Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 2, 2013 11:54:34 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 02 May 2013, at 17:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, May 2, 2013 4:39:43 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 01 May 2013, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, May 1, 2013 10:49:11 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 30 Apr 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 10:31:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 24 Apr 2013, at 15:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:50:07 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels 
 constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't do 
 that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually 
 multiplied by 
 number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so in reality the 
 can't 
 be conscious of a full picture, not even of the full color at a single 
 pixel.
>>>
>>>
>>>   
>>>
>>
>> He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese room.  
>> He is conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous to rule 
>> follower in Chinese room) with what the program can know.  Consider the 
>> program of a neural network: it can be processed by a sequentially 
>> operating CPU processing one connection at a time, but the simulated 
>> network itself can see any arbitrary number of inputs at once.
>>
>> How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only 
>> see a single pixel at a time?
>>
>
> Who says OCR software can recognize letters? All that it needs to do 
> is execute some algorithm sequentially and blindly against a table of 
> expected values. There need not be any recognition of the character as a 
> character at at all, let alone any "seeing". A program could convert a 
> Word 
> document into an input file for an OCR program without there ever being 
> any 
> optical activity - no camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at 
> all. 
> Completely in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into 
> the bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.
>
> Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point 
> out that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is 
> accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts. 
>
>
> Searle might be right on non-comp, but his argument has been shown 
> invalid by many.
>

 I'm surprised that you would try to pass that off as truth Bruno. You 
 have so much tolerance for doubt and uncertainty, yet you claim that it 
 "has been shown invalid". In whose opinion?


 It is not an opinion, it is a fact that you can verify if patient 
 enough. The refutation is already in Dennet and Hofstadter "Mind's I " 
 book. Searle concludes that the man in the room is not understanding 
 chinese, and that is right, but that can not refute comp, as the man in 
 the 
 room plays the role of a CPU, and not of the high level program on which 
 the consciousness of the chinese guy supervene. It is a simple confusion 
 of 
 level.

>>>
>>> The high level program is just a case-by-case syntactic handler though. 
>>> It's not high level, it's just a big lookup table. There is no confusion of 
>>> level. Neither the Chinese Room as whole, the book, nor the guy passing 
>>> messages and reading the book understand Chinese at all. The person who 
>>> understood Chinese and wrote the book is dead. 
>>>
>>> The kind of reasoning that you (and Dennett and Hofstadter) are using 
>>> would say that someone who is color blind is not impaired if they memorize 
>>> the answers to a color vision test. If I can retake the test as many times 
>>> as I want, and I can know which answers I get wrong, I don't even need to 
>>> cheat or get lucky. I can compute the correct answers as if I could see 
>>> color in spite of my complete color blindness.
>>>
>>> What you are saying is circular. You assume that the Chinese guy who 
>>> wrote the book is running on a program, but if you knew that was the case, 
>>> then there would be no point in the thought experiment. You don't know that 
>>> at all though, and the Chinese Room shows why computation need only be 
>>> performed on one level and never leads to understanding on any others.
>>>
>>>
>>> I am not sure I can help you. You confuse the levels. You don't really 
>>> try to understand th

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 May 2013, at 17:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, May 2, 2013 4:39:43 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 May 2013, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, May 1, 2013 10:49:11 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 Apr 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 10:31:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Apr 2013, at 15:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:50:07 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:



On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg  
 wrote:



"If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of  
pixels constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a  
computer can't do that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64  
pixels, eventually multiplied by number of kernels, but it see  
them as single bit's so in reality the can't be conscious of a  
full picture, not even of the full color at a single pixel.




He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese  
room.  He is conflating what the CPU can see at one time  
(analogous to rule follower in Chinese room) with what the  
program can know.  Consider the program of a neural network: it  
can be processed by a sequentially operating CPU processing one  
connection at a time, but the simulated network itself can see  
any arbitrary number of inputs at once.


How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can  
only see a single pixel at a time?


Who says OCR software can recognize letters? All that it needs  
to do is execute some algorithm sequentially and blindly against  
a table of expected values. There need not be any recognition of  
the character as a character at at all, let alone any "seeing".  
A program could convert a Word document into an input file for  
an OCR program without there ever being any optical activity -  
no camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all.  
Completely in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be  
converted into the bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto,  
invisible optics.


Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to  
point out that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic  
function which is accomplished with no need for understanding of  
larger contexts.


Searle might be right on non-comp, but his argument has been  
shown invalid by many.


I'm surprised that you would try to pass that off as truth Bruno.  
You have so much tolerance for doubt and uncertainty, yet you  
claim that it "has been shown invalid". In whose opinion?


It is not an opinion, it is a fact that you can verify if patient  
enough. The refutation is already in Dennet and Hofstadter "Mind's  
I " book. Searle concludes that the man in the room is not  
understanding chinese, and that is right, but that can not refute  
comp, as the man in the room plays the role of a CPU, and not of  
the high level program on which the consciousness of the chinese  
guy supervene. It is a simple confusion of level.


The high level program is just a case-by-case syntactic handler  
though. It's not high level, it's just a big lookup table. There  
is no confusion of level. Neither the Chinese Room as whole, the  
book, nor the guy passing messages and reading the book understand  
Chinese at all. The person who understood Chinese and wrote the  
book is dead.


The kind of reasoning that you (and Dennett and Hofstadter) are  
using would say that someone who is color blind is not impaired if  
they memorize the answers to a color vision test. If I can retake  
the test as many times as I want, and I can know which answers I  
get wrong, I don't even need to cheat or get lucky. I can compute  
the correct answers as if I could see color in spite of my  
complete color blindness.


What you are saying is circular. You assume that the Chinese guy  
who wrote the book is running on a program, but if you knew that  
was the case, then there would be no point in the thought  
experiment. You don't know that at all though, and the Chinese  
Room shows why computation need only be performed on one level and  
never leads to understanding on any others.


I am not sure I can help you. You confuse the levels. You don't  
really try to understand the point, which would mean that you talk  
like if you knew that comp is false.


I don't expect you to help me, I'm trying to help you.


Of course. But what helps me is reasoning, not personal conviction.

Consciousness cannot be accessed by reasoning, since reason is an  
experience within human consciousness.


You are entirely right on this.

But to communicate with others, even on consciousness, or on line and  
points, or galaxies or gods, we can only agree on principles and  
reason from that.











I don't know that comp is false, but I know that if it isn't it  
won't be because of the reasons you are suggesting. Comp may be 

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 2, 2013 4:39:43 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 01 May 2013, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 1, 2013 10:49:11 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 Apr 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 10:31:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Apr 2013, at 15:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:50:07 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> "If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels 
>>> constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't do 
>>> that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually 
>>> multiplied by 
>>> number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so in reality the 
>>> can't 
>>> be conscious of a full picture, not even of the full color at a single 
>>> pixel.
>>
>>
>>   
>>
>
> He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese room.  
> He is conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous to rule 
> follower in Chinese room) with what the program can know.  Consider the 
> program of a neural network: it can be processed by a sequentially 
> operating CPU processing one connection at a time, but the simulated 
> network itself can see any arbitrary number of inputs at once.
>
> How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only 
> see a single pixel at a time?
>

 Who says OCR software can recognize letters? All that it needs to do is 
 execute some algorithm sequentially and blindly against a table of 
 expected 
 values. There need not be any recognition of the character as a character 
 at at all, let alone any "seeing". A program could convert a Word document 
 into an input file for an OCR program without there ever being any optical 
 activity - no camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all. 
 Completely in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into 
 the bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.

 Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point 
 out that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is 
 accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts. 


 Searle might be right on non-comp, but his argument has been shown 
 invalid by many.

>>>
>>> I'm surprised that you would try to pass that off as truth Bruno. You 
>>> have so much tolerance for doubt and uncertainty, yet you claim that it 
>>> "has been shown invalid". In whose opinion?
>>>
>>>
>>> It is not an opinion, it is a fact that you can verify if patient 
>>> enough. The refutation is already in Dennet and Hofstadter "Mind's I " 
>>> book. Searle concludes that the man in the room is not understanding 
>>> chinese, and that is right, but that can not refute comp, as the man in the 
>>> room plays the role of a CPU, and not of the high level program on which 
>>> the consciousness of the chinese guy supervene. It is a simple confusion of 
>>> level.
>>>
>>
>> The high level program is just a case-by-case syntactic handler though. 
>> It's not high level, it's just a big lookup table. There is no confusion of 
>> level. Neither the Chinese Room as whole, the book, nor the guy passing 
>> messages and reading the book understand Chinese at all. The person who 
>> understood Chinese and wrote the book is dead. 
>>
>> The kind of reasoning that you (and Dennett and Hofstadter) are using 
>> would say that someone who is color blind is not impaired if they memorize 
>> the answers to a color vision test. If I can retake the test as many times 
>> as I want, and I can know which answers I get wrong, I don't even need to 
>> cheat or get lucky. I can compute the correct answers as if I could see 
>> color in spite of my complete color blindness.
>>
>> What you are saying is circular. You assume that the Chinese guy who 
>> wrote the book is running on a program, but if you knew that was the case, 
>> then there would be no point in the thought experiment. You don't know that 
>> at all though, and the Chinese Room shows why computation need only be 
>> performed on one level and never leads to understanding on any others.
>>
>>
>> I am not sure I can help you. You confuse the levels. You don't really 
>> try to understand the point, which would mean that you talk like if you 
>> knew that comp is false. 
>>
>
> I don't expect you to help me, I'm trying to help you. 
>
>
> Of course. But what helps me is reasoning, not personal conviction. 
>

Consciousness cannot be accessed by reasoning, since 

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 May 2013, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, May 1, 2013 10:49:11 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 Apr 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 10:31:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Apr 2013, at 15:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:50:07 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:



On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg  
 wrote:



"If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of  
pixels constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a  
computer can't do that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64  
pixels, eventually multiplied by number of kernels, but it see  
them as single bit's so in reality the can't be conscious of a  
full picture, not even of the full color at a single pixel.




He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese  
room.  He is conflating what the CPU can see at one time  
(analogous to rule follower in Chinese room) with what the  
program can know.  Consider the program of a neural network: it  
can be processed by a sequentially operating CPU processing one  
connection at a time, but the simulated network itself can see  
any arbitrary number of inputs at once.


How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can  
only see a single pixel at a time?


Who says OCR software can recognize letters? All that it needs to  
do is execute some algorithm sequentially and blindly against a  
table of expected values. There need not be any recognition of  
the character as a character at at all, let alone any "seeing". A  
program could convert a Word document into an input file for an  
OCR program without there ever being any optical activity - no  
camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all. Completely  
in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into  
the bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.


Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to  
point out that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function  
which is accomplished with no need for understanding of larger  
contexts.


Searle might be right on non-comp, but his argument has been shown  
invalid by many.


I'm surprised that you would try to pass that off as truth Bruno.  
You have so much tolerance for doubt and uncertainty, yet you  
claim that it "has been shown invalid". In whose opinion?


It is not an opinion, it is a fact that you can verify if patient  
enough. The refutation is already in Dennet and Hofstadter "Mind's  
I " book. Searle concludes that the man in the room is not  
understanding chinese, and that is right, but that can not refute  
comp, as the man in the room plays the role of a CPU, and not of  
the high level program on which the consciousness of the chinese  
guy supervene. It is a simple confusion of level.


The high level program is just a case-by-case syntactic handler  
though. It's not high level, it's just a big lookup table. There is  
no confusion of level. Neither the Chinese Room as whole, the book,  
nor the guy passing messages and reading the book understand  
Chinese at all. The person who understood Chinese and wrote the  
book is dead.


The kind of reasoning that you (and Dennett and Hofstadter) are  
using would say that someone who is color blind is not impaired if  
they memorize the answers to a color vision test. If I can retake  
the test as many times as I want, and I can know which answers I  
get wrong, I don't even need to cheat or get lucky. I can compute  
the correct answers as if I could see color in spite of my complete  
color blindness.


What you are saying is circular. You assume that the Chinese guy  
who wrote the book is running on a program, but if you knew that  
was the case, then there would be no point in the thought  
experiment. You don't know that at all though, and the Chinese Room  
shows why computation need only be performed on one level and never  
leads to understanding on any others.


I am not sure I can help you. You confuse the levels. You don't  
really try to understand the point, which would mean that you talk  
like if you knew that comp is false.


I don't expect you to help me, I'm trying to help you.


Of course. But what helps me is reasoning, not personal conviction.



I don't know that comp is false, but I know that if it isn't it  
won't be because of the reasons you are suggesting. Comp may be true  
in theory, but none of the replies to the Chinese room are adequate,  
or even mildly compelling to me.


Searles confuse a program, and a universal program running that program.

















This page http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ is quite  
thorough, and lists the most well known Replies, yet it concludes:


"There continues to be significant disagreement about what  
processes create meaning,

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, May 1, 2013 10:49:11 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Apr 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 10:31:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Apr 2013, at 15:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:50:07 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:




 On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> "If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels 
>> constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't do 
>> that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually multiplied 
>> by 
>> number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so in reality the 
>> can't 
>> be conscious of a full picture, not even of the full color at a single 
>> pixel.
>
>
>   
>

 He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese room.  
 He is conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous to rule 
 follower in Chinese room) with what the program can know.  Consider the 
 program of a neural network: it can be processed by a sequentially 
 operating CPU processing one connection at a time, but the simulated 
 network itself can see any arbitrary number of inputs at once.

 How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only see 
 a single pixel at a time?

