Re: Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon - my own quite logical example. I know that he did refer to the syllogism somewhere but I'm not going to look it up..but, it's obviously quite a logical assumption. Edwina On Mon 05/02/18 3:26 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: Peirce explicitly associated the conclusion of an Argument with its Interpretant--e.g., "An Argument is a sign which distinctly represents the Interpretant, called its Conclusion, which it is intended to determine" (CP 2.95; 1902). Just curious--is there any text where he similarly associated the Representamen with the major premiss and/or the Object with the minor premiss? Or is that just your own illustrative example? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 2:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Helmut - No, I consider that the bird's perception of the loud sound is NOT the representamen. The bird has several means of 'perception'. IO: the Immediate Object is a first sensual perception of an external existentiality; the bird's senses absorb the sound II - the Immediate Interpretant is the bird's neurological and knowledge based interpretation of this loud sound; It's an external 'thing' DI- the Dynamic Interpretant is the bird's articulation of the II: 'I should flee this external thing'. The Representamen is the mediation between the IO and the II/DI. The Representamen is the site of the information held by the neurological nature of the bird and the information from its life-experience. This stored information mediates the soundand 'thinks' about it..and comes up with the conclusion that 'this sound is something to run away from'. Think of the semiosic triad as a syllogism. The Objects can be understood as the Minor Premise, i.e., the individual situation. The Major Premise - the 'universal or general rules' - can be understood as the Representamen the Conclusion - can be understood as the Interpretant[s]. Edwina On Mon 05/02/18 2:16 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de [4] sent: Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, I wonder if this might be agreeable to all of you: The loud sound itself is not the representamen. The bird´s perception of the loud sound is. This has to do with memory: If the bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to instinct, due to neural structure, or due to having learned) that a loud sound means something, it would not perceive it. Best, Helmut Links: -- [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [4] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'h.raul...@gmx.de\',\'\',\'\',\'\') - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Edwina, List: Peirce explicitly associated the conclusion of an Argument with its Interpretant--e.g., "An *Argument *is a sign which distinctly represents the Interpretant, called its *Conclusion*, which it is intended to determine" (CP 2.95; 1902). Just curious--is there any text where he similarly associated the Representamen with the major premiss and/or the Object with the minor premiss? Or is that just your own illustrative example? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 2:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Helmut - No, I consider that the bird's perception of the loud sound is > NOT the representamen. The bird has several means of 'perception'. > > IO: the Immediate Object is a first sensual perception of an external > existentiality; the bird's senses absorb the sound > > II - the Immediate Interpretant is the bird's neurological and knowledge > based interpretation of this loud sound; It's an external 'thing' > > DI- the Dynamic Interpretant is the bird's articulation of the II: 'I > should flee this external thing'. > > The Representamen is the mediation between the IO and the II/DI. The > Representamen is the site of the information held by the neurological > nature of the bird and the information from its life-experience. > This stored information mediates the soundand 'thinks' about it..and > comes up with the conclusion that 'this sound is something to run away > from'. > > Think of the semiosic triad as a syllogism. > > The Objects can be understood as the Minor Premise, i.e., the individual > situation. > > The Major Premise - the 'universal or general rules' - can be understood > as the Representamen > > the Conclusion - can be understood as the Interpretant[s]. > > Edwina > > On Mon 05/02/18 2:16 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: > > Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, > I wonder if this might be agreeable to all of you: The loud sound itself > is not the representamen. The bird´s perception of the loud sound is. This > has to do with memory: If the bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to > instinct, due to neural structure, or due to having learned) that a loud > sound means something, it would not perceive it. > Best, > Helmut > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Helmut - No, I consider that the bird's perception of the loud sound is NOT the representamen. The bird has several means of 'perception'. IO: the Immediate Object is a first sensual perception of an external existentiality; the bird's senses absorb the sound II - the Immediate Interpretant is the bird's neurological and knowledge based interpretation of this loud sound; It's an external 'thing' DI- the Dynamic Interpretant is the bird's articulation of the II: 'I should flee this external thing'. The Representamen is the mediation between the IO and the II/DI. The Representamen is the site of the information held by the neurological nature of the bird and the information from its life-experience. This stored information mediates the soundand 'thinks' about it..and comes up with the conclusion that 'this sound is something to run away from'. Think of the semiosic triad as a syllogism. The Objects can be understood as the Minor Premise, i.e., the individual situation. The Major Premise - the 'universal or general rules' - can be understood as the Representamen the Conclusion - can be understood as the Interpretant[s]. Edwina On Mon 05/02/18 2:16 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, I wonder if this might be agreeable to all of you: The loud sound itself is not the representamen. The bird´s perception of the loud sound is. This has to do with memory: If the bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to instinct, due to neural structure, or due to having learned) that a loud sound means something, it would not perceive it. Best, Helmut 05. Februar 2018 um 19:43 Uhr Von: "Gary Richmond" Jon, Edwina, list, I think I'm going to drop out of the discussion as well principally, because as I wrote before my eye operations, I've already begun to move in different directions this year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading Peirce's late Pragmatism piece (1907) which I am currently rereading as well. I hope we can get a fruitful discussion going sometime soon on that extraordinary, late piece (the last before the Neglected Argument in EP2). There is so much in it of interest generally and, I think, of potential relevance to the current discussion, that in the light of "Pragmatism" it might be posaible to return to it with new understanding and fresh insights. I'm beginning to think--and especially in light of this discussion--that some of the issues discussed in this thread (and not just the terminological) really are as difficult as they seem. So I, for one, have found the recent discussion stimulating also because it reminds me that there is much in Peirce's semeiotic which, while initially seeming clear enough (or even 'obvious') turns out, upon reflective discussion, not to be at all. I think that that aspects of both of your approaches have some validity, while I personally haven't been able to agree with either of you on certain key points. In a sense I keep flipping back and forth between your very different interpretations. But, I think that this difficulty in interpretation may be in the "nature of the beast" and, again, I think the effort has been most worthwhile, stimulating and valuable in many ways. What has been somewhat unexpected is the way that at times you, Edwina and Jon, seem to get closer to agreement on some points (and I can join you in that agreement) and then a post or two later find yourself at odds again on what seemed like a kind of "breakthrough" in mutual understanding on that self-same point. Then I feel lost again myself. . . I disagree with Jerry C that your analysis is particularly 'linear', Jon; or, if it is, so is Peirce's. So will be anyone's to some extent. That is, I think that any such analysis will at least quasi-necessarily--because of the nature of language--at times appear linear, while I think that both you and Edwina have made it abundantly clear, albeit in your different ways, that the one thing you do clearly agree on is the essentially triadic nature of semiosis (and that is surely not linear). So, again--and this time I mean it!--I'll say farewell to this particular discussion for now to return to "Pragmatism" (1907, EP2: 398-433). And, in preparation for Lowell 4, read some Bellucci to see if I can make more sense of it in the light of Stjernfelt's work and Gary f's and Jeff's analyses, also very intriguing. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690 On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Edwina: I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise I fear that it is going to get contentious. You keep pressing me on where to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Gary R., List: I agree that the difficulties appear to be intrinsic to the subject matter, and cannot be attributed entirely to our individual idiosyncrasies in trying to sort it out. I would welcome a focused List discussion on "Pragmatism," but strongly urge you to include in its scope, besides the two variants published as EP 2:398-433, the alternate manuscript text that appeared as CP 5.467-481. The latter is where Peirce made a habit-*change *the ultimate logical interpretant, rather than a habit *itself*, which suggests that even he struggled to nail down *his own* comprehensive analysis of semiosis. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 12:43 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Jon, Edwina, list, > > I think I'm going to drop out of the discussion as well principally, > because as I wrote before my eye operations, I've already begun to move in > different directions this year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading > Peirce's late Pragmatism piece (1907) which I am currently rereading as > well. I hope we can get a fruitful discussion going sometime soon on that > extraordinary, late piece (the last before the Neglected Argument in EP2). > There is so much in it of interest generally and, I think, of potential > relevance to the current discussion, that in the light of "Pragmatism" it > might be posaible to return to it with new understanding and fresh insights. > > I'm beginning to think--and especially in light of this discussion--that > some of the issues discussed in this thread (and not just the > terminological) really *are* as difficult as they seem. So I, for one, > have found the recent discussion stimulating also* because* it reminds me > that there is much in Peirce's semeiotic which, while initially seeming > clear enough (or even 'obvious') turns out, upon reflective discussion, not > to be at all. > > I think that that aspects of both of your approaches have some validity, > while I personally haven't been able to agree with either of you on certain > key points. In a sense I keep flipping back and forth between your very > different interpretations. But, I think that this difficulty in > interpretation may be in the "nature of the beast" and, again, I think the > effort has been most worthwhile, stimulating and valuable in many ways. > What has been somewhat unexpected is the way that at times you, Edwina and > Jon, seem to get closer to agreement on some points (and I can join you in > that agreement) and then a post or two later find yourself at odds again on > what seemed like a kind of "breakthrough" in mutual understanding on that > self-same point. Then I feel lost again myself. . . > > I disagree with Jerry C that your analysis is particularly 'linear', Jon; > or, if it is, so is Peirce's. So will be anyone's to some extent. That is, > I think that any such analysis will at least quasi-necessarily--because of > the nature of language--at times *appear* linear, while I think that both > you and Edwina have made it abundantly clear, albeit in your different > ways, that the one thing you do clearly agree on is the *essentially *triadic > nature of semiosis (and *that* is surely *not* linear). > > So, again--and this time I mean it!--I'll say farewell to this particular > discussion for now to return to "Pragmatism" (1907, EP2: 398-433). And, in > preparation for Lowell 4, read some Bellucci to see if I can make more > sense of it in the light of Stjernfelt's work and Gary f's and Jeff's > analyses, also very intriguing. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Edwina: >> >> I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because >> otherwise I fear that it is going to get contentious. You keep pressing me >> on where to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, >> when the whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out >> exactly that--I do not have a firm opinion yet. Nevertheless, I continue >> to find your very definitive answer unpersuasive, since it directly >> contradicts my understanding of how Peirce explicitly defined the >> Representamen. >> >> On my reading of Peirce, all propositions are Symbols (although Dicisigns >> need not be), and every Symbol has a Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, and >> Representamen that is *general*--i.e., Symbols can *only *be Collective >> Copulative Legisigns (Types), as EP 2:481 and EP 2:484-489 (1908) make >> abundantly clear. Furthermore, in his late writings Peirce associated form >> (qualities/characters) with 1ns, matter (subjects/objects) with 2ns, and >> entelechy (signs/thought) with 3ns; e.g., NEM 4:292-300 (c.1903?), EP >> 2:304 (1904), CP 6.338-344 (1909). >> >> Perhaps you and Gary R. can carry on from here an
Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, I wonder if this might be agreeable to all of you: The loud sound itself is not the representamen. The bird´s perception of the loud sound is. This has to do with memory: If the bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to instinct, due to neural structure, or due to having learned) that a loud sound means something, it would not perceive it. Best, Helmut 05. Februar 2018 um 19:43 Uhr Von: "Gary Richmond" Jon, Edwina, list, I think I'm going to drop out of the discussion as well principally, because as I wrote before my eye operations, I've already begun to move in different directions this year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading Peirce's late Pragmatism piece (1907) which I am currently rereading as well. I hope we can get a fruitful discussion going sometime soon on that extraordinary, late piece (the last before the Neglected Argument in EP2). There is so much in it of interest generally and, I think, of potential relevance to the current discussion, that in the light of "Pragmatism" it might be posaible to return to it with new understanding and fresh insights. I'm beginning to think--and especially in light of this discussion--that some of the issues discussed in this thread (and not just the terminological) really are as difficult as they seem. So I, for one, have found the recent discussion stimulating also because it reminds me that there is much in Peirce's semeiotic which, while initially seeming clear enough (or even 'obvious') turns out, upon reflective discussion, not to be at all. I think that that aspects of both of your approaches have some validity, while I personally haven't been able to agree with either of you on certain key points. In a sense I keep flipping back and forth between your very different interpretations. But, I think that this difficulty in interpretation may be in the "nature of the beast" and, again, I think the effort has been most worthwhile, stimulating and valuable in many ways. What has been somewhat unexpected is the way that at times you, Edwina and Jon, seem to get closer to agreement on some points (and I can join you in that agreement) and then a post or two later find yourself at odds again on what seemed like a kind of "breakthrough" in mutual understanding on that self-same point. Then I feel lost again myself. . . I disagree with Jerry C that your analysis is particularly 'linear', Jon; or, if it is, so is Peirce's. So will be anyone's to some extent. That is, I think that any such analysis will at least quasi-necessarily--because of the nature of language--at times appear linear, while I think that both you and Edwina have made it abundantly clear, albeit in your different ways, that the one thing you do clearly agree on is the essentially triadic nature of semiosis (and that is surely not linear). So, again--and this time I mean it!--I'll say farewell to this particular discussion for now to return to "Pragmatism" (1907, EP2: 398-433). And, in preparation for Lowell 4, read some Bellucci to see if I can make more sense of it in the light of Stjernfelt's work and Gary f's and Jeff's analyses, also very intriguing. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690 On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidtwrote: Edwina: I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise I fear that it is going to get contentious. You keep pressing me on where to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out exactly that--I do not have a firm opinion yet. Nevertheless, I continue to find your very definitive answer unpersuasive, since it directly contradicts my understanding of how Peirce explicitly defined the Representamen. On my reading of Peirce, all propositions are Symbols (although Dicisigns need not be), and every Symbol has a Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, and Representamen that is general--i.e., Symbols can only be Collective Copulative Legisigns (Types), as EP 2:481 and EP 2:484-489 (1908) make abundantly clear. Furthermore, in his late writings Peirce associated form (qualities/characters) with 1ns, matter (subjects/objects) with 2ns, and entelechy (signs/thought) with 3ns; e.g., NEM 4:292-300 (c.1903?), EP 2:304 (1904), CP 6.338-344 (1909). Perhaps you and Gary R. can carry on from here and have a fruitful discussion. Enjoy the sponge cake! :-) Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic process. How does the single semiosic action contact the habits? And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation' of the external stimuli. I consider that this acti
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Jon, Edwina, list, I think I'm going to drop out of the discussion as well principally, because as I wrote before my eye operations, I've already begun to move in different directions this year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading Peirce's late Pragmatism piece (1907) which I am currently rereading as well. I hope we can get a fruitful discussion going sometime soon on that extraordinary, late piece (the last before the Neglected Argument in EP2). There is so much in it of interest generally and, I think, of potential relevance to the current discussion, that in the light of "Pragmatism" it might be posaible to return to it with new understanding and fresh insights. I'm beginning to think--and especially in light of this discussion--that some of the issues discussed in this thread (and not just the terminological) really *are* as difficult as they seem. So I, for one, have found the recent discussion stimulating also* because* it reminds me that there is much in Peirce's semeiotic which, while initially seeming clear enough (or even 'obvious') turns out, upon reflective discussion, not to be at all. I think that that aspects of both of your approaches have some validity, while I personally haven't been able to agree with either of you on certain key points. In a sense I keep flipping back and forth between your very different interpretations. But, I think that this difficulty in interpretation may be in the "nature of the beast" and, again, I think the effort has been most worthwhile, stimulating and valuable in many ways. What has been somewhat unexpected is the way that at times you, Edwina and Jon, seem to get closer to agreement on some points (and I can join you in that agreement) and then a post or two later find yourself at odds again on what seemed like a kind of "breakthrough" in mutual understanding on that self-same point. Then I feel lost again myself. . . I disagree with Jerry C that your analysis is particularly 'linear', Jon; or, if it is, so is Peirce's. So will be anyone's to some extent. That is, I think that any such analysis will at least quasi-necessarily--because of the nature of language--at times *appear* linear, while I think that both you and Edwina have made it abundantly clear, albeit in your different ways, that the one thing you do clearly agree on is the *essentially *triadic nature of semiosis (and *that* is surely *not* linear). So, again--and this time I mean it!--I'll say farewell to this particular discussion for now to return to "Pragmatism" (1907, EP2: 398-433). And, in preparation for Lowell 4, read some Bellucci to see if I can make more sense of it in the light of Stjernfelt's work and Gary f's and Jeff's analyses, also very intriguing. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Edwina: > > I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise > I fear that it is going to get contentious. You keep pressing me on where > to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the > whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out exactly > that--I do not have a firm opinion yet. Nevertheless, I continue to find > your very definitive answer unpersuasive, since it directly contradicts my > understanding of how Peirce explicitly defined the Representamen. > > On my reading of Peirce, all propositions are Symbols (although Dicisigns > need not be), and every Symbol has a Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, and > Representamen that is *general*--i.e., Symbols can *only *be Collective > Copulative Legisigns (Types), as EP 2:481 and EP 2:484-489 (1908) make > abundantly clear. Furthermore, in his late writings Peirce associated form > (qualities/characters) with 1ns, matter (subjects/objects) with 2ns, and > entelechy (signs/thought) with 3ns; e.g., NEM 4:292-300 (c.1903?), EP > 2:304 (1904), CP 6.338-344 (1909). > > Perhaps you and Gary R. can carry on from here and have a fruitful > discussion. Enjoy the sponge cake! :-) > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > >> Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic process. >> How does the single semiosic action contact the habits? >> >> And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation' of >> the external stimuli. I consider that this action of representation >> belongs to the Interpretant. >> >> You haven't defined WHERE in the semiosic process the contact with the >> 'memories and habits' takes place. I consider that such contact is the >> function of the Representamen, which mediates, by this contact, with the >> incoming sensate data of the DO...and interprets it into the Interpretant. >> >> I also disagree that the DI 'cannot be a cognitive proposition since that >> is a Symbol'. I
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Edwina: I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise I fear that it is going to get contentious. You keep pressing me on where to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out exactly that--I do not have a firm opinion yet. Nevertheless, I continue to find your very definitive answer unpersuasive, since it directly contradicts my understanding of how Peirce explicitly defined the Representamen. On my reading of Peirce, all propositions are Symbols (although Dicisigns need not be), and every Symbol has a Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, and Representamen that is *general*--i.e., Symbols can *only *be Collective Copulative Legisigns (Types), as EP 2:481 and EP 2:484-489 (1908) make abundantly clear. Furthermore, in his late writings Peirce associated form (qualities/characters) with 1ns, matter (subjects/objects) with 2ns, and entelechy (signs/thought) with 3ns; e.g., NEM 4:292-300 (c.1903?), EP 2:304 (1904), CP 6.338-344 (1909). Perhaps you and Gary R. can carry on from here and have a fruitful discussion. Enjoy the sponge cake! :-) Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic process. > How does the single semiosic action contact the habits? > > And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation' of the > external stimuli. I consider that this action of representation belongs to > the Interpretant. > > You haven't defined WHERE in the semiosic process the contact with the > 'memories and habits' takes place. I consider that such contact is the > function of the Representamen, which mediates, by this contact, with the > incoming sensate data of the DO...and interprets it into the Interpretant. > > I also disagree that the DI 'cannot be a cognitive proposition since that > is a Symbol'. I disagree that all cognition takes place as 'symbolic'. > After all, as Peirce said - Mind does not involve consciousness and takes > place within crystals. Do you consider that the habits of > chemcial formation which develop a crystal from various > chemcial...understanding the crystals' development as the > Dynamic Interpretant of the chemicals...do you consider that this action is > SYMBOLIC? > > I also disagree that a symbolic interpretation requires a general DO. If I > hear that loud sound..and finally think/say: That loud sound was the oak > tree falling...that DI [which itself is a full triad] is a SYMBOLIC > articulation of the physical event. Nothing general about that Dynamic > Object; it was the single tree falling in a local, particular place. > > Again - Form is not in a mode of Firstness, since Form is MIND - and Mind > is an action of Thirdness. > > And now - must go and bake a sponge cakeI'll check in later. > > Edwina > > On Mon 05/02/18 9:59 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > As anticipated, I cannot agree with this analysis, since I understand the > Representamen to be limited to whatever stands for (i.e., represents) the > loud sound in the human's mind. The Representamen does not itself include > the person's memories and habits; instead, the latter are what enable > him/her to recognize the sensate data as the result of a tree falling > (IO), and then infer that it corresponds in this case to a particular tree > falling (DI). Another complication is that if the (singular) loud sound is > the DO (Concretive), then the DI cannot be a cognitive proposition, since > that is a Symbol, which can only have a general DO (Collective); so this is > another sense in which I concede that 3ns must come into play somehow. > > In the bird example, I see the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign as the single > semiosic event that includes the loud sound (Dynamic Object) and the > bird's response of flight (Dynamic Interpretant). Again, I agree that the > bird's habits play a role in the process, somewhere between those two > stages. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > >> Jon, Gary R, list: >> >> OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different: >> >> DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I don't >> know that. >> >> IO: my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it >> differently than my cat or dog or children or... >> >> R: the Representamen consists of both my physiological and cognitive >> MEMORIES. Some are innate [the neurological; some are learned]. This >> Representamen accepts the sensate data from the IO and, according to its >> full knowledge baseinterprets that data. >> >> II: this is my internal interpretation. It's 'honed and constrained and >> organized by the combined memories of the Representamen...and I become >> conscious of an external disturbance. ..ie.. I become aware that it is not >> a dream; that it is existent and
