Re: Does p make sense?

[Bruno Marchal]

Hello Dan,

On 15 Feb 2013, at 05:31, freqflyer07281972 wrote:


Dear Bruno,

I would like to know what 'doxastic models of consciousness' means,  
as well as what means "S4Grz" - I know Craig was the one who  
originally used the term 'doxastic models' but you seemed to know  
right away what that meant, so I'd like to know from your  
perspective what it means;



Epistemic = knowledge

Doxastic = belief

Epistemic logic are modal (most of the time) logics where the modal  
box (here written with a B) represents a unary connector intended for  
the knower (Bp = "the agent know p", or "I know p").


Doxastic logic are modal (most of the time) logics where the modal box  
(here written with a B) represents a unary connector intended for the  
believer (Bp = "the agent believes p", or "I believe p").


The main difference between knowledge and belief is that knowledges  
are true, by definition, when beliefs can be false.


So among the axioms accepted for knowledge or epistemic logic, we have  
that Bp -> p (I know p entails p is true).

Contrariwise, modal doxastic logics will NOT have the axiom Bp -> p.

For the ideally self-referentially correct machine I consider, the  
belief B is modeled by provability. Before Gödel, most people  
(mathematicians and philosophers) would have thought that in this case  
we do have Bp -> p.


But as Gödel already remarked, the provability predicate, even in the  
correct case, cannot be modeled by a (normal) modal logic having Bp ->  
p. Indeed we would have Bf -> f, that is ~Bf, and that's consistency,  
which cannot be proven by the machine, despite it being true. That's  
why the logic of provability (belief) split into a true part and an  
believable, or provable part.


But that is also why the Theaetetus definition works non trivially  
when we define knowledge by Bp & p (that is I know p is I can justify  
it, and it is the case that p). Bp & p implies trivially p, and in the  
arithmetical setting we do get the classical modal logic of knowledge,  
known as S4. Indeed we get S4 + a new "axiom":


S4 is

Know p -> p   (main axiom for knowledge)
Know p -> Know Know p  (self-awareness, or introspective axiom)
Know (p -> q) -> (Know p -> Know q)   (rational "omniscience", more  
used for "knowledgeable")


+ the logical inference rule (p/ know p).   All this on the top of the  
classical propositional logic.


In the arithmetical context, we inherit the following axioms, named  
after a formula of Grzegorczyk, Grz):


Know (Know (p-> Know p) -> p) -> p.

It introduces a sort of antisymmetry on the Kripke accessibility  
relations, and avoid circular structure (in the finite world case,  
when used together with the other axioms). But there are other  
semantics too.


Note that the Bp of G represent an arithmetical sentence (beweisbar  
('p'), with beweisbar defining provability in arithmetic, and 'p'  
being a representation in arithmetic of the sentence put for the  
proposition p). We have no choice in the modal logic, and Solovay  
provided the relevant completeness of G for the formal effective  
theories, which correspond to the rich ideally correct machines.


For Bp & p, we have no similar direct definition in arithmetic, but we  
can study them at the metalevel by modeling Bp & p for each individual  
instantiated sentences, so "I know 2+2 = 4" is, in arithmetic:  
beweisbar ('2+2=4') & 2 + 2 = 4.




moreover, I want to know S4Grz or be pointed towards an advanced  
level logic book so I can understand what that means.


S4Grz is quite well explained in Boolos 1979, and Boolos 1993.  
Together with the logics of self-reference G and G*. Known also as GL  
and GLS (Gödel, Löb, Solovay).


Boolos, G. (1979). The unprovability of consistency. Cambridge  
University Press, London.


Boolos, G. (1993). The Logic of Provability. Cambridge University  
Press, Cambridge.


A good book on Modal logic is the book by Chellas:

Chellas, B. F. (1980). Modal Logic, an introduction. Cambridge  
University Press, Cambridge.


To get matter from arithmetic, we need to add a consistency condition  
(so we get intelligible matter with Bp & Dt), and sensible matter with  
Bp & p & Dt. This gives quantum-like logic. It is an open, but well  
formulated problem to know if we get quantum computer from them, as we  
should, if we are machine, and if the classical theory of knowledge is  
correct, by the UD Argument.


