ment as a statement of the
solution". The problem is that there is no notion of semantics for which
allows a system to refer to all its own semantic values. The 'solution' is
to say that semantics simply "isn't like that" (there is no 'completion' of
the se
On Sun, Jun 10, 2012 at 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 09 Jun 2012, at 21:53, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno, Wei,
>
> I've been reading the book "saving truth from paradox" on and off, and it
> has convinced me of the importance of the "inside vie
Hi everyone!
My name is Abram Demski. My interest, when it comes to this list, is:
what is the correct logic, the logic that can refer to (and reason
about) any mathematical structure? The logic that can define
everything definable? If every possible universe exists, then of
course we've g
ling predicate for each ordinal number. No gap will be left,
because if there was such a gap, it would correspond to an ordinal
number larger than all ordinal numbers, which is impossible. Of
course, this gives rise to an outlandish number of truth-values (one
for each ordinal number), when normally
Russel,
Can you point me to any references? I am curious to hear why the
universality goes away, and what "crucially depends" means, et cetera.
-Abram Demski
On Tue, Nov 25, 2008 at 5:44 AM, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 11:52:55
l it "meaningless", or I will then conclude it is true
(assuming something like classical logic). So I need to invent a new
predicate, 2-meaningless. Using this in an unrestricted manner again
would lead to trouble, so I'll need 3-meaningless and 4-meaningless
and finitely-meaningless
Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 25, 2008 at 04:58:41PM -0500, Abram Demski wrote:
>>
>> Russel,
>>
>> Can you point me to any references? I am curious to hear why the
>> universality goes away, and what "crucially depends&qu
u called a
"nonmonotonic surface" so we draw back and either give up or try from
different angles.
--Abram
On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:54 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Hi Abram,
>
>
> On 26 Nov 2008, at 00:01, Abram Demski wrote:
>
>>
>>
Bruno,
It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the
definition of time...
Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it.
Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the movie
billboards next to the train track, there is no longer a normal
tempora
n the
probability distribution?
--Abram Demski
On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 5:18 AM, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 02:55:08PM -0500, Abram Demski wrote:
>>
>> Russel,
>>
>> I do not see why some appropriately modified version
> Hi Abram,
>
> On 27 Nov 2008, at 20:02, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the
> definition of time...
>
> Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it.
>
> Supposing that Alice&#x
On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 2:38 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Abram Demski wrote:
>> Bruno,
>>
>> It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the
>> definition of time...
>>
>> Here is my argument; I am sure there will be di
r the proof again and
try to figure out whether it applies to even more general models (like
priors based on arithmetic describability or analytic describability).
--Abram
On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 5:22 PM, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 02:
Russel,
The paper does indeed showcase one example of a universal prior that
includes non-computable universes... Theorem 4.1. So it's *possible*.
Of course it then proceeds to dash hopes for a universal prior over a
broader domain, defined by GTMs. So, it would be interesting to know
more about
Hi Bruno,
>> So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative
>> argument against materialism, correct?
>
> It seems to me you were going in that direction, yes.
>
Well, *I* was suggesting that we run up against the problem of time in
*either* direction (physical reality / mathemat
Bruno,
I have done some thinking, and decided that I don't think this last
step of the argument works for me. You provided two arguments, and so
I provide two refutations.
1. (argument by removal of unnecessary parts): Suppose Alice lives in
a cave all her life, with bread and water tossed down
Bruno,
> The argument was more of the type : "removal of unnecessay and
> unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no
> perspective. If they have some perpective playing arole in Alice's
> consciousness, it would mean we have not well chosen the substitution
> level. You are rein
, 2008 at 3:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Nov 2008, at 15:56, Abram Demski wrote:
>
>>
>> Bruno,
>>
>>> The argument was more of the type : "removal of unnecessay and
>>> unconscious or unintelligent parts.
Colin,
I have several problems with that paper-- I think the reasoning is
sloppy in several places. Most importantly, I don't agree with his
formalization of the argument. My primary objection to that
formalization is similar to the objection he deals with in section 4--
the argument employs mult
Bruno,
No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this
case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as
if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if
someone tested those counterfactuals by doing something that the
recording didn't
Günther,
This analysis is also needed for the counterfactual objection to MGA
to be fully fleshed-out... the counterfactuals on the physical level
need to correspond to counterfactuals on the platonic level,
presumably arising from a notion of causality on the platonic level.
Perhaps we could see
te:
>
> Hi Abram,
>
>
> On 30 Nov 2008, at 19:17, Abram Demski wrote:
>
>>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this
>> case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as
>> if she were
posting a
commentary since there has been a great deal of discussion about it on
this list and I could just be repeating the comments of others...)