>>>
>>> Who says OCR software can recognize letters? All that it needs to do is 
>>> execute some algorithm sequentially and blindly against a table of expected 
>>> values. There need not be any recognition of the character as a character 
>>> at at all, let alone any "seeing". A program could convert a Word document 
>>> into an input file for an OCR program without there ever being any optical 
>>> activity - no camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all. 
>>> Completely in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into 
>>> the bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.
>>>
>>> Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point out 
>>> that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is 
>>> accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Searle might be right on non-comp, but his argument has been shown 
>>> invalid by many.
>>>
>>
>> I'm surprised that you would try to pass that off as truth Bruno. You 
>> have so much tolerance for doubt and uncertainty, yet you claim that it 
>> "has been shown invalid". In whose opinion?
>>
>>
>> It is not an opinion, it is a fact that you can verify if patient enough. 
>> The refutation is already in Dennet and Hofstadter "Mind's I " book. Searle 
>> concludes that the man in the room is not understanding chinese, and that 
>> is right, but that can not refute comp, as the man in the room plays the 
>> role of a CPU, and not of the high level program on which the consciousness 
>> of the chinese guy supervene. It is a simple confusion of level.
>>
>
> The high level program is just a case-by-case syntactic handler though. 
> It's not high level, it's just a big lookup table. There is no confusion of 
> level. Neither the Chinese Room as whole, the book, nor the guy passing 
> messages and reading the book understand Chinese at all. The person who 
> understood Chinese and wrote the book is dead. 
>
> The kind of reasoning that you (and Dennett and Hofstadter) are using 
> would say that someone who is color blind is not impaired if they memorize 
> the answers to a color vision test. If I can retake the test as many times 
> as I want, and I can know which answers I get wrong, I don't even need to 
> cheat or get lucky. I can compute the correct answers as if I could see 
> color in spite of my complete color blindness.
>
> What you are saying is circular. You assume that the Chinese guy who wrote 
> the book is running on a program, but if you knew that was the case, then 
> there would be no point in the thought experiment. You don't know that at 
> all though, and the Chinese Room shows why computation need only be 
> performed on one level and never leads to understanding on any others.
>
>
> I am not sure I can help you. You confuse the levels. You don't really try 
> to understand the point, which would mean that you talk like if you knew 
> that comp is false. 
>

I don't expect you to help me, I'm trying to help you. I don't know that 
comp is false, but I know that if it isn't it won't be because of the 
reasons you are suggesting. Comp may be true in theory, but none of the 
replies to the Chinese room are adequate, or even mildly compelling to me.
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> This page http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ is quite 
>> thorough, and lists the most well known

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Apr 2013, at 22:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:



It seems like there's nothing to bet on though. Comp is not really  
giving any guidance as to whether Comp itself is valid - it only  
shows that some machines believe it isn't, and that suggests that it  
is, and some machines see through that belief, and that somehow  
suggests that it is also. It's an unfalsifiable ideology.



Showing you miss the main point. I have try to explain it more than  
once, but you repeat over and over your simple negative affirmation,  
without ever given a clue why you think so, or answering the comments.


Some other comments you made contain rhetorical traps. I would lose my  
and your time in answering them.


I will wait for a theory, if ever you try to provide one. Words are  
not enough.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Apr 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 10:31:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Apr 2013, at 15:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:50:07 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:



On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg  
 wrote:



"If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of  
pixels constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a  
computer can't do that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64  
pixels, eventually multiplied by number of kernels, but it see  
them as single bit's so in reality the can't be conscious of a  
full picture, not even of the full color at a single pixel.




He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese  
room.  He is conflating what the CPU can see at one time  
(analogous to rule follower in Chinese room) with what the program  
can know.  Consider the program of a neural network: it can be  
processed by a sequentially operating CPU processing one  
connection at a time, but the simulated network itself can see any  
arbitrary number of inputs at once.


How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can  
only see a single pixel at a time?


Who says OCR software can recognize letters? All that it needs to  
do is execute some algorithm sequentially and blindly against a  
table of expected values. There need not be any recognition of the  
character as a character at at all, let alone any "seeing". A  
program could convert a Word document into an input file for an  
OCR program without there ever being any optical activity - no  
camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all. Completely  
in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into the  
bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.


Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to  
point out that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function  
which is accomplished with no need for understanding of larger  
contexts.


Searle might be right on non-comp, but his argument has been shown  
invalid by many.


I'm surprised that you would try to pass that off as truth Bruno.  
You have so much tolerance for doubt and uncertainty, yet you claim  
that it "has been shown invalid". In whose opinion?


It is not an opinion, it is a fact that you can verify if patient  
enough. The refutation is already in Dennet and Hofstadter "Mind's I  
" book. Searle concludes that the man in the room is not  
understanding chinese, and that is right, but that can not refute  
comp, as the man in the room plays the role of a CPU, and not of the  
high level program on which the consciousness of the chinese guy  
supervene. It is a simple confusion of level.


The high level program is just a case-by-case syntactic handler  
though. It's not high level, it's just a big lookup table. There is  
no confusion of level. Neither the Chinese Room as whole, the book,  
nor the guy passing messages and reading the book understand Chinese  
at all. The person who understood Chinese and wrote the book is dead.


The kind of reasoning that you (and Dennett and Hofstadter) are  
using would say that someone who is color blind is not impaired if  
they memorize the answers to a color vision test. If I can retake  
the test as many times as I want, and I can know which answers I get  
wrong, I don't even need to cheat or get lucky. I can compute the  
correct answers as if I could see color in spite of my complete  
color blindness.


What you are saying is circular. You assume that the Chinese guy who  
wrote the book is running on a program, but if you knew that was the  
case, then there would be no point in the thought experiment. You  
don't know that at all though, and the Chinese Room shows why  
computation need only be performed on one level and never leads to  
understanding on any others.


I am not sure I can help you. You confuse the levels. You don't really  
try to understand the point, which would mean that you talk like if  
you knew that comp is false.












This page http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ is quite  
thorough, and lists the most well known Replies, yet it concludes:


"There continues to be significant disagreement about what  
processes create meaning, understanding, and consciousness, as well  
as what can be proven a priori by thought experiments."


Thought experience are like proofs in math. Some are valid, some are  
not valid, some are fatally not valid, some can be corrected or made  
more precise. The debate often focuse on the truth of comp and non- 
comp, and that involves sometimes opinion. I don't really play that  
game.


Game? All it's saying is that there is no consensus as you claim.  
The fact that you claim a consensus to me smells like a major  
insecurity. Very much a 'pay no attention to the

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 10:31:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Apr 2013, at 15:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:50:07 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>


 "If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels 
> constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't do 
> that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually multiplied 
> by 
> number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so in reality the 
> can't 
> be conscious of a full picture, not even of the full color at a single 
> pixel.


   

>>>
>>> He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese room.  He 
>>> is conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous to rule follower 
>>> in Chinese room) with what the program can know.  Consider the program of a 
>>> neural network: it can be processed by a sequentially operating CPU 
>>> processing one connection at a time, but the simulated network itself can 
>>> see any arbitrary number of inputs at once.
>>>
>>> How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only see 
>>> a single pixel at a time?
>>>
>>
>> Who says OCR software can recognize letters? All that it needs to do is 
>> execute some algorithm sequentially and blindly against a table of expected 
>> values. There need not be any recognition of the character as a character 
>> at at all, let alone any "seeing". A program could convert a Word document 
>> into an input file for an OCR program without there ever being any optical 
>> activity - no camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all. 
>> Completely in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into 
>> the bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.
>>
>> Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point out 
>> that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is 
>> accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts. 
>>
>>
>> Searle might be right on non-comp, but his argument has been shown 
>> invalid by many.
>>
>
> I'm surprised that you would try to pass that off as truth Bruno. You have 
> so much tolerance for doubt and uncertainty, yet you claim that it "has 
> been shown invalid". In whose opinion?
>
>
> It is not an opinion, it is a fact that you can verify if patient enough. 
> The refutation is already in Dennet and Hofstadter "Mind's I " book. Searle 
> concludes that the man in the room is not understanding chinese, and that 
> is right, but that can not refute comp, as the man in the room plays the 
> role of a CPU, and not of the high level program on which the consciousness 
> of the chinese guy supervene. It is a simple confusion of level.
>

The high level program is just a case-by-case syntactic handler though. 
It's not high level, it's just a big lookup table. There is no confusion of 
level. Neither the Chinese Room as whole, the book, nor the guy passing 
messages and reading the book understand Chinese at all. The person who 
understood Chinese and wrote the book is dead. 

The kind of reasoning that you (and Dennett and Hofstadter) are using would 
say that someone who is color blind is not impaired if they memorize the 
answers to a color vision test. If I can retake the test as many times as I 
want, and I can know which answers I get wrong, I don't even need to cheat 
or get lucky. I can compute the correct answers as if I could see color in 
spite of my complete color blindness.

What you are saying is circular. You assume that the Chinese guy who wrote 
the book is running on a program, but if you knew that was the case, then 
there would be no point in the thought experiment. You don't know that at 
all though, and the Chinese Room shows why computation need only be 
performed on one level and never leads to understanding on any others.
 

>
>
>
>
> This page http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ is quite 
> thorough, and lists the most well known Replies, yet it concludes:
>
> "There continues to be significant disagreement about what processes 
> create meaning, understanding, and consciousness, as well as what can be 
> proven a priori by thought experiments."
>
>
> Thought experience are like proofs in math. Some are valid, some are not 
> valid, some are fatally not valid, some can be corrected or made more 
> precise. The debate often focuse on the truth of comp and non-comp, and 
> that involves sometimes opinion. I don't really play that game. 
>

Game? All it's saying is that there is no consensus as you claim. The fact 
that you claim a consensus to me smells like a major insecurity. Very much 
a 'pay no attention to the man behind the curtain' response.
 

>

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Apr 28, 2013 at 02:15:31PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> I know you like Robert Rosen, who asserted that Church Turing thesis
> is false, but he has not convinced me at all on this.
> 

Where did he assert this? Admittedly, I haven't read all his works,
mainly just "What is life?", but I thought his main thesis was that
living systems could be distinguished from computation by virtue of it
being closed under efficient causation (which computations aren't).


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Apr 2013, at 17:10, John Mikes wrote:


Dear Stathis and Bruno,
Stathis' reply is commendable, with one excessive word:
   "  r e a l ".  I asked Bruno several times to 'identify' the term  
'number' in common-sense language.
So far I did not understand such (my mistake?) I still hold  
'numbers' as the product of human thinking which cannot be  
retrospect to the basis of brain-function.
(Unless we consider BRAIN as the tissue-organ in our skull,  
executing technical steps for our "mentality" - whatever that may be.



Well, we usually consider the brain to be the tissue-organ, and in the  
comp theory, we assume his function can be replaced by a suitable  
universal machine, that is computer.


I am not sure what it is that you don't understand in the notion of  
number. Usually it means "natural numbers", but mathematicians have  
thousand of generalization of that concept (integer, rational numbers,  
real nubers, complex numbers, quaternion, octonions, and many others).


In common sense language, natural numbers are related to the words  
"zero", "one", "two", "three", etc. I am not sure what problem you  
have with them.






My remark to Bruno: in my (agnostic?) mind 'machine' means a  
functioning contraption composed of finite parts,


OK. And we can be neutral at the start if those part are physically  
realized or not. The machine I talk about have been defined precisely  
in math, and can be assumed to be approximated in the physical world  
(primitive or not).



an ascertainable inventory, while 'universal machine' - as I  
understand(?) the term includes lots of infinite connotations  
(references).


That's right, but they are themselves composed of a finite number of  
finite parts.






So I would be happy to name them something different from 'machine'.


On the contrary, the alluring fact about universal machine is that  
they are machine. They are finite. General purpose computers and  
programming language interpreters are example of such (physical,  
virtual) universal machines.





I accept 'computation' as not restricted to numerical (math?)  
calculations although our (embryonic, binary) Touring machine is  
based on such.


With the Church Turing thesis, all computers are equivalent for the  
computations they can execute. They will differ in the unboundable  
range of provability, knowability, observability and sensibility though.





I am still at a loss to see in extended practice a 'quantum', or a  
'molecularly based' computer so often referred to in fictional lit.


Yes, we will see, but we already believe (with respect to all current  
facts and  theories of course) that they do not violate the Church  
Turing thesis. It is a theorem that a quantum computer does not  
compute more functions than a Turing machine, or than Babbage machine.


I know you like Robert Rosen, who asserted that Church Turing thesis  
is false, but he has not convinced me at all on this.






The "Universal Computer" (Loeb?)


It is Turing who discovered it explicitly, but Babbage, Post, Church  
and others made equivalent discoveries. Gödel and Löb's discoveries  
concerns notion like truth and provability, which quite typically have  
no corresponding Church thesis, and there is no notion of universality  
related to them.


On the contrary, we know that provability is constructively NOT  
universal. We can build a machine contradicting any attempt to find a  
universal provability predicate. Some machines (the Löbian one) can  
prove that about themselves.





requires better descriptions as to it's qualia to include domains  
beyond our present knowledge and the infinities. (Maybe "human"mind?  
which is also unidentified).


That can depend on the theory that you will assume. With comp, our  
brain are equivalent to Turing machine, with respect to computations,  
but not with respect of provability, knowability, sensibility, etc.


Bruno





JohnM





On Sat, Apr 27, 2013 at 5:40 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:
On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:14 AM, Craig Weinberg  
 wrote:

> A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?
>
>> "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for  
real
>> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational.  
No computer
>> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when  
consciousness can
>> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate  
it."


If it is true that you need real numbers to simulate a brain then
since real numbers are not computable the brain is not computable, and
hence consciousness is not necessarily computable (although it may
still be contingently computable). But what evidence is there that
real numbers are needed to simulate the brain?


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, April 27, 2013 2:20:20 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 28/04/2013, at 3:31 AM, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, April 27, 2013 5:40:18 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:14 AM, Craig Weinberg  
>> wrote: 
>> > A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments? 
>> > 
>> >> "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real 
>> >> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No 
>> computer 
>> >> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when 
>> consciousness can 
>> >> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it." 
>>
>> If it is true that you need real numbers to simulate a brain then 
>> since real numbers are not computable the brain is not computable, and 
>> hence consciousness is not necessarily computable (although it may 
>> still be contingently computable). But what evidence is there that 
>> real numbers are needed to simulate the brain? 
>>
>
> Since we ourselves can easily conceive of real numbers without converting 
> them from floating point decimals in our conscious mind, and since we are 
> talking as if the mind supervenes on the brain locally, then we would have 
> to explain where this faculty comes from. Whether it is the brain or the 
> mind which we are talking about emulating with Comp, the final result must 
> include a capacity to conceive of real numbers directly, which we have no 
> reason to assume will ever be possible with a Turing based digital machine.
>
>
> Can you conceive of a real number? I can't. It's like conceiving of 
> infinity - you can say it but I don't think you can really do it. 
>

Sure I can. It's easy because I'm not trying to conceive of it literally 
like a computer, but figuratively as an idea. Pi, as the ratio of the 
circumference of a circle to its radius, can be understood in radians or 
just geometrically by visual feel. Pi falls out of the aesthetics of 
circularity itself, and it need not be enumerated abstractly. 
 

