John M:
>To Searle's book-title: it implies that we already
>HAVE discovered what the 'mind' is. Well, we did not.
>At least not to the satisfaction of the advanced
>thinking community.
>
>John M
I think the name was a play the name of another book
"The discovery of the mind" by Bruno Snell
Se
Hi John,
Le 01-août-05, à 16:57, John M a écrit :
Also simulating menatlity from computer
expressions seems reversing the fact that in comp (AI
etc.) the computer science attempts to simulate
certain and very limited items we already discovered
from our "mind".
Except that since Turing, Churc
--- Lee Corbin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Russell writes
>
> > John M. wrote
> >
> > > To Russell's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how
> come
> > > the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my
> mind -
> > > (mind: not a thing, not a place, not
> time-restricted)
> > > should have t,x,y,z co
Aditya writes
> [LC]:
> > Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as
> > alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way:
>
> > So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of
> > "event" and "observer moment" can't really be said to be at
> > all th
To the quote of Lee's remark:
I would try "Vernumft" (which may as well be similarly
inaccurate for 'consciousness'). There were some
German speaking souls(!) who used it quite effectively
.
I try for'mind':the mentality aspect of the living
complexity which says not much more if 'mentality'
is
[LC]:
> Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as
> alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way:
> So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of
> "event" and "observer moment" can't really be said to be at
> all the same thing. (Folks like
[Lee wrote:]
>Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language
>equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when
>employing it. Teutonic zombies elided.>
>
>In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What is Thought?"
>by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as the n
[Lee wrote:]
>Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language
>equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when
>employing it. Teutonic zombies elided.>
>
>In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What is Thought?"
>by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as the n
Lee wrote:
>Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language
>equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when
>employing it. Teutonic zombies elided.>
>
>In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What is Thought?"
>by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as the nam
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at 08:09:46PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language
> equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when
> employing it. Teutonic zombies elided.>
>
I am surprised about that! The word "der Geist" sprang immediate
Russell writes
> John M. wrote
>
> > I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with
> > common sense content as well, we should not restrict
> > ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics
> > but generalize the meanings beyond such restrictions.
I agree: that is, so long as we c
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at 02:00:30PM -0700, John M wrote:
> I salute Lee's new subject designation.
>
> I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with
> common sense content as well, we should not restrict
> ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics
> but generalize the meanings be
I would not be surprised if there were some sort of duality
relationship (note: mathematical term employed here) between observer
moment and event, appropriately defined, however it is unclear how one
might adjust the definitions I gave to illuminate such a duality.
Cheers
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at
Brent writes
> [Lee writes]
> > [Jesse wrote]
> > > Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where
> > > reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments at the most
> > > fundamental level--something like the "naturalistic panpsychism"
> > > discussed on that webpage I me
I salute Lee's new subject designation.
I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with
common sense content as well, we should not restrict
ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics
but generalize the meanings beyond such restrictions.
Of course: I am no physicist. My apologies.
Russell submits the following as clarifications:
> An event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D
> spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway.
>
> An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently
> information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time).
>
ndish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2005 12:40 AM
Subject: Re: What We Can Know About the World
On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an id
Jesse Mazer writes:
> as I said, my idea is
> that *all* possible causal patterns qualify as "observer-moments", not just
> complex ones like ours. And I don't disagree that complex observer-moments
> are generally the result of a long process of evolution in the physical
> universe, it's just
[RS]
On 7/31/05, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
> >
> > This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea
> > like Aditya has: what is the real difference between an event
> > and an observer-moment? In tryi
On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea
> like Aditya has: what is the real difference between an event
> and an observer-moment? In trying to answer that question, many
> of us may learn something (at least
> -Original Message-
> From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2005 12:29 AM
> To: Lee Corbin
> Subject: Re: What We Can Know About the World
>
>
> On 29-Jul-05, you wrote:
>
> > Jesse writes
> >
> >>&g
Whoa!
A simple question that just opened up SO many things in my mind!
(maybe a few screws too:-) ) Blabber on I shall!