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon - I don't separate Mind and Matter. Mind exists AS matter. Matter couldn't exist without habits-of-formation. And Mind couldn't exist without being those habits within Matter...Pure Aristotle. Edwina On Mon 05/02/18 10:18 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: Analyzing the various "Signs within Signs" might be unavoidable eventually, especially if we end up going down the road of defining Dicisigns (i.e., natural propositions) as "complete Signs" and all other classes (except Arguments) as "incomplete Signs." However, right now it just muddies the waters further from my standpoint. Your last statement, "Mind exists within matter," is problematic for me, because it maintains a distinction where Peirce insisted on continuity--"matter is effete mind." That is yet another can of worms that we probably should not reopen right now. Thanks, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon, list - there are multiple semiosic actions going on 'at the same time' so to speak. If we just take this one example of the loud sound/tree falling...whether the Receiver is a bird or human - there are multiple semiosic actions involved. 1] For both, there can be the 'rhematic iconic qualisign' [a feeling of sound]. This would involve DO and IO and R. The neurological R. 2] For both, there can be a Rhematic indexical sinsign'..[a local, non-intentional reaction to a local indexical stimuli...This would involve DO, IO, R and II. Again, neurological. Here we just have the neurological reaction..but note..even this neurological reaction could not appear without there being neurological habits within the bird/human's systems 3] So, bringing in Thirdness, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign...which involves that DO, IO, R and II. Here, the system acknowledges the habits of formation of the human/bird. 4] With the human, I'd add: possibly, a Dicent Symbolic Legisign to acknowledge that the human has symbolically named the DO. BUT - semiosic action 1 and 2 rest within 3. That is - my view is that there is no such thing as a 'feeling' of redness or a feeling of sound - existing outside of a morphological or material 'home'/form. Mind exists within matter. Edwina On Mon 05/02/18 9:20 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com [2] sent: Gary R., List: Your observation that I tend to associate the concept of "Sign" with something external first (e.g., the loud sound) and internal second (e.g., the bird's neural pattern) is accurate. It seems to me that any adequate model of semiosis must be able to take both kinds of Signs into account. What I continue to find tricky in this particular discussion is where to "locate" the collateral experience and habits of interpretation that come into play when an external Sign is "translated" into an internal Sign. I have some hints in mind now that I have started rereading "New Elements," but nothing that I can explicate or defend just yet. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:06 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter." I meant to say that your emphasis seems to be on latter (the external sign), mine on the internal (the cognitive sign that 'responds' to that external sign as immediate object. Sorry about that! Best, Gary R Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690 [3] On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Jon S, list, Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a sign' than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more general as I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being existent is but half the story. You seem to me to look at the sign from 'without', while I tend to look at it from 'within'. But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me, human semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the non-human, non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690 [4] On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Gary R., List: Of course the Sign can be within the bird; what I said was that I think it does not necessarily h
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic process. How does the single semiosic action contact the habits? And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation' of the external stimuli. I consider that this action of representation belongs to the Interpretant. You haven't defined WHERE in the semiosic process the contact with the 'memories and habits' takes place. I consider that such contact is the function of the Representamen, which mediates, by this contact, with the incoming sensate data of the DO...and interprets it into the Interpretant. I also disagree that the DI 'cannot be a cognitive proposition since that is a Symbol'. I disagree that all cognition takes place as 'symbolic'. After all, as Peirce said - Mind does not involve consciousness and takes place within crystals. Do you consider that the habits of chemcial formation which develop a crystal from various chemcial...understanding the crystals' development as the Dynamic Interpretant of the chemicals...do you consider that this action is SYMBOLIC? I also disagree that a symbolic interpretation requires a general DO. If I hear that loud sound..and finally think/say: That loud sound was the oak tree falling...that DI [which itself is a full triad] is a SYMBOLIC articulation of the physical event. Nothing general about that Dynamic Object; it was the single tree falling in a local, particular place. Again - Form is not in a mode of Firstness, since Form is MIND - and Mind is an action of Thirdness. And now - must go and bake a sponge cakeI'll check in later. Edwina On Mon 05/02/18 9:59 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: As anticipated, I cannot agree with this analysis, since I understand the Representamen to be limited to whatever stands for (i.e., represents) the loud sound in the human's mind. The Representamen does not itself include the person's memories and habits; instead, the latter are what enable him/her to recognize the sensate data as the result of a tree falling (IO), and then infer that it corresponds in this case to a particular tree falling (DI). Another complication is that if the (singular) loud sound is the DO (Concretive), then the DI cannot be a cognitive proposition, since that is a Symbol, which can only have a general DO (Collective); so this is another sense in which I concede that 3ns must come into play somehow. In the bird example, I see the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign as the single semiosic event that includes the loud sound (Dynamic Object) and the bird's response of flight (Dynamic Interpretant). Again, I agree that the bird's habits play a role in the process, somewhere between those two stages. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon, Gary R, list: OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different: DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I don't know that. IO: my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it differently than my cat or dog or children or... R: the Representamen consists of both my physiological and cognitive MEMORIES. Some are innate [the neurological; some are learned]. This Representamen accepts the sensate data from the IO and, according to its full knowledge baseinterprets that data. II: this is my internal interpretation. It's 'honed and constrained and organized by the combined memories of the Representamen...and I become conscious of an external disturbance. ..ie.. I become aware that it is not a dream; that it is existent and that it is outside of me and that..it might be familiar... DI: I am articulate, conscious that this external force is outside of me, is existent and is, since I've heard these noises before..the sound of a tree falling and dredging up more of my memories from the Representamen...I decide.."It's that old oak tree'. Now - the only difference between the bird and the human - is the Representamen is more powerful in its stock of habits; and thus, sets up a cognitive rather than physical reaction. The bird's DI is to flee. The human will come up with a conceptual interpretant... Again - I emphasize the necessity of the semiosic action including the action of habits. Jon's outline doesn't seem to include this and I don't understand how any Interpretation can take place, except an almost purely mechanical one, that doesn't include this force. Certainly, the classes of signs that do NOT include Thirdness [habit-taking] DO exist, but only as a short-term event...and even they, are 'nestled' within the body of something that DOES function within habits That is - Jon's suggestion that the bird-event is a rhematic indexical sinsign only refers to the single event
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Edwina, List: Analyzing the various "Signs within Signs" might be unavoidable eventually, especially if we end up going down the road of defining Dicisigns (i.e., natural propositions) as "complete Signs" and all other classes (except Arguments) as "incomplete Signs." However, right now it just muddies the waters further from my standpoint. Your last statement, "Mind exists *within *matter," is problematic for me, because it maintains a distinction where Peirce insisted on continuity--"matter *is *effete mind." That is yet another can of worms that we probably should not reopen right now. Thanks, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon, list - there are multiple semiosic actions going on 'at the same > time' so to speak. > > If we just take this one example of the loud sound/tree falling...whether > the Receiver is a bird or human - there are multiple semiosic actions > involved. > > 1] For both, there can be the 'rhematic iconic qualisign' [a feeling of > sound]. This would involve DO and IO and R. The neurological R. > > 2] For both, there can be a Rhematic indexical sinsign'..[a local, > non-intentional reaction to a local indexical stimuli...This would involve > DO, IO, R and II. Again, neurological. Here we just have the neurological > reaction..but note..even this neurological reaction could not appear > without there being neurological habits within the bird/human's systems > > 3] So, bringing in Thirdness, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign...which > involves that DO, IO, R and II. Here, the system acknowledges the habits of > formation of the human/bird. > > 4] With the human, I'd add: possibly, a Dicent Symbolic Legisign to > acknowledge that the human has symbolically named the DO. > > BUT - semiosic action 1 and 2 rest within 3. That is - my view is that > there is no such thing as a 'feeling' of redness or a feeling of sound - > existing outside of a morphological or material 'home'/form. Mind exists > within matter. > > Edwina > > On Mon 05/02/18 9:20 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Gary R., List: > > Your observation that I tend to associate the concept of "Sign" with > something external first (e.g., the loud sound) and internal second (e.g., > the bird's neural pattern) is accurate. It seems to me that any adequate > model of semiosis must be able to take both kinds of Signs into account. > What I continue to find tricky in this particular discussion is where to > "locate" the collateral experience and habits of interpretation that come > into play when an external Sign is "translated" into an internal Sign. I > have some hints in mind now that I have started rereading "New Elements," > but nothing that I can explicate or defend just yet. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:06 PM, Gary Richmond > wrote: > >> Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as >> emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn >> to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your >> emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter." >> >> I meant to say that your emphasis seems to be on latter (the external >> sign), mine on the internal (the cognitive sign that 'responds' to that >> external sign as immediate object. >> >> Sorry about that! >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Blocked image] >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> >> >> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Gary Richmond >> wrote: >> >>> Jon S, list, >>> >>> Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a >>> sign' than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more >>> general as I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of >>> the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being existent is but half the >>> story. You seem to me to look at the sign from 'without', while I tend to >>> look at it from 'within'. >>> >>> But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me, human >>> semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the non-human, >>> non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign, >>> whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least >>> springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the >>> former, mine the latter. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> [image: Blocked image] >>> >>> Gary Richmond >>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>> Communication Studies >>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> >>> >>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> Gary R., List: Of course the Sign can be within the bird; what I said was that I think it does not necessarily have to be be within the bird. I have tri
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Edwina, List: As anticipated, I cannot agree with this analysis, since I understand the Representamen to be limited to whatever stands for (i.e., *represents*) the loud sound in the human's mind. The Representamen does not *itself *include the person's memories and habits; instead, the latter are what enable him/her to *recognize *the sensate data as the result of a tree falling (IO), and then infer that it corresponds in this case to a *particular *tree falling (DI). Another complication is that if the (singular) loud sound is the DO (Concretive), then the DI cannot be a cognitive proposition, since that is a Symbol, which can only have a general DO (Collective); so this is another sense in which I concede that 3ns must come into play somehow. In the bird example, I see the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign as the single semiosic event that *includes *the loud sound (Dynamic Object) *and *the bird's response of flight (Dynamic Interpretant). Again, I agree that the bird's habits play a role in the process, somewhere between those two stages. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon, Gary R, list: > > OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different: > > DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I don't know > that. > > IO: my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it > differently than my cat or dog or children or... > > R: the Representamen consists of both my physiological and cognitive > MEMORIES. Some are innate [the neurological; some are learned]. This > Representamen accepts the sensate data from the IO and, according to its > full knowledge baseinterprets that data. > > II: this is my internal interpretation. It's 'honed and constrained and > organized by the combined memories of the Representamen...and I become > conscious of an external disturbance. ..ie.. I become aware that it is not > a dream; that it is existent and that it is outside of me and that..it > might be familiar... > > DI: I am articulate, conscious that this external force is outside of me, > is existent and is, since I've heard these noises before..the sound of a > tree falling and dredging up more of my memories from the Representamen...I > decide.."It's that old oak tree'. > > Now - the only difference between the bird and the human - is the > Representamen is more powerful in its stock of habits; and thus, sets up a > cognitive rather than physical reaction. The bird's DI is to flee. > The human will come up with a conceptual interpretant... > > Again - I emphasize the necessity of the semiosic action including the > action of habits. Jon's outline doesn't seem to include this and I don't > understand how any Interpretation can take place, except an almost purely > mechanical one, that doesn't include this force. > > Certainly, the classes of signs that do NOT include Thirdness > [habit-taking] DO exist, but only as a short-term event...and even they, > are 'nestled' within the body of something that DOES function within > habits > > That is - Jon's suggestion that the bird-event is a rhematic indexical > sinsign only refers to the single event of the loud sound. This is, as Gary > R explains, the focus on the EXTERNAL. But - when we add in the RESULT, > the bird's flight - we must include the neurological habits of the bird, > which are: 'run from danger' - and so, the Interpretant is: flight. > > Edwina > > Edwina > > On Mon 05/02/18 8:33 AM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent: > > Jon, Gary R - I thought Gary R's quotes were excellent, pointing out the > necessity for memory/habits and their function in semiosis. What carries > out this function of habit? The Representamen. > > Edwina > > On Sun 04/02/18 10:31 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Gary R., List: > > Welcome back! I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will > soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because > frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human, > non-cognitive example. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond > wrote: > >> Edwina, Jon S, list, >> >> At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation >> than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in >> this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer >> a few quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis >> added by me in all cases). >> >> 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23 >> >> …we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to our >> outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it >> calls up some feeling, effort, or thought… >> >> >> 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, list 1. See my most recent post - which has the Representamen as the mediation between the O and the I. As to whether this semiosic triad can function 'outside or inside' - to me, that doesn't make any sense, since I consider semiosic as an interaction between two entities. ..Yes, this can be a purely conceptual interaction taking place within one human..but..semiosis remains an interaction. 2. I disagree that Peirce considered the form as operative in Firstness. Firstness is a quality, a sensation - and Form, as such, functions within constraints, borders, rules .Form is a property of Thirdness. I also disagree that matter is 'Secondness'. Secondness is a brute interaction and not necessarily material. And- even matter doesn't exist without Form. That's why I use the term 'morpohological unit' - to outline the nature of matter-as-a-form. 3. I think that your interpretation of Peirce's outline misses the point that the function of the Representamen is to mediate, and transform the sensate data received from the DO - into some understanding of what that data is. How can the Representamen mediate - unless it 'is in touch' with, so to speak, the normative patterns, the habits, of that entity? Edwina On Mon 05/02/18 9:39 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: 1. Per my last response to Gary R., it depends on which Sign we are discussing. The loud sound is obviously outside the bird, while the neural pattern is obviously inside the bird. In my current thinking, both can be analyzed as Representamens; in yours, if I understand you correctly, only the latter is a Representamen. 2. I start having trouble following you when you introduce new terms like "morphological units" and "material forms"; the latter term, in particular, almost seems like an oxymoron, since philosophers (including Peirce) traditionally maintain a distinction between form (1ns) and matter (2ns). In any case, you only mention birds, trees, and insects as "locations" of semiosis; does this mean that you reject physical semiosis in non-living material things, or perhaps view it as consisting entirely of brute dyadic reactions? 3. Again, where memory (collateral experience) and habits (of interpretation) fit into the process of semiosis is precisely what I am now trying to figure out. Because I define the Representamen as that which stands for an Object to an Intepretant--which is how I read Peirce defining it, as well--I do not see how these elements can be "located" within the Representamen. Instead, my sense--still quite vague and tentative at this point--is that collateral experience has something to do with recognizing the Immediate Object as a determination of its Dynamic Object, while habits of interpretation have something to do with the tendency to produce a particular Dynamic Interpretant from the range of possibilities that constitutes the Immediate Interpretant. 4. It sounds like we agree on interpreting Peirce as holding that substances (like an individual bird) are bundles of habits. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 7:31 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon, list 1] In your view - where is the location of the Sign - if not in the bird? Is your Sign floating around as an ICloud? 2] Yes - semiosis only takes place within morphological units, in this case, within the bird. Semiosis is also going on in other material forms outside of this bird, within the tree, the other birds, the insects.. Semiosis is ongoing within these material forms and between these material forms. 3] Where, in your view, does memory or continuity or habits exist? I consider that habits/memory exist within the material form. Consider an atom; its habits of formation DO exist; without such habits - it would not exist as that atom. Same with the bird; its habits of formation exist [DNA etc] within it. 4] The individual sound acts on the habits of form within the Bird; these habits set up the neurological reaction of 'fear and flight'. Without such habits- the bird would not exist but would collapse into...multiple diverse molecules??? Edwina On Sun 04/02/18 10:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com [2] sent: Edwina, List: I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the Sign, not necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis only take place within the bird? Is there no other semiosis going on, in which the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen? How can the Representamen be classified as general (Legisign or Type) in a scenario where an individual sound leads an individual bird to the individual action of flight? I thought you were saying in your previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much more sense
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Edwina, List: 1. Per my last response to Gary R., it depends on which Sign we are discussing. The loud sound is obviously outside the bird, while the neural pattern is obviously inside the bird. In my current thinking, both can be analyzed as Representamens; in yours, if I understand you correctly, only the latter is a Representamen. 2. I start having trouble following you when you introduce new terms like "morphological units" and "material forms"; the latter term, in particular, almost seems like an oxymoron, since philosophers (including Peirce) traditionally maintain a *distinction *between form (1ns) and matter (2ns). In any case, you only mention birds, trees, and insects as "locations" of semiosis; does this mean that you reject *physical *semiosis in *non-living* material things, or perhaps view it as consisting entirely of brute dyadic reactions? 3. Again, where memory (collateral experience) and habits (of interpretation) fit into the process of semiosis is precisely what I am now trying to figure out. Because I define the Representamen as that which stands for an Object to an Intepretant--which is how I read Peirce defining it, as well--I do not see how these elements can be "located" within the Representamen. Instead, my sense--still quite vague and tentative at this point--is that collateral experience has something to do with recognizing the Immediate Object as a determination of its Dynamic Object, while habits of interpretation have something to do with the tendency to produce a particular Dynamic Interpretant from the range of possibilities that constitutes the Immediate Interpretant. 4. It sounds like we agree on interpreting Peirce as holding that substances (like an individual bird) are bundles of habits. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 7:31 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon, list > > 1] In your view - where is the location of the Sign - if not in the bird? > Is your Sign floating around as an ICloud? > > 2] Yes - semiosis only takes place within morphological units, in this > case, within the bird. Semiosis is also going on in other material forms > outside of this bird, within the tree, the other birds, the insects.. > Semiosis is ongoing within these material forms and between these material > forms. > > 3] Where, in your view, does memory or continuity or habits exist? I > consider that habits/memory exist within the material form. Consider > an atom; its habits of formation DO exist; without such habits - it would > not exist as that atom. Same with the bird; its habits of formation exist > [DNA etc] within it. > > 4] The individual sound acts on the habits of form within the Bird; these > habits set up the neurological reaction of 'fear and flight'. Without such > habits- the bird would not exist but would collapse into...multiple diverse > molecules??? > > Edwina > > On Sun 04/02/18 10:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the Sign, not necessarily > within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for > now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis only take place > within the bird? Is there no other semiosis going on, in which the loud > sound plays the role of the Representamen? > > How can the Representamen be classified as general (Legisign or Type) in > a scenario where an individual sound leads an individual bird to the > individual > action of flight? I thought you were saying in your previous post that it > is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much more sense to me. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > >> The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the >> birdthe IO-Representamen-II. >> >> A Representamen is always internal to the triad. >> >> The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to >> react and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological >> system is the IO. >> >> What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis: >> which is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI. >> >> The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object. >> >> The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't >> stand alone. >> >> >> >> A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that >> deaf bird- the bird's flight. >> >> Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that >> other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that >> adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight. >> >> --- >> No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in >> a mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base, >> both biological and learned, of that bird. >> >>
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, list - there are multiple semiosic actions going on 'at the same time' so to speak. If we just take this one example of the loud sound/tree falling...whether the Receiver is a bird or human - there are multiple semiosic actions involved. 1] For both, there can be the 'rhematic iconic qualisign' [a feeling of sound]. This would involve DO and IO and R. The neurological R. 2] For both, there can be a Rhematic indexical sinsign'..[a local, non-intentional reaction to a local indexical stimuli...This would involve DO, IO, R and II. Again, neurological. Here we just have the neurological reaction..but note..even this neurological reaction could not appear without there being neurological habits within the bird/human's systems 3] So, bringing in Thirdness, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign...which involves that DO, IO, R and II. Here, the system acknowledges the habits of formation of the human/bird. 4] With the human, I'd add: possibly, a Dicent Symbolic Legisign to acknowledge that the human has symbolically named the DO. BUT - semiosic action 1 and 2 rest within 3. That is - my view is that there is no such thing as a 'feeling' of redness or a feeling of sound - existing outside of a morphological or material 'home'/form. Mind exists within matter. Edwina On Mon 05/02/18 9:20 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Gary R., List: Your observation that I tend to associate the concept of "Sign" with something external first (e.g., the loud sound) and internal second (e.g., the bird's neural pattern) is accurate. It seems to me that any adequate model of semiosis must be able to take both kinds of Signs into account. What I continue to find tricky in this particular discussion is where to "locate" the collateral experience and habits of interpretation that come into play when an external Sign is "translated" into an internal Sign. I have some hints in mind now that I have started rereading "New Elements," but nothing that I can explicate or defend just yet. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:06 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter." I meant to say that your emphasis seems to be on latter (the external sign), mine on the internal (the cognitive sign that 'responds' to that external sign as immediate object. Sorry about that! Best, Gary R Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690 [2] On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Jon S, list, Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a sign' than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more general as I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being existent is but half the story. You seem to me to look at the sign from 'without', while I tend to look at it from 'within'. But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me, human semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the non-human, non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690 [4] On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Gary R., List: Of course the Sign can be within the bird; what I said was that I think it does not necessarily have to be be within the bird. I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in that direction. In a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, the Sign itself is an Existent (individual), not a Necessitant (general); so I do not understand what point you are making about this. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [6] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [7] On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Jon, Edwina, list, Jon wrote: I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the Sign, not necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis only take place within the bird? Is there no other semiosis going on, in which the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen? me. Cannot the Sign be "
