Re: Time

2008-12-21 Thread Abram Demski
it is not the only possible way of defining things. --Abram On Sun, Dec 21, 2008 at 12:24 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Abram Demski wrote: Brent, It sounds like you are saying that probability is useful because it allows us to predict things-- we convert (past) relative

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2008-12-21 Thread Abram Demski
, The answer to your post is really the step 3 of the UDA reasoning. It is the justification of the first person indeterminacy, and the definition of (relatively) normal machine. On 20 Dec 2008, at 04:46, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, From what assumptions could a probability ultimately be derived

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2008-12-22 Thread Abram Demski
is the assumption that I, and my continuous life, is preserved in teleportation, and polyplication (duplication and other self- multiplication). (I know you are playing the role of the time person skeptic). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-dem

worlds propositions

2008-12-23 Thread Abram Demski
Here is a fun article about possible worlds, for those of us who are logically inclined. http://consequently.org/news/2008/12/09/always_more/#more --Abram -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address

Re: Machines was:Kim 2.1

2008-12-24 Thread Abram Demski
/ -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything

Re: Machines was:Kim 2.1

2008-12-25 Thread Abram Demski
...@ozemail.com.au wrote: On 26/12/2008, at 5:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Dec 2008, at 08:05, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, I agree with Gunther about the two types of machine. The broader machine is any system that can be logically described-- a system that is governed by rules and has

Re: Machines was:Kim 2.1

2008-12-26 Thread Abram Demski
/descriptions. --Abram On Fri, Dec 26, 2008 at 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 25 Dec 2008, at 22:27, Kim Jones wrote: On 26/12/2008, at 5:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Dec 2008, at 08:05, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, I agree with Gunther about the two types of machine

Re: Machines was:Kim 2.1

2008-12-26 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, Thanks for the reference. That book sounds very interesting... unfortunately it is also very expensive. --Abram On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 25 Dec 2008, at 08:05, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, I agree with Gunther about the two types

Re: Revisions to my approach. Is it a UD?

2008-12-28 Thread Abram Demski
Demski Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group

Re: Revisions to my approach. Is it a UD?

2008-12-28 Thread Abram Demski
. Original Message- From: everything-l...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Abram Demski Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2008 3:10 PM To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Revisions to my approach. Is it a UD? Hal, Is there a pattern to how

Re: Revisions to my approach. Is it a UD?

2009-01-02 Thread Abram Demski
of inconsistency driven traces. I had not considered this before. Yours Hal -Original Message- From: everything-l...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Abram Demski Sent: Monday, December 29, 2008 12:59 AM To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com Subject: Re

Re: Revisions to my approach. Is it a UD?

2009-01-02 Thread Abram Demski
? In other words, is the hole that Godel pointed out flexible enough to fill in any hole eventually if we keep adding con(x), or are there non-godelian holes? --Abram On Fri, Jan 2, 2009 at 11:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Jan 2009, at 16:01, Abram Demski wrote: Hal, I went

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-05 Thread Abram Demski
, right). Memory is then nothing but marks in the brain, and consciousness just like other moving things in nature with a (relatively) stable structure (a body, river, plant, etc), only more complex. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-dem

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-06 Thread Abram Demski
as a magical requirement for you, though. --Abram On Tue, Jan 6, 2009 at 8:07 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com: Thomas, If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience moving in it always and only in one

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-06 Thread Abram Demski
more general notion of dimensional spaces, some of which have nothing to do with geometry. In physics metrics play always some role somewhere though. Bruno Le 06-janv.-09, à 02:59, Brent Meeker a écrit : Abram Demski wrote: Thomas, If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do

Re: Newbie Questions

2009-01-17 Thread Abram Demski
quantum histories realized in the multiverse? Is the number of possible histories infinite, or merely a fantastically large and growing number? I don't like infinity so I'm hoping you say no. THANKS! -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com Public archive: http

Re: Newbie Questions

2009-01-17 Thread Abram Demski
quantum histories realized in the multiverse? Is the number of possible histories infinite, or merely a fantastically large and growing number? I don't like infinity so I'm hoping you say no. THANKS! -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com Public archive: http

Re: Binary Logic is Insufficient

2009-01-20 Thread Abram Demski
not appearing so I'm manually posting it. -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you

Re: logic mailing list

2009-05-18 Thread Abram Demski
. John M On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 12:54 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Abram, On 24 Apr 2009, at 18:55, Abram Demski wrote: I'm starting a mailing list for logic, and I figured some people from here might be interested. http://groups.google.com/group/one-logic

Re: logic mailing list

2009-05-18 Thread Abram Demski
this. --Abram On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 12:54 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Abram, On 24 Apr 2009, at 18:55, Abram Demski wrote: I'm starting a mailing list for logic, and I figured some people from here might be interested. http://groups.google.com/group/one-logic

