RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-08-01 Thread John M
To the quote of Lee's remark: I would try Vernumft (which may as well be similarly inaccurate for 'consciousness'). There were some German speaking souls(!) who used it quite effectively G. I try for'mind':the mentality aspect of the living complexity which says not much more if 'mentality' is

RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-08-01 Thread Lee Corbin
Aditya writes [LC]: Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way: So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of event and observer moment can't really be said to be at all the same thing.

RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-08-01 Thread John M
--- Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell writes John M. wrote To Russell's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how come the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my mind - (mind: not a thing, not a place, not time-restricted) should have t,x,y,z coordinates?

Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-08-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi John, Le 01-août-05, à 16:57, John M a écrit : Also simulating menatlity from computer expressions seems reversing the fact that in comp (AI etc.) the computer science attempts to simulate certain and very limited items we already discovered from our mind. Except that since Turing,

RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-08-01 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]
John M: snip:) To Searle's book-title: it implies that we already HAVE discovered what the 'mind' is. Well, we did not. At least not to the satisfaction of the advanced thinking community. John M I think the name was a play the name of another book The discovery of the mind by Bruno

Re: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-31 Thread Aditya Varun Chadha
[RS] On 7/31/05, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea like Aditya has: what is the real difference between an event and an observer-moment? In trying to

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-31 Thread Hal Finney
Jesse Mazer writes: as I said, my idea is that *all* possible causal patterns qualify as observer-moments, not just complex ones like ours. And I don't disagree that complex observer-moments are generally the result of a long process of evolution in the physical universe, it's just that I

Re: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-31 Thread Stephen Paul King
PROTECTED] To: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2005 12:40 AM Subject: Re: What We Can Know About the World On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea like Aditya

Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-07-31 Thread Lee Corbin
Russell submits the following as clarifications: An event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway. An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time). It

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-31 Thread Lee Corbin
Brent writes [Lee writes] [Jesse wrote] Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments at the most fundamental level--something like the naturalistic panpsychism discussed on that webpage I mentioned.

Re: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-31 Thread Russell Standish
I would not be surprised if there were some sort of duality relationship (note: mathematical term employed here) between observer moment and event, appropriately defined, however it is unclear how one might adjust the definitions I gave to illuminate such a duality. Cheers On Sun, Jul 31, 2005

Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-07-31 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at 02:00:30PM -0700, John M wrote: I salute Lee's new subject designation. I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with common sense content as well, we should not restrict ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics but generalize the meanings beyond

RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-07-31 Thread Lee Corbin
Russell writes John M. wrote I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with common sense content as well, we should not restrict ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics but generalize the meanings beyond such restrictions. I agree: that is, so long as we can

Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-07-31 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at 08:09:46PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: Interesting note about mind: there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. Sarcastic comment about the possibility of Teutonic zombies elided. I am surprised about that!

RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-07-31 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Lee wrote: Interesting note about mind: there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. Sarcastic comment about the possibility of Teutonic zombies elided. In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, What is Thought? by Eric Baum, the author

RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-07-31 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[Lee wrote:] Interesting note about mind: there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. Sarcastic comment about the possibility of Teutonic zombies elided. In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, What is Thought? by Eric Baum, the

RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-07-31 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[Lee wrote:] Interesting note about mind: there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. Sarcastic comment about the possibility of Teutonic zombies elided. In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, What is Thought? by Eric Baum, the

Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-07-31 Thread Aditya Varun Chadha
[LC]: Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way: So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of event and observer moment can't really be said to be at all the same thing. (Folks like Russell

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread Lee Corbin
Jesse writes I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes because your brain is a part of an obviously successful survival machine designed by evolution. Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread Jesse Mazer
Lee Corbin wrote: Jesse writes I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes because your brain is a part of an obviously successful survival machine designed by evolution. Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where reality is made up of nothing

Re: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear Jesse and Lee, I must interject! - Original Message - From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2005 9:32 AM Subject: RE: What We Can Know About the World Lee Corbin wrote: snip [LC] The disagreement I

