the transition of that agent to a different set of
motivations B (ie
Le 19-août-07, à 08:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
On Aug 19, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a
particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we
can use empirical means to determine
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract
Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete
information would agree with.
Even in the restricted arithmetical Platonia, no observer can have
On Aug 20, 9:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with
the physics argument I gave above).
*Consider an agent with a set of motivations A
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 19-août-07, à 08:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the possibility
of comp. OK?
Sorry, I meant to say in previous post that my version property is NOT
quite the same as
On Aug 19, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a
particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we
can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However,
if I like red and you
On Aug 19, 9:25 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Marc, refers to a commonality averaged across many events and agents so
apparently he has in mind a residue of consensus or near consensus.
Correct.
Color preferences might average out to nil except in narrow circumstances,
Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months.
Concerning objective values, as we have discussed in the past, I don't
see any rational argument in support of their existence. For example
if one has chosen to consider the elimination of the human species as
a priority value (like some
On 19/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a
particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we
can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However,
if I like red and you like blue,
MG: 'It's really quite obvious in retrospect - physical
properties involve energy, mathematical properties involve knowledge
(meaningful patterns). Old David Chalmers was right about this one
(see his 'property dualism'). The two properties just ain't the same
and no amount of semantic
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months.
No. That's because after the terrible insults levelled at me by some
I had to take a break to make absolutely certain that my arguments,
theories (and java code) are all
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Question: why do you _want_
to think that there are objective values?
G.
Here's my answer:
I want to to think that there are objective values because I dislike
the idea that important aspects of our (human) existence are
3PV observation and analysis _may_ eventually turn up with objective
criteria that establish universally consistent and reliable
correlation between certain brain processes and certain reported
phenomenal experiences
Of course. It appears from all scientific evidence that phenomenal
experiences
Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do.
They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the
laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of
future states of matter. The descriptions of the future states of
matter are *implied by*
On 18/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do.
They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the
laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of
future states of matter. The
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do.
They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the
laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of
67 matches
Mail list logo
