Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Dec 2012, at 14:11, Roger Clough wrote:


Bruno Marchal said

"They are logically "interacting" though."

Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are
treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads.
Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical.

So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's
"Hard Problem") is the only possibly correct one.


I agree. A part of the mind-body problem comes from the ... invention  
of matter (primitive matter). It is an extrapolation coming from our  
taking seriously the local appearances, to eat, and to avoid being  
eaten. I guess.


Bruno







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/8/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science


On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Stephen,

I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind  
and body

are completely different substances,


In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this  
case, as subtance is often considered as primary)




no matter what your philosophy or
science, and cannot interact.


They are logically "interacting" though.

Bruno




The failure to solve the "hard problem"
shows that.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/7/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -----
From: Telmo Menezes
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

Hi Stephen,



This is the case with modern cognitive science:
1)牋It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
solution to the mind/brain problem in favor爋f treating
both substances as material.

A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If  
mind is outside the physical world, how does it interact with  
body? Any mechanism of interaction you can propose would make mind  
part of the physical world, thus negating dualism.


Dear Telmo,

牋 There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are  
isomorphs of each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of  
each other, here. Descartes' substance dualism fails because the  
poor chap was asking the wrong question. The right question to ask  
is: How do minds interact with each other? Answer: via bodies.  
Minds are just the self-representations that bodies can have of  
themselves.


Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time.




I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something  
extremely weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by  
current science. I don't buy into the idea that consciousness  
emerges from neural activity. Yet, any explanation must place  
consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or vice-versa),  
otherwise the previous paradox arises.


牋 Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first  
person sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/ 
explanations for it.


I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly  
the same thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered...



--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Roger Clough]

Hi Alberto G. Corona 

Leibniz, being an Idealist, took the monads and ideas to be real, 
the physical world to be phenomenol, but not an illusion.
You could still stub your toe.  


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/9/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Alberto G. Corona 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-08, 10:04:04
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science







2012/12/8 Stephen P. King 

On 12/7/2012 6:01 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Fantastic links, specially the latter. I?l read it. 


This is my standpoint now:


First is necessary to define existence. ?y standpoint is that what exists ?s 
what the mind assumes that exist (because it is relevant) .


Dear Alberto,

?? But this makes existence subservient on the ability of a mind to apprehend 
what might exist. This is requires an explanation of how that could occur! How 
can a mind cause something to exist? I see this as conflating the notion of 
existence with the notion of definiteness of properties. 

?? In my philosophy, I take existence as ontological primitive and completely 
divorsed of innate properties; it replaces 'substance' as the neutral 'bearer 
of of properties'. Existence is eternal, it cannot be created or destroyed. 
Properties are that which the mind selects as actual from the possible. If we 
demand that an entity's existence requires a priori properties, then I would 
stipulate that all possible properties are implied by bare existence. 



Dear Stephen:
?
...Here you express a belief that is coherent with my notion of existence. Mine 
is historically called Realism, that is, what the mind aprehend is the reality 
because apart from that, there is no other reality that we can access. Phisical 
reality is part of this mind created reality. Your idea of existence is also an 
instance


? take an operational approach from outside, and I said that the ontological 
concepts are the ones in each individual mind shares with others. Outside of 
that I can not imagine other notion of existence apart from mathematical 
existence. Do men exist? This is because we have a hardwired category for men. 
Do cars exists? yes because we have a hardwired categories for man-made things, 
?ast things, dangerous things and so on that are used to construct the category 
of car.


Mathematical existence may be also a necessary consequence of the existence of 
the mind.


? don? fall into relativism, since the hard and soft architecture of the human 
mind are the same in all men, and so the categorizations. ?here are universal 
categories because there are universal feelings, worries and problems. that 
humans have and we deal with them in similar ways. If not, there would be no 
translation possible between languages, and the Arabs would not like 
south-american soap-operas, as the relativist culturalists used to believe.


?n this case, the process is what make the category. ?hat something is a 
substance means that there are patterns in the processes that have a 
recognizable structure recognized as substantial. A processis composed of 
patterns, these patterns are categories or substances. 



?? Yes, Process defines categories. Substances, in my thinking, are collections 
of similar bundles of properties.
?



That is unavoidable, because the mind has no infinite power neither the brain 
has a infinite?uantity?f connections, therefore it has to reuse functional 
components, some of?hich?re ?ard wired. ?etaphors are a sign of 
this?e-usability: ? can kill an insect, but a bacteria can kill me, ? can 
"kill" a program...


?? I disagree. The mind has infinite power but is contained such that it can 
only have extensions that are consistent with precedent. No 'new idea' or 
thought can be in logical conflict with previously held truths! Remember, a 
mind is not a fixed 'thing'!


So a mind is not consistent with or is the efect-cause of ?he activity of the 
brain? how a limited computer like the brain can have infinite power?. At least 
it is quite slow for some tasks, if we compare with an ordinary calculator. So 
some limitation apply to the mind, at least in the time parameter




In al these processes, the pattern is the same: something that existed before 
does not exit now because an active subject has acted to kill it. ?he category 
of killing has certain properties: it ?s nor reflexive, has a relation of order 
etc. ? 



?? Not in my thinking. Some new properties become known to be the case, thus a 
mind can evolve by gaining new knowledge. Existence is completely passive. 



Sure, you can make subcategories. But for sure when you and a Yanomamo think 
about the concept of "killing" for sure that both of you are thinking about 
exactly the same concept and could compose phrases in which both of you will 
agree.


I can philosophize about the n

Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Telmo Menezes]

>
>
> On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 1:19 PM, Roger Clough  wrote:
>
>>  Hi Stephen P. King
>>
>> Processes still have to have overall coordination to prevent
>> collisions, keep oil and water separate.
>>
>
> No they don't. The separation of oil and water is just the macroscopic
> outcome of local interactions between molecules with no overall
> coordination whatsoever.
>
>
> OK. But Roger was perhaps referring to the laws making those interaction
> occurring, the thing which, in a way or another implement those laws, I am
> not sure ...
>


Fair enough. The reason why I dislike the term "overall coordination" in
this case is that it is a loaded term. To me it implies intelligent
control. Of course intelligence is a mushy concept in itself, so we are
thrown into a world of fuzzy concepts and start to lose meaning.