Re: logic mailing list

2009-05-20 Thread Abram Demski
invoked to justify the motto programs are proofs, but it doesn't seem like it does any such thing. --Abram On Tue, May 19, 2009 at 11:25 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Abram, On 18 May 2009, at 21:53, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, I know just a little about the curry-howard

Re: logic mailing list

2009-05-28 Thread Abram Demski
...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Abram, On 18 May 2009, at 21:53, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, I know just a little about the curry-howard isomorphism... I looked into it somewhat, because I was thinking about the possibility of representing programs as proof methods (so that a single run of the program would

Re: Abstract: Cognitive Reflectivity

2009-06-18 Thread Abram Demski
goodness ensures that the relevant program structure is preserved between state transitions and thus maintains a stable goal system. Cheers -- Abram Demski http://dragonlogic-ai.blogspot.com/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you

join post

2008-11-24 Thread Abram Demski
Hi everyone! My name is Abram Demski. My interest, when it comes to this list, is: what is the correct logic, the logic that can refer to (and reason about) any mathematical structure? The logic that can define everything definable? If every possible universe exists, then of course we've got

Re: join post

2008-11-24 Thread Abram Demski
numbers, which is impossible. Of course, this gives rise to an outlandish number of truth-values (one for each ordinal number), when normally any more than 2 is considered questionable. --Abram Demski --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you

Re: join post

2008-11-25 Thread Abram Demski
Russel, Can you point me to any references? I am curious to hear why the universality goes away, and what crucially depends means, et cetera. -Abram Demski On Tue, Nov 25, 2008 at 5:44 AM, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 11:52:55AM -0500, Abram Demski wrote

Re: join post

2008-11-25 Thread Abram Demski
-meaningless and 4-meaningless and finitely-meaningless and countably-meaningless and so on. --Abram On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 5:03 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 24 Nov 2008, at 21:52, Abram Demski wrote: Hi Bruno, I am not sure I follow you here. All what Godel's incompleteness

Re: join post

2008-11-26 Thread Abram Demski
PROTECTED] wrote: On Tue, Nov 25, 2008 at 04:58:41PM -0500, Abram Demski wrote: Russel, Can you point me to any references? I am curious to hear why the universality goes away, and what crucially depends means, et cetera. -Abram Demski This is sort of discussed in my book Theory

Re: join post

2008-11-26 Thread Abram Demski
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Abram, On 26 Nov 2008, at 00:01, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, Yes, I have encountered the provability logics before, but I am no expert. We will perhaps have opportunity to talk about this. In any given generation, the entity who can represent the truth

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-27 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the definition of time... Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it. Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the movie billboards next to the train track, there is no longer a normal

Re: join post

2008-11-27 Thread Abram Demski
in the probability distribution? --Abram Demski On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 5:18 AM, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 02:55:08PM -0500, Abram Demski wrote: Russel, I do not see why some appropriately modified version of that theorem couldn't be proven for other

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-27 Thread Abram Demski
:02, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the definition of time... Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it. Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the movie billboards next to the train track

Re: join post

2008-11-27 Thread Abram Demski
whether it applies to even more general models (like priors based on arithmetic describability or analytic describability). --Abram On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 5:22 PM, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 02:40:04PM -0500, Abram Demski wrote: Russel, Hmm, can't we

Re: join post

2008-11-27 Thread Abram Demski
Russel, The paper does indeed showcase one example of a universal prior that includes non-computable universes... Theorem 4.1. So it's *possible*. Of course it then proceeds to dash hopes for a universal prior over a broader domain, defined by GTMs. So, it would be interesting to know more about

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-28 Thread Abram Demski
Hi Bruno, So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative argument against materialism, correct? It seems to me you were going in that direction, yes. Well, *I* was suggesting that we run up against the problem of time in *either* direction (physical reality / mathematical

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-28 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, I have done some thinking, and decided that I don't think this last step of the argument works for me. You provided two arguments, and so I provide two refutations. 1. (argument by removal of unnecessary parts): Suppose Alice lives in a cave all her life, with bread and water tossed down

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-29 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, The argument was more of the type : removal of unnecessay and unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no perspective. If they have some perpective playing arole in Alice's consciousness, it would mean we have not well chosen the substitution level. You are

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-29 Thread Abram Demski
, 2008 at 3:12 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 29 Nov 2008, at 15:56, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, The argument was more of the type : removal of unnecessay and unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no perspective. If they have some perpective playing arole