> But that is beside the point: if you can conceive of something why should 
> that mean that it is true or, even worse, that there is a little bit of 
> that something in your brain?
>

You can either say that it is in your brain or that it isn't, but either 
way, the thing that Comp claims to be able to emulate does something which 
Comp cannot do now, and which gives us no reason to expect that it will 
ever do.
 

>
> Besides that, it should be pretty clear that the world of classical 
> physics is quite enamored with real-number type relations rather than 
> decimal. Even at the microcosmic levels, where we find discrete states 
> rather than continuous, it is not at all clear that this is a true 
> reflection of nature or a local reflection of our instrumental approach. 
> The digital approach is always an amputation and an approximation. Not a 
> bad thing when we are talking about sending videos and text across the 
> world, but not necessarily a good thing for building a working brain from 
> scratch.
>
>
> We can simulate any classical system with discrete arithmetic. If we could 
> not then computers would be useless for many of the things they are 
> actually used for.
>

Inspecting a classical system from some arbitrary level of substitution is 
different than being a proprietary system which is by definition unique. 
The very kinds of things which machines fail at are the things which are 
most essential to consciousness.

Craig
 

>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 28/04/2013, at 3:31 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> 
> 
> On Saturday, April 27, 2013 5:40:18 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>> 
>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:14 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
>> > A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments? 
>> > 
>> >> "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real 
>> >> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No 
>> >> computer 
>> >> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness 
>> >> can 
>> >> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it." 
>> 
>> If it is true that you need real numbers to simulate a brain then 
>> since real numbers are not computable the brain is not computable, and 
>> hence consciousness is not necessarily computable (although it may 
>> still be contingently computable). But what evidence is there that 
>> real numbers are needed to simulate the brain?
> 
> Since we ourselves can easily conceive of real numbers without converting 
> them from floating point decimals in our conscious mind, and since we are 
> talking as if the mind supervenes on the brain locally, then we would have to 
> explain where this faculty comes from. Whether it is the brain or the mind 
> which we are talking about emulating with Comp, the final result must include 
> a capacity to conceive of real numbers directly, which we have no reason to 
> assume will ever be possible with a Turing based digital machine.

Can you conceive of a real number? I can't. It's like conceiving of infinity - 
you can say it but I don't think you can really do it. But that is beside the 
point: if you can conceive of something why should that mean that it is true 
or, even worse, that there is a little bit of that something in your brain?

> Besides that, it should be pretty clear that the world of classical physics 
> is quite enamored with real-number type relations rather than decimal. Even 
> at the microcosmic levels, where we find discrete states rather than 
> continuous, it is not at all clear that this is a true reflection of nature 
> or a local reflection of our instrumental approach. The digital approach is 
> always an amputation and an approximation. Not a bad thing when we are 
> talking about sending videos and text across the world, but not necessarily a 
> good thing for building a working brain from scratch.

We can simulate any classical system with discrete arithmetic. If we could not 
then computers would be useless for many of the things they are actually used 
for.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, April 27, 2013 5:40:18 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:14 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
> > A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments? 
> > 
> >> "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real 
> >> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No 
> computer 
> >> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness 
> can 
> >> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it." 
>
> If it is true that you need real numbers to simulate a brain then 
> since real numbers are not computable the brain is not computable, and 
> hence consciousness is not necessarily computable (although it may 
> still be contingently computable). But what evidence is there that 
> real numbers are needed to simulate the brain? 
>

Since we ourselves can easily conceive of real numbers without converting 
them from floating point decimals in our conscious mind, and since we are 
talking as if the mind supervenes on the brain locally, then we would have 
to explain where this faculty comes from. Whether it is the brain or the 
mind which we are talking about emulating with Comp, the final result must 
include a capacity to conceive of real numbers directly, which we have no 
reason to assume will ever be possible with a Turing based digital machine.

Besides that, it should be pretty clear that the world of classical physics 
is quite enamored with real-number type relations rather than decimal. Even 
at the microcosmic levels, where we find discrete states rather than 
continuous, it is not at all clear that this is a true reflection of nature 
or a local reflection of our instrumental approach. The digital approach is 
always an amputation and an approximation. Not a bad thing when we are 
talking about sending videos and text across the world, but not necessarily 
a good thing for building a working brain from scratch.

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[John Mikes]

Dear Stathis and Bruno,
Stathis' reply is commendable, with one excessive word:
   "  r e a l ".  I asked Bruno several times to 'identify' the term
'number' in common-sense language. So far I did not understand such (my
mistake?) I still hold *'numbers'* as the product of human thinking which
cannot be retrospect to the basis of brain-function. (Unless we consider
BRAIN as the tissue-organ in our skull, executing technical steps for
our *"mentality"
- *whatever that may be.
My remark to Bruno: in my (agnostic?) mind 'machine' means a functioning
contraption composed of finite parts,
an ascertainable inventory, while 'universal machine' - as I understand(?)
the term includes lots of infinite connotations (references). So I would be
happy to name them something different from 'machine'.
I accept 'computation' as not restricted to numerical (math?) calculations
although our (embryonic, binary) Touring machine is based on such. I am
still at a loss to see in extended practice a 'quantum', or a 'molecularly
based' computer so often referred to in fictional lit. The "Universal
Computer" (Loeb?) requires better descriptions as to it's qualia to include
domains beyond our present knowledge and the infinities. (Maybe
"human"mind? which is also unidentified).
JohnM





On Sat, Apr 27, 2013 at 5:40 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:14 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> wrote:
> > A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?
> >
> >> "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real
> >> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No
> computer
> >> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness
> can
> >> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."
>
> If it is true that you need real numbers to simulate a brain then
> since real numbers are not computable the brain is not computable, and
> hence consciousness is not necessarily computable (although it may
> still be contingently computable). But what evidence is there that
> real numbers are needed to simulate the brain?
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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>
>
>

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Apr 2013, at 11:40, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:14 AM, Craig Weinberg  
 wrote:

A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?

"Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for  
real
numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No  
computer
can represent pi or any other real number... So even when  
consciousness can

be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."


If it is true that you need real numbers to simulate a brain then
since real numbers are not computable the brain is not computable, and
hence consciousness is not necessarily computable (although it may
still be contingently computable). But what evidence is there that
real numbers are needed to simulate the brain?



Actually there exist notions of computable real numbers, and  
computable function from R to R.


For example the function y = sin(2*PI* x) is "intuitively" computable,  
as you can approximate as precisely as you want the input (2 * PI * i)  
and the corresponding output sin (2 * PI * x).


But there is no Church thesis for such notion, and there are many non  
equivalent definition of computability on the reals.

(I could add some nuance, here, but that's for later perhaps).

Yet, all analog machines known today, are emulable by digital  
machines. There would be a problem only if some real number is non  
computable and used in extenso by some machine. That exists ...  
mathematically. Some computable function of the reals can have their  
derivative being non computable. But in those case, the recursion  
theory is the same as for Turing machine with oracle, and this does  
not change the logic and the conceptual consequences. Nor is there any  
evidence that a brain uses such oracle, although it can be said that  
evolution uses the halting oracle, by selecting out the stopping  
machines (death). But that is just long term behavior of machines. It  
does not make us locally non emulable by computer. We already do  
ourself that selection for computers by buying new one, and throwing  
out old one ...


Bruno






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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:14 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?
>
>> "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real
>> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No computer
>> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness can
>> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."

If it is true that you need real numbers to simulate a brain then
since real numbers are not computable the brain is not computable, and
hence consciousness is not necessarily computable (although it may
still be contingently computable). But what evidence is there that
real numbers are needed to simulate the brain?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, April 25, 2013 6:04:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Apr 2013, at 00:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:49:00 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 5:11:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 22 Apr 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?
>>>
>>> "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real 
 numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No 
 computer 
 can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness 
 can 
 be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You can represent many real numbers by the program computing their 
>>> approximation. You can fan constructively on all real numbers (like the UD 
>>> does notably).
>>>
>>> Only if a brain uses some non computable real number as an oracle, with 
>>> all decimals given in one "strike", then we cannot simulate it with Turing 
>>> machine, but this needs to make the mind actually infinite.
>>>
>>
>> If the mind is what is real, then there are no decimals. 
>>
>>
>> But there are decimal, and so if you are correct, the mind is not real. 
>> But the mind is real, so you are not correct.
>>
>
> How do you know that the mind uses decimals? 
>
>
> I just said that decimal exists. Then the mind of mathematician uses 
> decimal because they are handy.
>

Right, but that doesn't mean that beneath their conscious threshold, their 
mind actually runs on decimal computations.
 

>
>
>
> It seems that our natural understanding is primarily in ratios and real 
> number type concepts. 
>
>
> Real numbers can be seen as a terrible simplification of reality.
>

Why is an immediate understanding of a conceptual ratio more terrible than 
an infinite computation of approximate figures?
 

>
>
>
>
> Decimals could be a notion derived from stepping down experience through 
> the body, but the native experiential fabric of all has no decimal content.
>
>
>
> I can agree. With comp you don't need to put real numbers and decimals in 
> the ontology.
>

Interesting. Do you see both reals and decimals as 
distortions/reductions/masks of the universal numbers? If so, that leaves 
us with arithmetic truth as a pure abstract essence with only potential 
forms and functions. Meta-Platonic? Even so, to me it's still sensory-motor 
experience. There is no urge or expectation except for one which is 
experienced.


>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> The brain is the public representation of the history, and as such, it 
>> can only be observed from the reduced 3p set of qualia. The 3p reduction 
>> may rationalize the appearance. From an absolute perspective, all phenomena 
>> are temporary partitions within the one "strike" of eternity.
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> So the statement above is just a statement of non-comp, not an argument 
>>> for non comp, as it fails to give us what is that non computable real 
>>> playing a role in cognition.
>>>
>>
>> What does the machine say when we ask it why it can't understand pi 
>> without approximating it?
>>
>>
>> One machine can answer "It seems that I can understand PI without 
>> approximating it. PI is the ratio of the length of a circle divided by its 
>> perimeter, and a circle is the locus of the point in a plane which share 
>> the same distance with respect to some point." Then the machine drew a 
>> circle on the ground and said, look, it seems PI is about a tiny bigger 
>> than 3.
>>
>
> Are there any machines that do as we do, and say 'pi is the unchanging 
> ratio between the distance across the circle compared to the distance 
> around it, and a circle is self evident pattern which manifests literally 
> as [circle shape] and figuratively as any pattern of returning to the 
> starting point repeatedly.
>
>
> Yes. You.
> (I *assume* comp).
> For man made machine, it is far too early. I would say that PA could say 
> that, but it might be long and tedious to prove, and you would be able to 
> say "she does not really meant what she says", so you would not been 
> convinced. You argument will conflate knowledge and knowledge theory, so I 
> will not try.
>

All that would be required is to walk a person off of their brain onto a 
machine and back. If that works, then we could assume that comp is correct 
enough to rely on. What if it turns out never to work though? Is comp 
falsifiable? How many centuries of failure until we can begin to doubt the 
underpinnings of comp?

I think that the reals vs rationals issue another obvious clue, along with 
the geometry issue, the hard problem, the explanatory gap, the metaphorical 
residue in language (is there any language in the world where machines are 
associated with warmth and love rather than unfeeling or unconsciousness?), 
that Comp is a very hard sell to match with 

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Apr 2013, at 00:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:49:00 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 5:11:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Apr 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:


A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?

"Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for  
real numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as  
rational. No computer can represent pi or any other real number...  
So even when consciousness can be explained by computations, no  
computer can actually simulate it."



You can represent many real numbers by the program computing their  
approximation. You can fan constructively on all real numbers (like  
the UD does notably).


Only if a brain uses some non computable real number as an oracle,  
with all decimals given in one "strike", then we cannot simulate it  
with Turing machine, but this needs to make the mind actually  
infinite.


If the mind is what is real, then there are no decimals.


But there are decimal, and so if you are correct, the mind is not  
real. But the mind is real, so you are not correct.


How do you know that the mind uses decimals?


I just said that decimal exists. Then the mind of mathematician uses  
decimal because they are handy.




It seems that our natural understanding is primarily in ratios and  
real number type concepts.


Real numbers can be seen as a terrible simplification of reality.




Decimals could be a notion derived from stepping down experience  
through the body, but the native experiential fabric of all has no  
decimal content.



I can agree. With comp you don't need to put real numbers and decimals  
in the ontology.










The brain is the public representation of the history, and as such,  
it can only be observed from the reduced 3p set of qualia. The 3p  
reduction may rationalize the appearance. From an absolute  
perspective, all phenomena are temporary partitions within the one  
"strike" of eternity.


OK.






So the statement above is just a statement of non-comp, not an  
argument for non comp, as it fails to give us what is that non  
computable real playing a role in cognition.


What does the machine say when we ask it why it can't understand pi  
without approximating it?


One machine can answer "It seems that I can understand PI without  
approximating it. PI is the ratio of the length of a circle divided  
by its perimeter, and a circle is the locus of the point in a plane  
which share the same distance with respect to some point." Then the  
machine drew a circle on the ground and said, look, it seems PI is  
about a tiny bigger than 3.


Are there any machines that do as we do, and say 'pi is the  
unchanging ratio between the distance across the circle compared to  
the distance around it, and a circle is self evident pattern which  
manifests literally as [circle shape] and figuratively as any  
pattern of returning to the starting point repeatedly.