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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Dec 2012, at 16:23, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 1:19 PM, Roger Clough   
wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Processes still have to have overall coordination to prevent
collisions, keep oil and water separate.

No they don't. The separation of oil and water is just the  
macroscopic outcome of local interactions between molecules with no  
overall coordination whatsoever.


OK. But Roger was perhaps referring to the laws making those  
interaction occurring, the thing which, in a way or another implement  
those laws, I am not sure ...


Bruno





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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Stephen P. King]

On 12/8/2012 7:19 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King
Processes still have to have overall coordination to prevent
collisions, keep oil and water separate.

Dear Roger,

What determines the property of immiscibility of oil and water? I 
am asking you to consider the nature of properties and how it is that 
they become definite, instread of jsut assuming that the properties are 
innate and definite in an a priori sense.


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Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 1:19 PM, Roger Clough  wrote:

>  Hi Stephen P. King
>
> Processes still have to have overall coordination to prevent
> collisions, keep oil and water separate.
>

No they don't. The separation of oil and water is just the macroscopic
outcome of local interactions between molecules with no overall
coordination whatsoever.

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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Alberto G. Corona]

2012/12/8 Stephen P. King 

>  On 12/7/2012 6:01 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
> Fantastic links, specially the latter. I´ll read it.
>
>  This is my standpoint now:
>
>  First is necessary to define existence.  My standpoint is that what
> exists  is what the mind assumes that exist (because it is relevant) .
>
>
> Dear Alberto,
>
> But this makes existence subservient on the ability of a mind to
> apprehend what might exist. This is requires an explanation of how that
> could occur! How can a mind cause something to exist? I see this as
> conflating the notion of existence with the notion of definiteness of
> properties.
>
> In my philosophy, I take *existence* as ontological primitive and
> completely divorsed of innate properties; it replaces 'substance' as the
> neutral 'bearer of of properties'. Existence is eternal, it cannot be
> created or destroyed. Properties are that which the mind selects as actual
> from the possible. If we demand that an entity's existence requires a
> priori properties, then I would stipulate that all possible properties are
> implied by bare existence.
>
> Dear Stephen:

...Here you express a belief that is coherent with my notion of existence.
Mine is historically called Realism, that is, what the mind aprehend is the
reality because apart from that, there is no other reality that we can
access. Phisical reality is part of this mind created reality. Your idea of
existence is also an instance

 I take an operational approach from outside, and I said that the
ontological concepts are the ones in each individual mind shares with
others. Outside of that I can not imagine other notion of existence apart
from mathematical existence. Do men exist? This is because we have a
hardwired category for men. Do cars exists? yes because we have a hardwired
categories for man-made things,  fast things, dangerous things and so on
that are used to construct the category of car.

Mathematical existence may be also a necessary consequence of the existence
of the mind.

 I don´t fall into relativism, since the hard and soft architecture of the
human mind are the same in all men, and so the categorizations.  There are
universal categories because there are universal feelings, worries and
problems. that humans have and we deal with them in similar ways. If not,
there would be no translation possible between languages, and the Arabs
would not like south-american soap-operas, as the relativist culturalists
used to believe.

>
>   In this case, the process is what make the category.  That something is
> a substance means that there are patterns in the processes that have a
> recognizable structure recognized as substantial. A processis composed of
> patterns, these patterns are categories or substances.
>
>
> Yes, Process defines categories. Substances, in my thinking, are
> collections of similar bundles of properties.
>
>

>  That is unavoidable, because the mind has no infinite power neither the
> brain has a infinite quantity of connections, therefore it has to reuse
> functional components, some of which are  hard wired.  Metaphors are a sign
> of this re-usability:  I can kill an insect, but a bacteria can kill me,  I
> can "kill" a program...
>
>
> I disagree. The mind has infinite power but is contained such that it
> can only have extensions that are consistent with precedent. No 'new idea'
> or thought can be in logical conflict with previously held truths!
> Remember, a mind is not a fixed 'thing'!
>
> So a mind is not consistent with or is the efect-cause of  the activity of
the brain? how a limited computer like the brain can have infinite power?.
At least it is quite slow for some tasks, if we compare with an ordinary
calculator. So some limitation apply to the mind, at least in the time
parameter

>
>
>  In al these processes, the pattern is the same: something that existed
> before does not exit now because an active subject has acted to kill it.
>  the category of killing has certain properties: it  is nor reflexive, has
> a relation of order etc.
>
>
> Not in my thinking. Some new properties become known to be the case,
> thus a mind can evolve by gaining new knowledge. Existence is completely
> passive.
>
> Sure, you can make subcategories. But for sure when you and a Yanomamo
think about the concept of "killing" for sure that both of you are thinking
about exactly the same concept and could compose phrases in which both of
you will agree.

>
>  I can philosophize about the notion of killing, abstracted from the
> concrete situation . In the same way I can think about love, or reason, or
> any other category because they can applied to different processes but have
> certain patterns and properties that make them different one from the other
> and thus they are substantial.  I can relate one category with other in the
> abstract, like for example: if you kill something, you don´t love it.
>
>
> I try to not base my philosophical mussing on reasonings t

Re: Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Richard Ruquist]

No Roger,

The BEC properties are known from laboratory experiment.

For example, light can skip thru a BEC at infinite speed,
leaving the BEC as it enters,
or light can be stopped and started in a BEC.

My opinion is that a BEC is effectively outside of spacetime.
I am not alone in that opinion. For example , See:
Hu H and Wu M. Thinking outside the box: the essence
and implications of quantum entanglement.
NeuroQuantology 2006.