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Gary R., List: Your observation that I tend to associate the concept of "Sign" with something external first (e.g., the loud sound) and internal second (e.g., the bird's neural pattern) is accurate. It seems to me that any adequate model of semiosis must be able to take both kinds of Signs into account. What I continue to find tricky in this particular discussion is where to "locate" the collateral experience and habits of interpretation that come into play when an external Sign is "translated" into an internal Sign. I have some hints in mind now that I have started rereading "New Elements," but nothing that I can explicate or defend just yet. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:06 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as > emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn > to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your > emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter." > > I *meant *to say that your emphasis seems to be on latter (the external > sign), mine on the internal (the cognitive sign that 'responds' to that > external sign as immediate object. > > Sorry about that! > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Gary Richmond > wrote: > >> Jon S, list, >> >> Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a sign' >> than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more general as >> I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of the >> Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being *existent *is but half the >> story. You seem to me to look at the sign from 'without', while I tend to >> look at it from 'within'. >> >> But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me, human >> semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the non-human, >> non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign, >> whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least >> springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the >> former, mine the latter. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >> >> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Gary R., List: >>> >>> Of course the Sign *can *be within the bird; what I said was that I >>> think it does not necessarily *have to* be be within the bird. >>> >>> I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I >>> suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in >>> that direction. >>> >>> In a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, the Sign itself is an Existent >>> (individual), not a Necessitant (general); so I do not understand what >>> point you are making about this. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Gary Richmond >>> wrote: >>> Jon, Edwina, list, Jon wrote: I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take place within the bird? Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen? me. Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place within the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the sign (of which it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another analysis). (Btw, I think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this analysis to consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and clarify the analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird although we can take a stab at the mind of a man/woman). Jon wrote: How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type) in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to the *individual *action of flight? I thought you were saying in your previous post that it is a Rhemat
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Jon, Gary R, list: OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different: DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I don't know that. IO: my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it differently than my cat or dog or children or... R: the Representamen consists of both my physiological and cognitive MEMORIES. Some are innate [the neurological; some are learned]. This Representamen accepts the sensate data from the IO and, according to its full knowledge baseinterprets that data. II: this is my internal interpretation. It's 'honed and constrained and organized by the combined memories of the Representamen...and I become conscious of an external disturbance. ..ie.. I become aware that it is not a dream; that it is existent and that it is outside of me and that..it might be familiar... DI: I am articulate, conscious that this external force is outside of me, is existent and is, since I've heard these noises before..the sound of a tree falling and dredging up more of my memories from the Representamen...I decide.."It's that old oak tree'. Now - the only difference between the bird and the human - is the Representamen is more powerful in its stock of habits; and thus, sets up a cognitive rather than physical reaction. The bird's DI is to flee. The human will come up with a conceptual interpretant... Again - I emphasize the necessity of the semiosic action including the action of habits. Jon's outline doesn't seem to include this and I don't understand how any Interpretation can take place, except an almost purely mechanical one, that doesn't include this force. Certainly, the classes of signs that do NOT include Thirdness [habit-taking] DO exist, but only as a short-term event...and even they, are 'nestled' within the body of something that DOES function within habits That is - Jon's suggestion that the bird-event is a rhematic indexical sinsign only refers to the single event of the loud sound. This is, as Gary R explains, the focus on the EXTERNAL. But - when we add in the RESULT, the bird's flight - we must include the neurological habits of the bird, which are: 'run from danger' - and so, the Interpretant is: flight. Edwina Edwina On Mon 05/02/18 8:33 AM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent: BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, Gary R - I thought Gary R's quotes were excellent, pointing out the necessity for memory/habits and their function in semiosis. What carries out this function of habit? The Representamen. Edwina On Sun 04/02/18 10:31 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Gary R., List: Welcome back! I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human, non-cognitive example. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Edwina, Jon S, list, At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis added by me in all cases). 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23 …we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought… 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38 A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A] sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an immediate present. The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory. 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228 A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is here to be understood in a so
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, Gary R - I thought Gary R's quotes were excellent, pointing out the necessity for memory/habits and their function in semiosis. What carries out this function of habit? The Representamen. Edwina On Sun 04/02/18 10:31 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Gary R., List: Welcome back! I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human, non-cognitive example. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Edwina, Jon S, list, At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis added by me in all cases). 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23 …we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought… 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38 A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A] sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an immediate present. The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory. 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228 A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is to have a like content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant of the interval a new idea. 1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6 … a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So that it appears that every species of actual cognition is of the nature of a sign. [—] Best, Gary R Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690 [4] Links: -- [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'gary.richm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [4] http://webmail.primus.ca/tel:(718)%20482-5690 - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, list 1] In your view - where is the location of the Sign - if not in the bird? Is your Sign floating around as an ICloud? 2] Yes - semiosis only takes place within morphological units, in this case, within the bird. Semiosis is also going on in other material forms outside of this bird, within the tree, the other birds, the insects.. Semiosis is ongoing within these material forms and between these material forms. 3] Where, in your view, does memory or continuity or habits exist? I consider that habits/memory exist within the material form. Consider an atom; its habits of formation DO exist; without such habits - it would not exist as that atom. Same with the bird; its habits of formation exist [DNA etc] within it. 4] The individual sound acts on the habits of form within the Bird; these habits set up the neurological reaction of 'fear and flight'. Without such habits- the bird would not exist but would collapse into...multiple diverse molecules??? Edwina On Sun 04/02/18 10:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the Sign, not necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis only take place within the bird? Is there no other semiosis going on, in which the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen? How can the Representamen be classified as general (Legisign or Type) in a scenario where an individual sound leads an individual bird to the individual action of flight? I thought you were saying in your previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much more sense to me. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the birdthe IO-Representamen-II. A Representamen is always internal to the triad. The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to react and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological system is the IO. What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis: which is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI. The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object. The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't stand alone. A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that deaf bird- the bird's flight. Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight. --- No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in a mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base, both biological and learned, of that bird. -- Edwina On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com [2] sent: Edwina, List: Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more differences in our views that are becoming apparent. The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a certain way. Are you positing some kind of discontinuity in the semiosis during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the loud sound that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves on the bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight? Otherwise, it seems to me that each of these could be analyzed as a Representamen--even the bird's flight, which might signal to another bird (say, a deaf one) that it should flee, as well. As I have stated a couple of times before, I consider our example to be one in which all of the correlates are Existents (2ns); i.e., per the 1903 Sign classification, it is an Indexical Sinsign, although I am inclined to agree that it is Rhematic, rather than Dicent. The bird's reaction/interpretation of the Sign is the individual action of flight; the habit was already in place before the loud sound ever happened. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 6:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it transforms the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an Interpretation... So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act as MIND, transforming this sound into some interpretation of it. I am, in the above, assuming that the Representamen is in a mode o