Yes. You.
(I *assume* comp).
For man made machine, it is far too early. I would say that PA could  
say that, but it might be long and tedious to prove, and you would be  
able to say "she does not really meant what she says", so you would  
not been convinced. You argument will conflate knowledge and knowledge  
theory, so I will not try.












But there is something correct. A computer, nor a brain, can  
simulate consciousness. Nor can a computer simlulate the number  
one, or the number two. It has to borrow them from arithmetical  
truth.


Then why would your son in law's computer brain provide him with  
consciousness?


It is not the computer brain which provides him consciousness. The  
computer brain provides him a way to manifest his consciousness in  
your restaurant, and to get pleasant qualia of some good food (I  
hope). What provides the consciousness is God, or (arithmetical)  
truth. Nobody can program that, in the same sense than nobody can  
program the number one. But we can write program making possible to  
manifest the number one, or to make some consciousness manifest  
relatively to you.


Ok, but why assume that it is arithmetical truth which is God rather  
than feeling?



To avoid solipsism, and be able to believe in other people's feeling.




Feeling and being are an Art. Doing and knowing are a science.  
Science makes sense as a derivative of art,


Hmm... Why not. It is a bit vague. My agreement is by default.





but art makes no sense as a function of science.


Why? Without some amount of science, you have no art.





It isn't necessary, and arithmetic truth is about the necessary.


Arithmetic truth is beyond the necessary. Far beyond. And its internal  
views define necessities and contingencies.





Even if we say that arithmetic truth is art, it is certainly only  
one kind of art among many.


If I'm right, and I think I have every reason to guess that I am,

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2013, at 23:54, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

Perhaps one should define things such that it can be impolemented by  
any arbitrary finite state machine, no mater how large. Then, while  
there may not be a limit to the capacity of finite state machines,  
each such machine has a finite capacity, and therefore in none of  
these machines can one implement the Peano axiom that every integer  
has a successor.


Number(0)
Number(s(x)) := Number(x)

This implements (in PROLOG) the Peano axiom that every number has a  
successor


What you say is that the existential query "Number(x)?" will lead the  
PROLOG machine into a non terminating computation. It will generates  
0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), s(s(s(s(0, 


Similarly, you can implement a universal machine in a finite code. But  
then the machine will ask sometimes for more memory space, like us.






But some other properties of integers are valid if they are valid in  
every finite state machine that implement arithmetic modulo prime  
numbers.


Not the fundamental recursion properties. If you fix the prime number,  
you will stay in an ultrafinistic setting, without recursion, without  
universal machine, without any fertile theorems of computer science  
which makes sense even if it means that the machines, when implemented  
in a limited environment will complain, write on the walls, or will  
build a rocket to explore space and expand their memory by themselves.






I'm not into the foundations of math, I'll leave that to Bruno :) .  
But since we are machines with a finite brain capacity,


In the long run, it is a growing one. And we have infinite capacities  
relatively to our neighborhood. We don't stop to expand ourselves.




and even the entire visible universe has only a finite information  
content,


If the physical universe is finite, but very big, we are still  
universal machine. But doomed for some long run. No worry if comp is  
true, as comp precludes a finite physical universe.



we should be able to replace real analysis with discrete analysis as  
explained by Doron.


That can makes sense for some application, but would contradict comp  
for the theoretical consequences.


Bruno






Saibal


Citeren Brian Tenneson :


Interesting read.

The problem I have with this is that in set theory, there are several
examples of sets who owe their existence to axioms alone. In other  
words,

there is an axiom that states there is a set X such that (blah, blah,
blah). How are we to know which sets/notions are meaningless  
concepts?
Because to me, it sounds like Doron's personal opinion that some  
concepts
are meaningless while other concepts like huge, unknowable, and  
tiny are
not meaningless.  Is there anything that would remove the opinion  
portion

of this?

How is the second axiom an improvement while containing words like  
huge,

unknowable, and tiny??

quote
So I deny even the existence of the Peano axiom that every integer  
has a

successor. Eventually
we would get an overflow error in the big computer in the sky, and  
the sum

and product of any
two integers is well-defined only if the result is less than p, or  
if one

wishes, one can compute them
modulo p. Since p is so large, this is not a practical problem,  
since the

overflow in our earthly
computers comes so much sooner than the overflow errors in the big  
computer

in the sky.
end quote

What if the big computer in the sky is infinite? Or if all  
computers are

finite in capacity yet there is no largest computer?

What if NO computer activity is relevant to the set of numbers that  
exist

"mathematically"?


On Monday, April 22, 2013 11:28:46 AM UTC-7, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:


See here:

http://www.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/mamarim/mamarimPDF/real.pdf

Saibal


> To post to this group, send email to  
everyth...@googlegroups.com.


> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
.


> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
>





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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:49:00 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 5:11:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Apr 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?
>>
>> "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real 
>>> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No computer 
>>> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness can 
>>> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."
>>
>>
>>
>> You can represent many real numbers by the program computing their 
>> approximation. You can fan constructively on all real numbers (like the UD 
>> does notably).
>>
>> Only if a brain uses some non computable real number as an oracle, with 
>> all decimals given in one "strike", then we cannot simulate it with Turing 
>> machine, but this needs to make the mind actually infinite.
>>
>
> If the mind is what is real, then there are no decimals. 
>
>
> But there are decimal, and so if you are correct, the mind is not real. 
> But the mind is real, so you are not correct.
>

How do you know that the mind uses decimals? It seems that our natural 
understanding is primarily in ratios and real number type concepts. 
Decimals could be a notion derived from stepping down experience through 
the body, but the native experiential fabric of all has no decimal content.


>
>
>
> The brain is the public representation of the history, and as such, it can 
> only be observed from the reduced 3p set of qualia. The 3p reduction may 
> rationalize the appearance. From an absolute perspective, all phenomena are 
> temporary partitions within the one "strike" of eternity.
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>
>
>> So the statement above is just a statement of non-comp, not an argument 
>> for non comp, as it fails to give us what is that non computable real 
>> playing a role in cognition.
>>
>
> What does the machine say when we ask it why it can't understand pi 
> without approximating it?
>
>
> One machine can answer "It seems that I can understand PI without 
> approximating it. PI is the ratio of the length of a circle divided by its 
> perimeter, and a circle is the locus of the point in a plane which share 
> the same distance with respect to some point." Then the machine drew a 
> circle on the ground and said, look, it seems PI is about a tiny bigger 
> than 3.
>

Are there any machines that do as we do, and say 'pi is the unchanging 
ratio between the distance across the circle compared to the distance 
around it, and a circle is self evident pattern which manifests literally 
as [circle shape] and figuratively as any pattern of returning to the 
starting point repeatedly.
  

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>> But there is something correct. A computer, nor a brain, can simulate 
>> consciousness. Nor can a computer simlulate the number one, or the number 
>> two. It has to borrow them from arithmetical truth.
>>
>
> Then why would your son in law's computer brain provide him with 
> consciousness? 
>
>
> It is not the computer brain which provides him consciousness. The 
> computer brain provides him a way to manifest his consciousness in your 
> restaurant, and to get pleasant qualia of some good food (I hope). What 
> provides the consciousness is God, or (arithmetical) truth. Nobody can 
> program that, in the same sense than nobody can program the number one. But 
> we can write program making possible to manifest the number one, or to make 
> some consciousness manifest relatively to you.
>

Ok, but why assume that it is arithmetical truth which is God rather than 
feeling? Feeling and being are an Art. Doing and knowing are a science. 
Science makes sense as a derivative of art, but art makes no sense as a 
function of science. It isn't necessary, and arithmetic truth is about the 
necessary. Even if we say that arithmetic truth is art, it is certainly 
only one kind of art among many.

If I'm right, and I think I have every reason to guess that I am, then 
arithmetic is a feeling about doing which is one step removed from both 
feeling and moving - a step which can provides a clarity and universality 
that is unavailable in any other form of understanding, but it is precisely 
that precision, that clarity and universality which comes at the cost of 
intimacy with all that feels and does. Arithmetic is detachment from 
physics and psyche, not the source. Multisense realism is the idea that 
your view, the Platonic view, which places arithmetic at the top, or the 
Idealist view which places psyche at the top, or the Materialist view are 
all three valid almost entirely, and that through each of them, a 
self-consistent truthful view of the universe can be validated. Any of 
these three views can be used to explain the other two, but only the view 
which explains all three in terms of sensory-motor participation, aka 
bein

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[smitra]

Perhaps one should define things such that it can be impolemented by 
any arbitrary finite state machine, no mater how large. Then, while 
there may not be a limit to the capacity of finite state machines, each 
such machine has a finite capacity, and therefore in none of these 
machines can one implement the Peano axiom that every integer has a 
successor. But some other properties of integers are valid if they are 
valid in every finite state machine that implement arithmetic modulo 
prime numbers.


I'm not into the foundations of math, I'll leave that to Bruno :) . But 
since we are machines with a finite brain capacity, and even the entire 
visible universe has only a finite information content, we should be 
able to replace real analysis with discrete analysis as explained by 
Doron.


Saibal


Citeren Brian Tenneson :


Interesting read.

The problem I have with this is that in set theory, there are several
examples of sets who owe their existence to axioms alone. In other words,
there is an axiom that states there is a set X such that (blah, blah,
blah). How are we to know which sets/notions are meaningless concepts?
Because to me, it sounds like Doron's personal opinion that some concepts
are meaningless while other concepts like huge, unknowable, and tiny are
not meaningless.  Is there anything that would remove the opinion portion
of this?

How is the second axiom an improvement while containing words like huge,
unknowable, and tiny??

quote
So I deny even the existence of the Peano axiom that every integer has a
successor. Eventually
we would get an overflow error in the big computer in the sky, and the sum
and product of any
two integers is well-defined only if the result is less than p, or if one
wishes, one can compute them
modulo p. Since p is so large, this is not a practical problem, since the
overflow in our earthly
computers comes so much sooner than the overflow errors in the big computer
in the sky.
end quote

What if the big computer in the sky is infinite? Or if all computers are
finite in capacity yet there is no largest computer?

What if NO computer activity is relevant to the set of numbers that exist
"mathematically"?


On Monday, April 22, 2013 11:28:46 AM UTC-7, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:


See here:

http://www.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/mamarim/mamarimPDF/real.pdf

Saibal


> To post to this group, send email to 
everyth...@googlegroups.com.


> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
>





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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 11:58:08 AM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
> I probably shouldn't be talking to someone who thinks distinguishing a 
> sack of potatoes from a woman means understanding women.  
>
> News flash: understand tacitly implies understand completely.
>

If you define complete understanding as impossible a priori, and you insist 
that understanding must be complete, then you have just removed the word 
from the English language.

 

>
> On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 8:37 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 10:09:44 AM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 4:46 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>


 On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 4:31:55 AM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 8:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 11:37:14 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>>
>>> You keep claiming that we understand this and that or know this and 
>>> that.  And, yes, saying something along the lines of "we know we 
>>> understand 
>>> because we care about what we understand" *is* circular.  
>>
>>
>> No, it's not. I'm saying that it is impossible to doubt we 
>> understand. It's just playing with words. My point about caring is that 
>> it 
>> makes it clear that we intuitively make a distinction between merely 
>> being 
>> aware of something and understanding it.
>>
> I'll try to explain how  "we know we understand because we care about 
> what we understand" is circular.  Note the use of the word understand 
> towards the left edge of the statement in quotes followed by another 
> instance of the word understand. 
>

 You should read it as "we know we understand because we care about X". 
 My only intention in repeating the word was to make it clear that the 
 thing 
 that we care about is the thing that we understand. It is the caring which 
 is a symptom of understanding. The absence of that symptom of caring in a 
 machine indicates to me that there is a lack of understanding. Things 
 which 
 understand can care, but things that cannot care cannot understand.

 Now that isn't circular but that's a poor sign of understanding.  I 
>>> care very much for women but I can't say that I understand them.
>>>
>>
>> That's a cliche. You may not be able to understand women completely, but 
>> you are not likely to confuse them with a sack of potatoes in a dress. With 
>> a computer, the dress might be all that a security camera search engine 
>> might look for, and may very well categorize a sack of potatoes as a woman 
>> if it happens to be wearing a dress.
>>  
>>
>>>   I understand the rules of English grammar and punctuation but care 
>>> little of it.  
>>>
>>
>> Yes, you don't have to care about it, but you can care about it if you 
>> want to. A machine does not have that option. It can't try harder to follow 
>> proper grammar, it can only assign a priority to the task. It has no 
>> feeling for which tasks are assigned which priority, which is the entire 
>> utility of machines.
>>  
>>
>>> I'm sure you can think of examples.  So the two are not correlated, 
>>> caring and understanding. 
>>>
>>
>> Can you explain why the word understanding is a synonym for kindness and 
>> caring? A coincidence? 
>>  
>>
>>>  Caring is not something that can really be measured in humans while 
>>> caring can be measured in machines/computers.
>>>
>>
>> Give me a break.
>>  
>>
>>>   For example, one might define caring about something means it is 
>>> thinking a lot about it
>>>
>>
>> You might define warm feelings by the onset of influenza but that is a 
>> false equivalence.
>>  
>>
>>> , where a lot means some threshold like over 50% resources are dedicated 
>>> to think about something for a while (a nonzero, finite span of time).  
>>> These days, we can multitask and look up the resource monitor to see what 
>>> the CPU cares about, if anything.
>>>
>>
>> That has nothing whatsover to do with caring. Does the amount of money in 
>> your wallet tell you how much your wallet values money?
>>  
>>
>>>  If it doesn't care about anything, it uses close to 0% and is called 
>>> idle. 
>>>
>>
>> Next you are going to tell me that when a stuffed animal doesn't eat 
>> anything it must be because it is full - but we have no way of knowing if 
>> we are hungry ourselves.
>>  
>>
>>> But if I am running an intensive computation while typing this and look 
>>> at my resource monitor, I can see measurements indicating that my CPU cares 
>>> much more about the intensive computation rather than what I am typing.  
>>> Does that mean the CPU understands what it is doing?  No.  Likewise with 
>>> human brains: we can care a lot about something but have little to no 
>>> understanding of it.
>>>
>>
>> Your entire argument is a defense of the Pathetic fal

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Brian Tenneson]

I probably shouldn't be talking to someone who thinks distinguishing a sack
of potatoes from a woman means understanding women.