This is explained (concisely, with reference) in the sane04 paper:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html




Finally, as a simple confirmation, I do assume that when you guys  
talk about Bp & p you mean the literal proposition "someone believes  
p & it is the case that it is p" --


OK.



if I don't get at least that, I should hang up my hat around here!


No worry :)

Best,

Bruno


On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:56:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 12 Feb 2013, at 20:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:

When we talk abou

Re: Does p make sense?

[freqflyer07281972]

Dear Bruno, 

I would like to know what 'doxastic models of consciousness' means, as well 
as what means "S4Grz" - I know Craig was the one who originally used the 
term 'doxastic models' but you seemed to know right away what that meant, 
so I'd like to know from your perspective what it means; moreover, I want 
to know S4Grz or be pointed towards an advanced level logic book so I can 
understand what that means. 

Finally, as a simple confirmation, I do assume that when you guys talk 
about Bp & p you mean the literal proposition "someone believes p & it is 
the case that it is p" -- if I don't get at least that, I should hang up my 
hat around here!

Cheers,

Dan

On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:56:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Feb 2013, at 20:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making 
> an assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a 
> proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group 
> of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) 
>
>
> ?
>
>
>
> which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no 
> given condition in actual experience. 
>
>
> That's why we put Bp & p. To get the condition of 1p experience. It works 
> as we get a non nameable, and non formalisable notion of knowledge. S4 and 
> S4Grz do succeed in meta-formalizing a thoroughly non formalisable notion. 
>
>
>
>
> All experiences are contingent upon what the experiencer is capable of 
> receiving or interacting with.
>
> Any proposition that can be named relies on some pre-existing context 
> (which is sensed or makes sense). 
>
> The problem with applying Doxastic models to consciousness is not only 
> that it amputates the foundations of awareness,
>
>
>
> It does not for the reason above. Note that even Bp & p can lead to 
> falsity, in principle. Things get more complex when you add the non 
> monotonic layers, that we need for natural languages and for the mundane 
> type of belief or knowledge. Here, of course, with the goal of deriving the 
> correct physical laws; it is simpler to consider the case of ideally 
> correct machine, for which us, but not the machine itself can know the 
> equivalence.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> but that the fact of the amputation will be hidden by the results. In 
> Baudrillard's terms, this is a stage 3 simulacrum, (stage one = a true 
> reflection, stage two = a perversion of the truth, stage three = a 
> perversion which pretends not to be a perversion).
>
> The third stage masks the absence of a profound reality, where the 
>> simulacrum *pretends* to be a faithful copy, but it is a copy with no 
>> original. Signs and images claim to represent something real, but no 
>> representation is taking place and arbitrary images are merely suggested as 
>> things which they have no relationship to. Baudrillard calls this the 
>> "order of sorcery", a regime of 
>> semanticalgebra where all human 
>> meaning is conjured artificially to appear as a 
>> reference to the (increasingly) hermetic truth.
>>
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulacra_and_Simulation
>
> This is made more important by the understanding that sense or awareness 
> is the source of authenticity itself. This means that there can be no 
> tolerance for any stage of simulation beyond 1. In my hypotheses, I am 
> always trying to get at the 1 stage for that reason, because consciousness 
> or experience, by definition, has no substitute.
>
> Craig 
>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
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> .
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> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>  
>  
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Does p make sense?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2013, at 17:01, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 2/14/2013 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:08, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 2/13/2013 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we  
are making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look  
closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really  
nothing but a group
of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which  
we are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no  
given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are  
contingent upon what

the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.

I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree  
with you

that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.

I'm happy for Bp&  p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to  
scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too  
far.


But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify  
Theatetus :(.



Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.


Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal  
logic S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger  
logic S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knower  
unnameable and close to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "inner  
God".




As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes'  
as in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental.  Hence he  
argued that the belief must be causally connected to the fact  
of the proposition in order to count as knowledge.


We have already discussed this.  Edmund Gettier seems to accept  
a notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in  
comp, nor in platonism.


From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem we read:

"A Gettier problem is any one of a category of thought experiments  
in contemporary epistemology that seem torepudiate a  
definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). The  
category of problem owes its name to a three-page paper published  
in 1963, by Edmund Gettier, called "Is Justified True Belief  
Knowledge?". In it, Gettier proposed two scenarios where the three  
criteria (justification, truth, and belief) seemed to be met, but  
where the majority of readers would not have felt that the result  
was knowledge due to the element of luck involved."