[LC]:
> By "event" do you mean an event that leaves a record? Just
> wondering.
"leaves a record" is the same as saying "affects/causes/interferes
with other events".
Side
Chris writes
> Im dont know. Im in two minds now. I think my own objection to Sam Johnsons
> 'refutation' is based on a very strict definition of knowledge which entails
> some notion of certainty. To be only 99% certain is not enough on this
> definition to know something. Its a little sceptic
Aditya writes
> At the risk of barging in once again,
Oh, please forget about all that! No one should apologize for it. Ever.
I (Lee) had written
> > When in the laboratory we examine the concepts mice
> > have of the world, we can easily see their limitations.
> > What would we think of mice w
py by transcendental
argument like that, but it makes a little sense to me.
Perhaps there is something in Sam Johnson's quip afterall.
Many Regards
Chris.
From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "EverythingList"
Subjec
Le 30-juil.-05, à 08:53, Lee Corbin a écrit :
When in the laboratory we examine the concepts mice
have of the world, we can easily see their limitations.
What would we think of mice who attempted to found all
of reality on "mouse observer moments"?
Give them time! Mice will probably discover
Le 30-juil.-05, à 17:18, Aditya Varun Chadha a écrit :
I think Mazer has put this across quite nicely, so I pause here.
I agree with you and Jesse Mazer. Except that Jesse points on a
"speculation on the observer-moments", where I find enough to speculate
on the truth on the comp hypothes
Dear Jesse and Lee,
I must interject!
- Original Message -
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2005 9:32 AM
Subject: RE: What We Can Know About the World
Lee Corbin wrote:
snip
[LC]
The disagreemen
Lee Corbin wrote:
Jesse writes
> > I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes
> > because your brain is a part of an obviously successful
> > survival machine designed by evolution.
>
> Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where
> reality is made up of n
Jesse writes
> > I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes
> > because your brain is a part of an obviously successful
> > survival machine designed by evolution.
>
> Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where
> reality is made up of nothing but observer-
Lee Corbin wrote:
Jesse writes
> Lee Corbin wrote:
> >
> >Chris writes
> >
> > > >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley.
> > >
> > > The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show
> > > that sensory perception is
> > > indirect, and therefore the existence of a
> > > material cause for those p
Jesse writes
> Lee Corbin wrote:
> >
> >Chris writes
> >
> > > >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley.
> > >
> > > The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show
> > > that sensory perception is
> > > indirect, and therefore the existence of a
> > > material cause for those perceptions is an
> > >
Lee Corbin wrote:
Chris writes
> >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley.
>
> The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception
is
> indirect, and therefore the existence of a material cause for those
> perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's
r
Please see interleaved in the remnants of the text
below
John Mikes
--- Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Le 27-juil.-05, à 20:11, Lee Corbin a écrit :
>
> > Build carefully upon what is simple and knowable,
> and keep the
> > wild theories to a minimum. Even then, the world
> is
Le 27-juil.-05, à 20:11, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Build carefully upon what is simple and knowable, and keep the
wild theories to a minimum. Even then, the world is hardly
simple, but at least we've got a chance.
I agree completely.
In other words, dualists and materialists contravene Occam
er Johnson refuted Berkley. I cant see
how he did.
many regards
Chris.
From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "EverythingList"
Subject: RE: What We Can Know About the World
Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2005 11:11:33 -0700
Chris writ
Chris writes
> >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley.
>
> The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is
> indirect, and therefore the existence of a material cause for those
> perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's razor.
> The argument
Hi Bruno;
There are problems with Berkley to be sure, but I dont think Johnson had
much of a grasp of them. Are there good objections to Berkley? Certainly.
Did SJ propose any? Not really.
I agree ontologically. But I disagree epistemologically. It is like with
Mendeleev classification of th
Le 27-juil.-05, à 15:55, chris peck a écrit :
Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley.
The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory
perception is indirect, and therefore the existance of a material
cause for those perceptions is an unjustified inference in
contravention of Occa
Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley.
The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is
indirect, and therefore the existance of a material cause for those
perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's razor.
The argument that the look, texture, s
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