News flash: understand tacitly implies understand completely.

On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 8:37 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 10:09:44 AM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 4:46 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 4:31:55 AM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>>


 On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 8:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 11:37:14 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>
>> You keep claiming that we understand this and that or know this and
>> that.  And, yes, saying something along the lines of "we know we 
>> understand
>> because we care about what we understand" *is* circular.
>
>
> No, it's not. I'm saying that it is impossible to doubt we understand.
> It's just playing with words. My point about caring is that it makes it
> clear that we intuitively make a distinction between merely being aware of
> something and understanding it.
>
 I'll try to explain how  "we know we understand because we care about
 what we understand" is circular.  Note the use of the word understand
 towards the left edge of the statement in quotes followed by another
 instance of the word understand.

>>>
>>> You should read it as "we know we understand because we care about X".
>>> My only intention in repeating the word was to make it clear that the thing
>>> that we care about is the thing that we understand. It is the caring which
>>> is a symptom of understanding. The absence of that symptom of caring in a
>>> machine indicates to me that there is a lack of understanding. Things which
>>> understand can care, but things that cannot care cannot understand.
>>>
>>> Now that isn't circular but that's a poor sign of understanding.  I care
>> very much for women but I can't say that I understand them.
>>
>
> That's a cliche. You may not be able to understand women completely, but
> you are not likely to confuse them with a sack of potatoes in a dress. With
> a computer, the dress might be all that a security camera search engine
> might look for, and may very well categorize a sack of potatoes as a woman
> if it happens to be wearing a dress.
>
>
>>   I understand the rules of English grammar and punctuation but care
>> little of it.
>>
>
> Yes, you don't have to care about it, but you can care about it if you
> want to. A machine does not have that option. It can't try harder to follow
> proper grammar, it can only assign a priority to the task. It has no
> feeling for which tasks are assigned which priority, which is the entire
> utility of machines.
>
>
>> I'm sure you can think of examples.  So the two are not correlated,
>> caring and understanding.
>>
>
> Can you explain why the word understanding is a synonym for kindness and
> caring? A coincidence?
>
>
>> Caring is not something that can really be measured in humans while
>> caring can be measured in machines/computers.
>>
>
> Give me a break.
>
>
>>   For example, one might define caring about something means it is
>> thinking a lot about it
>>
>
> You might define warm feelings by the onset of influenza but that is a
> false equivalence.
>
>
>> , where a lot means some threshold like over 50% resources are dedicated
>> to think about something for a while (a nonzero, finite span of time).
>> These days, we can multitask and look up the resource monitor to see what
>> the CPU cares about, if anything.
>>
>
> That has nothing whatsover to do with caring. Does the amount of money in
> your wallet tell you how much your wallet values money?
>
>
>> If it doesn't care about anything, it uses close to 0% and is called
>> idle.
>>
>
> Next you are going to tell me that when a stuffed animal doesn't eat
> anything it must be because it is full - but we have no way of knowing if
> we are hungry ourselves.
>
>
>> But if I am running an intensive computation while typing this and look
>> at my resource monitor, I can see measurements indicating that my CPU cares
>> much more about the intensive computation rather than what I am typing.
>> Does that mean the CPU understands what it is doing?  No.  Likewise with
>> human brains: we can care a lot about something but have little to no
>> understanding of it.
>>
>
> Your entire argument is a defense of the Pathetic fallacy. Nothing you
> have said could not apply to any inanimate object, cartoon, abstract
> concept etc. Anyone can say 'you can't prove ice cream isn't melting
> because it's sad'. It's ridiculous. Find the universe. It is more
> interesting than making up stories about CPUs cares, kindnesses, and
> understanding.
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>  This is analogous to saying We are Unicorns because care about
 Unicorns.

>>>
>>> No, this is analogous  to you not understanding what I mean and
>>> u

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 10:09:44 AM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 4:46 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 4:31:55 AM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 8:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>


 On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 11:37:14 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
> You keep claiming that we understand this and that or know this and 
> that.  And, yes, saying something along the lines of "we know we 
> understand 
> because we care about what we understand" *is* circular.  


 No, it's not. I'm saying that it is impossible to doubt we understand. 
 It's just playing with words. My point about caring is that it makes it 
 clear that we intuitively make a distinction between merely being aware of 
 something and understanding it.

>>> I'll try to explain how  "we know we understand because we care about 
>>> what we understand" is circular.  Note the use of the word understand 
>>> towards the left edge of the statement in quotes followed by another 
>>> instance of the word understand. 
>>>
>>
>> You should read it as "we know we understand because we care about X". My 
>> only intention in repeating the word was to make it clear that the thing 
>> that we care about is the thing that we understand. It is the caring which 
>> is a symptom of understanding. The absence of that symptom of caring in a 
>> machine indicates to me that there is a lack of understanding. Things which 
>> understand can care, but things that cannot care cannot understand.
>>
>> Now that isn't circular but that's a poor sign of understanding.  I care 
> very much for women but I can't say that I understand them.
>

That's a cliche. You may not be able to understand women completely, but 
you are not likely to confuse them with a sack of potatoes in a dress. With 
a computer, the dress might be all that a security camera search engine 
might look for, and may very well categorize a sack of potatoes as a woman 
if it happens to be wearing a dress.
 

>   I understand the rules of English grammar and punctuation but care 
> little of it.  
>

Yes, you don't have to care about it, but you can care about it if you want 
to. A machine does not have that option. It can't try harder to follow 
proper grammar, it can only assign a priority to the task. It has no 
feeling for which tasks are assigned which priority, which is the entire 
utility of machines.
 

> I'm sure you can think of examples.  So the two are not correlated, caring 
> and understanding. 
>

Can you explain why the word understanding is a synonym for kindness and 
caring? A coincidence? 
 

> Caring is not something that can really be measured in humans while caring 
> can be measured in machines/computers.
>

Give me a break.
 

>   For example, one might define caring about something means it is 
> thinking a lot about it
>

You might define warm feelings by the onset of influenza but that is a 
false equivalence.
 

> , where a lot means some threshold like over 50% resources are dedicated 
> to think about something for a while (a nonzero, finite span of time).  
> These days, we can multitask and look up the resource monitor to see what 
> the CPU cares about, if anything.
>

That has nothing whatsover to do with caring. Does the amount of money in 
your wallet tell you how much your wallet values money?
 

> If it doesn't care about anything, it uses close to 0% and is called idle. 
>

Next you are going to tell me that when a stuffed animal doesn't eat 
anything it must be because it is full - but we have no way of knowing if 
we are hungry ourselves.
 

> But if I am running an intensive computation while typing this and look at 
> my resource monitor, I can see measurements indicating that my CPU cares 
> much more about the intensive computation rather than what I am typing.  
> Does that mean the CPU understands what it is doing?  No.  Likewise with 
> human brains: we can care a lot about something but have little to no 
> understanding of it.
>

Your entire argument is a defense of the Pathetic fallacy. Nothing you have 
said could not apply to any inanimate object, cartoon, abstract concept 
etc. Anyone can say 'you can't prove ice cream isn't melting because it's 
sad'. It's ridiculous. Find the universe. It is more interesting than 
making up stories about CPUs cares, kindnesses, and understanding. 

 
>
>>
>>  This is analogous to saying We are Unicorns because care about Unicorns. 
>>>
>>
>> No, this is analogous  to you not understanding what I mean and 
>> unintentionally making a straw man of my argument. 
>>
>
> Well, be honest here, you changed a phrasing.  You went from 
> (paraphrasing)  "we know we understand because we care that we understand" 
> to "You know we understand because we care about X". Correct me if I'm 
> wrong.  
>

Correcting you. You're wrong. What I said was "Because

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Apr 2013, at 15:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:50:07 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:



On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg  
 wrote:



"If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels  
constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't  
do that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually  
multiplied by number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so  
in reality the can't be conscious of a full picture, not even of  
the full color at a single pixel.




He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese  
room.  He is conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous  
to rule follower in Chinese room) with what the program can know.   
Consider the program of a neural network: it can be processed by a  
sequentially operating CPU processing one connection at a time, but  
the simulated network itself can see any arbitrary number of inputs  
at once.


How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only  
see a single pixel at a time?


Who says OCR software can recognize letters? All that it needs to  
do is execute some algorithm sequentially and blindly against a  
table of expected values. There need not be any recognition of the  
character as a character at at all, let alone any "seeing". A  
program could convert a Word document into an input file for an OCR  
program without there ever being any optical activity - no camera,  
no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all. Completely in the  
dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into the bits of  
an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.


Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to  
point out that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function  
which is accomplished with no need for understanding of larger  
contexts.


Searle might be right on non-comp, but his argument has been shown  
invalid by many.


I'm surprised that you would try to pass that off as truth Bruno.  
You have so much tolerance for doubt and uncertainty, yet you claim  
that it "has been shown invalid". In whose opinion?


It is not an opinion, it is a fact that you can verify if patient  
enough. The refutation is already in Dennet and Hofstadter "Mind's I "  
book. Searle concludes that the man in the room is not understanding  
chinese, and that is right, but that can not refute comp, as the man  
in the room plays the role of a CPU, and not of the high level program  
on which the consciousness of the chinese guy supervene. It is a  
simple confusion of level.






This page http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ is quite  
thorough, and lists the most well known Replies, yet it concludes:


"There continues to be significant disagreement about what processes  
create meaning, understanding, and consciousness, as well as what  
can be proven a priori by thought experiments."


Thought experience are like proofs in math. Some are valid, some are  
not valid, some are fatally not valid, some can be corrected or made  
more precise. The debate often focuse on the truth of comp and non- 
comp, and that involves sometimes opinion. I don't really play that  
game.






The replies listed are not at all impressive to me, and are all  
really variations on the same sophistry. Obviously there is a  
difference between understanding a conversation and simply copying a  
conversation in another language. There is a difference between  
painting a masterpiece and doing a paint by numbers or spraypainting  
through a stencil. This is what computers and machines are for - to  
free us from having to work and think ourselves. If the machine had  
to think and feel that it was working like a person does, then it  
would want servants also. Machines don't want servants though,  
because they don't know that they are working, and they function  
without having to think or exert effort.


And this is begging the question.

Bruno






Craig


Bruno





Craig


Jason

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Apr 2013, at 21:29, Brian Tenneson wrote:


Interesting read.

The problem I have with this is that in set theory, there are  
several examples of sets who owe their existence to axioms alone. In  
other words, there is an axiom that states there is a set X such  
that (blah, blah, blah). How are we to know which sets/notions are  
meaningless concepts?  Because to me, it sounds like Doron's  
personal opinion that some concepts are meaningless while other  
concepts like huge, unknowable, and tiny are not meaningless.  Is  
there anything that would remove the opinion portion of this?


How is the second axiom an improvement while containing words like  
huge, unknowable, and tiny??


quote
So I deny even the existence of the Peano axiom that every integer  
has a successor.


I guess the author means that he denies the truth of the axiom of the  
Peano axiom.






Eventually
we would get an overflow error in the big computer in the sky, and  
the sum and product of any
two integers is well-defined only if the result is less than p, or  
if one wishes, one can compute them
modulo p. Since p is so large, this is not a practical problem,  
since the overflow in our earthly
computers comes so much sooner than the overflow errors in the big  
computer in the sky.

end quote

What if the big computer in the sky is infinite?


Indeed.





Or if all computers are finite in capacity yet there is no largest  
computer?


Indeed.





What if NO computer activity is relevant to the set of numbers that  
exist "mathematically"?


Indeed.

Eventually it depends on the theory we start from. But to start the  
reasoning in comp, we have to assume at least one universal system (in  
the Church-Turing sense). If not, we don't get it. It remains a  
logical possibility of using some physicalist ultrafinitism, but this  
is heavy to only drop an explanation of the origin of consciousness/ 
physical--realities coupling. And by MGA + occam, unless there is  
flaw, this cannot work with comp.


Bruno






On Monday, April 22, 2013 11:28:46 AM UTC-7, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
See here:

http://www.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/mamarim/mamarimPDF/real.pdf

Saibal


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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Brian Tenneson]

On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 4:46 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 4:31:55 AM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 8:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 11:37:14 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:

 You keep claiming that we understand this and that or know this and
 that.  And, yes, saying something along the lines of "we know we understand
 because we care about what we understand" *is* circular.
>>>
>>>
>>> No, it's not. I'm saying that it is impossible to doubt we understand.
>>> It's just playing with words. My point about caring is that it makes it
>>> clear that we intuitively make a distinction between merely being aware of
>>> something and understanding it.
>>>
>> I'll try to explain how  "we know we understand because we care about
>> what we understand" is circular.  Note the use of the word understand
>> towards the left edge of the statement in quotes followed by another
>> instance of the word understand.
>>
>
> You should read it as "we know we understand because we care about X". My
> only intention in repeating the word was to make it clear that the thing
> that we care about is the thing that we understand. It is the caring which
> is a symptom of understanding. The absence of that symptom of caring in a
> machine indicates to me that there is a lack of understanding. Things which
> understand can care, but things that cannot care cannot understand.
>
> Now that isn't circular but that's a poor sign of understanding.  I care
very much for women but I can't say that I understand them.  I understand
the rules of English grammar and punctuation but care little of it.  I'm
sure you can think of examples.  So the two are not correlated, caring and
understanding.  Caring is not something that can really be measured in
humans while caring can be measured in machines/computers.  For example,
one might define caring about something means it is thinking a lot about
it, where a lot means some threshold like over 50% resources are dedicated
to think about something for a while (a nonzero, finite span of time).
These days, we can multitask and look up the resource monitor to see what
the CPU cares about, if anything.  If it doesn't care about anything, it
uses close to 0% and is called idle.  But if I am running an intensive
computation while typing this and look at my resource monitor, I can see
measurements indicating that my CPU cares much more about the intensive
computation rather than what I am typing.  Does that mean the CPU
understands what it is doing?  No.  Likewise with human brains: we can care
a lot about something but have little to no understanding of it.