Bruno's notion involves betting, so luck is a factor! ;-)


Not with Bp & p. The betting is for observation, not knowledge.


Hi Bruno,

I don't understand the difference between knowledge and  
observation when considering 1p. Knowledge isn't just recollection  
of facts, it is always observation, event if purely internal  
experience of abstractions. I am aware of that I have knowledge of,  
especially when I am thinking of it.



Knowledge and observation can be related, but it is better to  
distinguish different notions. With comp and the naive Theaetetus,  
say, knowledge is given by Bp & p, and observation is given by the Bp  
& Dt. And feeling is given by Bp & Dt & p.
This gives an intuitionist epistemic logic for the first person  
knowledge, with an antisymmetrical knowledge state evolution. Bp & Dt  
( & p) gives, for observation, at the "*" level, a symmetrical  
structures, with a quantum like quasi orthomodular structure. It  
provides steps toward having the arithmetical frame to get a Gleason- 
like theorem, to solve the measure problem, in the way UDA explains to  
do.


With comp, a physical proposition is a true sigma_1 proposition  
pondered by the frequence of its proof in the universal dovetailing  
(UD*), or equivalently, in arithmetic. That follows from the global 1p  
indeterminacy, on UD*.


p is arithmetical truth. You can see it as Dennett intentional stance  
toward the set of the Gödel numbers of the true proposition, true in  
the standard model of Peano Arithmetic.  Comp will explain notably why  
we cannot define that standard model. p plays the role of Plotinus' one.


Bp is a statement made by some number relatively to some universal  
number. It plays the role of Plotinus' discursive reasoner, or  
'man' (that includes woman, as it is the generic term). Here it is the  
3p, finitely describable machine, or its Gödel number, programs, etc.  
It is the 3p duplicable entity you can bet on.


Bp & p, is simply the same statement made in the case of p. It  
restrict the prover or justifier to truth, in a non necessary  
constructive way. The intensional interpretation of p can be given by  
the set of worlds, or of computations, satisfying (in some sense) p.  
Or p can represent some actual truth in this actual

Re: Does p make sense?

[Stephen P. King]

On 2/14/2013 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:08, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 2/13/2013 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we 
are making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look 
closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing 
but a group
of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we 
are

arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent 
upon what

the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.


I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.

I'm happy for Bp&  p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.

But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify 
Theatetus :(.



Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.


Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic 
S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic 
S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knower unnameable 
and close to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "inner God".




As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as 
in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental.  Hence he argued 
that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the 
proposition in order to count as knowledge.


We have already discussed this.  Edmund Gettier seems to accept a 
notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor 
in platonism. 


From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem we read:

"A Gettier problem is any one of a category of thought experiments in 
contemporary epistemology that seem to repudiate a definition of 
knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). The category of problem 
owes its name to a three-page paper published in 1963, by Edmund 
Gettier, called "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". In it, Gettier 
proposed two scenarios where the three criteria (justification, 
truth, and belief) seemed to be met, but where the majority of 
readers would not have felt that the result was knowledge due to the 
element of luck involved."


Bruno's notion involves betting, so luck is a factor! ;-)


Not with Bp & p. The betting is for observation, not knowledge.


Hi Bruno,

I don't understand the difference between knowledge and observation 
when considering 1p. Knowledge isn't just recollection of facts, it is 
always observation, event if purely internal experience of abstractions. 
I am aware of that I have knowledge of, especially when I am thinking of 
it.



The betting is handled with Bp & Dt & p. Somehow, we impose the 
consistency: that is, for machine talking first person logic, the 
existence of at least one reality (Dt).


(By Gödel's completeness theorem (not incompleteness !) we have that 
Dt is true iff "B" has a model (a mathematical reality "satisfying" 
his beliefs)). Bp & Dt (& p) makes p true in all the accessible 
realities in the neighborhood, so the "p" has measure one, and the 
corresponding logic is the logic of the "probability" one.


