Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Dear list: “the fact that A presents B with gift C...” “I cannot forget that there are the germs of the *theory of the categories* which is (if anything is) the gift I make to the world. That is my child. In it I shall live when oblivion has me — my body” The surprising fact, *C*, is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

List, Charles: > On Apr 30, 2017, at 2:43 PM, Charles Pyle wrote: > > Many years ago linguists chewed over the issue of whether the semantic > analysis of three place predicates can be broken down into a series of two > place predicates and discovered that the two are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

List: > On Apr 29, 2017, at 10:41 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Re mathematical category theory: Many mathematicians believe that > the term 'category theory' was a poor choice. The focus of category > theory is on the mappings or morphisms. The things that are mapped > could

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Helmut and Jon, HR I think, the problem with bringing together Peirce and conventional mathematics is, that Peirces monism is one of time / change, and the conventional mathematical monism is one of space / permanence. Peirce would not say that. Charles learned mathematics from his father

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

List, Lest we forget. . . 1.135. Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 20, 2017, at 9:32 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > After that one can consider > the fine points of generic versus degenerate cases, and that is > all well and good, but until you venture to say exactly *which* > monadic, dyadic, or triadic predicate you have in mind, you >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

April 14, 2017 8:54 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs On 4/14/2017 10:41 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s > terms — especially what he means by a *triadic relation* —

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 8:09 AM To: 'Peirce-L'; Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Sorry, Jeffrey- but I don't see how your explanation below denies my view of the 'umbrella image' of the semiosic process. An

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

On 4/14/2017 10:41 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s terms — especially what he means by a *triadic relation* — we need to read them *in the context *where Peirce uses them, not lift them out of their context and drop them into

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

other remarks separately. --Jeff From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: 12-Apr-17 16:45 To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Edwina, Jon S, List, First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, list - yes, makes sense. Yes - I meant the internal Sign triadAnd yes, the three correlates are in 'other Sign relations'enables diversity Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

    Supplement: I have made a mistake with my explaining a relation with itself: If there is a set that has a relation with itself, this relation is not a subset of all tupels possibly formed by any two elements of this set, but of the set that would be formed by all tupels of the set and a copy

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?

Edwina, List: ET: In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has three 'loose ends' or blank forms - which means, as I understand it, that it is open to being filled by some subject. So far, so good. The triadic Sign relation has three loose ends, which are filled by three subjects--the Sign

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?

List, Edwina > On Apr 13, 2017, at 4:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Now- what am I missing in this view? I do not understand how your question(s) relate to the concept of identity. Perhaps if you can clearly state the premises and the conclusions of your arguments, I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?

On 4/13/2017 3:59 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: In my mind, I am left with an intractable question: Is a Procrustian Bed essential to understanding the role of the identity relation in CSP’s theory of logical graphs of relations? Or, is a semantic explanation possible? Peirce published his

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?

Jerry, list - as someone with no background in chemistry, I have a few questions: 1) I understand your analysis using the 'doctrine of valency' in chemistry and, as you point out, Peirce was a chemist. Now, in Robert's, p.115, he shows several figures - and figure 3 'represents triadic

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Jon, List, You wrote, that a dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity. Well, I dont know, how far you can apply the mathematical "relation" to the Peircean, but in mathematics it is not so: Eg. you have the set (mouse, dog, elephant), and the dyadic relation reason is "smaller

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Helmut, List: That is a very interesting suggestion, and some quick Googling confirms that Jon Awbrey has written about compositive vs. projective reduction in the past. He even cited the Sign relation as a specific example of a triadic relation that is "projectively reducible." I still wonder,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

on is inexpressible by > means of dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion may be required to > convince yourself of the first of these premisses, that every triadic > relation involves meaning.” > > > > If anyone wants to study this passage from the Lowell lectures

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?

List: (This post is rather technical and the contents may be intractably perplex for many readers of this list. One purpose of this post is to crisply separate the fundamental philosophical concept of identity from the mathematical concept of identity. To differentiate CSP view of lines of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

reduced to dyads. I have never found Pierce’s arguments convincing about the irreducibility. John FROM: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] SENT: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 1:47 PM TO: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs On Apr 12, 201

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon - I see your point about what we have discussed is an INTERNAL semiosis of the Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant. I agree with this - since they are all in the same mode, then, I can understand

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Gary F- thanks for your comments, but I disagree with your explanation. A dyad is between TWO existential entities. A Relation, such as between the Representamen and the Interpretant is not between two existential entities, but is an interaction that actually enables both to function.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, List: Again, my understanding is that the three-spoke diagram represents one triadic relation. As such, it corresponds to only one of the ten trichotomies of 1908--the very last one, "the Triadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Object and to its Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483),

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

ser look at it. Gary f. From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: 12-Apr-17 16:45 To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Edwina, Jon S, List, First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Pierce’s arguments convincing about the irreducibility. John From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] Sent: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 1:47 PM To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier <colli...@u

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, Jon S, List, First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I think the three pronged spoke *does *exactly represent a triadic relation, not three relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node from which the three spokes protrude make it one

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }see my comments -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Wed 12/04/17 1:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, List: ET: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon, list 1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where are these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a cell; its habits, which function to mould its material content

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 12, 2017, at 9:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > I'm guessing an engineer would have some acquaintance with > relational databases, which have after all a history going > back to Peirce, and I would recommend keeping that example > in mind for thinking about k-adic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 12, 2017, at 8:15 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > CG >> I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t >> reducible to chemistry or physics... attempting to make the >> reduction... did perhaps help in getting biologists to think >> more carefully about the

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, List: I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation" and associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now. My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) *triad *of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

List: I was finally able to borrow Aaron Bruce Wilson's new book, *Peirce's Empiricism: Its Roots and Its Originality*, via interlibrary loan this week. Previously I could only access the Google preview, but from that I could tell that the whole thing would be well worth reading. He points out

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Jon A., I was attepting to express as understandably as possible. To offer answers to your quest for exactness would take more time than I have at my disposal. - Sorry for that!! Best, Kirsti Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 10.4.2017 21:44: Kirsti, List: I am indeed exploring the hypothesis

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation

On 4/10/2017 11:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: The unique role of the chemical elements in the composition of chemical sentences serve as an excellent model for the logical structures of other sentences in other symbol systems. I agree that the system of chemical elements is more tractable

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 10, 2017, at 12:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'? > What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it? I take it primarily as the problem of reference. While

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Kirsti, List: I am indeed exploring the hypothesis that all Signs can be classified, but not necessarily assuming that this is always easy to do. On the contrary, I recognize the difficulty in many cases, including this one in particular--which is why I sought input from the List. "Our existing

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation

Jerry, List, did I get it right, that "individuation" is just a thought-experiment about what and how a thing (or law...) would be, if it was totally rid of any representation? just, what a "thing in itself" would be: Something incomprehensible for the scholastic doctors, as Gary wrote? Not only

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 9, 2017, at 7:41 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > The surface is a vague boundary. All plants and animals have > exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark) > and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins). > > The outer layers are always

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation

List: The following quote deserves rigorous study. It is deeply relevant to three critical aspects of CSP’s philosophy of science: 1. issues that relate realism to idealism 2. issues that relate the physical sciences to the chemical sciences and 3. issues that relate the sciences to the

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } John, a very nice post - but I do have some quibbles. I don't think that you can reduce the differentiation and subsequent networking of these differences that is the basis of complexity- to vagueness. That is,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

John, I found it very interesting that you took up metaphor in connection with "laws of nature". I once got across with a study on metaphors in science with a side note by the researchers that natural scientist often got angry on any hint that they may have been using such. - It was just

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Jon, The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If you look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs, and you'll see what kinds of problems I mean. "Our existing universe" does not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list, Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined. There is a continuum. The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's atmosphere). The borders of living things are an intermediate

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, Jon, List, I agree, that a molecule (and an atom, a particle...) is a token. But, when something happens with this molecule due to a natural law, eg. the law of gravitation, is then the spatial section of this law that works upon the molecule a token of the law? I was thinking no,

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Helmut, Edwina, List: HR: my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body) ... In this context, "embodied" does not necessarily mean that a Token "has a body," it just means that it is existentially instantiated in some way. The word "Token" is a Type,

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Helmut, list - the molecule doesn't need to have a discrete self with distinct borders in order to be a 'token' of a 'type'. The fact that its composition is specific; i.e., a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Helmut, Your idea of “self-defined bodies” is essentially the “autopoiesis” of Maturana and Varela, and the idea of final causation being intrinsic to animate bodymind is shared by Gregory Bateson and, I think, by Peirce. My book Turning Signs joins these concepts with Robert Rosen’s

Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

ton < > eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu> > *Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs > > > > > Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often quote > from Peirce, > > "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain.

RE: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

e-l@list.iupui.edu>; Eugene Halton <eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu> Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often quote from Peirce, "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, List, my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans,

Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often quote from Peirce, "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely

Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Dear Edwina, Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be “reasonableness energizing in the world.” Not “universe.” I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious atheist,”

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction. Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction. An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.” The expectations for

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Gary F., List: GF: In Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and without regard to the motives which originally governed its

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

John S., Helmut, Edwina, List: JFS: Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types. Technically anything that can affect our sense organs is a *replica *of a Qualisign/Mark, the peculiar kind of Sinsign/Token that

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

John S., Helmut, List: Of course, Peirce famously argued for the *Reality *of God, not the *existence *of God. He explained why in one of the manuscript drafts of "A Neglected Argument." CSP: Thus, He is so much like a mind, and so little like a singular Existent (meaning by an Existent, or

Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, List: ET: Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. I did not suggest that this was "the purpose of Reason," but that it is "God's purpose" as "the development of Reason." CP 1.615 (1903)

RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Gary F., List: There is much to digest here. As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is t

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent. So- I'm unsure of your point. I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents]

Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon, list: And here is a key difference. Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about both God and the

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. I agree. So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation. Is my guess. For a law of science, the proposition that

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

John, List, Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Jon and Edwina, Jon I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/ regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat reality as consisting entirely of Signs. Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks could be interpreted and

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Gary F., List: There is much to digest here. As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the universe as Symbol, and "living realities"

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

ntinually receiving new accretions. > Those premisses of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual > facts that are premisses to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being > premisses. We can only imagine what they are by comparing them with the > premisses for us. As premisses they mus

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon, list - hmm - that is interesting and I'd agree; the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact with another external organism, to

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, John S., List: JFS: Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such. I agree, and I am

[PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

by asking whether the laws of nature are symbols. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 7-Apr-17 12:04 Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Gary F - Thanks for the quotation. I have only part of the EP2 - and those pages weren't included. I do

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, Gary, Clark, list, ET I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is indexical, in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of these laws. Intellectually analyzing them and developing symbolic constructs - is a secondary step. I agree with both sentences. And I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 6, 2017, at 1:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis in the > physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred to me. What > class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

agine what they are by comparing them with the premisses for us. As premisses they must involve Qualities. ]] Gary F. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Sig

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement: "These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents of an arg

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement: "These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic"

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Jon A.S., John S., I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below. Gary F. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52 John S., List: JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for aspects

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }John, list: I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e., among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific instantiation. That is, a law would refer to the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not our linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Jon and Edwina, Jon What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we /describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other /representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/, the real general that governs actual occurrences. Edwina But a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, List: I requested that very book from the library yesterday, because I am hoping that it will shed some light on this. Of course, a law of nature is not *itself *a physical or otherwise existent entity, hence a (general) Legisign. I am mainly looking for feedback on the identity of the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } I think that Stjernfelt's book Natural Propositions ... on DiciSigns examines the semiosic process in these realms. There are three types of Dicisigns. The Dicent Sinsign [ dicent indexical sinsign]. The Dicent

[PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

List: With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis in the physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred to me. What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we *describe* a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other