Richard

On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:39 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:
> Hi Richard Ruquist
>
> Didn't you just make that up ?
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/8/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Richard Ruquist
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-08, 08:20:14
> Subject: Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
>
> Roger,
>
> BECs make that interaction possible.
> Don't you ever rad my posts?
> Richard
>
> On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:11 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal said
>>
>> "They are logically "interacting" though."
>>
>> Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are
>> treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads.
>> Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical.
>>
>> So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's
>> "Hard Problem") is the only possibly correct one.
>>
>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
>> 12/8/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>
>>
>> - Receiving the following content -
>> From: Bruno Marchal
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39
>> Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
>>
>>
>> On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote:
>>
>> Hi Stephen,
>>
>> I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and
>> body
>> are completely different substances,
>>
>>
>> In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case,
>> as
>> subtance is often considered as primary)
>>
>>
>> no matter what your philosophy or
>> science, and cannot interact.
>>
>>
>> They are logically "interacting" though.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> The failure to solve the "hard problem"
>> shows that.
>>
>>
>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
>> 12/7/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>
>>
>> - Receiving the following content -
>> From: Telmo Menezes
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29
>> Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
>>
>> Hi Stephen,
>>
>>>
>>>> This is the case with modern cognitive science:
>>>> 1)牋It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
>>>> solution to the mind/brain problem in favor爋f treating
>>>> both substances as material.
>>>
>>>
>>> A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is
>>> outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism
>>> of
>>> interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world,
>>> thus
>>> negating dualism.
>>>
>>>
>>> Dear Telmo,
>>>
>>> 牋 There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are isomorphs of
>>> each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here.
>>> Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the
>>> wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with
>>> each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations
>>> that
>>> bodies can have of themselves.
>>
>>
>> Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely
>>> weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I
>>> don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity.
>>> Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical
>>> laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.
>>>
>>>
>>> 牋 Once we accept that consciousness i

Re: Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Roger Clough]

Hi Richard Ruquist 

Didn't you just make that up ?


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/8/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Richard Ruquist 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-08, 08:20:14
Subject: Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science


Roger,

BECs make that interaction possible.
Don't you ever rad my posts?
Richard

On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:11 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:
> Bruno Marchal said
>
> "They are logically "interacting" though."
>
> Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are
> treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads.
> Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical.
>
> So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's
> "Hard Problem") is the only possibly correct one.
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/8/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39
> Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
>
>
> On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote:
>
> Hi Stephen,
>
> I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and body
> are completely different substances,
>
>
> In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case, as
> subtance is often considered as primary)
>
>
> no matter what your philosophy or
> science, and cannot interact.
>
>
> They are logically "interacting" though.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> The failure to solve the "hard problem"
> shows that.
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/7/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Telmo Menezes
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29
> Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
>
> Hi Stephen,
>
>>
>>> This is the case with modern cognitive science:
>>> 1)?It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
>>> solution to the mind/brain problem in favor?f treating
>>> both substances as material.
>>
>>
>> A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is
>> outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of
>> interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus
>> negating dualism.
>>
>>
>> Dear Telmo,
>>
>> ? There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are isomorphs of
>> each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here.
>> Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the
>> wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with
>> each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that
>> bodies can have of themselves.
>
>
> Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely
>> weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I
>> don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity.
>> Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical
>> laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.
>>
>>
>> ? Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person
>> sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for it.
>
>
> I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly the same
> thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered...
>
>>
>> --
>> Onward!
>>
>> Stephen
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
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>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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> To u

Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Richard Ruquist]

Roger,

BECs make that interaction possible.
Don't you ever rad my posts?
Richard

On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:11 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:
> Bruno Marchal said
>
> "They are logically "interacting" though."
>
> Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are
> treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads.
> Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical.
>
> So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's
> "Hard Problem") is the only possibly correct one.
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/8/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39
> Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
>
>
> On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote:
>
> Hi Stephen,
>
> I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and body
> are completely different substances,
>
>
> In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case, as
> subtance is often considered as primary)
>
>
> no matter what your philosophy or
> science, and cannot interact.
>
>
> They are logically "interacting" though.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> The failure to solve the "hard problem"
> shows that.
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/7/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Telmo Menezes
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29
> Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
>
> Hi Stephen,
>
>>
>>> This is the case with modern cognitive science:
>>> 1)牋It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
>>> solution to the mind/brain problem in favor爋f treating
>>> both substances as material.
>>
>>
>> A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is
>> outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of
>> interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus
>> negating dualism.
>>
>>
>> Dear Telmo,
>>
>> 牋 There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are isomorphs of
>> each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here.
>> Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the
>> wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with
>> each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that
>> bodies can have of themselves.
>
>
> Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely
>> weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I
>> don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity.
>> Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical
>> laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.
>>
>>
>> 牋 Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person
>> sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for it.
>
>
> I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly the same
> thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered...
>
>>
>> --
>> Onward!
>>
>> Stephen
>>
>>
>> --
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>
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Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Roger Clough]

Bruno Marchal said

"They are logically "interacting" though."

Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are 
treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads.
Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical.

So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's
"Hard Problem") is the only possibly correct one.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/8/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science




On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Stephen,

I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and body
are completely different substances, 


In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case, as 
subtance is often considered as primary)




no matter what your philosophy or
science, and cannot interact. 


They are logically "interacting" though.


Bruno






The failure to solve the "hard problem" 
shows that.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/7/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Telmo Menezes 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science


Hi Stephen,





This is the case with modern cognitive science:
1)?It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
solution to the mind/brain problem in favor?f treating
both substances as material.


A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is outside 
the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of 
interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus 
negating dualism.


Dear Telmo,

? There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are isomorphs of each 
other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here. Descartes' 
substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the wrong question. 
The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with each other? Answer: 
via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that bodies can have of 
themselves.


Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time.





I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely weird 
about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I don't buy 
into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. Yet, any 
explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or 
vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises. 



? Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person sense we 
will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for it. 



I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly the same 
thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered...




-- 
Onward!

Stephen


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Roger Clough]

Hi Stephen P. King 

Processes still have to have overall coordination to prevent
collisions, keep oil and water separate.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/8/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-07, 07:53:54
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science


On 12/7/2012 7:04 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen,
?
I think that's just more?aterialist wishful thinking, because mind and body
are completely different substances, no matter what your philosophy or
science,?nd cannot interact. The failure to solve the "hard problem" 
shows that.
?
?
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/7/2012 
Dear Roger,

?? There are no "substances", there are only processes. 


-- 
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Stephen,

I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind  
and body

are completely different substances,


In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this  
case, as subtance is often considered as primary)




no matter what your philosophy or
science, and cannot interact.


They are logically "interacting" though.

Bruno




The failure to solve the "hard problem"
shows that.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/7/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Telmo Menezes
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

Hi Stephen,



This is the case with modern cognitive science:
�
1)牋It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
solution to the mind/brain problem in favor爋f treating
both substances as material.

A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If  
mind is outside the physical world, how does it interact with body?  
Any mechanism of interaction you can propose would make mind part  
of the physical world, thus negating dualism.


Dear Telmo,

牋� There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are  
isomorphs of each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of  
each other, here. Descartes' substance dualism fails because the  
poor chap was asking the wrong question. The right question to ask  
is: How do minds interact with each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds  
are just the self-representations that bodies can have of themselves.


Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time.
�




I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something  
extremely weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by  
current science. I don't buy into the idea that consciousness  
emerges from neural activity. Yet, any explanation must place  
consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or vice-versa),  
otherwise the previous paradox arises.


牋� Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first  
person sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/ 
explanations for it.


I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly the  
same thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered...


�

--
Onward!

Stephen

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Stephen P. King]

On 12/7/2012 6:01 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Fantastic links, specially the latter. I´ll read it.

This is my standpoint now:

First is necessary to define existence.  My standpoint is that what 
exists  is what the mind assumes that exist (because it is relevant) .


Dear Alberto,

But this makes existence subservient on the ability of a mind to 
apprehend what might exist. This is requires an explanation of how that 
could occur! How can a mind cause something to exist? I see this as 
conflating the notion of existence with the notion of definiteness of 
properties.


In my philosophy, I take /existence/ as ontological primitive and 
completely divorsed of innate properties; it replaces 'substance' as the 
neutral 'bearer of of properties'. Existence is eternal, it cannot be 
created or destroyed. Properties are that which the mind selects as 
actual from the possible. If we demand that an entity's existence 
requires a priori properties, then I would stipulate that all possible 
properties are implied by bare existence.




 In this case, the process is what make the category.  That something 
is a substance means that there are patterns in the processes that 
have a recognizable structure recognized as substantial. A processis 
composed of patterns, these patterns are categories or substances.


Yes, Process defines categories. Substances, in my thinking, are 
collections of similar bundles of properties.




That is unavoidable, because the mind has no infinite power neither 
the brain has a infinite quantity of connections, therefore it has to 
reuse functional components, some of which are  hard wired.  Metaphors 
are a sign of this re-usability:  I can kill an insect, but a bacteria 
can kill me,  I can "kill" a program...


I disagree. The mind has infinite power but is contained such that 
it can only have extensions that are consistent with precedent. No 'new 
idea' or thought can be in logical conflict with previously held truths! 
Remember, a mind is not a fixed 'thing'!




In al these processes, the pattern is the same: something that existed 
before does not exit now because an active subject has acted to kill 
it.  the category of killing has certain properties: it  is nor 
reflexive, has a relation of order etc.


Not in my thinking. Some new properties become known to be the 
case, thus a mind can evolve by gaining new knowledge. Existence is 
completely passive.




I can philosophize about the notion of killing, abstracted from the 
concrete situation . In the same way I can think about love, or 
reason, or any other category because they can applied to different 
processes but have certain patterns and properties that make them 
different one from the other and thus they are substantial.  I can 
relate one category with other in the abstract, like for example: if 
you kill something, you don´t love it.


I try to not base my philosophical mussing on reasonings that are 
so emotionally charged. You are in the area of etheics here, not 
ontology, IMHO.




The categories may look ambiguous because they may be applied to very 
different processes for the sake of reusability and computational 
efficiency, (so they have subcategories) but in essence they can be 
rigorously defined in terms of category theory.


But this makes categorization a field that the mind of an 
individual has a tyrannical rule over. I see categories as democratic, 
they are collections of mutual agreement and consent between entities, 
not captives to be commanded.




The mere fact that I say I "killed the browser" without any conscious 
thinking and the fact that you understand it immediately without 
further concern means that categories are in the human mind, and 
therefore, configure the reality that we perceive.


Umm, you might be bringing in ideas from semiotics and considering 
the problem of the signified. Please watch this: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdP_dtBvtQo (I presume that you can 
understand Spanish)





To say that these abstract things do not  exist is the 
nominalist-positivist- materialist standpoint that I see deeply flawed 
in philosophical, mathematical, computational, experiential and even 
materialistic and moral terms.


I am weaving together ideas from both nominalism and universalism 
to overcome problems within each one (taken individually).





2012/12/7 Stephen P. King >


On 12/7/2012 9:02 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

"There are no "substances", there are only processes"

In terms of category theory, this is like

"there are no categoríes, there are only arrows!"


Dear Alberto,

Indeed! Have you studied a bit of N-Category theory
? Any "object" is constructed
from arrows of another level. What I am claiming is that all of
the properties that we define "substances" as can be shown to be
merely invariances in some collection of 

Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Stephen P. King]

On 12/7/2012 9:02 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

"There are no "substances", there are only processes"

In terms of category theory, this is like

"there are no categoríes, there are only arrows!"