Bruno




--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Does p make sense?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:08, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 2/13/2013 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we  
are making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look  
closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing  
but a group
of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which  
we are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no  
given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent  
upon what

the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.

I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with  
you

that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.

I'm happy for Bp&  p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to  
scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too  
far.


But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify  
Theatetus :(.



Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.


Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal  
logic S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic  
S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knower  
unnameable and close to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "inner  
God".




As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes'  
as in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental.  Hence he  
argued that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of  
the proposition in order to count as knowledge.


We have already discussed this.  Edmund Gettier seems to accept a  
notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp,  
nor in platonism.


From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem we read:

"A Gettier problem is any one of a category of thought experiments  
in contemporary epistemology that seem to repudiate a definition of  
knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). The category of problem  
owes its name to a three-page paper published in 1963, by Edmund  
Gettier, called "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". In it,  
Gettier proposed two scenarios where the three criteria  
(justification, truth, and belief) seemed to be met, but where the  
majority of readers would not have felt that the result was  
knowledge due to the element of luck involved."


Bruno's notion involves betting, so luck is a factor! ;-)


Not with Bp & p. The betting is for observation, not knowledge. The  
betting is handled with Bp & Dt & p. Somehow, we impose the  
consistency: that is, for machine talking first person logic, the  
existence of at least one reality (Dt).


(By Gödel's completeness theorem (not incompleteness !) we have that  
Dt is true iff "B" has a model (a mathematical reality "satisfying"  
his beliefs)). Bp & Dt (& p) makes p true in all the accessible  
realities in the neighborhood, so the "p" has measure one, and the  
corresponding logic is the logic of the "probability" one.


Bruno






I don't know what notion of knowledge he accepts, but he rejects  
accidental beliefs that happen to be true.  The example he gives is  
Bob and Bill work together.  Bob knows that Bill has gone to pick  
up a new car he bought.  He sees Bill drive a new blue car into the  
parking lot and concludes that the car Bill bought is blue.  In  
fact it is blue, but it wasn't ready and so the dealer gave Bill a  
blue loaner to drive that day.  So does Bob know that Bill bought a  
blue car, or does he only believe, truly that he did?


From my reflection about the dream-argument, it probably means  
that Gettier believes that we can know things for sure


I don't think that follows that all.  Even a causally connected  
belief can be false.  The problem is in explicating what  
constitutes 'causally connected' in complicated cases.


WTF is a "causally connected belief "? I see something related  
to the idea in this paper but Causality is a concept that is on  
intimate terms with Time. No?




Brent

and communicate them as such, making him believe implicitly, at  
least, that we can know that we are awake, or that our  
communicable knowledge is secure, but with comp that is  
impossible. With comp we can be sure of our consciousness only,  
but that knowledge is typically not communicable.


And the belief does not need to be accidental, and hopefully (but  
only hopefully) is not. And it is never accidental for the ideal  
case of simpler machine than us, that we need to study to get the  
physics (quanta and qualia) from the numbers relations.


Bruno



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Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Does p make sense?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2013, at 21:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:56:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 12 Feb 2013, at 20:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:

When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are  
making an assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we  
look closely, a proposition can only be another level of B. p is  
really nothing but a group of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically  
nested as B^n)


?

If I understand it correctly:

If Bp = 'The belief that China is in Asia',


With that example, p is for the fact that China is in Asia.





then p = 'China is in Asia'.


No. It is that China is in Asia. p represents some truth (or falsity),  
like 2+3 =6. It  does not represent some sentence used for referring  
to that fact. If we could define a truth predicate, it would be  
equivalent with TRUE('p'). But such truth predicate does not exist, so  
we use the sentence itself, to denote the fact.






What I'm saying is that "p" is really hundreds of millions of  
experiences in which the location of China is referenced, visually,  
verbally, cognitively.


I do not use it in that sense.



The p is the inertia of those implicit memories, balanced against  
the absence of any counterfactual experiences. Each one of those  
memories, thoughts, and images is itself a lower level 'Bp'. I might  
imagine a composite image of a generic world map in my mind, where  
China is represented as a green bulge in Asia. That image is a Bp:  
'China is shaped like this (China shape) and is part of the shape  
called Asia'. There is no objective p condition of China being in  
Asia which is independent of all experiences. It is the Bp  
experiences, direct and indirect, of China and Asia which define  
every possible p about China being in Asia.