>
> This is analogous to saying We are Unicorns because care about Unicorns.
>>
>
> No, this is analogous  to you not understanding what I mean and
> unintentionally making a straw man of my argument.
>

Well, be honest here, you changed a phrasing.  You went from
(paraphrasing)  "we know we understand because we care that we understand"
to "You know we understand because we care about X". Correct me if I'm
wrong.  The first phrasing is meaningless because of the second use of the
word understand (so you might as well be talking about unicorns).  The
first phrasing gives no insight into what understanding is and why we have
it but computers can't.  The problem with your new and improved phrasing is
that it's a doctored definition of caring; you pick a definition related to
understanding such that it (the definition of 'caring') will
*automatically*fail for anything other than a non-apathetic human, in
essence, assuming
computers don't care about anything when, in fact, doing what they are
programmed to do (much like a human, I might add) is the machine-equivalent
of them caring about what they are told to do.


>
> Doesn't prove unicorns exist; doesn't prove understanding exists (i.e.,
>> that any human understands anything). If this is all sophistry then it
>> should be easily dismissible. And yes, playing with words is what people
>> normally do, wittingly or unwittingly, and that lends more evidence to the
>> notion that we are processors in a Chinese room.
>>
>
> The position that we only think we understand or that consciousness is an
> illusion is, in my view, the desperate act of a stubborn mind. Truly, you
> are sawing off the branch that you are sitting on to suggest that we are
> incapable of understanding the very conversation that we are having.
>

Well calling a conclusion the desperate act of a stubborn mind, rather than
supply some decent rejoinder, is also the desperate act of a stubborn mind,
wouldn't you say?  While "sawing off the branch you are sitting on" is a
very clever arrangement of letters (can I use it in a future poem?), it
falls short of being an argument at all or even persuasive. We can get
along just fine by thinking that we understand this conversation.  But
knowing that we understand this conversation?

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:50:07 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels 
 constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't do 
 that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually multiplied 
 by 
 number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so in reality the can't 
 be conscious of a full picture, not even of the full color at a single 
 pixel.
>>>
>>>
>>>   
>>>
>>
>> He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese room.  He 
>> is conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous to rule follower 
>> in Chinese room) with what the program can know.  Consider the program of a 
>> neural network: it can be processed by a sequentially operating CPU 
>> processing one connection at a time, but the simulated network itself can 
>> see any arbitrary number of inputs at once.
>>
>> How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only see a 
>> single pixel at a time?
>>
>
> Who says OCR software can recognize letters? All that it needs to do is 
> execute some algorithm sequentially and blindly against a table of expected 
> values. There need not be any recognition of the character as a character 
> at at all, let alone any "seeing". A program could convert a Word document 
> into an input file for an OCR program without there ever being any optical 
> activity - no camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all. 
> Completely in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into 
> the bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.
>
> Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point out 
> that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is 
> accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts. 
>
>
> Searle might be right on non-comp, but his argument has been shown invalid 
> by many.
>

I'm surprised that you would try to pass that off as truth Bruno. You have 
so much tolerance for doubt and uncertainty, yet you claim that it "has 
been shown invalid". In whose opinion?

This page http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ is quite 
thorough, and lists the most well known Replies, yet it concludes:

"There continues to be significant disagreement about what processes create 
meaning, understanding, and consciousness, as well as what can be proven a 
priori by thought experiments."

The replies listed are not at all impressive to me, and are all really 
variations on the same sophistry. Obviously there is a difference between 
understanding a conversation and simply copying a conversation in another 
language. There is a difference between painting a masterpiece and doing a 
paint by numbers or spraypainting through a stencil. This is what computers 
and machines are for - to free us from having to work and think ourselves. 
If the machine had to think and feel that it was working like a person 
does, then it would want servants also. Machines don't want servants 
though, because they don't know that they are working, and they function 
without having to think or exert effort.

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>  
>
>> Jason
>>
>
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>
>
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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:



On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:



"If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels  
constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't  
do that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually  
multiplied by number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so  
in reality the can't be conscious of a full picture, not even of the  
full color at a single pixel.




He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese  
room.  He is conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous  
to rule follower in Chinese room) with what the program can know.   
Consider the program of a neural network: it can be processed by a  
sequentially operating CPU processing one connection at a time, but  
the simulated network itself can see any arbitrary number of inputs  
at once.


How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only  
see a single pixel at a time?


Who says OCR software can recognize letters? All that it needs to do  
is execute some algorithm sequentially and blindly against a table  
of expected values. There need not be any recognition of the  
character as a character at at all, let alone any "seeing". A  
program could convert a Word document into an input file for an OCR  
program without there ever being any optical activity - no camera,  
no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all. Completely in the  
dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into the bits of  
an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.


Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point  
out that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is  
accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts.


Searle might be right on non-comp, but his argument has been shown  
invalid by many.


Bruno





Craig


Jason

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 5:11:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Apr 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:


A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?

"Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for  
real numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as  
rational. No computer can represent pi or any other real number...  
So even when consciousness can be explained by computations, no  
computer can actually simulate it."



You can represent many real numbers by the program computing their  
approximation. You can fan constructively on all real numbers (like  
the UD does notably).


Only if a brain uses some non computable real number as an oracle,  
with all decimals given in one "strike", then we cannot simulate it  
with Turing machine, but this needs to make the mind actually  
infinite.


If the mind is what is real, then there are no decimals.


But there are decimal, and so if you are correct, the mind is not  
real. But the mind is real, so you are not correct.





The brain is the public representation of the history, and as such,  
it can only be observed from the reduced 3p set of qualia. The 3p  
reduction may rationalize the appearance. From an absolute  
perspective, all phenomena are temporary partitions within the one  
"strike" of eternity.


OK.






So the statement above is just a statement of non-comp, not an  
argument for non comp, as it fails to give us what is that non  
computable real playing a role in cognition.


What does the machine say when we ask it why it can't understand pi  
without approximating it?


One machine can answer "It seems that I can understand PI without  
approximating it. PI is the ratio of the length of a circle divided by  
its perimeter, and a circle is the locus of the point in a plane which  
share the same distance with respect to some point." Then the machine  
drew a circle on the ground and said, look, it seems PI is about a  
tiny bigger than 3.







But there is something correct. A computer, nor a brain, can  
simulate consciousness. Nor can a computer simlulate the number one,  
or the number two. It has to borrow them from arithmetical truth.


Then why would your son in law's computer brain provide him with  
consciousness?


It is not the computer brain which provides him consciousness. The  
computer brain provides him a way to manifest his consciousness in  
your restaurant, and to get pleasant qualia of some good food (I  
hope). What provides the consciousness is God, or (arithmetical)  
truth. Nobody can program that, in the same sense than nobody can  
program the number one. But we can write program making possible to  
manifest the number one, or to make some consciousness manifest  
relatively to you.


Bruno






Craig

Bruno







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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 4:31:55 AM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 8:53 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 11:37:14 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>>
>>> You keep claiming that we understand this and that or know this and 
>>> that.  And, yes, saying something along the lines of "we know we understand 
>>> because we care about what we understand" *is* circular.  
>>
>>
>> No, it's not. I'm saying that it is impossible to doubt we understand. 
>> It's just playing with words. My point about caring is that it makes it 
>> clear that we intuitively make a distinction between merely being aware of 
>> something and understanding it.
>>
> I'll try to explain how  "we know we understand because we care about what 
> we understand" is circular.  Note the use of the word understand towards 
> the left edge of the statement in quotes followed by another instance of 
> the word understand. 
>

You should read it as "we know we understand because we care about X". My 
only intention in repeating the word was to make it clear that the thing 
that we care about is the thing that we understand. It is the caring which 
is a symptom of understanding. The absence of that symptom of caring in a 
machine indicates to me that there is a lack of understanding. Things which 
understand can care, but things that cannot care cannot understand.


This is analogous to saying We are Unicorns because care about Unicorns. 
>

No, this is analogous  to you not understanding what I mean and 
unintentionally making a straw man of my argument. 

Doesn't prove unicorns exist; doesn't prove understanding exists (i.e., 
> that any human understands anything). If this is all sophistry then it 
> should be easily dismissible. And yes, playing with words is what people 
> normally do, wittingly or unwittingly, and that lends more evidence to the 
> notion that we are processors in a Chinese room.  
>

The position that we only think we understand or that consciousness is an 
illusion is, in my view, the desperate act of a stubborn mind. Truly, you 
are sawing off the branch that you are sitting on to suggest that we are 
incapable of understanding the very conversation that we are having. 


>  
>>
>>> Still doesn't rule out the possibility that we are in a Chinese room 
>>> right now, manipulating symbols without really understanding what's going 
>>> on but able to adeptly shuffle the symbols around fast enough to appear 
>>> functional. 
>>
>>
>> Why not? If we were manipulating symbols, why would we care about them. 
>> What you're saying doesn't even make sense. We are having a conversation. 
>> We care about the conversation because we understand it. If I was being 
>> dictated to write in another language instead, I would not care about the 
>> conversation. Are you claiming that there is no difference between having a 
>> conversation in English and dictating text in a language you don't 
>> understand?
>>
>  

> We care about the symbols because working through the symbols in our 
> brains is what leads to food, shelter, sex, and all the things animals 
> want. 
>

First of all, there are no symbols in our brains, unless you think that 
serotonin or ATP is a symbol. Secondly, the fact that species have needs 
does not imply any sort of caring at all. A car needs fuel and oil but it 
doesn't care about them. When the fuel light comes up on your dashboard, 
that is for you to care about your car, not a sign that the car is anxious. 
Instead of a light on the dashboard, a more intelligently designed car 
could proceed to the filling station and dock at a smart pump, or it could 
use geological measurements and drill out its own petroleum to refine...all 
without the slightest bit of caring or understanding. 
 

> Or we care about the symbols because they further enrich our lives. 
>

That's circular. Why do we care about enriching our lives? Because we care 
about our lives and richness. We don't have to though in theory, and a 
machine never can.
 

> The symbols in this corner of the internet (barring my contributions of 
> course) are examples of that.  Regarding the world, would you say there is 
> more that we (i.e., at least one human) understand or more that we don't?  
> I would vote 'don't' and that leads me also to suspect we are in a chinese 
> room right now.  
>

I don't know where we are in the extent of our understanding, but there is 
some understanding, while the man in the Chinese room has no understanding.
 

> Your coupling of caring and understanding is somewhat arbitrary.  
>

No, it is supported by the English language: 
http://dictionary.reverso.net/english-synonyms/understanding

 "accepting, compassionate, considerate, discerning, forbearing, forgiving, 
kind, kindly, patient, perceptive, responsive, sensitive, sympathetic, 
tolerant"

Your discoupling of caring and understanding is intentionally fabricated 
and incorrect.

 

> You seem 

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Brian Tenneson]

On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 8:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 11:37:14 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>
>> You keep claiming that we understand this and that or know this and
>> that.  And, yes, saying something along the lines of "we know we understand
>> because we care about what we understand" *is* circular.
>
>
> No, it's not. I'm saying that it is impossible to doubt we understand.
> It's just playing with words. My point about caring is that it makes it
> clear that we intuitively make a distinction between merely being aware of
> something and understanding it.
>
I'll try to explain how  "we know we understand because we care about what
we understand" is circular.  Note the use of the word understand towards
the left edge of the statement in quotes followed by another instance of
the word understand.  This is analogous to saying We are Unicorns because
care about Unicorns.  Doesn't prove unicorns exist; doesn't prove
understanding exists (i.e., that any human understands anything). If this
is all sophistry then it should be easily dismissible. And yes, playing
with words is what people normally do, wittingly or unwittingly, and that
lends more evidence to the notion that we are processors in a Chinese
room.


>
>> Still doesn't rule out the possibility that we are in a Chinese room
>> right now, manipulating symbols without really understanding what's going
>> on but able to adeptly shuffle the symbols around fast enough to appear
>> functional.
>
>
> Why not? If we were manipulating symbols, why would we care about them.
> What you're saying doesn't even make sense. We are having a conversation.
> We care about the conversation because we understand it. If I was being
> dictated to write in another language instead, I would not care about the
> conversation. Are you claiming that there is no difference between having a
> conversation in English and dictating text in a language you don't
> understand?
>
We care about the symbols because working through the symbols in our brains
is what leads to food, shelter, sex, and all the things animals want.  Or
we care about the symbols because they further enrich our lives.  The
symbols in this corner of the internet (barring my contributions of course)
are examples of that.  Regarding the world, would you say there is more
that we (i.e., at least one human) understand or more that we don't?  I
would vote 'don't' and that leads me also to suspect we are in a chinese
room right now.  Your coupling of caring and understanding is somewhat
arbitrary.  You seem to be saying we care because we understand and we
understand because we care.  But it is the case that even if we do
understand something, we don't have to care about it.  And understanding
because we care doesn't follow either: I care a great deal about science,
20-21st stuff mainly, but I understand almost nothing of it.  Would you say
we live in a world where we are confronted daily with numerous events; are
you claiming you understand most or all of these events? The less you
understand the greater the chances of being in a Chinese room.

We know that we're not the center of the universe or even the solar
system.  We know that space is almost unfathomably vast.  We know humans
are fallible, even when it comes time to do some math and science.  So why
be so shocked that we are in a "Chinese room," lacking understanding of the
"texts"?

>
>
>

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 11:37:14 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
> You keep claiming that we understand this and that or know this and that.  
> And, yes, saying something along the lines of "we know we understand 
> because we care about what we understand" *is* circular.  


No, it's not. I'm saying that it is impossible to doubt we understand. It's 
just playing with words. My point about caring is that it makes it clear 
that we intuitively make a distinction between merely being aware of 
something and understanding it.
 

> Still doesn't rule out the possibility that we are in a Chinese room right 
> now, manipulating symbols without really understanding what's going on but 
> able to adeptly shuffle the symbols around fast enough to appear 
> functional. 