Dear Alberto,

Indeed! Have you studied a bit of N-Category theory 
? Any "object" is constructed from 
arrows of another level. What I am claiming is that all of the 
properties that we define "substances" as can be shown to be merely 
invariances in some collection of transformations. In other words, there 
are no primitive substances, there are only processes. Please read this 
article on the concept of Substance in philosophy to see the ideas that 
I am considering: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/
The discussion of "substantivalism" in physics is particularly 
interesting as seen here: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/








2012/12/7 Stephen P. King >


On 12/7/2012 7:04 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen,
I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because
mind and body
are completely different substances, no matter what your
philosophy or
science, and cannot interact. The failure to solve the "hard
problem"
shows that.
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/7/2012

Dear Roger,

There are no "substances", there are only processes.

-- 




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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Richard Ruquist]

Roger,

Different substances have been shown to be capable of entanglement
if they are in the form of a BEC- Bose-Einstein Condensate.
Richard

On Fri, Dec 7, 2012 at 9:02 AM, Alberto G. Corona  wrote:
> "There are no "substances", there are only processes"
>
> In terms of category theory, this is like
>
> "there are no categoríes, there are only arrows!"
>
>
>
>
> 2012/12/7 Stephen P. King 
>>
>> On 12/7/2012 7:04 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>>
>> Hi Stephen,
>>
>> I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and
>> body
>> are completely different substances, no matter what your philosophy or
>> science, and cannot interact. The failure to solve the "hard problem"
>> shows that.
>>
>>
>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
>> 12/7/2012
>>
>> Dear Roger,
>>
>> There are no "substances", there are only processes.
>>
>> --
>> Onward!
>>
>> Stephen
>>
>> --
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>
>
>
>
> --
> Alberto.
>
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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Stephen P. King]

On 12/7/2012 7:04 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen,
I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind 
and body

are completely different substances, no matter what your philosophy or
science, and cannot interact. The failure to solve the "hard problem"
shows that.
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/7/2012

Dear Roger,

There are no "substances", there are only processes.

--
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Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Roger Clough]

Hi ya'll , 

String theory is outside of spacetime but strings, if they exist, 
must exist in spacetime. 


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/7/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content -  
From: Telmo Menezes  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-06, 10:02:09 
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science 


Hi Richard,? 


>> > A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is 
>> > outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any 
>> > mechanism of 
>> > interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, 
>> > thus 
>> > negating dualism. 
>> > 
>> > I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely 
>> > weird 
>> > about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I 
>> > don't 
>> > buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. Yet, 
>> > any 
>> > explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws 
>> > (or 
>> > vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises. 
>> > 
>> 
>> Telmo, String theory monads, the particles of compactified extra 
>> string dimensions, 6 dimensions each, called Calabi-Yau compact 
>> manifolds, are uniformly distributed in space in a rather crystalline 
>> structure, yet are effectively outside spacetime because each monad 
>> maps the universe instantly to its interior; and if that were not 
>> enough, the monads being space precipitating from space in the big 
>> bang, they are motionless and therefore form a Bose-Einstein 
>> Condensate BEC in which light can propagate at any speed including 
>> infinite speed. Those monads also contain the laws and constants of 
>> physics and they regulate physical particle interactions. 
>> 
>> Bet on string theory and you get everything in one package. 
>> BTW the instantaneous monad perception is my hypothesis. 
>> ? 3-D solution is not available yet. 
>> 
>> But the other properties of CY compact manifolds are well known in 
>> string theory. 
>> Richard 
> 
> 
> 
> Ok, but where's the dualism there? What you're describing is a physical 
> model. Everything in it is still in the physical world, it's just that in 
> this model space has more than 3 dimensions and a weird topology. 
> 

Telmo, 
If you mean a dualism like the wave/particle dualism, there ain't 
none. ?f you mean a mind/brain dualism, which is really not a dualism 
at 


I mean mind/body dualism in the Cartesian sense, i.e that the mind is made of 
non-physical stuff, which was the one that Roger Clough alluded to. That form 
of dualism suffers from the interaction paradox because if non-physical stuff 
interacts with the physical world, it necessarily becomes part of the physical 
world, so there's no valid distinction to begin with. 
? 
all as the physical consciousness of the brain is very different 
from the consciousness manifested by the compact manifolds (which is 
the basis of our individual minds as well as a universal mind, much 
like comp) even though the two consciousnesses are connected and often 
copies of each other. 

The space of this model is 3-D. The extra dimensions have precipitated 
out into very tiny balls some 1000 Planck lengths across. Everything 
is in the physical world, but the compact manifolds each instantly 
image the entire universe within themselves which puts them 
effectively outside spacetime. 
Let me know if you cannot see that and I will try to explain it to you 
some other way. 



I don't get this: "the compact manifolds each instantly 
image the entire universe within themselves which puts them 

effectively outside spacetime". Especially, why does that put them outside 
spacetime? 
? 
Richard 


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Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Roger Clough]

Hi Stephen,

I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and body
are completely different substances, no matter what your philosophy or
science, and cannot interact. The failure to solve the "hard problem" 
shows that.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/7/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Telmo Menezes 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science


Hi Stephen,





This is the case with modern cognitive science:
?
1)?It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
solution to the mind/brain problem in favor?f treating
both substances as material.


A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is outside 
the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of 
interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus 
negating dualism.


Dear Telmo,

?? There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are isomorphs of each 
other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here. Descartes' 
substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the wrong question. 
The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with each other? Answer: 
via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that bodies can have of 
themselves.


Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time.
?





I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely weird 
about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I don't buy 
into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. Yet, any 
explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or 
vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises. 



?? Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person sense 
we will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for it. 



I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly the same 
thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered...


?


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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Dec 2012, at 22:13, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 3:51 PM, Telmo Menezes  
 wrote:

Hi Roger,



This is the case with modern cognitive science:

1)  It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
solution to the mind/brain problem in favor of treating
both substances as material.



A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If  
mind is
outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any  
mechanism of
interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical  
world, thus

negating dualism.

I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something  
extremely weird
about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I  
don't
buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity.  
Yet, any
explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical  
laws (or

vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.



Telmo, String theory monads, the particles of compactified extra
string dimensions, 6 dimensions each, called Calabi-Yau compact
manifolds, are uniformly distributed in space in a rather crystalline
structure, yet are effectively outside spacetime because each monad
maps the universe instantly to its interior; and if that were not
enough, the monads being space precipitating from space in the big
bang, they are motionless and therefore form a Bose-Einstein
Condensate BEC in which light can propagate at any speed including
infinite speed. Those monads also contain the laws and constants of
physics and they regulate physical particle interactions.

Bet on string theory and you get everything in one package.
BTW the instantaneous monad perception is my hypothesis.
A 3-D solution is not available yet.

But the other properties of CY compact manifolds are well known in
string theory.
Richard



Even if string theory is correct, it is better to extract it from comp.
If not you miss the genuine (with respect to comp) qualia, and keep  
consciousness under the rug.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Dec 2012, at 18:48, Roger Clough wrote:




Hi Bruno,

Another quote I can't find is one to the effect that

"For every complex problem one can usually find simple
solutions that are almost always wrong."

This is the case with modern cognitive science:

1)  It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
solution to the mind/brain problem in favor of treating
both substances as material.


?

"modern" is not a clear reference, and "substance" or "primitive  
(assumed) substance" does not make sense in comp, even if current  
cognitivist ignore this.





Hence we have a number
of of mind/brain theories that dance aournd accept these
two subjstances as being the same.


Which does not make sense either. In physics "substance" does not make  
much more sense, imo.





Descartes, oddly enough, seems to
have ignored this problem.


I totally disagree on this. Descartes has gone very far, but express  
himself in some way to avoid (in vain) some troubles with the local  
authorities. I am not even sure Descartes is a dualist. That is  
debatable, but is also another topics.




Leibniz treated both mind and brain as mind
(Idealism), which correctly allowed unity of mind and brain, but
he has been ignored.


OK. (We are in the Aristotelian era).




2) Modern cognitive science does not allow introspection,


? (it really depends what you mean by "modern").
Obviously the approach I describe gives introspection the key role.  
Indeed you can sum up it by "the truth is in the head of the machine".




because
it isn't rational.


Introspection leads to something beyond justifiability. OK.



Kant does give a rational interpretation of
synthesis, which requires  introspection, through adopting an
alternate (nonintrospective) path, a rational prodecure which is very
complicated and hard to understand, if it indeed works at all.
A semiotic approach would seem to be- at least  in principle -
much better, because it includes 1p, (in the form of relations)
although I have not seen how this works yet. Leibniz
in his monads attempts to deal with this problem through
a third party  (the Supreme Monad), but the details are
unspecified.


Computer's semiotics is handled by mathematical logic semantic, model  
theory, etc.


Bruno







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Roger Clough
Receiver: Roger Clough
Time: 2012-12-05, 07:47:47
Subject: Introspection (internal 1p) has been dropped by cognitive  
science


Hi Bruno,

I found the quote I had been searching for:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mind/
"Kant thought that transcendental arguments were a priori or
yielded the a priori in all three ways. Nonetheless, at the heart of
this method is inference to the best explanation. When introspection
[the empirical, not logical method of synthesis]
fell out of favour about 100 years ago, the alternative approach
[Kant's method of synthesis] adopted was exactly this approach.

Its nonempirical roots in Kant notwithstanding, it is now the major  
method

used by experimental cognitive scientists.

Other things equally central to Kant's approach to the mind have not  
been taken
up by cognitive science, as we will see near the end, a key part of  
his
doctrine of synthesis and most of what he had to say about  
consciousness

of self in particular. Far from his model having been superseded
by cognitive science, some important things have not even been
assimilated by it. "


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Roger Clough
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-05, 05:05:38
Subject: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the  
mind



Hi Bruno Marchal

Indeed, we can not code for [1p].  But we need not abandon
itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive
theory has done.   We can replace [1p] by its actions -
those of perception,  in which terms are relational (subject: object).
You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective.

That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or
interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations.
Your responses seem to leave out such relations.  I cannot find
again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument
for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive
theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize
cognition.  While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work
when living breathing humans are concerned.

IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent
computer calculations from emulating the mind.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Ti

Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Richard Ruquist]

On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 10:02 AM, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> Hi Richard,
>
>> >> > A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind
>> >> > is
>> >> > outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any
>> >> > mechanism of
>> >> > interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical
>> >> > world,
>> >> > thus
>> >> > negating dualism.
>> >> >
>> >> > I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something
>> >> > extremely
>> >> > weird
>> >> > about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I
>> >> > don't
>> >> > buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity.
>> >> > Yet,
>> >> > any
>> >> > explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws
>> >> > (or
>> >> > vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> Telmo, String theory monads, the particles of compactified extra
>> >> string dimensions, 6 dimensions each, called Calabi-Yau compact
>> >> manifolds, are uniformly distributed in space in a rather crystalline
>> >> structure, yet are effectively outside spacetime because each monad
>> >> maps the universe instantly to its interior; and if that were not
>> >> enough, the monads being space precipitating from space in the big
>> >> bang, they are motionless and therefore form a Bose-Einstein
>> >> Condensate BEC in which light can propagate at any speed including
>> >> infinite speed. Those monads also contain the laws and constants of
>> >> physics and they regulate physical particle interactions.
>> >>
>> >> Bet on string theory and you get everything in one package.
>> >> BTW the instantaneous monad perception is my hypothesis.
>> >>  A 3-D solution is not available yet.
>> >>
>> >> But the other properties of CY compact manifolds are well known in
>> >> string theory.
>> >> Richard
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Ok, but where's the dualism there? What you're describing is a physical
>> > model. Everything in it is still in the physical world, it's just that
>> > in
>> > this model space has more than 3 dimensions and a weird topology.
>> >
>> Telmo,
>> If you mean a dualism like the wave/particle dualism, there ain't
>> none.  If you mean a mind/brain dualism, which is really not a dualism
>> at
>
>
> I mean mind/body dualism in the Cartesian sense, i.e that the mind is made
> of non-physical stuff, which was the one that Roger Clough alluded to. That
> form of dualism suffers from the interaction paradox because if non-physical
> stuff interacts with the physical world, it necessarily becomes part of the
> physical world, so there's no valid distinction to begin with.

I invoke as a conjecture an extension of the experimental fact that
BECs (Bose-Einstein Condensates) may become entangled regardless of
the kind of particles. That is one BEC composed of a certain kind of
particle may connect to another BEC composed of a different kind of
particle.

I extend this to the conjecture that the BEC of Compact String
Particles (or String Monads) may be entangled with whatever BECs exist
in the brain, or anywhere in nature for that matter.


>
>>
>> all as the physical consciousness of the brain is very different
>> from the consciousness manifested by the compact manifolds (which is
>> the basis of our individual minds as well as a universal mind, much
>> like comp) even though the two consciousnesses are connected and often
>> copies of each other.
>>
>> The space of this model is 3-D. The extra dimensions have precipitated
>> out into very tiny balls some 1000 Planck lengths across. Everything
>> is in the physical world, but the compact manifolds each instantly
>> image the entire universe within themselves which puts them
>> effectively outside spacetime.
>> Let me know if you cannot see that and I will try to explain it to you
>> some other way.
>
>
> I don't get this: "the compact manifolds each instantly
> image the entire universe within themselves which puts them
> effectively outside spacetime". Especially, why does that put them outside
> spacetime?

If the entire space of the universe is imaged to essentially a point
in space, and essentially also to every other point in physical space,
then in a sense the properties of those points are outside space. In
an Everett block universe they would be outside spacetime. A 2-d
string solution by Greene verifies that the entire universe is mapped
to the interior of a circle instantly. But such a string solution for
the 3-d CSM particles is not available. I conjecture that the
instantaneous property is carried over to the 3-d particle. And
besides since they are collectively a BEC, information can flow
instantly, or at least at speeds far beyond the speed of light as
demonstarted for laboratory physical BECs.


>
>>
>> Richard
>>
>>
>> > --
>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>> > Groups
>> > "Everything List" group.
>> > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> > To un

Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Telmo Menezes]

Hi Stephen,


>This is the case with modern cognitive science:
>>
>> 1)  It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
>> solution to the mind/brain problem in favor of treating
>> both substances as material.
>>
>
>  A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is
> outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism
> of interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world,
> thus negating dualism.
>
>
> Dear Telmo,
>
> There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are isomorphs of
> each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, 
> here.
> Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the
> wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with
> each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations
> that bodies can have of themselves.
>

Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time.


>
>
>
>  I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely
> weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I
> don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity.
> Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical
> laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.
>
>
> Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person
> sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for
> it.
>

I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly the same
thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered...



>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Telmo Menezes]

Hi Richard,

>> > A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is
> >> > outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any
> >> > mechanism of
> >> > interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical
> world,
> >> > thus
> >> > negating dualism.
> >> >
> >> > I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely
> >> > weird
> >> > about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I
> >> > don't
> >> > buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity.
> Yet,
> >> > any
> >> > explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws
> >> > (or
> >> > vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.
> >> >
> >>
> >> Telmo, String theory monads, the particles of compactified extra
> >> string dimensions, 6 dimensions each, called Calabi-Yau compact
> >> manifolds, are uniformly distributed in space in a rather crystalline
> >> structure, yet are effectively outside spacetime because each monad
> >> maps the universe instantly to its interior; and if that were not
> >> enough, the monads being space precipitating from space in the big
> >> bang, they are motionless and therefore form a Bose-Einstein
> >> Condensate BEC in which light can propagate at any speed including
> >> infinite speed. Those monads also contain the laws and constants of
> >> physics and they regulate physical particle interactions.
> >>
> >> Bet on string theory and you get everything in one package.
> >> BTW the instantaneous monad perception is my hypothesis.
> >>  A 3-D solution is not available yet.
> >>
> >> But the other properties of CY compact manifolds are well known in
> >> string theory.
> >> Richard
> >
> >
> >
> > Ok, but where's the dualism there? What you're describing is a physical
> > model. Everything in it is still in the physical world, it's just that in
> > this model space has more than 3 dimensions and a weird topology.
> >
> Telmo,
> If you mean a dualism like the wave/particle dualism, there ain't
> none.  If you mean a mind/brain dualism, which is really not a dualism
> at


I mean mind/body dualism in the Cartesian sense, i.e that the mind is made
of non-physical stuff, which was the one that Roger Clough alluded to. That
form of dualism suffers from the interaction paradox because if
non-physical stuff interacts with the physical world, it necessarily
becomes part of the physical world, so there's no valid distinction to
begin with.


> all as the physical consciousness of the brain is very different
> from the consciousness manifested by the compact manifolds (which is
> the basis of our individual minds as well as a universal mind, much
> like comp) even though the two consciousnesses are connected and often
> copies of each other.
>
> The space of this model is 3-D. The extra dimensions have precipitated
> out into very tiny balls some 1000 Planck lengths across. Everything
> is in the physical world, but the compact manifolds each instantly
> image the entire universe within themselves which puts them
> effectively outside spacetime.
> Let me know if you cannot see that and I will try to explain it to you
> some other way.
>

I don't get this: "the compact manifolds each instantly
image the entire universe within themselves which puts them
effectively outside spacetime". Especially, why does that put them outside
spacetime?


> Richard
>
>
> > --
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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Stephen P. King]

On 12/5/2012 3:51 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Hi Roger,


This is the case with modern cognitive science:
1)  It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
solution to the mind/brain problem in favor of treating
both substances as material.


A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind 
is outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any 
mechanism of interaction you can propose would make mind part of the 
physical world, thus negating dualism.


Dear Telmo,

There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are isomorphs 
of each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, 
here . Descartes' substance 
dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the wrong question. The 
right question to ask is: How do minds interact with each other? Answer: 
via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that bodies can have 
of themselves.




I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely 
weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current 
science. I don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from 
neural activity. Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside 
the real of physical laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous 
paradox arises.


Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first 
person sense we will stop asking for third person 
descriptions/explanations for it.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Richard Ruquist]

On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 4:30 PM, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> Hi Richard,
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 10:13 PM, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 3:51 PM, Telmo Menezes 
>> wrote:
>> > Hi Roger,
>> >
>> >
>> >> This is the case with modern cognitive science:
>> >>
>> >> 1)  It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
>> >> solution to the mind/brain problem in favor of treating
>> >> both substances as material.
>> >
>> >
>> > A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is
>> > outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any
>> > mechanism of
>> > interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world,
>> > thus
>> > negating dualism.
>> >
>> > I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely
>> > weird
>> > about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I
>> > don't
>> > buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. Yet,
>> > any
>> > explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws
>> > (or
>> > vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.
>> >
>>
>> Telmo, String theory monads, the particles of compactified extra
>> string dimensions, 6 dimensions each, called Calabi-Yau compact
>> manifolds, are uniformly distributed in space in a rather crystalline
>> structure, yet are effectively outside spacetime because each monad
>> maps the universe instantly to its interior; and if that were not
>> enough, the monads being space precipitating from space in the big
>> bang, they are motionless and therefore form a Bose-Einstein
>> Condensate BEC in which light can propagate at any speed including
>> infinite speed. Those monads also contain the laws and constants of
>> physics and they regulate physical particle interactions.
>>
>> Bet on string theory and you get everything in one package.
>> BTW the instantaneous monad perception is my hypothesis.
>>  A 3-D solution is not available yet.
>>
>> But the other properties of CY compact manifolds are well known in
>> string theory.
>> Richard
>
>
>
> Ok, but where's the dualism there? What you're describing is a physical
> model. Everything in it is still in the physical world, it's just that in
> this model space has more than 3 dimensions and a weird topology.
>
Telmo,
If you mean a dualism like the wave/particle dualism, there ain't
none.  If you mean a mind/brain dualism, which is really not a dualism
at all as the physical consciousness of the brain is very different
from the consciousness manifested by the compact manifolds (which is
the basis of our individual minds as well as a universal mind, much
like comp) even though the two consciousnesses are connected and often
copies of each other.

The space of this model is 3-D. The extra dimensions have precipitated
out into very tiny balls some 1000 Planck lengths across. Everything
is in the physical world, but the compact manifolds each instantly
image the entire universe within themselves which puts them
effectively outside spacetime.
Let me know if you cannot see that and I will try to explain it to you
some other way.
Richard


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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Telmo Menezes]

Hi Richard,


On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 10:13 PM, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 3:51 PM, Telmo Menezes 
> wrote:
> > Hi Roger,
> >
> >
> >> This is the case with modern cognitive science:
> >>
> >> 1)  It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
> >> solution to the mind/brain problem in favor of treating
> >> both substances as material.
> >
> >
> > A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is
> > outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any
> mechanism of
> > interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world,
> thus
> > negating dualism.
> >
> > I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely
> weird
> > about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I don't
> > buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. Yet,
> any
> > explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or
> > vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.
> >
>
> Telmo, String theory monads, the particles of compactified extra
> string dimensions, 6 dimensions each, called Calabi-Yau compact
> manifolds, are uniformly distributed in space in a rather crystalline
> structure, yet are effectively outside spacetime because each monad
> maps the universe instantly to its interior; and if that were not
> enough, the monads being space precipitating from space in the big
> bang, they are motionless and therefore form a Bose-Einstein
> Condensate BEC in which light can propagate at any speed including
> infinite speed. Those monads also contain the laws and constants of
> physics and they regulate physical particle interactions.
>
> Bet on string theory and you get everything in one package.
> BTW the instantaneous monad perception is my hypothesis.
>  A 3-D solution is not available yet.
>
> But the other properties of CY compact manifolds are well known in
> string theory.
> Richard
>


Ok, but where's the dualism there? What you're describing is a physical
model. Everything in it is still in the physical world, it's just that in
this model space has more than 3 dimensions and a weird topology.

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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Richard Ruquist]

On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 3:51 PM, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> Hi Roger,
>
>
>> This is the case with modern cognitive science:
>>
>> 1)  It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
>> solution to the mind/brain problem in favor of treating
>> both substances as material.
>
>
> A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is
> outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of
> interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus
> negating dualism.
>
> I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely weird
> about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I don't
> buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. Yet, any
> explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or
> vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.
>

Telmo, String theory monads, the particles of compactified extra
string dimensions, 6 dimensions each, called Calabi-Yau compact
manifolds, are uniformly distributed in space in a rather crystalline
structure, yet are effectively outside spacetime because each monad
maps the universe instantly to its interior; and if that were not
enough, the monads being space precipitating from space in the big
bang, they are motionless and therefore form a Bose-Einstein
Condensate BEC in which light can propagate at any speed including
infinite speed. Those monads also contain the laws and constants of
physics and they regulate physical particle interactions.

Bet on string theory and you get everything in one package.
BTW the instantaneous monad perception is my hypothesis.
 A 3-D solution is not available yet.

But the other properties of CY compact manifolds are well known in
string theory.
Richard


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Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science

[Telmo Menezes]

Hi Roger,


This is the case with modern cognitive science:
>
> 1)  It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
> solution to the mind/brain problem in favor of treating
> both substances as material.
>

A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is
outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism
of interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world,
thus negating dualism.

I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely
weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I
don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity.
Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical
laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.

-- 
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