Re: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 30-juil.-05, à 17:18, Aditya Varun Chadha a écrit : I think Mazer has put this across quite nicely, so I pause here. I agree with you and Jesse Mazer. Except that Jesse points on a speculation on the observer-moments, where I find enough to speculate on the truth on the comp

Re: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 30-juil.-05, à 08:53, Lee Corbin a écrit : When in the laboratory we examine the concepts mice have of the world, we can easily see their limitations. What would we think of mice who attempted to found all of reality on mouse observer moments? Give them time! Mice will probably discover

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread chris peck
that, but it makes a little sense to me. Perhaps there is something in Sam Johnson's quip afterall. Many Regards Chris. From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: EverythingList everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: RE: What We Can Know About the World Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2005

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread Lee Corbin
Aditya writes At the risk of barging in once again, Oh, please forget about all that! No one should apologize for it. Ever. I (Lee) had written When in the laboratory we examine the concepts mice have of the world, we can easily see their limitations. What would we think of mice who

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread Lee Corbin
Chris writes Im dont know. Im in two minds now. I think my own objection to Sam Johnsons 'refutation' is based on a very strict definition of knowledge which entails some notion of certainty. To be only 99% certain is not enough on this definition to know something. Its a little sceptical

Re: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread Aditya Varun Chadha
Whoa! A simple question that just opened up SO many things in my mind! (maybe a few screws too:-) ) Blabber on I shall! [LC]: By event do you mean an event that leaves a record? Just wondering. leaves a record is the same as saying affects/causes/interferes with other events. Side Note:

(offlist) RE: What We Can Know About the World (fwd)

2005-07-30 Thread Brent Meeker
-Original Message- From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2005 12:29 AM To: Lee Corbin Subject: Re: What We Can Know About the World On 29-Jul-05, you wrote: Jesse writes I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes because

Re: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread Russell Standish
On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea like Aditya has: what is the real difference between an event and an observer-moment? In trying to answer that question, many of us may learn something (at least for

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-29 Thread Jesse Mazer
Lee Corbin wrote: Chris writes Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is indirect, and therefore the existence of a material cause for those perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's razor.

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-29 Thread Lee Corbin
Jesse writes Lee Corbin wrote: Chris writes Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is indirect, and therefore the existence of a material cause for those perceptions is an unjustified inference in

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-29 Thread Jesse Mazer
Lee Corbin wrote: Jesse writes Lee Corbin wrote: Chris writes Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is indirect, and therefore the existence of a material cause for those perceptions is an

Re: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 27-juil.-05, à 20:11, Lee Corbin a écrit : Build carefully upon what is simple and knowable, and keep the wild theories to a minimum. Even then, the world is hardly simple, but at least we've got a chance. I agree completely. In other words, dualists and materialists contravene

Re: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-28 Thread janos nagyapu
Please see interleaved in the remnants of the text below John Mikes --- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 27-juil.-05, à 20:11, Lee Corbin a écrit : Build carefully upon what is simple and knowable, and keep the wild theories to a minimum. Even then, the world is hardly

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-27 Thread chris peck
Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is indirect, and therefore the existance of a material cause for those perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's razor. The argument that the look, texture,

Re: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 27-juil.-05, à 15:55, chris peck a écrit : Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is indirect, and therefore the existance of a material cause for those perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of

Re: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-27 Thread chris peck
Hi Bruno; There are problems with Berkley to be sure, but I dont think Johnson had much of a grasp of them. Are there good objections to Berkley? Certainly. Did SJ propose any? Not really. I agree ontologically. But I disagree epistemologically. It is like with Mendeleev classification of

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-27 Thread Lee Corbin
Chris writes Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is indirect, and therefore the existence of a material cause for those perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's razor. The argument that

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-27 Thread chris peck
refuted Berkley. I cant see how he did. many regards Chris. From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: EverythingList everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: RE: What We Can Know About the World Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2005 11:11:33 -0700 Chris writes Samuel Johnson did refute