Why not? If we were manipulating symbols, why would we care about them. 
What you're saying doesn't even make sense. We are having a conversation. 
We care about the conversation because we understand it. If I was being 
dictated to write in another language instead, I would not care about the 
conversation. Are you claiming that there is no difference between having a 
conversation in English and dictating text in a language you don't 
understand?
 

> If that is the case, AI might be able to replicate human behavior if human 
> behavior is all computation-based.
>

Yes and no. Human behavior can never be generic. The more generic it is, 
the more inhuman it is. AI could imitate a particular person's behavior and 
fool X% of a given audience, but because human behavior is ultimately 
driven by proprietary preferences, there will probably always be some ratio 
of audience size to duration of exposure which will wind up with a positive 
detection of simulation. The threshold may be much lower than it seems. 
Judging from existing simulation, it may not always be possible to 
determine absolutely that something is a simulation, but I would be willing 
to bet that some part of the brain lights up differently when presented 
with a simulated presentation vs a genuine one.

Craig
 

>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 8:25 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 7:59:26 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>


 On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 4:31:05 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point 
>> out that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is 
>> accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts. 
>>
>>
>
> How do we know that what humans do is understand things rather than 
> just compute things? 
>
  

 Because we care about what we understand, and we identify with it 
 personally.  Understanding is used also to mean compassion. When someone 
 demonstrates a lack of human understanding, we say that they are behaving 
 robotically, like a machine, etc. Questions like, "How do you know you are 
 conscious?", or "How do you know that you feel?" are sophistry. How do you 
 know that you can ask that question?


>>> Sounds circular. "we do understand things because we care about what we 
>>> understand."  The type of understanding I was referring to was not about 
>>> compassion.  Why is it so strange to think that we are stuck in a big 
>>> Chinese room, without really understanding anything but being adept at 
>>> pushing symbols around? 
>>>
>>
>> It's not circular, I was trying to be clear about the difference between 
>> computation and understanding. Computation is variations on the theme of 
>> counting, but counting does not help us understand. A dog might be able to 
>> count how many times we speak a command, and we can train them to respond 
>> to the third instance we speak it, but we can use any command to associate 
>> with the action of sitting or begging. We are not in a Chinese room because 
>> we know what kinds of things the word 'sit' actually might refer to. We 
>> know what kind of context it relates to, and we understand what our options 
>> for interpretation and participation are. The dog has no options. It can 
>> follow the conditioned response and get the reward, or it can fail to do 
>> that. It doesn't know what else to do. 
>>
>> Craig
>>
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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 7:09:42 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 4:46:52 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>


 On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:

>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> "If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels 
>>> constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't do 
>>> that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually 
>>> multiplied by 
>>> number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so in reality the 
>>> can't 
>>> be conscious of a full picture, not even of the full color at a single 
>>> pixel.
>>
>>   
>>
>
> He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese room.  
> He is conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous to rule 
> follower in Chinese room) with what the program can know.  Consider the 
> program of a neural network: it can be processed by a sequentially 
> operating CPU processing one connection at a time, but the simulated 
> network itself can see any arbitrary number of inputs at once.
>
> How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only 
> see a single pixel at a time?
>

 Who says OCR software can recognize letters?

>>>
>>> The people who buy such software and don't return it.
>>>  
>>>
 All that it needs to do is execute some algorithm sequentially and 
 blindly against a table of expected values.

>>>
>>> It's a little more sophisticated than that.  There are CAPTCHA defeating 
>>> OCR programs that recognize letters distorted in ways they have never 
>>> previously seen before:
>>> http://www.slideshare.net/**rachelshadoan/machine-**
>>> learning-methods-for-captcha-**recognition
>>>
>>> You need more than a simple look up table for that capability.
>>>
>>
>> I don't deny that, but you still only need a more sophisticated 
>> algorithm, you don't need to 'see' anything or understand characters. 
>>
>
> To recognize a character (in most algorithms that do so) must consider 
> multiple the values of pixels at once, which was the whole point of me 
> bringing up this example.
>

Multiple values of pixels aren't characters though. No pixels are even 
necessary - which is why I brought up the OCR file emulator. The OCR will 
interpolate just as well from hexadecimal code as it would from adjacent 
pixels in bitmap. This is relevant because if we can see that computation 
can only offer us approximations of real numbers, or real circles, then we 
could only expect that it could offer an approximation of sense - which 
doesn't work for sense, because it is that which cannot be approximated or 
generalized. It is 100% proprietary because it is the principle through 
which privacy itself is defined.
 

>
>  
>>
>>>  
>>>
 There need not be any recognition of the character as a character at at 
 all, let alone any "seeing". A program could convert a Word document into 
 an input file for an OCR program without there ever being any optical 
 activity - no camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all. 
 Completely in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into 
 the bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.

>>>
>>> Sounds like what goes on when someone dreams in the dark.
>>>
>>
>> If that were the case then we would not need a video screen, we could 
>> simply look at the part of the computer where the chip is showing videos to 
>> itself and put a big magnifying glass on it.
>>  
>>
>
> You could plug the electronics of the computer up to your optic nerve in a 
> way that let you see the screen without any photons having to enter your 
> eyes at all.
>

Not without a driver to convert the meaningless patterns of bits into 
something that your visual cortex expects to see. If you used that same 
driver on a person who had been blind since birth, they would not be able 
to see, and what they would feel would not likely have the same meaning. 
Blindsight tells us that information processing can occur without any 
personal aesthetic experience, so there is no reason at all to give the 
benefit of the doubt to a CPU that its processing is clothed in any sensory 
qualia, let alone some specific human qualia.
 

>
>  
>
>>  
>>>

 Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point 
 out that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is 
 accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts.  

>>>  
>>> It doesn't point out anything, it is an intuition pump ( 
>>> htt

Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Brian Tenneson]

You keep claiming that we understand this and that or know this and that.
And, yes, saying something along the lines of "we know we understand
because we care about what we understand" *is* circular.  Still doesn't
rule out the possibility that we are in a Chinese room right now,
manipulating symbols without really understanding what's going on but able
to adeptly shuffle the symbols around fast enough to appear functional.  If
that is the case, AI might be able to replicate human behavior if human
behavior is all computation-based.

On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 8:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 7:59:26 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 4:31:05 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>>


 On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point
> out that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is
> accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts.
>
>

 How do we know that what humans do is understand things rather than
 just compute things?

>>>
>>>
>>> Because we care about what we understand, and we identify with it
>>> personally.  Understanding is used also to mean compassion. When someone
>>> demonstrates a lack of human understanding, we say that they are behaving
>>> robotically, like a machine, etc. Questions like, "How do you know you are
>>> conscious?", or "How do you know that you feel?" are sophistry. How do you
>>> know that you can ask that question?
>>>
>>>
>> Sounds circular. "we do understand things because we care about what we
>> understand."  The type of understanding I was referring to was not about
>> compassion.  Why is it so strange to think that we are stuck in a big
>> Chinese room, without really understanding anything but being adept at
>> pushing symbols around?
>>
>
> It's not circular, I was trying to be clear about the difference between
> computation and understanding. Computation is variations on the theme of
> counting, but counting does not help us understand. A dog might be able to
> count how many times we speak a command, and we can train them to respond
> to the third instance we speak it, but we can use any command to associate
> with the action of sitting or begging. We are not in a Chinese room because
> we know what kinds of things the word 'sit' actually might refer to. We
> know what kind of context it relates to, and we understand what our options
> for interpretation and participation are. The dog has no options. It can
> follow the conditioned response and get the reward, or it can fail to do
> that. It doesn't know what else to do.
>
> Craig
>
> --
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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 7:59:26 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:13 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 4:31:05 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>


 Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point 
 out that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is 
 accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts. 


>>>
>>> How do we know that what humans do is understand things rather than just 
>>> compute things? 
>>>
>>  
>>
>> Because we care about what we understand, and we identify with it 
>> personally.  Understanding is used also to mean compassion. When someone 
>> demonstrates a lack of human understanding, we say that they are behaving 
>> robotically, like a machine, etc. Questions like, "How do you know you are 
>> conscious?", or "How do you know that you feel?" are sophistry. How do you 
>> know that you can ask that question?
>>
>>
> Sounds circular. "we do understand things because we care about what we 
> understand."  The type of understanding I was referring to was not about 
> compassion.  Why is it so strange to think that we are stuck in a big 
> Chinese room, without really understanding anything but being adept at 
> pushing symbols around? 
>

It's not circular, I was trying to be clear about the difference between 
computation and understanding. Computation is variations on the theme of 
counting, but counting does not help us understand. A dog might be able to 
count how many times we speak a command, and we can train them to respond 
to the third instance we speak it, but we can use any command to associate 
with the action of sitting or begging. We are not in a Chinese room because 
we know what kinds of things the word 'sit' actually might refer to. We 
know what kind of context it relates to, and we understand what our options 
for interpretation and participation are. The dog has no options. It can 
follow the conditioned response and get the reward, or it can fail to do 
that. It doesn't know what else to do. 

Craig

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Brian Tenneson]

On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 4:31:05 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point out
>>> that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is
>>> accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> How do we know that what humans do is understand things rather than just
>> compute things?
>>
>
>
> Because we care about what we understand, and we identify with it
> personally.  Understanding is used also to mean compassion. When someone
> demonstrates a lack of human understanding, we say that they are behaving
> robotically, like a machine, etc. Questions like, "How do you know you are
> conscious?", or "How do you know that you feel?" are sophistry. How do you
> know that you can ask that question?
>
>
Sounds circular. "we do understand things because we care about what we
understand."  The type of understanding I was referring to was not about
compassion.  Why is it so strange to think that we are stuck in a big
Chinese room, without really understanding anything but being adept at
pushing symbols around?

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 4:46:52 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>>



 On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> "If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels
>> constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't do
>> that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually multiplied 
>> by
>> number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so in reality the 
>> can't
>> be conscious of a full picture, not even of the full color at a single
>> pixel.
>
>
>

 He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese room.
 He is conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous to rule
 follower in Chinese room) with what the program can know.  Consider the
 program of a neural network: it can be processed by a sequentially
 operating CPU processing one connection at a time, but the simulated
 network itself can see any arbitrary number of inputs at once.

 How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only see
 a single pixel at a time?

>>>
>>> Who says OCR software can recognize letters?
>>>
>>
>> The people who buy such software and don't return it.
>>
>>
>>> All that it needs to do is execute some algorithm sequentially and
>>> blindly against a table of expected values.
>>>
>>
>> It's a little more sophisticated than that.  There are CAPTCHA defeating
>> OCR programs that recognize letters distorted in ways they have never
>> previously seen before:
>> http://www.slideshare.net/**rachelshadoan/machine-**
>> learning-methods-for-captcha-**recognition
>>
>> You need more than a simple look up table for that capability.
>>
>
> I don't deny that, but you still only need a more sophisticated algorithm,
> you don't need to 'see' anything or understand characters.
>

To recognize a character (in most algorithms that do so) must consider
multiple the values of pixels at once, which was the whole point of me
bringing up this example.


>
>>
>>
>>> There need not be any recognition of the character as a character at at
>>> all, let alone any "seeing". A program could convert a Word document into
>>> an input file for an OCR program without there ever being any optical
>>> activity - no camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all.
>>> Completely in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into
>>> the bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.
>>>
>>
>> Sounds like what goes on when someone dreams in the dark.
>>
>
> If that were the case then we would not need a video screen, we could
> simply look at the part of the computer where the chip is showing videos to
> itself and put a big magnifying glass on it.
>
>

You could plug the electronics of the computer up to your optic nerve in a
way that let you see the screen without any photons having to enter your
eyes at all.



>
>>
>>>
>>> Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point out
>>> that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is
>>> accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts.
>>>
>>
>> It doesn't point out anything, it is an intuition pump (
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/**Intuition_pump)
>>  that succeeds in swaying people to an apparently obvious conclusion (if
>> they don't think too deeply about it).
>>
>
> Intuition pumps are exactly what are needed to understand consciousness.
>

They can be used and misused.


> The conclusion is obvious because the alternative is absurd, and the
> absurdity stems from trying to project public physics into the realm of
> private physics. It is a category error and the Chinese Room demonstrates
> that.
>
What makes you so sure that intuition is not the only way to find
> consciousness?
>
>
Our intuitions were evolved to suit our survival and propagation, why
should we expect them to be better at locating consciousness than reasoned
thought?

Jason

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 4:46:52 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:26 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>


 "If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels 
> constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't do 
> that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually multiplied 
> by 
> number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so in reality the 
> can't 
> be conscious of a full picture, not even of the full color at a single 
> pixel.

   

>>>
>>> He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese room.  He 
>>> is conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous to rule follower 
>>> in Chinese room) with what the program can know.  Consider the program of a 
>>> neural network: it can be processed by a sequentially operating CPU 
>>> processing one connection at a time, but the simulated network itself can 
>>> see any arbitrary number of inputs at once.
>>>
>>> How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only see 
>>> a single pixel at a time?
>>>
>>
>> Who says OCR software can recognize letters?
>>
>
> The people who buy such software and don't return it.
>  
>
>> All that it needs to do is execute some algorithm sequentially and 
>> blindly against a table of expected values.
>>
>
> It's a little more sophisticated than that.  There are CAPTCHA defeating 
> OCR programs that recognize letters distorted in ways they have never 
> previously seen before:
>
> http://www.slideshare.net/rachelshadoan/machine-learning-methods-for-captcha-recognition
>
> You need more than a simple look up table for that capability.
>

I don't deny that, but you still only need a more sophisticated algorithm, 
you don't need to 'see' anything or understand characters. 
 

>  
>
>> There need not be any recognition of the character as a character at at 
>> all, let alone any "seeing". A program could convert a Word document into 
>> an input file for an OCR program without there ever being any optical 
>> activity - no camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all. 
>> Completely in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into 
>> the bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.
>>
>
> Sounds like what goes on when someone dreams in the dark.
>

If that were the case then we would not need a video screen, we could 
simply look at the part of the computer where the chip is showing videos to 
itself and put a big magnifying glass on it.
 