?





which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but  
there is no given condition in actual experience.


That's why we put Bp & p. To get the condition of 1p experience. It  
works as we get a non nameable, and non formalisable notion of  
knowledge. S4 and S4Grz do succeed in meta-formalizing a thoroughly  
non formalisable notion.


I don't know what that means. If notions are non nameable and non  
formalisable, it doesn't have to mean that they are all the same  
notion.


It means that when we apply the definition of knowledge given by  
Theaetetus, we get a modal logic of knowledge, and more, it verifies  
some property accepted for Plotinus' "inner God" or "universal soul".  
In particular, that "first person notion is not a 3p-machine.








All experiences are contingent upon what the experiencer is capable  
of receiving or interacting with.


Any proposition that can be named relies on some pre-existing  
context (which is sensed or makes sense).


The problem with applying Doxastic models to consciousness is not  
only that it amputates the foundations of awareness,



It does not for the reason above. Note that even Bp & p can lead to  
falsity, in principle. Things get more complex when you add the non  
monotonic layers, that we need for natural languages and for the  
mundane type of belief or knowledge. Here, of course, with the goal  
of deriving the correct physical laws; it is simpler to consider the  
case of ideally correct machine, for which us, but not the machine  
itself can know the equivalence.


?


You might try to understand UDA before trying to see how the antic  
knowledge notions can translate UDA in arithmetic, and be used to  
recover physics, in the way UDA asks us to proceed.


"Bp & p" has certainly major defect for human knowledge, but to derive  
physics we need only the case of ideally arithmetically-correct  
machine, as we search the universal comp-correct physics, not some  
human non correct physics.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Does p make sense?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:46, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we  
are making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look  
closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing  
but a group
of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we  
are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no  
given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent  
upon what

the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.


I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.

I'm happy for Bp&  p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.

But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify  
Theatetus :(.



Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.


Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic  
S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic  
S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knower unnameable  
and close to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "inner God".




As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as  
in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental.  Hence he argued  
that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the  
proposition in order to count as knowledge.


We have already discussed this.  Edmund Gettier seems to accept a  
notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor  
in platonism.


I don't know what notion of knowledge he accepts, but he rejects  
accidental beliefs that happen to be true.


So we might agree. I don't see how any belief can be accidental in  
comp, given that a (rational) belief is defined by what a machine can  
assert for logical reason. That's the B part of Bp (& p).





The example he gives is Bob and Bill work together.  Bob knows that  
Bill has gone to pick up a new car he bought.  He sees Bill drive a  
new blue car into the parking lot and concludes that the car Bill  
bought is blue.  In fact it is blue, but it wasn't ready and so the  
dealer gave Bill a blue loaner to drive that day.  So does Bob know  
that Bill bought a blue car, or does he only believe, truly that he  
did?


He believes wrongly. That distinction is important for the study of  
natural languages, but not for the theology and physics. I avoid that  
problem by restricting myself to ideally correct machines, where the  
important distonction is between Bp and Bp & p, with Bp implying p at  
the meta-level (G*).






From my reflection about the dream-argument, it probably means that  
Gettier believes that we can know things for sure


I don't think that follows that all.  Even a causally connected  
belief can be false.  The problem is in explicating what constitutes  
'causally connected' in complicated cases.


OK. In comp "causally" is a very high level feature, not something  
which can be explained by the physical realm, which emerges from the  
low levels. In the low level we don't need causality. Implication is  
enough.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Does p make sense?

[Stephen P. King]

On 2/13/2013 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are 
making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look 
closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing 
but a group

of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent 
upon what

the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.


I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.

I'm happy for Bp&  p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.

But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify 
Theatetus :(.



Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.


Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic 
S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic S4Grz1, 
and it works very well. It even makes the knower unnameable and close 
to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "inner God".




As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as 
in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental.  Hence he argued 
that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the 
proposition in order to count as knowledge.


We have already discussed this.  Edmund Gettier seems to accept a 
notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor 
in platonism. 