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter." I *meant *to say that your emphasis seems to be on latter (the external sign), mine on the internal (the cognitive sign that 'responds' to that external sign as immediate object. Sorry about that! Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Jon S, list, > > Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a sign' > than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more general as > I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of the > Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being *existent *is but half the > story. You seem to me to look at the sign from 'without', while I tend to > look at it from 'within'. > > But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me, human > semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the non-human, > non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign, > whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least > springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the > former, mine the latter. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> Of course the Sign *can *be within the bird; what I said was that I >> think it does not necessarily *have to* be be within the bird. >> >> I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I >> suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in >> that direction. >> >> In a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, the Sign itself is an Existent >> (individual), not a Necessitant (general); so I do not understand what >> point you are making about this. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Gary Richmond >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, Edwina, list, >>> >>> Jon wrote: >>> >>> I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not >>> necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement >>> aside for now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take >>> place within the bird? Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which >>> the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen? >>> me. >>> >>> >>> Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is >>> perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within >>> the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree >>> with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central >>> importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place >>> within the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the >>> sign (of which it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another >>> analysis). (Btw, I think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this >>> analysis to consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and >>> clarify the analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird >>> although we can take a stab at the mind of a man/woman). >>> >>> Jon wrote: >>> >>> How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type) >>> in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to >>> the *individual *action of flight? I thought you were saying in your >>> previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much >>> more sense to me. >>> >>> >>> But aren't we *also* concerned, Jon, with individual semiosis? "A *rhematic >>> indexical sinsign* (such as a cry in the street) is a sign that directs >>> attention to the object by which it is caused." CSP >>> >>> Wouldn't this 'work' for *any* bird say in a flock of birds? >>> >>> OK, hazy thinking for now. But circling around this seems to be of >>> potential value imo, at least for me. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >>> > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts sho
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Jon S, list, Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a sign' than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more general as I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being *existent *is but half the story. You seem to me to look at the sign from 'without', while I tend to look at it from 'within'. But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me, human semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the non-human, non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Gary R., List: > > Of course the Sign *can *be within the bird; what I said was that I think > it does not necessarily *have to* be be within the bird. > > I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I > suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in > that direction. > > In a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, the Sign itself is an Existent > (individual), not a Necessitant (general); so I do not understand what > point you are making about this. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Gary Richmond > wrote: > >> Jon, Edwina, list, >> >> Jon wrote: >> >> I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not >> necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement >> aside for now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take >> place within the bird? Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which >> the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen? >> me. >> >> >> Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is >> perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within >> the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree >> with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central >> importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place within >> the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the sign (of >> which it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another analysis). >> (Btw, I think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this analysis to >> consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and clarify the >> analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird although we can >> take a stab at the mind of a man/woman). >> >> Jon wrote: >> >> How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type) >> in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to >> the *individual *action of flight? I thought you were saying in your >> previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much >> more sense to me. >> >> >> But aren't we *also* concerned, Jon, with individual semiosis? "A *rhematic >> indexical sinsign* (such as a cry in the street) is a sign that directs >> attention to the object by which it is caused." CSP >> >> Wouldn't this 'work' for *any* bird say in a flock of birds? >> >> OK, hazy thinking for now. But circling around this seems to be of >> potential value imo, at least for me. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >> >>> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Gary R., List: Of course the Sign *can *be within the bird; what I said was that I think it does not necessarily *have to* be be within the bird. I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in that direction. In a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, the Sign itself is an Existent (individual), not a Necessitant (general); so I do not understand what point you are making about this. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Jon, Edwina, list, > > Jon wrote: > > I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not > necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement > aside for now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take > place within the bird? Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which > the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen? > me. > > > Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is > perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within > the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree > with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central > importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place within > the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the sign (of > which it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another analysis). > (Btw, I think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this analysis to > consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and clarify the > analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird although we can > take a stab at the mind of a man/woman). > > Jon wrote: > > How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type) > in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to > the *individual *action of flight? I thought you were saying in your > previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much > more sense to me. > > > But aren't we *also* concerned, Jon, with individual semiosis? "A *rhematic > indexical sinsign* (such as a cry in the street) is a sign that directs > attention to the object by which it is caused." CSP > > Wouldn't this 'work' for *any* bird say in a flock of birds? > > OK, hazy thinking for now. But circling around this seems to be of > potential value imo, at least for me. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > >> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Jon, Edwina, list, I'm not quite *back*, but thanks for the welcome back! Again, I would suggest that a return to a human, cognitive example would be helpful for clarifying the ideas being considered. Perhaps you hadn't read my last post when you questioned how those quotations might be helpful. I think it might be easier to get a 'handle' on this question focusing on human semiosis (anyhow, I'm finding the 'bird' example 'tricky'). Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Gary R., List: > > Welcome back! I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will > soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because > frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human, > non-cognitive example. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond > wrote: > >> Edwina, Jon S, list, >> >> At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation >> than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in >> this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer >> a few quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis >> added by me in all cases). >> >> 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23 >> >> …we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our >> outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it >> calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…* >> >> >> 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38 >> >> A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its >> interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A] >> sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that >> thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the >> other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an >> immediate present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the >> deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.* >> >> >> 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228 >> >> A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for >> something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, >> creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more >> developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of >> the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands >> for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, >> which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is >> here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in >> everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches >> another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was >> thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which >> when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so >> far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is >> to have a *like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each >> instant of the interval a new idea. >> >> >> 1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6 >> >> …a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So >> that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature >> of a sign.* [—] >> >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >> > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Jon, Edwina, list, Jon wrote: I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take place within the bird? Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen? me. Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place within the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the sign (of which it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another analysis). (Btw, I think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this analysis to consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and clarify the analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird although we can take a stab at the mind of a man/woman). Jon wrote: How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type) in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to the *individual *action of flight? I thought you were saying in your previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much more sense to me. But aren't we *also* concerned, Jon, with individual semiosis? "A *rhematic indexical sinsign* (such as a cry in the street) is a sign that directs attention to the object by which it is caused." CSP Wouldn't this 'work' for *any* bird say in a flock of birds? OK, hazy thinking for now. But circling around this seems to be of potential value imo, at least for me. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:12 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Edwina, List: > > I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not > necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement > aside for now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take > place within the bird? Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which > the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen? > > How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type) > in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to > the *individual *action of flight? I thought you were saying in your > previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much > more sense to me. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > >> The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the >> birdthe IO-Representamen-II. >> >> A Representamen is always internal to the triad. >> >> The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to >> react and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological >> system is the IO. >> >> What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis: >> which is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI. >> >> The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object. >> >> The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't >> stand alone. >> >> >> >> A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that >> deaf bird- the bird's flight. >> >> Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that >> other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that >> adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight. >> >> --- >> No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in >> a mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base, >> both biological and learned, of that bird. >> >> -- >> Edwina >> >> On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight >> more differences in our views that are becoming apparent. >> >> The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and >> mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not >> seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a >> certain way. Are you positing some kind of discontinuity in the >> semiosis during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the >> loud sound that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves >> on the bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight? Otherwise, it >> seems to me that each of these could be analyzed as a