Re: MGA for DUMMIES

2008-11-29 Thread Abram Demski
Colin, I have several problems with that paper-- I think the reasoning is sloppy in several places. Most importantly, I don't agree with his formalization of the argument. My primary objection to that formalization is similar to the objection he deals with in section 4-- the argument employs

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if someone tested those counterfactuals by doing something that the recording

Re: Platonia and causality

2008-11-30 Thread Abram Demski
Günther, This analysis is also needed for the counterfactual objection to MGA to be fully fleshed-out... the counterfactuals on the physical level need to correspond to counterfactuals on the platonic level, presumably arising from a notion of causality on the platonic level. Perhaps we could

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-01 Thread Abram Demski
, On 30 Nov 2008, at 19:17, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if someone tested those

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-02 Thread Abram Demski
mentioned SMAT, which actually sounds like the CMAT I proposed... so I'll refer to it as SMAT from now on. --Abram On Tue, Dec 2, 2008 at 12:18 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 02 Dec 2008, at 01:05, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, It sounds like what you are saying in this reply

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-02 Thread Abram Demski
Günther, Why does MGA 2 show that SMAT + MEC is inconsistent? The way I see it, SMAT + MEC should say that a recording of Alice does not count as conscious, because it lacks the proper causal structure (or equivalently, the proper counterfactual behavior). --Abram On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:53

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-03 Thread Abram Demski
, 2008 at 4:08 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Abram, On 02 Dec 2008, at 20:33, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, I am a bit confused. To me, you said Or, you are weakening the physical supervenience thesis by appeal to a notion of causality which seems to me a bit magical

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-04 Thread Abram Demski
PS Abram. I think I will have to meditate a bit longer on your (difficult) post. You may have a point (hopefully only pedagogical :) A little bit more commentary may be in order then... I think my point may be halfway between pedagogical and serious... What I am saying is that people will

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Abram Demski
, 2008 at 3:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 2008/12/1 Abram Demski [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Yes, consciousness supervenes on computation, but that computation needs to actually take place (meaning, physically). Otherwise, how could consciousness supervene on it? Now, in order

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, Are you asserting this based on published findings concerning provability logic? If so, I would be very interested in references. If not, then your results obviously seem publishable :). That is, if you can show that huge amounts of set theory beyond ZFC emerge from provability logic in

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Abram Demski
consciousness when the first correction occurred, though that is silly upon reflection.) How does that sound? --Abram On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 7:58 PM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 2008/12/6 Abram Demski [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Stathis, I think I can get around your objection by pointing out

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, Could you possibly link to the conversation with George Levy you refer to? I did not find it looking on my own. --Abram On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 4:20 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 05 Dec 2008, at 03:56, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Dec 03, 2008 at 04:53:11PM

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-06 Thread Abram Demski
Stathis, Yes, you are right. My main point is to show that such a point of view is possible, not to actually argue for it... but I am largely just asserting my intuitions nonetheless. --Abram On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 4:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 2008/12/6 Abram Demski

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-06 Thread Abram Demski
). Of course, as you say, you'd be in a hard spot if you were required to deal with every various intuition that anybody had... but, for what it's worth, that is mine. --Abram On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 9:32 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 05-déc.-08, à 22:11, Abram Demski a écrit : Bruno

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-06 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, Thanks, I will look up those names. If you have the time to reference specific papers, I would be grateful. --Abram On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 9:07 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 05-déc.-08, à 20:51, Abram Demski a écrit : Bruno, Are you asserting this based

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-09 Thread Abram Demski
2008, at 06:19, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, Yes, I think there is a big difference between making an argument more detailed and making it more understandable. They can go together or be opposed. So a version of the argument targeted at my complaint might not be good at all pedagogically... I

Time

2008-12-18 Thread Abram Demski
be more or less accurate if all possible next moments do in fact occur? Hope that sparks some thought... -- Abram Demski Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com

Re: Time

2008-12-19 Thread Abram Demski
the probable paths, does this make it more probable that I experience the more probable result? What would that mean?) --Abram On Thu, Dec 18, 2008 at 7:21 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Abram Demski wrote: [Sorry if this is a duplicate, I think that I did not send correctly

Re: Time

2008-12-19 Thread Abram Demski
Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Abram, I agree mostly with Brent's reply. Other precision should appear in my explanation of the UDA to Kim, and in my answer to Ronald (Sunday). I will just add general remarks to Brent's reply. Le 19-déc.-08, à 00:18, Abram Demski a écrit : [Sorry

Re: Time

2008-12-20 Thread Abram Demski
the only concept of sticking together I can imagine. So anything with a topology counts as time?? That doesn't sound right. Or are you saying it is necessary, rather then sufficient? --Abram On Sat, Dec 20, 2008 at 12:54 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Abram Demski wrote: Brent