From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem we read:

"A Gettier problem is any one of a category of thought experiments in 
contemporary epistemology that seem to repudiate a definition of 
knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). The category of problem owes 
its name to a three-page paper published in 1963, by Edmund Gettier, 
called "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". In it, Gettier proposed 
two scenarios where the three criteria (justification, truth, and 
belief) seemed to be met, but where the majority of readers would not 
have felt that the result was knowledge due to the element of luck 
involved."


Bruno's notion involves betting, so luck is a factor! ;-)



I don't know what notion of knowledge he accepts, but he rejects 
accidental beliefs that happen to be true.  The example he gives is 
Bob and Bill work together.  Bob knows that Bill has gone to pick up a 
new car he bought.  He sees Bill drive a new blue car into the parking 
lot and concludes that the car Bill bought is blue.  In fact it is 
blue, but it wasn't ready and so the dealer gave Bill a blue loaner to 
drive that day.  So does Bob know that Bill bought a blue car, or does 
he only believe, truly that he did?


From my reflection about the dream-argument, it probably means that 
Gettier believes that we can know things for sure 


I don't think that follows that all.  Even a causally connected belief 
can be false.  The problem is in explicating what constitutes 
'causally connected' in complicated cases.


WTF is a "causally connected belief "? I see something related to 
the idea in this paper 
 
but Causality is a concept that is on intimate terms with Time. No?




Brent

and communicate them as such, making him believe implicitly, at 
least, that we can know that we are awake, or that our communicable 
knowledge is secure, but with comp that is impossible. With comp we 
can be sure of our consciousness only, but that knowledge is 
typically not communicable.


And the belief does not need to be accidental, and hopefully (but 
only hopefully) is not. And it is never accidental for the ideal case 
of simpler machine than us, that we need to study to get the physics 
(quanta and qualia) from the numbers relations.


Bruno



--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Does p make sense?

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:56:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Feb 2013, at 20:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making 
> an assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a 
> proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group 
> of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) 
>
>
> ?
>

If I understand it correctly:

If Bp = 'The belief that China is in Asia', 
then p = 'China is in Asia'. 

What I'm saying is that "p" is really hundreds of millions of experiences 
in which the location of China is referenced, visually, verbally, 
cognitively. The p is the inertia of those implicit memories, balanced 
against the absence of any counterfactual experiences. Each one of those 
memories, thoughts, and images is itself a lower level 'Bp'. I might 
imagine a composite image of a generic world map in my mind, where China is 
represented as a green bulge in Asia. That image is a Bp: 'China is shaped 
like this (China shape) and is part of the shape called Asia'. There is no 
objective p condition of China being in Asia which is independent of all 
experiences. It is the Bp experiences, direct and indirect, of China and 
Asia which define every possible p about China being in Asia.


which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no 
given condition in actual experience. 


That's why we put Bp & p. To get the condition of 1p experience. It works 
as we get a non nameable, and non formalisable notion of knowledge. S4 and 
S4Grz do succeed in meta-formalizing a thoroughly non formalisable notion. 

I don't know what that means. If notions are non nameable and non 
formalisable, it doesn't have to mean that they are all the same notion.



All experiences are contingent upon what the experiencer is capable of 
receiving or interacting with.

Any proposition that can be named relies on some pre-existing context 
(which is sensed or makes sense). 

The problem with applying Doxastic models to consciousness is not only that 
it amputates the foundations of awareness,



It does not for the reason above. Note that even Bp & p can lead to 
falsity, in principle. Things get more complex when you add the non 
monotonic layers, that we need for natural languages and for the mundane 
type of belief or knowledge. Here, of course, with the goal of deriving the 
correct physical laws; it is simpler to consider the case of ideally 
correct machine, for which us, but not the machine itself can know the 
equivalence.

?

Craig
Bruno



but that the fact of the amputation will be hidden by the results. In 
Baudrillard's terms, this is a stage 3 simulacrum, (stage one = a true 
reflection, stage two = a perversion of the truth, stage three = a 
perversion which pretends not to be a perversion).