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Gary R., List: Welcome back! I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human, non-cognitive example. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Edwina, Jon S, list, > > At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than > with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this > matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few > quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis added > by me in all cases). > > 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23 > > …we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our > outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it > calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…* > > > 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38 > > A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its > interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A] > sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that > thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the > other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an > immediate present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the > deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.* > > > 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228 > > A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for > something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, > creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more > developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of > the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands > for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, > which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is > here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in > everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches > another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was > thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which > when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so > far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is > to have a *like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant > of the interval a new idea. > > > 1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6 > > …a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So > that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature > of a sign.* [—] > > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Edwina, List: I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take place within the bird? Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen? How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type) in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to the *individual *action of flight? I thought you were saying in your previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much more sense to me. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the > birdthe IO-Representamen-II. > > A Representamen is always internal to the triad. > > The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to react > and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological system is > the IO. > > What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis: which > is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI. > > The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object. > > The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't > stand alone. > > > > A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that > deaf bird- the bird's flight. > > Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that > other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that > adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight. > > --- > No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in a > mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base, both > biological and learned, of that bird. > > -- > Edwina > > On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more > differences in our views that are becoming apparent. > > The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and > mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not > seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a > certain way. Are you positing some kind of discontinuity in the semiosis > during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the loud sound > that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves on the > bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight? Otherwise, it seems > to me that each of these could be analyzed as a Representamen--even the > bird's flight, which might signal to another bird (say, a deaf one) that it > should flee, as well. > > As I have stated a couple of times before, I consider our example to be > one in which all of the correlates are Existents (2ns); i.e., per the 1903 > Sign classification, it is an Indexical Sinsign, although I am inclined to > agree that it is Rhematic, rather than Dicent. The bird's > reaction/interpretation of the Sign is the individual action of flight; > the habit was already in place before the loud sound ever happened. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 6:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > >> 1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it transforms >> the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an Interpretation... >> >> So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act >> as MIND, transforming this sound into some interpretation of it. >> >> I am, in the above, assuming that the Representamen is in a mode of >> Thirdness [Mind]. For example, as >> >> O-R-I or a Rhematic Indexical Legisign, an individual interpretation of >> local stimuli as referenced to a general rule. >> >> So- the bird's reaction/interpretation of the sound..is the habit of >> flight. >> >> But- the Representamen can be in other modes. >> >> >> - >> >> 2] Now..let's see..what if it's instead in a mode of Firstness. >> >> this would have the triad [O-R-I] as a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign- where >> all three parts of the Sign are in a mode of Firstness. Peirce's example >> was that 'feeling of redness'; this example would be a feeling of sound. A >> local and internal non-interpreted, non-describe individual state. >> >> 3] What if the Representamen were in a mode of Secondness. There are >> three classes where the R is in a mode of Secondness: >> >> O-R-I or 1-2-1 A Rhematic Iconic Sinsign. An individual diagram; an >> iconic non-analyzed description of a sensation >> >> O-R-I or 2-2-1 A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign . A spontaneous cry. a >> local non-intentional react
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Edwina, Jon S, list, At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis added by me in all cases). 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23 …we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…* 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38 A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A] sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an immediate present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.* 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228 A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is to have a *like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant of the interval a new idea. 1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6 …a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature of a sign.* [—] Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the > birdthe IO-Representamen-II. > > A Representamen is always internal to the triad. > > The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to react > and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological system is > the IO. > > What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis: which > is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI. > > The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object. > > The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't > stand alone. > > > > A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that > deaf bird- the bird's flight. > > Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that > other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that > adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight. > > --- > No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in a > mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base, both > biological and learned, of that bird. > > -- > Edwina > > On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more > differences in our views that are becoming apparent. > > The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and > mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not > seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a > certain way. Are you positing some kind of discontinuity in the semiosis > during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the loud sound > that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves on the > bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight? Otherwise, it seems > to me that each of these could be analyzed as a Representamen--even the > bird's flight, which might signal to another bird (say, a deaf one) that it > should flee, as well. > > As I have stated a couple of times before, I consider our example to be > one in whi
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the birdthe IO-Representamen-II. A Representamen is always internal to the triad. The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to react and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological system is the IO. What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis: which is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI. The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object. The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't stand alone. A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that deaf bird- the bird's flight. Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight. --- No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in a mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base, both biological and learned, of that bird. -- Edwina On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more differences in our views that are becoming apparent. The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a certain way. Are you positing some kind of discontinuity in the semiosis during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the loud sound that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves on the bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight? Otherwise, it seems to me that each of these could be analyzed as a Representamen--even the bird's flight, which might signal to another bird (say, a deaf one) that it should flee, as well. As I have stated a couple of times before, I consider our example to be one in which all of the correlates are Existents (2ns); i.e., per the 1903 Sign classification, it is an Indexical Sinsign, although I am inclined to agree that it is Rhematic, rather than Dicent. The bird's reaction/interpretation of the Sign is the individual action of flight; the habit was already in place before the loud sound ever happened. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 6:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it transforms the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an Interpretation... So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act as MIND, transforming this sound into some interpretation of it. I am, in the above, assuming that the Representamen is in a mode of Thirdness [Mind]. For example, as O-R-I or a Rhematic Indexical Legisign, an individual interpretation of local stimuli as referenced to a general rule. So- the bird's reaction/interpretation of the sound..is the habit of flight. But- the Representamen can be in other modes. - 2] Now..let's see..what if it's instead in a mode of Firstness. this would have the triad [O-R-I] as a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign- where all three parts of the Sign are in a mode of Firstness. Peirce's example was that 'feeling of redness'; this example would be a feeling of sound. A local and internal non-interpreted, non-describe individual state. 3] What if the Representamen were in a mode of Secondness. There are three classes where the R is in a mode of Secondness: O-R-I or 1-2-1 A Rhematic Iconic Sinsign. An individual diagram; an iconic non-analyzed description of a sensation O-R-I or 2-2-1 A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign . A spontaneous cry. a local non-intentional reaction to a local and direct indexical stimuli. O-R-I or 2-2-2- a Dicent Indexical Sinsign; a mechanical reaction. So - in the above - I could see that the Representamen could be in a mode of Secondness..as a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. --- But- in none of the above - do I define the loud sound as the Representamen, since I maintain that its role is mediation. Edwina On Sun 04/02/18 7:13 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com [2] sent: Edwina, List: Yes, again, we have very different definitions of "Represen
Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Edwina, List: Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more differences in our views that are becoming apparent. The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a certain way. Are you positing some kind of *discontinuity *in the semiosis during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the loud sound that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves on the bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight? Otherwise, it seems to me that *each *of these could be analyzed as a Representamen--even the bird's flight, which might signal to another bird (say, a deaf one) that it should flee, as well. As I have stated a couple of times before, I consider our example to be one in which all of the correlates are Existents (2ns); i.e., per the 1903 Sign classification, it is an Indexical Sinsign, although I am inclined to agree that it is Rhematic, rather than Dicent. The bird's reaction/interpretation of the Sign is the *individual *action of flight; the *habit *was already in place before the loud sound ever happened. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 6:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > 1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it transforms > the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an Interpretation... > > So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act > as MIND, transforming this sound into some interpretation of it. > > I am, in the above, assuming that the Representamen is in a mode of > Thirdness [Mind]. For example, as > > O-R-I or a Rhematic Indexical Legisign, an individual interpretation of > local stimuli as referenced to a general rule. > > So- the bird's reaction/interpretation of the sound..is the habit of > flight. > > But- the Representamen can be in other modes. > > > - > > 2] Now..let's see..what if it's instead in a mode of Firstness. > > this would have the triad [O-R-I] as a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign- where > all three parts of the Sign are in a mode of Firstness. Peirce's example > was that 'feeling of redness'; this example would be a feeling of sound. A > local and internal non-interpreted, non-describe individual state. > > 3] What if the Representamen were in a mode of Secondness. There are three > classes where the R is in a mode of Secondness: > > O-R-I or 1-2-1 A Rhematic Iconic Sinsign. An individual diagram; an > iconic non-analyzed description of a sensation > > O-R-I or 2-2-1 A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign . A spontaneous cry. a local > non-intentional reaction to a local and direct indexical stimuli. > > O-R-I or 2-2-2- a Dicent Indexical Sinsign; a mechanical reaction. > > > > So - in the above - I could see that the Representamen could be in a mode > of Secondness..as a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. > > --- > > But- in none of the above - do I define the loud sound as the > Representamen, since I maintain that its role is mediation. > > Edwina > > On Sun 04/02/18 7:13 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > Yes, again, we have very different definitions of "Representamen." Just > to clarify--are you saying that in your view, the loud sound cannot be > treated as the Representamen in any semiotic analysis of this scenario? > If so, why not? > > Thanks, > > Jon S. > > On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > >> I would disagree. The falling of the tree is a full Sign [O-R-I]with >> the actual fall as the Dynamic Interpretant. The wind-taking-down-the-tree >> might by a Dynamic Object to the tree...which then reacts by falling [DI]. >> >> But within the bird, what affects the senses of the bird - is that loud >> sound. That is the external Dynamic Object to that situation. The Immediate >> Object is whatever sensual data is felt within the bird from that sound. >> The Representamen is a process of mediating this sensate data into an >> interpretation [II and DI]. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Sun 04/02/18 4:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: >> >> Helmut, List: >> >> In my view, we can indeed take the loud sound to be the Representamen, as >> I initially suggested--noting again that my definition differs >> significantly from Edwina's. This leads to a different analysis in which >> the Dynamic Object is the falling of the tree that causes the sound, >> with the other terms reassigned accordingly. Sign-action is mediation, >> even though the Sign itself is indeed the First Correlate of the genuine >> triadic relation that has the Object as its Second Correlate and the >> Interpretant as its Third Correlate (cf. EP 2:290; 1903). >> >> Regards
Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it transforms the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an Interpretation... So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act as MIND, transforming this sound into some interpretation of it. I am, in the above, assuming that the Representamen is in a mode of Thirdness [Mind]. For example, as O-R-I or a Rhematic Indexical Legisign, an individual interpretation of local stimuli as referenced to a general rule. So- the bird's reaction/interpretation of the sound..is the habit of flight. But- the Representamen can be in other modes. - 2] Now..let's see..what if it's instead in a mode of Firstness. this would have the triad [O-R-I] as a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign- where all three parts of the Sign are in a mode of Firstness. Peirce's example was that 'feeling of redness'; this example would be a feeling of sound. A local and internal non-interpreted, non-describe individual state. 3] What if the Representamen were in a mode of Secondness. There are three classes where the R is in a mode of Secondness: O-R-I or 1-2-1 A Rhematic Iconic Sinsign. An individual diagram; an iconic non-analyzed description of a sensation O-R-I or 2-2-1 A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign . A spontaneous cry. a local non-intentional reaction to a local and direct indexical stimuli. O-R-I or 2-2-2- a Dicent Indexical Sinsign; a mechanical reaction. So - in the above - I could see that the Representamen could be in a mode of Secondness..as a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. --- But- in none of the above - do I define the loud sound as the Representamen, since I maintain that its role is mediation. Edwina On Sun 04/02/18 7:13 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: Yes, again, we have very different definitions of "Representamen." Just to clarify--are you saying that in your view, the loud sound cannot be treated as the Representamen in any semiotic analysis of this scenario? If so, why not? Thanks, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: I would disagree. The falling of the tree is a full Sign [O-R-I]with the actual fall as the Dynamic Interpretant. The wind-taking-down-the-tree might by a Dynamic Object to the tree...which then reacts by falling [DI]. But within the bird, what affects the senses of the bird - is that loud sound. That is the external Dynamic Object to that situation. The Immediate Object is whatever sensual data is felt within the bird from that sound. The Representamen is a process of mediating this sensate data into an interpretation [II and DI]. Edwina On Sun 04/02/18 4:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com [2] sent: Helmut, List: In my view, we can indeed take the loud sound to be the Representamen, as I initially suggested--noting again that my definition differs significantly from Edwina's. This leads to a different analysis in which the Dynamic Object is the falling of the tree that causes the sound, with the other terms reassigned accordingly. Sign-action is mediation, even though the Sign itself is indeed the First Correlate of the genuine triadic relation that has the Object as its Second Correlate and the Interpretant as its Third Correlate (cf. EP 2:290; 1903). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4] Links: -- [1] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [2] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Edwina, List: Yes, again, we have very different definitions of "Representamen." Just to clarify--are you saying that in your view, the loud sound *cannot *be treated as the Representamen in *any *semiotic analysis of this scenario? If so, why not? Thanks, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > I would disagree. The falling of the tree is a full Sign [O-R-I]with > the actual fall as the Dynamic Interpretant. The wind-taking-down-the-tree > might by a Dynamic Object to the tree...which then reacts by falling [DI]. > > But within the bird, what affects the senses of the bird - is that loud > sound. That is the external Dynamic Object to that situation. The Immediate > Object is whatever sensual data is felt within the bird from that sound. > The Representamen is a process of mediating this sensate data into an > interpretation [II and DI]. > > Edwina > > On Sun 04/02/18 4:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Helmut, List: > > In my view, we can indeed take the loud sound to be the Representamen, as > I initially suggested--noting again that my definition differs > significantly from Edwina's. This leads to a different analysis in which > the Dynamic Object is the falling of the tree that causes the sound, with > the other terms reassigned accordingly. Sign-action is mediation, even > though the Sign itself is indeed the First Correlate of the genuine > triadic relation that has the Object as its Second Correlate and the > Interpretant as its Third Correlate (cf. EP 2:290; 1903). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I would disagree. The falling of the tree is a full Sign [O-R-I]with the actual fall as the Dynamic Interpretant. The wind-taking-down-the-tree might by a Dynamic Object to the tree...which then reacts by falling [DI]. But within the bird, what affects the senses of the bird - is that loud sound. That is the external Dynamic Object to that situation. The Immediate Object is whatever sensual data is felt within the bird from that sound. The Representamen is a process of mediating this sensate data into an interpretation [II and DI]. Edwina On Sun 04/02/18 4:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Helmut, List: In my view, we can indeed take the loud sound to be the Representamen, as I initially suggested--noting again that my definition differs significantly from Edwina's. This leads to a different analysis in which the Dynamic Object is the falling of the tree that causes the sound, with the other terms reassigned accordingly. Sign-action is mediation, even though the Sign itself is indeed the First Correlate of the genuine triadic relation that has the Object as its Second Correlate and the Interpretant as its Third Correlate (cf. EP 2:290; 1903). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 1:51 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Edwina, isn´t mediation (thirdness) a matter of the interpretant (thirdness), not the representamen? Well, I see representamen, object, interpretant as 1ns, 2ns, 3ns, which perhaps you don´t. Ok, representamen is also the sign, which is thirdness, because it includes all. This is difficult. Maybe the solution lies in the semiosis, when the interpretant (3ns) becomes a representamen (1ns) again? I don´t know. Have to ponder, get back later. Or do you have an idea what I am missing? Best, Helmut 04. Februar 2018 um 20:19 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" Helmut - I'll disagree. You are missing the triadic semiosic process of O-R-I. You are missing the process of mediation between the Object and the Interpretant - which is the action carried out by the Representamen. Therefore - the Representamen is not 'the loud sound' - Edwina On Sun 04/02/18 2:13 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de [5] sent:Jon, Edwina, List, I think: - The representamen is the loud sound, and everything connected with it in the situation (as the representamen is also the sign, so including all following points too) - The dynamical object is that, what the bird initially feels to be the source of the loud sound, as this (imaginary) source really (not imaginary) is, and as it is in the concepts of all other birds and all other creatures, - The immediate object is what is initially arisen (imagined) in the bird´s mind by the loud sound for being its source, - The immediate interpretant is the reason the bird assumes having to fly away, - The dynamical interpretant is really avoiding the (still imaginary) danger by flying away, - The final interpretant is the real benefit achieved by the bird, defined by what would really have happened if the bird had not flown away. This was a quick shot. Now I guess, maybe there is a pattern of combinations of "imaginary" and "real"... Best, Helmut Links: -- [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'h.raul...@gmx.de\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [4] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [5] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'h.raul...@gmx.de\',\'\',\'\',\'\') - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)
Helmut, List: In my view, we can indeed take the loud sound to be the Representamen, as I initially suggested--noting again that my definition differs significantly from Edwina's. This leads to a different analysis in which the Dynamic Object is the falling of the tree that *causes *the sound, with the other terms reassigned accordingly. Sign-action *is *mediation, even though the Sign itself is indeed the *First *Correlate of the genuine triadic relation that has the Object as its Second Correlate and the Interpretant as its Third Correlate (cf. EP 2:290; 1903). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 1:51 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > Edwina, isn´t mediation (thirdness) a matter of the interpretant > (thirdness), not the representamen? Well, I see representamen, object, > interpretant as 1ns, 2ns, 3ns, which perhaps you don´t. Ok, representamen > is also the sign, which is thirdness, because it includes all. This is > difficult. Maybe the solution lies in the semiosis, when the interpretant > (3ns) becomes a representamen (1ns) again? I don´t know. Have to ponder, > get back later. Or do you have an idea what I am missing? > Best, > Helmut > 04. Februar 2018 um 20:19 Uhr > *Von:* "Edwina Taborsky" > > Helmut - I'll disagree. You are missing the triadic semiosic process of > O-R-I. You are missing the process of mediation between the Object and the > Interpretant - which is the action carried out by the Representamen. > > Therefore - the Representamen is not 'the loud sound' - > > Edwina > > On Sun 04/02/18 2:13 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: > > Jon, Edwina, List, > I think: > - The representamen is the loud sound, and everything connected with it in > the situation (as the representamen is also the sign, so including all > following points too) > - The dynamical object is that, what the bird initially feels to be the > source of the loud sound, as this (imaginary) source really (not imaginary) > is, and as it is in the concepts of all other birds and all other creatures, > - The immediate object is what is initially arisen (imagined) in the > bird´s mind by the loud sound for being its source, > - The immediate interpretant is the reason the bird assumes having to fly > away, > - The dynamical interpretant is really avoiding the (still imaginary) > danger by flying away, > - The final interpretant is the real benefit achieved by the bird, defined > by what would really have happened if the bird had not flown away. > This was a quick shot. Now I guess, maybe there is a pattern of > combinations of "imaginary" and "real"... > Best, > Helmut > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .