BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, Jon, list:
1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because
Firstness, which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as
Thirdness/habits. Even a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think
Neal,
I do not know if it's the one you have in mind but there is
a similar thought in a passage we discussed much in olden days
on the List. I saved it through various sites over the years
and now find a copy here:
Logic As Semiotic
Jon, list,
1. I am inclined to agree with you on this. As I understand it, the end
of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively
On Gary’s first point, cf. Peirce, "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits
becoming physical laws", discussed by
Lucia Santella, in Sign System Studies, the reference at
https://philpapers.org/rec/SANMAE-8
I recall, and cannot find, Peirce saying somewhere something like that the
purpose of
Thanks, Soren -- I think that clears it up. Does phenomenology apply as a
sort of catch-all for the various attributes of the three elements of the
triad? Does Peirce's phenomenology deal with the ontological. I assume that
while ontology deals with words that words themselves refer to what lies
Interesting Edwina -- I would see the formation of a habit as what we are
looking at. And indeed a continual adjustment even when habits exist in
relatively stable form. A while back I took entropy to mean the dispersion
of everything with no reference to Peirce or habits or the eventual
Thank you, Jon and Edwina. I don´t understand it, except I have a hunch that he is saying: A thing´s form is unique, and its matter is not, because other things are also made of the same material. I guess I rather want to keep my concept of form and matter, which I think is more naiive: In a
Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?
List:
In an effort to reduce the quantity of my individual messages, I am going
to try combining multiple replies into one post.
Gary R.:
1. I agree that even persons can lose, or deliberately set aside, their
capacity for Habit-change. Hopefully it is evident that I am still very
much open
List
With reference to 'form', as I said, Peirce has multiple references
to it. When I look up, in the CP index, the term 'form', besides page
numbers, I also find 'see also Generals'...and generals are Thirdness.
"originality is not an attribute of the matter of life, present
Thank you, Jon! But, if matter is potentiality, and form is actuality, I still wonder why Peirce didn´t assign 1ns to matter, and 2ns to form. But everybody, please try not to explain, at least not if it were meant for just my sake, I would not understand it in the moment.
Best,
Helmut
12.
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Stephen - I can't answer all your questions, but, to my
understanding, the fact of Firstness - which introduces deviations
from the norm, is a key 'cause' of the dissipation of a habit. To me
- that is entropy.
I
Edwina, List:
Just to clarify, what is undeniable is that Peirce associated Form with 1ns *in
those two passages* (NEM 4:292-300, EP 2:304)--not as "freshness,
spontaneity," but as "quality, suchness" in one case and "characters, or
qualities" in the other. I agree that he used "form" to mean
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - in reply
1 My reading of EP 2.304 is different from yours. Peirce writes:
'sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
passing from this to its matter, to successive
Edwina, List:
What you quoted from EP 2:304 is at the bottom of the page, where Peirce
contrasts theory (from a Sign of an Object as Matter to Interpretants as
Form to *perceiving *Entelechy) with practice (from a Sign of a character
as Form to Interpretants as Matter to *producing* Entelechy).
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - I continue to disagree with your reading of both passages.
I do not agree that as you write, "Form is 1ns (characters or
qualities signified by the Sign), ". I consider that Firstness is the
immediate
Hi Soren... Interesting. Peirce uses the word flummery in ref. to Hegel.
Who has examined Peirce in relation to logical positivism? He missed it
didn't he? As to finding a basis for empirically showing the impact of
ontological terms, it seems to me that the Symbol in the triad Icon(Sign)
Index
Helmut, List,
I have to say I don't see all that much of consequence
riding on the “pin the tail on the category” game that
so diverts the List on so many occasions, apart perhaps
from the functional value of social cohesion it affords.
And I have come to suspect, after many many years, that
Gary R., List:
Thank you for your characteristically thoughtful and thought-provoking
response. Up until now, I have been considering all of this with the
mindset that the child's scream must be analyzed as *one *Sign. Upon
reflection, I realize that such an approach fails to take proper
List,
This post began as my (hopefully) final note on the theme of reducing the
frequency of posts to the forum.
"To enjoy freedom we have to control ourselves." Virginia Woolf
This was the sum total of Gary Fuhrman's blog entry for today.
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2018/02/of-course/
Of course
Jon, Edwina, list,
Jon, while I am tending to agree with you on much of your analysis, I still
can't agree with you in the matter of the Dynamic Object for the mother.
You wrote:
JAS: In this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the
child's semiosis" and "the mother's
Jon, list
You asked of your analysis of the child and mother example:
JAS: Does any of this make sense? To be honest, it all still feels highly
conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive) criticism.
I am sorry to say that your complex analysis does not make a lot of sense
to
Jon S, Gary F, Gary R, List,
I've been thinking about Peirce's explanations of how signs represent objects
to interpretants. In this vein, I'd like to ask a straightforward question
about the relation of determination and the role it seems to play in his
account of semiosis. Some have
23 matches
Mail list logo