Also: Günther mentioned "SMAT", which actually sounds like the "CMAT"
I proposed... so I'll refer to it as SMAT from now o
Günther,
Why does MGA 2 show that SMAT + MEC is inconsistent?
The way I see it, SMAT + MEC should say that a recording of Alice does
not count as conscious, because it lacks the proper causal structure
(or equivalently, the proper counterfactual behavior).
--Abram
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:53 P
rent matter...
Does that make sense?
--Abram
On Wed, Dec 3, 2008 at 4:08 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Hi Abram,
>
> On 02 Dec 2008, at 20:33, Abram Demski wrote:
>
>>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> I am a bit confused. To me, you said
>>
>
> PS Abram. I think I will have to meditate a bit longer on your
> (difficult) post. You may have a point (hopefully only pedagogical :)
A little bit more commentary may be in order then... I think my point
may be halfway between pedagogical and serious...
What I am saying is that people will co
, 2008 at 3:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> 2008/12/1 Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>> "Yes, consciousness supervenes on computation, but that computation
>> needs to actually take place (meaning, physically). Otherwise, how
>&
Bruno,
Are you asserting this based on published findings concerning
provability logic? If so, I would be very interested in references. If
not, then your results obviously seem publishable :). That is, if you
can show that huge amounts of set theory beyond ZFC emerge from
provability logic in so
assumptions more clearly will make it more
clear where the contradiction is coming from, and thus which versions
of MEC and MAT the argument applies to.
--Abram
On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 4:36 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Dec 2008, at 15:58, Abram Demski wro
my intuition says that the person
would lose consciousness when the first correction occurred, though
that is silly upon reflection.)
How does that sound?
--Abram
On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 7:58 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> 2008/12/6 Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROT
Bruno,
Could you possibly link to the conversation with George Levy you refer
to? I did not find it looking on my own.
--Abram
On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 4:20 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Dec 2008, at 03:56, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 03, 2008 at 04:53:1
Stathis,
Yes, you are right. My main point is to show that such a point of view
is possible, not to actually argue for it... but I am largely just
asserting my intuitions nonetheless.
--Abram
On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 4:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> 200
that don't require
counterfactuals).
Of course, as you say, you'd be in a hard spot if you were required to
deal with every various intuition that anybody had... but, for what
it's worth, that is mine.
--Abram
On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 9:32 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Bruno,
Thanks, I will look up those names. If you have the time to reference
specific papers, I would be grateful.
--Abram
On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 9:07 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Le 05-déc.-08, à 20:51, Abram Demski a écrit :
>
>>
>> Bruno
t;
> On 07 Dec 2008, at 06:19, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> Yes, I think there is a big difference between making an argument more
> detailed and making it more understandable. They can go together or be
> opposed. So a version of the argument targeted at my c
s there any sense in
which such estimates can be more or less accurate if all possible next
moments do in fact occur?
Hope that sparks some thought...
--
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-
ns. (Even if there
are literally more alternatives down the probable paths, does this
make it more probable that I experience the more probable result? What
would that mean?)
--Abram
On Thu, Dec 18, 2008 at 7:21 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Abram Demski wrote:
>> [Sorry if this is a
:56 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Abram,
>
> I agree mostly with Brent's reply. Other precision should appear in my
> explanation of the UDA to Kim, and in my answer to Ronald (Sunday).
> I will just add general remarks to Brent's reply.
>
>
> Le 19-déc.-08, à 00:
together" remains.
>>
> They come with a topology which is about the only concept of sticking
> together I can imagine.
So anything with a topology counts as time?? That doesn't sound right.
Or are you saying it is necessary, rather then sufficient?
--Abram
On Sat, Dec 20,
is not the
only possible way of defining things.
--Abram
On Sun, Dec 21, 2008 at 12:24 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Abram Demski wrote:
>> Brent,
>>
>> It sounds like you are saying that probability is useful because it
>> allows us to predict things-- we convert (pa
e questions, so
> you or Abram, or anyone else can answer.
>
> Abram, The answer to your post is really the step 3 of the UDA
> reasoning. It is the justification of the first person indeterminacy,
> and the definition of (relatively) normal machine.
>
>
>
>
> On 20
u are the copy.
>
> Computability can be thought as a topological notion. MEC is the
> assumption that I, and my continuous life, is preserved in
> teleportation, and polyplication (duplication and other self-
> multiplication).
>
> (I know you are playing the role of the "ti
t;> used to argue about the meaning of "life". Were viruses alive? Were
>>> sperm alive? What they could or could not consider "alive" was really
>>> important to the old-school biologists, and there was endless debate
>>> between them. (People o
Here is a fun article about possible worlds, for those of us who are
logically inclined.
http://consequently.org/news/2008/12/09/always_more/#more
--Abram
--
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski
Private address
m QM without collapse. That is "non comp", but I doubt Harnad
> believe in such non-comp. He has to say explicitely the machine have
> non replicable functions, it seems to me. I have not the paper, and if
> this what he says, let me known, that would be curious and
> intere
im Jones wrote:
>
>
> On 26/12/2008, at 5:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 25 Dec 2008, at 08:05, Abram Demski wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Bruno,
>>>
>>> I agree with Gunther about the two types of machine. The broader
>>> machine
hose
rules/descriptions.
--Abram
On Fri, Dec 26, 2008 at 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Dec 2008, at 22:27, Kim Jones wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 26/12/2008, at 5:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 25 Dec 2008, at 08:05, Abram Demski wrot
Bruno,
Thanks for the reference. That book sounds very interesting...
unfortunately it is also very expensive.
--Abram
On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 25 Dec 2008, at 08:05, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> I agree with Gunther about the tw
lates a universal Turing machine.
> To simulate it on a computer would help you (and us) to interpret the
> words that you are using in the description of your system.
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
> On 27 Dec 2008, at 03:27, Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
>
>
> >
>
-
bols.
>
> Original Message-
> From: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
> [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Abram Demski
> Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2008 3:10 PM
> To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Revisions to my approach. Is it a UD?
&
ave been.
>
> However, this lack of clarity seems to have been useful given your
> discussion of inconsistency driven traces. I had not considered this
> before.
>
> Yours
>
> Hal
>
> -Original Message-
> From: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
> [mailto:everythin
t of axioms that contains all of
arithmetical truth, or is it gappy? In other words, is the hole that
Godel pointed out flexible enough to fill in any hole eventually if we
keep adding con(x), or are there "non-godelian" holes?
--Abram
On Fri, Jan 2, 2009 at 11:32 AM, Bruno Marchal
behind is true (if I
>> > understand Everett and others, mainly Deutsch and Tegmark in their
>> > popular papers, right). Memory is then nothing but "marks" in the
>> > brain, and consciousness just like other moving things in nature with
>> > a (relatively) st
as a magical requirement for you, though.
--Abram
On Tue, Jan 6, 2009 at 8:07 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> 2009/1/6 Abram Demski :
>>
>> Thomas,
>>
>> If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
>> "moving" in it a
an hermitian space: it is infinite dimensional, but there is
>> still a geometrical structure, with notions akin to angles and
>> distances. Of course mathematician have far more general notion of
>> dimensional spaces, some of which have nothing to do with geometry. In
&
L possible quantum histories realized in the multiverse?
>
> Is the number of possible histories infinite, or merely a
> fantastically large and growing number?
>
> I don't like infinity so I'm hoping you say no.
>
> THANKS!
> >
>
--
Abram Demski
Public ad
L possible quantum histories realized in the multiverse?
>
> Is the number of possible histories infinite, or merely a
> fantastically large and growing number?
>
> I don't like infinity so I'm hoping you say no.
>
> THANKS!
> >
>
--
Abram Demski
Public ad
ot; can't be false
> A similar argument shows that "D contains D" can't be false. If we
> suppose "D contains D" is false, then "D does does not contain D" is
> true. However, by the definition of D, "D contains D" is then true
> since D
aven't been entirely disappointed there, but at the
same time that isn't what this list is really intended for.
--
Abram Demski
http://dragonlogic-ai.blogspot.com/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google G
not in footnotes, not in appendicis, not as intro- or post-
> chapters. They were just applied from page 1.
> So I gave up.
>
> John M
>
> On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 12:54 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Hi Abram,
>>
>>
>> On 24 Apr 2009, at 18:55, Abram
nswer this.
--Abram
On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 12:54 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Hi Abram,
>
>
> On 24 Apr 2009, at 18:55, Abram Demski wrote:
>
>>
>> I'm starting a mailing list for logic, and I figured some people from
>> here might be interested.
ally
invoked to justify the motto "programs are proofs", but it doesn't
seem like it does any such thing.
--Abram
On Tue, May 19, 2009 at 11:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Abram,
>
> On 18 May 2009, at 21:53, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> I know just a l
GOTO instruction, TRY
> CATCH, handling of error, continuation passing, etc.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>> On Tue, May 19, 2009 at 11:25 AM, Bruno Marchal
>> wrote:
>>> Hi Abram,
>>>
>>> On 18 May 2009, at 21:53, Abram Demski wrote:
>>&g
pts, and the
> mapping is evaluated in terms of its aesthetic goodness. Godelian
> limitations are overcome, since analogical reasoning always enables a
> comparison of the relative complexity between any two finite strings.
> Further the new met
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