The third stage masks the absence of a profound reality, where the 
> simulacrum *pretends* to be a faithful copy, but it is a copy with no 
> original. Signs and images claim to represent something real, but no 
> representation is taking place and arbitrary images are merely suggested as 
> things which they have no relationship to. Baudrillard calls this the 
> "order of sorcery", a regime of 
> semanticalgebra where all human 
> meaning is conjured artificially to appear as a 
> reference to the (increasingly) hermetic truth.
>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulacra_and_Simulation

This is made more important by the understanding that sense or awareness is 
the source of authenticity itself. This means that there can be no 
tolerance for any stage of simulation beyond 1. In my hypotheses, I am 
always trying to get at the 1 stage for that reason, because consciousness 
or experience, by definition, has no substitute.

Craig 

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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Does p make sense?

[meekerdb]

On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:

When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group
of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon what
the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.


I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.

I'm happy for Bp&  p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.

But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify Theatetus :(.



Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.


Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic S4), and in the comp 
context, we get the more stronger logic S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes 
the knower unnameable and close to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "inner God".




As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as in non-mathematical 
discourse, can be accidental.  Hence he argued that the belief must be causally 
connected to the fact of the proposition in order to count as knowledge.


We have already discussed this.  Edmund Gettier seems to accept a notion of knowledge 
which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor in platonism. 


I don't know what notion of knowledge he accepts, but he rejects accidental beliefs that 
happen to be true.  The example he gives is Bob and Bill work together.  Bob knows that 
Bill has gone to pick up a new car he bought.  He sees Bill drive a new blue car into the 
parking lot and concludes that the car Bill bought is blue.  In fact it is blue, but it 
wasn't ready and so the dealer gave Bill a blue loaner to drive that day.  So does Bob 
know that Bill bought a blue car, or does he only believe, truly that he did?


From my reflection about the dream-argument, it probably means that Gettier believes 
that we can know things for sure 


I don't think that follows that all.  Even a causally connected belief can be false.  The 
problem is in explicating what constitutes 'causally connected' in complicated cases.


Brent

and communicate them as such, making him believe implicitly, at least, that we can know 
that we are awake, or that our communicable knowledge is secure, but with comp that is 
impossible. With comp we can be sure of our consciousness only, but that knowledge is 
typically not communicable.


And the belief does not need to be accidental, and hopefully (but only hopefully) is 
not. And it is never accidental for the ideal case of simpler machine than us, that we 
need to study to get the physics (quanta and qualia) from the numbers relations.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Does p make sense?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are  
making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look  
closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing  
but a group

of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent  
upon what

the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.


I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.

I'm happy for Bp&  p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.

But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify  
Theatetus :(.



Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.


Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic  
S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic S4Grz1,  
and it works very well. It even makes the knower unnameable and close  
to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "inner God".




As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as  
in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental.  Hence he argued  
that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the  
proposition in order to count as knowledge.


We have already discussed this.  Edmund Gettier seems to accept a  
notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor in  
platonism. From my reflection about the dream-argument, it probably  
means that Gettier believes that we can know things for sure and  
communicate them as such, making him believe implicitly, at least,  
that we can know that we are awake, or that our communicable knowledge  
is secure, but with comp that is impossible. With comp we can be sure  
of our consciousness only, but that knowledge is typically not  
communicable.


And the belief does not need to be accidental, and hopefully (but only  
hopefully) is not. And it is never accidental for the ideal case of  
simpler machine than us, that we need to study to get the physics  
(quanta and qualia) from the numbers relations.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Does p make sense?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Feb 2013, at 20:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:

When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are  
making an assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we  
look closely, a proposition can only be another level of B. p is  
really nothing but a group of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically  
nested as B^n)


?



which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there  
is no given condition in actual experience.


That's why we put Bp & p. To get the condition of 1p experience. It  
works as we get a non nameable, and non formalisable notion of  
knowledge. S4 and S4Grz do succeed in meta-formalizing a thoroughly  
non formalisable notion.





All experiences are contingent upon what the experiencer is capable  
of receiving or interacting with.


Any proposition that can be named relies on some pre-existing  
context (which is sensed or makes sense).


The problem with applying Doxastic models to consciousness is not  
only that it amputates the foundations of awareness,



It does not for the reason above. Note that even Bp & p can lead to  
falsity, in principle. Things get more complex when you add the non  
monotonic layers, that we need for natural languages and for the  
mundane type of belief or knowledge. Here, of course, with the goal of  
deriving the correct physical laws; it is simpler to consider the case  
of ideally correct machine, for which us, but not the machine itself  
can know the equivalence.


Bruno



but that the fact of the amputation will be hidden by the results.  
In Baudrillard's terms, this is a stage 3 simulacrum, (stage one = a  
true reflection, stage two = a perversion of the truth, stage three  
= a perversion which pretends not to be a perversion).


The third stage masks the absence of a profound reality, where the  
simulacrum pretends to be a faithful copy, but it is a copy with no  
original. Signs and images claim to represent something real, but no  
representation is taking place and arbitrary images are merely  
suggested as things which they have no relationship to. Baudrillard  
calls this the "order of sorcery", a regime of semantic algebra  
where all human meaning is conjured artificially to appear as a  
reference to the (increasingly) hermetic truth.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulacra_and_Simulation

This is made more important by the understanding that sense or  
awareness is the source of authenticity itself. This means that  
there can be no tolerance for any stage of simulation beyond 1. In  
my hypotheses, I am always trying to get at the 1 stage for that  
reason, because consciousness or experience, by definition, has no  
substitute.


Craig

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Re: Does p make sense?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2013, at 02:28, Russell Standish wrote:


On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are  
making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look  
closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but  
a group

of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon  
what

the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.



I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.


That is why I like to sum up Popper by "in Science there are only  
belief, never knowledge per se".
It is related to the modesty/Löbianity of the correct machines, and  
the fact that the genuine mystical machines are mute on their knowledge.
Unfortunately this leads to vocabulary problem (only) for some  
Popperians.






I'm happy for Bp & p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.


Well, actually it was a problem that Bp & p could work for Bp = "I  
prove p", because most scientists believe that this makes knowledge  
equivalent with belief or proof for/by the correct machine.


It takes some understanding of Gödel's theorem to realize that, even  
for the correct machine, and despite the fact that Bp is equivalent  
with Bp & p (prove the same arithmetical p), they obey different  
logics. So only G* proves Bp <-> Bp & p, the machine, nor G, can't  
prove that equivalence, and this makes Bp & p obeying a different  
logic (indeed the modal logic S4 defining the classical notion of  
knowledge).


A machine cannot prove that Bf is equivalent with Bf & f, without  
contradicting Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.







But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify  
Theatetus :(.


In "conscience and mécanisme" I argue in detail that the acceptance of  
the classical theory of knowledge (S4) which we get back by applying  
Theaetetus' definition of knowledge on Gödel's provability predicate)  
is the only one which can make sense of the "dream argument" in  
metaphysics.  We can know that we are dreaming, but we cannot know  
that we are awake, and that is a key to get the platonist idea that we  
might be in a sort of cave/matrix (in the digital setting).


Bruno





Cheers

--


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Does p make sense?

[meekerdb]

On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:

When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group
of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon what
the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.


I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.

I'm happy for Bp&  p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.

But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify Theatetus :(.



Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.  As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B 
stands for 'believes' as in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental.  Hence he 
argued that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the proposition in order 
to count as knowledge.


Brent

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Re: Does p make sense?

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 8:28:24 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making 
> an 
> > assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a 
> > proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a 
> group 
> > of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are 
> > arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given 
> > condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon what 
> > the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with. 
> > 
>
> I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you 
> that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me 
> uncomfortable, post Popper. 
>
> I'm happy for Bp & p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B 
> semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific 
> knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far. 
>

I agree - for mathematical knowledge, I have no problem with it.  

>
> But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify Theatetus :(. 
>

It may not have to be modified, but if we apply it to anything with true 1p 
subjectivity, I think p could be redefined in the what that I was trying to 
propose, i.e. instead of p, there is a logarithmic scale of B (i.e. beliefs 
are a perception of a set of perceptions), then B and p are understood to 
be relativistic measures of sense-of-sense corroboration.  

Craig

PS With the Simulacrum stuff I was saying that it's bad juju to sneak 
simulation of any kind into our understanding of consciousness. 


> Cheers 
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: Does p make sense?

[Russell Standish]

On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an 
> assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a 
> proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group 
> of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are 
> arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given 
> condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon what 
> the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.
> 

I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.

I'm happy for Bp & p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.

But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify Theatetus :(.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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