Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

John S., List: Thank you, this is very helpful. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 11:54 AM, John F Sowa wrote: >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Jon A.S., Clark, list, I started writing this note several days ago, but I got sidetracked with other commitments. My main interest (at the moment) is in the following slides, which I presented in 2015, and which I am now developing into a longer article: http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

John, I wish to draw your attention to this part in you mail: JFS: ... a theory expressed in discrete signs... This statement presupposes that even signs acting as symbols, are discrete. Written statements are put down in the form of discrete parts. But it does not follow that the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 29, 2017, at 1:58 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > J.A.S., your post quoting “New Elements” makes much more sense that the other > Jon’s claim that “icons and indices are species under the genus” of symbol, > which I’m pretty sure Peirce would never say. The point that Peirce makes

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Tom: Exactly right, good point. Jon On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 11:42 AM, Tom Gollier wrote: > Jon, > > For what it's worth, I think you're right on. > > I would just add that a "diagram" in Peirce's sense (i.e. distinguished > from both images and metaphors) not only would

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Jon, For what it's worth, I think you're right on. I would just add that a "diagram" in Peirce's sense (i.e. distinguished from both images and metaphors) not only would require relations between the parts (indices) but also those relationships should be such that we can derive new relationships

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Tom: A simple list of color *names *does not seem to qualify as a diagram in Peirce's terminology, because it does not embody any relations among its parts. A depiction of the visible spectrum is probably a better example, whether it is a simple color wheel or the discrete (but dense) version

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

List, I will be occupied with other business for a while, with no more than bits and snatches of time on line, so I will continue this discussion later next month. I added a few links to the blog version of my last post on behalf of the extensional view of sign relations that one needs to make

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 28, 2017, at 6:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > But the point of Peirce's extreme scholastic realism is that the universal > "red" is not defined by the collection of all red things, and the universal > "lion" is not defined by the collection of all

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Clark, John S., List: But the point of Peirce's extreme scholastic realism is that the universal "red" is *not *defined by the collection of all red things, and the universal "lion" is *not* defined by the collection of all lions. Rather, each universal/general is a *continuum *that encompasses

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

":--*O wonderful being, and to what are you looking? I hope not to red... On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 9:16 PM, CLARK GOBLE wrote: > > On Mar 27, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Clark, List: I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John Sowa--but I still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he meant by this. JFS: Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and every particular is something we classify by relating it to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 27, 2017, at 9:59 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything we can > imagine, and mathematics can analyze anything we can imagine. > (This point is independent of the nominalist-realist debate.) There’s a bit to unpack there

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Catching up on my reading - apologies for not responding much the past week or two. It seems to me the starting point for thinking about truth for Peirce ought be externalism. That is are we talking about a knower who is roughly a human individual at a specific time or are we talking about

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Hi Jon, Sorry to get back to you as late this on a question as pertinent as that. I've been on the road. I should have mentioned "coherence" as, indeed it is, the foundation of nominalism's theory of truth. As I read Peirce, if find "concordance" subsuming coherence but exceeds mere coherence

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Clark, list: I have to say, I really like this sentence: “Peirce’s notion largely comes out of the idea that for a difference to be a difference it must make a difference and that those differences over time act on inquirers.” But this one leaves me uneasy: “Peirce gets the idea of habit

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 19, 2017, at 9:54 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > Re: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth > > > I have been giving another look at the InterSciWiki (ISW) article on the >

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Jerry, List Now I have had a look at the Commens Dictionary: Ok, to say that the immediate object is inside, and the dynamical object outside of the sign, is not exctly how Peirce wrote it. He rather wrote, that the immediate object is the object as represented in the sign, and the dynamical

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Helmut, John, List: Thank you for the interesting post. It raises some questions in my mind. > On Mar 17, 2017, at 3:20 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Dear List Members, > I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate and > the dynamical object,

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Dear List Members, I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate and the dynamical object, achieved in the infinite future, and this similarity will be perfect (after indefinite time), when the only aspect, that tells it (the similarity) from sameness, is, that the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

John, List > On Mar 16, 2017, at 1:49 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit > the theories to a finite specification, there are at most > a countable number of theories. > > But there are two ways for a theory expressed in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Dear Clark, John, list: If you’re talking about convergence to an ultimate end, you should be clear on what part esthetics plays and the thing that is the object of perceptual judgment. If that is not specified, how will you decide whether the limit is local from global? As to whether

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

On 3/16/2017 11:20 AM, Clark Goble wrote: The way I usually think about it is that there are many continuous equations such that the limit as x → ∞ y → 0. But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit the theories to a finite specification, there are at most a countable number

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 16, 2017, at 7:48 AM, John F Sowa > wrote: > > To formalize the idea of convergence, I combined a Lindenbaum > lattice with methods of belief (or theory) revision. The lattice > contains all possible theories expressible within a given

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

On 3/16/2017 8:44 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: This is the question of “convergence”, a question that mathematicians, physicists, systems theorists, etc. have investigated in great detail. As a rule we find that some methods of procedure, of stepping through a sequence of states, will eventually

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Jon A., List: It is also important to recognize that Peirce deliberately revised his formulation over time from the indicative to the subjunctive conditional; again, "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation *would *tend to bring

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Thread: JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg00098.html JR:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg00104.html Jerry, List, The key word there is “investigate”. We can read that loosely as any method of fixing belief, but we know that Peirce ranked methods of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 13, 2017, at 7:00 AM, Jon Awbrey > wrote: > > I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by ignoring > [Peirce]” > and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a “Procrustian > bed > for CSP's concepts” are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

List: As Val and Jon A. were perhaps fully aware, Peirce himself used "concordance" when discussing truth in his article, "Truth and Falsity and Error," for Baldwin's 1901 *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (CP 5.565, 568-570). Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Signs are logical arguments...except when they aren't. The issue is whether Signs correspond to real. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by *all who investigate*, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. Best, Jerry On Mon,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Jerry C., List: Again, Val invoked consensus and correspondence, not coherence and correspondence. Frankly, I am not sure exactly what to make of "truth by concordance"; I am hoping that Val and/or Jon A. will elaborate on what they meant by that suggestion. I now see that perhaps you were

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Jon: the phrase: "by adding, Truth by "concordance” " What is your interpretation of this phrase? (Within philosophical writings, the two principle theories of truth are referred to as “coherence” and “correspondence”. In my view, CSP focused his logic on correspondence between signs and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

That the concept of truth requires order, index and inferring is not obvious to all. In other words; that order, index and inferring is contained in truth requires awareness through collateral experience. Best, Jerry R On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 3:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Jerry C.: I am a bit puzzled by your questions, since there was no mention of "order," "index," or "inferring" in the preceding posts by Jon A. and Val. Which three concepts are you seeking to bind together? Val: Besides consensus and correspondence, you left out the coherence and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

...and there you have it. Only *everybody* can know the truth. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by *all who investigate*, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. The true precept is not to abstain from hypostatization, but to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

List: I am a bit puzzled by this suggestion. Concordance? “Order” (inferring numerical order and mathematics? “Index" as a categorization? Are propositions inferred by “concordances”? Or what is the glue that binds the three concepts together? Can anyone expand on this proposal? Cheers

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Dear Jon and Peirces, I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories of truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by "concordance" (what you, Jon, call "triple correspondence"). val daniel E. Valentine Daniel Professor of Anthropology 958