>  
>
>>
>> Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point out 
>> that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is 
>> accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts.  
>>
>  
> It doesn't point out anything, it is an intuition pump ( 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuition_pump ) that succeeds in swaying 
> people to an apparently obvious conclusion (if they don't think too deeply 
> about it).
>

Intuition pumps are exactly what are needed to understand consciousness. 
The conclusion is obvious because the alternative is absurd, and the 
absurdity stems from trying to project public physics into the realm of 
private physics. It is a category error and the Chinese Room demonstrates 
that. What makes you so sure that intuition is not the only way to find 
consciousness?

Craig
 

>
> Jason
>

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 4:31:05 PM UTC-4, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point out 
>> that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is 
>> accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts. 
>>
>>
>
> How do we know that what humans do is understand things rather than just 
> compute things? 
>
 

Because we care about what we understand, and we identify with it 
personally.  Understanding is used also to mean compassion. When someone 
demonstrates a lack of human understanding, we say that they are behaving 
robotically, like a machine, etc. Questions like, "How do you know you are 
conscious?", or "How do you know that you feel?" are sophistry. How do you 
know that you can ask that question?

Craig


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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 3:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels
 constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't do
 that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually multiplied by
 number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so in reality the can't
 be conscious of a full picture, not even of the full color at a single
 pixel.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese room.  He
>> is conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous to rule follower
>> in Chinese room) with what the program can know.  Consider the program of a
>> neural network: it can be processed by a sequentially operating CPU
>> processing one connection at a time, but the simulated network itself can
>> see any arbitrary number of inputs at once.
>>
>> How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only see a
>> single pixel at a time?
>>
>
> Who says OCR software can recognize letters?
>

The people who buy such software and don't return it.


> All that it needs to do is execute some algorithm sequentially and blindly
> against a table of expected values.
>

It's a little more sophisticated than that.  There are CAPTCHA defeating
OCR programs that recognize letters distorted in ways they have never
previously seen before:
http://www.slideshare.net/rachelshadoan/machine-learning-methods-for-captcha-recognition

You need more than a simple look up table for that capability.


> There need not be any recognition of the character as a character at at
> all, let alone any "seeing". A program could convert a Word document into
> an input file for an OCR program without there ever being any optical
> activity - no camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all.
> Completely in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into
> the bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.
>

Sounds like what goes on when someone dreams in the dark.


>
> Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point out
> that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is
> accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts.
>

It doesn't point out anything, it is an intuition pump (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuition_pump ) that succeeds in swaying
people to an apparently obvious conclusion (if they don't think too deeply
about it).

Jason

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Brian Tenneson]

On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point out
> that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is
> accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts.
>
>

How do we know that what humans do is understand things rather than just
compute things?

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 3:58:33 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> "If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels 
>>> constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't do 
>>> that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually multiplied by 
>>> number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so in reality the can't 
>>> be conscious of a full picture, not even of the full color at a single 
>>> pixel.
>>
>>   
>>
>
> He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese room.  He 
> is conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous to rule follower 
> in Chinese room) with what the program can know.  Consider the program of a 
> neural network: it can be processed by a sequentially operating CPU 
> processing one connection at a time, but the simulated network itself can 
> see any arbitrary number of inputs at once.
>
> How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only see a 
> single pixel at a time?
>

Who says OCR software can recognize letters? All that it needs to do is 
execute some algorithm sequentially and blindly against a table of expected 
values. There need not be any recognition of the character as a character 
at at all, let alone any "seeing". A program could convert a Word document 
into an input file for an OCR program without there ever being any optical 
activity - no camera, no screen caps, no monitor or printer at all. 
Completely in the dark, the bits of the Word file could be converted into 
the bits of an emulated optical scan, and presto, invisible optics.

Searle wasn't wrong. The whole point of the Chinese Room is to point out 
that computation is a disconnected, anesthetic function which is 
accomplished with no need for understanding of larger contexts. 

Craig

 

> Jason
>

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 5:11:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Apr 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?
>
> "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real 
>> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No computer 
>> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness can 
>> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."
>
>
>
> You can represent many real numbers by the program computing their 
> approximation. You can fan constructively on all real numbers (like the UD 
> does notably).
>
> Only if a brain uses some non computable real number as an oracle, with 
> all decimals given in one "strike", then we cannot simulate it with Turing 
> machine, but this needs to make the mind actually infinite.
>

If the mind is what is real, then there are no decimals. The brain is the 
public representation of the history, and as such, it can only be observed 
from the reduced 3p set of qualia. The 3p reduction may rationalize the 
appearance. From an absolute perspective, all phenomena are temporary 
partitions within the one "strike" of eternity.


> So the statement above is just a statement of non-comp, not an argument 
> for non comp, as it fails to give us what is that non computable real 
> playing a role in cognition.
>

What does the machine say when we ask it why it can't understand pi without 
approximating it?
 

>
> But there is something correct. A computer, nor a brain, can simulate 
> consciousness. Nor can a computer simlulate the number one, or the number 
> two. It has to borrow them from arithmetical truth.
>

Then why would your son in law's computer brain provide him with 
consciousness? 

Craig

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -- 
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> .
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>  
>  
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 6:53 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> "If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels
>> constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't do
>> that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually multiplied by
>> number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so in reality the can't
>> be conscious of a full picture, not even of the full color at a single
>> pixel.
>
>
>

He is making the same mistake Searle did regarding the Chinese room.  He is
conflating what the CPU can see at one time (analogous to rule follower in
Chinese room) with what the program can know.  Consider the program of a
neural network: it can be processed by a sequentially operating CPU
processing one connection at a time, but the simulated network itself can
see any arbitrary number of inputs at once.

How do he propose OCR software can recognize letters if it can only see a
single pixel at a time?

Jason

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Brian Tenneson]

Interesting read.

The problem I have with this is that in set theory, there are several 
examples of sets who owe their existence to axioms alone. In other words, 
there is an axiom that states there is a set X such that (blah, blah, 
blah). How are we to know which sets/notions are meaningless concepts?  
Because to me, it sounds like Doron's personal opinion that some concepts 
are meaningless while other concepts like huge, unknowable, and tiny are 
not meaningless.  Is there anything that would remove the opinion portion 
of this?

How is the second axiom an improvement while containing words like huge, 
unknowable, and tiny??

quote
So I deny even the existence of the Peano axiom that every integer has a 
successor. Eventually
we would get an overflow error in the big computer in the sky, and the sum 
and product of any
two integers is well-defined only if the result is less than p, or if one 
wishes, one can compute them
modulo p. Since p is so large, this is not a practical problem, since the 
overflow in our earthly
computers comes so much sooner than the overflow errors in the big computer 
in the sky.
end quote

What if the big computer in the sky is infinite? Or if all computers are 
finite in capacity yet there is no largest computer?

What if NO computer activity is relevant to the set of numbers that exist 
"mathematically"? 


On Monday, April 22, 2013 11:28:46 AM UTC-7, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>
> See here: 
>
> http://www.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/mamarim/mamarimPDF/real.pdf 
>
> Saibal 
>
>
> > To post to this group, send email to 
> > everyth...@googlegroups.com. 
>
> > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. 
>
> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
>
>
>

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, April 22, 2013 10:23:04 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 08:06:29PM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On 22 avr. 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > > A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments? 
> > > 
> > > "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real 
> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No computer 
> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness can 
> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it." 
> > 
> > Of course it can, the same way it represents the letter A, as some 
> sequence of bits. And it can perform symbolic computations with it. It can 
>  calculate pi/2 + pi/2 = pi and so on. 
> > 
> > 
>
> To expand a bit on Telmo's comment, the computer represents pi, e, 
> sqrt(2) and so on as a set of properties, or algorithms. Computers can 
> happily compute exactly with any computable number (which are of 
> measure zero in the reals). They cannot represent nondescribable 
> numbers, and cannot compute with noncomputable numbers (such as 
> Chaitin's Omega). 
>
> Also, computers do not compute with rational numbers, they compute 
> with integers (often of fixed word size, but that restriction can 
> easily be lifted, at the cost of performance). Rational numbers can 
> obviously be represented as a pair of integers. What are called "real" 
> numbers in some computer languages, or more accurately "float" numbers 
> in other computer languages, are actually integers that have been 
> mapped in a non-uniform way onto subsets of the real number 
> line. Their properties are such that they efficiently generate 
> adequate approximations to continuous mathematical models. There is a 
> whole branch of mathematics devoted to determining what "adequate" 
> means in this context. 
>

I think there are some clues there as to why computation can never generate 
awareness. While a computer can approximate the reals to an arbitrary 
degree of precision, we must delimit that degree programmatically.  A 
machine has no preference about what is adequate, and can compute decimal 
places for a thousand years without coming any closer to conceiving of the 
particular significance of pi to circle geometry.  

I'll paste the next comment from the OP of the first. I think it's 
interesting that he also has noticed the connection between biological 
origins in the single cell and non-computability, but he is looking at it 
from QM perspective. My view is to focus on the single cell origin as a 
single autopoietic event origin...an event which lasts an entire lifetime.

"If you think about your own vision, you can see millions of pixels 
> constantly, you are aware of the full picture, but a computer can't do 
> that, the cpu can only know about 32 or 64 pixels, eventually multiplied by 
> number of kernels, but it see them as single bit's so in reality the can't 
> be conscious of a full picture, not even of the full color at a single 
> pixel.
>
> This is simply a HW problem you can't get around with the current 
> technology. With Quantum Computing it may be possible to make large models 
> where all pixels are part of one structure build on entanglement.
>
> Man comes from a single cell and that means that entanglement could bind 
> the cells together, icluding our cells dedicated to building the internal 
> cinema. But it is still not enough to create the necessary understanding of 
> the picture.
>
> Gödels theorem states than there are problems that are unsolvable within 
> the system, that you need something from without the system, and computers 
> are fully within the system and as man can solve these problems he must 
> have something from without this system. This understanding you wouldn't 
> get if you don't use Gödels theorem, so you put fences up and around you 
> hindering your expansion of your understanding.
>
> BTW I am a computer scientist educated at Datalogical Institute at the 
> University of Copenhagen, and have worked with Artificial Intelligence, 
> Numerical Analysis and Combinatorial Optimization, all ways to bring pseudo 
> intelligence to computers."


Craig
 

>
> Cheers 
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Apr 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:


A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?

"Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for  
real numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational.  
No computer can represent pi or any other real number... So even  
when consciousness can be explained by computations, no computer can  
actually simulate it."



You can represent many real numbers by the program computing their  
approximation. You can fan constructively on all real numbers (like  
the UD does notably).


Only if a brain uses some non computable real number as an oracle,  
with all decimals given in one "strike", then we cannot simulate it  
with Turing machine, but this needs to make the mind actually infinite.


So the statement above is just a statement of non-comp, not an  
argument for non comp, as it fails to give us what is that non  
computable real playing a role in cognition.


But there is something correct. A computer, nor a brain, can simulate  
consciousness. Nor can a computer simlulate the number one, or the  
number two. It has to borrow them from arithmetical truth.


Bruno







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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 08:06:29PM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> 
> 
> On 22 avr. 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> 
> > A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?
> > 
> > "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real 
> > numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No computer 
> > can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness can 
> > be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."
> 
> Of course it can, the same way it represents the letter A, as some sequence 
> of bits. And it can perform symbolic computations with it. It can  calculate 
> pi/2 + pi/2 = pi and so on.
> 
> 

To expand a bit on Telmo's comment, the computer represents pi, e,
sqrt(2) and so on as a set of properties, or algorithms. Computers can
happily compute exactly with any computable number (which are of
measure zero in the reals). They cannot represent nondescribable
numbers, and cannot compute with noncomputable numbers (such as
Chaitin's Omega).

Also, computers do not compute with rational numbers, they compute
with integers (often of fixed word size, but that restriction can
easily be lifted, at the cost of performance). Rational numbers can
obviously be represented as a pair of integers. What are called "real"
numbers in some computer languages, or more accurately "float" numbers
in other computer languages, are actually integers that have been
mapped in a non-uniform way onto subsets of the real number
line. Their properties are such that they efficiently generate
adequate approximations to continuous mathematical models. There is a
whole branch of mathematics devoted to determining what "adequate"
means in this context.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, April 22, 2013 2:28:46 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>
> See here: 
>
> http://www.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/mamarim/mamarimPDF/real.pdf 
>

Ah yes, we come full circle...

Develop math to help understand reality > realize that math is different 
from reality > build instruments using math which prove that math can only 
see the mathematical aspects of reality > decide that reality can't be real 
and make plans to replace it with math.

Craig


> Saibal 
>
> Citeren Craig Weinberg >: 
>
> > A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments? 
> > 
> > "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real 
> >> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No 
> computer 
> >> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness 
> can 
> >> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it." 
> > 
> > -- 
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> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
>
>
>

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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, April 22, 2013 2:06:29 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
>
>
> On 22 avr. 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote:
>
> A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?
>
> "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real 
>> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No computer 
>> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness can 
>> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."
>
>
> Of course it can, the same way it represents the letter A, as some 
> sequence of bits. And it can perform symbolic computations with it. It can 
>  calculate pi/2 + pi/2 = pi and so on.
>

It's not representing pi with A though, it's representing a digital 
sequence which is arbitrarily truncated or rounded off at some point. It is 
not pi, but pi-ish.
 

>
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>  
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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[smitra]

See here:

http://www.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/mamarim/mamarimPDF/real.pdf

Saibal

Citeren Craig Weinberg :


A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?

"Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real

numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No computer
can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness can
be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."


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Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

[Telmo Menezes]

On 22 avr. 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?
> 
> "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real 
> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No computer 
> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness can 
> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."

Of course it can, the same way it represents the letter A, as some sequence of 
bits. And it can perform symbolic computations with it. It can  calculate pi/2 
+ pi/2 = pi and so on.


> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
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>  
>  

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