cryptography  

Messages by Date

• 2009/09/17 Re: Biotech Based "Cryptogram Challenge" Jon Callas
• 2009/09/17 Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI David Wagner
• 2009/09/17 Biotech Based "Cryptogram Challenge" Jim Windle
• 2009/09/17 Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Brian Warner
• 2009/09/17 Re: Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Alexandre Dulaunoy
• 2009/09/17 Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI Peter Gutmann
• 2009/09/17 Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI Kevin W. Wall
• 2009/09/16 Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI Peter Gutmann
• 2009/09/16 Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI Joseph Ashwood
• 2009/09/16 Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI David Wagner
• 2009/09/16 Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI Joseph Ashwood
• 2009/09/16 Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/09/16 Re: Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Ivan Krstić
• 2009/09/16 Re: Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI David Wagner
• 2009/09/16 Detecting attempts to decrypt with incorrect secret key in OWASP ESAPI Kevin W. Wall
• 2009/09/15 Re: Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP James A. Donald
• 2009/09/15 Re: Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Ivan Krstić
• 2009/09/15 Re: how to encrypt and integrity-check with only one key David-Sarah Hopwood
• 2009/09/14 Re: how to encrypt and integrity-check with only one key Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/09/14 how to encrypt and integrity-check with only one key Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/09/14 Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Damien Miller
• 2009/09/14 Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Peter Gutmann
• 2009/09/14 Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Damien Miller
• 2009/09/11 Re: Privacy Plug-In Fakes out Facebook Adam Shostack
• 2009/09/11 Re: UK Prime Minister apologizes for Alan Turing's mistreatment. Stephan Somogyi
• 2009/09/10 UK Prime Minister apologizes for Alan Turing's mistreatment. Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/09/10 Re: Privacy Plug-In Fakes out Facebook Ali, Saqib
• 2009/09/10 Google Plans Tools to Help News Media Charge for Content R.A. Hettinga
• 2009/09/10 Privacy Plug-In Fakes out Facebook R.A. Hettinga
• 2009/09/10 Serpent close to AES speed thanks to SSE2 Eugen Leitl
• 2009/09/09 Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/09/09 NSA intercepts led to a terrorist conviction Steven Bellovin
• 2009/09/09 Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Matt Ball
• 2009/09/09 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Steven M. Bellovin
• 2009/09/09 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
• 2009/09/09 Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Peter Gutmann
• 2009/09/09 Re: "Fed's RFIDiocy pwnd at DefCon" Jerry Leichter
• 2009/09/08 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Jerry Leichter
• 2009/09/08 Re: so how do *you* manage your keys, then? part 3 Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/09/08 Re: Source for Skype Trojan released Dave Howe
• 2009/09/08 Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Peter Gutmann
• 2009/09/08 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Jerry Leichter
• 2009/09/08 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
• 2009/09/08 Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Brian Warner
• 2009/09/08 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Steven Bellovin
• 2009/09/08 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
• 2009/09/08 Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP James A. Donald
• 2009/09/08 Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm David Johnston
• 2009/09/08 Re: [cryptography] AES-GMAC as a hash Eric Young
• 2009/09/08 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Nicolas Williams
• 2009/09/08 Re: "Fed's RFIDiocy pwnd at DefCon" Matt Crawford
• 2009/09/08 Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Jack Lloyd
• 2009/09/08 Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm Nicolas Williams
• 2009/09/04 [fc-announce] Financial Crypto and Data Security 2010: speakers and workshops [submission deadline: September 15, 2009] R.A. Hettinga
• 2009/09/04 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
• 2009/09/04 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
• 2009/09/04 so how do *you* manage your keys, then? part 3 Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/09/04 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Steven Bellovin
• 2009/09/04 RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm priya yelgar
• 2009/09/04 "Fed's RFIDiocy pwnd at DefCon" Jerry Leichter
• 2009/09/04 Re: AES-GMAC as a hash Matt Ball
• 2009/09/04 Re: AES-GMAC as a hash Darren J Moffat
• 2009/09/04 Re: [Macgpg-users] GPGMail & Snow Leopard David Shaw
• 2009/09/04 Re: AES-GMAC as a hash "Hal Finney"
• 2009/09/04 Re: Source for Skype Trojan released Stephan Neuhaus
• 2009/09/04 Re: [tahoe-dev] a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/31 Source for Skype Trojan released Jerry Leichter
• 2009/08/31 Fwd: [Macgpg-users] GPGMail & Snow Leopard R.A. Hettinga
• 2009/08/31 Fwd: Important Information for PGP® Desktop Use rs Running Mac OS X R.A. Hettinga
• 2009/08/31 "Defending Against Sensor-Sniffing Attacks on Mobile Phones" Jerry Leichter
• 2009/08/31 Practical attack on WPA? Jerry Leichter
• 2009/08/31 Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Brian Warner
• 2009/08/31 Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Michael Walsh
• 2009/08/31 Re: [tahoe-dev] a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility James A. Donald
• 2009/08/31 Cloud Security: Alice and Bob Go to Washington R.A. Hettinga
• 2009/08/31 Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP Brian Warner
• 2009/08/31 Re: [tahoe-dev] a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/31 Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Thor Lancelot Simon
• 2009/08/31 AES-GMAC as a hash Darren J Moffat
• 2009/08/27 Re: a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility Jerry Leichter
• 2009/08/26 Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) James A. Donald
• 2009/08/26 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
• 2009/08/26 Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Peter Gutmann
• 2009/08/26 Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Jon Callas
• 2009/08/26 Re: a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility Richard Salz
• 2009/08/26 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Stefan Santesson
• 2009/08/26 a crypto puzzle about digital signatures and future compatibility Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/26 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Ben Laurie
• 2009/08/25 Re: Certainty Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/08/25 Re: Certainty "Hal Finney"
• 2009/08/25 Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) James A. Donald
• 2009/08/25 Small-key DSA variant "Hal Finney"
• 2009/08/25 Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Nicolas Williams
• 2009/08/25 Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Thor Lancelot Simon
• 2009/08/25 Re: SHA-1 and Git Paul Hoffman
• 2009/08/25 Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Darren J Moffat
• 2009/08/25 Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Jonathan Thornburg
• 2009/08/25 Re: SHA-1 and Git Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/08/25 Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Ben Laurie
• 2009/08/23 Re: Certainty Paul Hoffman
• 2009/08/23 NIST Requests Public Comments Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/08/21 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? -- OT anonymous-transaction Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• 2009/08/21 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? [OT anonymous-transaction bull***t] Ray Dillinger
• 2009/08/21 Re: Certainty John Gilmore
• 2009/08/21 Re: Certainty Greg Rose
• 2009/08/21 Re: Certainty james hughes
• 2009/08/19 Re (security fix): A Basic Rabin-Williams Digital Signature Specification Thierry Moreau
• 2009/08/19 Re: Certainty Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/08/19 Re: Crypto '09 rump session summary? Paul Hoffman
• 2009/08/19 Certainty Paul Hoffman
• 2009/08/19 Re: Crypto '09 rump session summary? Greg Rose
• 2009/08/19 SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git) Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/08/19 Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git James A. Donald
• 2009/08/19 Crypto '09 rump session summary? Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/08/19 Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/08/19 Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/19 Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git Jack Lloyd
• 2009/08/19 Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/18 Re: Crypto'09 Rump session to be webcast james hughes
• 2009/08/18 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
• 2009/08/18 2 serving time in UK prisons for refusing to decrypt on demand John Gilmore
• 2009/08/18 512 bit RSA key used for TI 83+ auth cracked Jack Lloyd
• 2009/08/18 So how do *you* manage your keys, then? Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/18 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
• 2009/08/16 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
• 2009/08/14 Re: Seizing the Enigma John Levine
• 2009/08/14 Crypto'09 Rump session to be webcast james hughes
• 2009/08/14 Re: Ultimate limits to computation Your Monkey Overlord
• 2009/08/14 Re: Kahn's "Seizing the Enigma" back in print -- with a catch John Levine
• 2009/08/13 Kahn's "Seizing the Enigma" back in print -- with a catch Steven Bellovin
• 2009/08/13 RE: strong claims about encryption safety Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Jason Resch
• 2009/08/13 Re: brute force physics Was: cleversafe... Florian Weimer
• 2009/08/13 Re: brute force physics Was: cleversafe... Alexander Klimov
• 2009/08/13 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Wes Felter
• 2009/08/12 strong claims about encryption safety Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/12 Re: brute force physics Was: cleversafe... David Wagner
• 2009/08/12 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
• 2009/08/12 Re: Ultimate limits to computation Jerry Leichter
• 2009/08/12 Re: brute force physics Was: cleversafe... Jerry Leichter
• 2009/08/12 Ultimate limits to computation "Hal Finney"
• 2009/08/12 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
• 2009/08/12 RE: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Thomas Hardjono
• 2009/08/11 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
• 2009/08/11 Entropy USB key Alex Pankratov
• 2009/08/11 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Frank Siebenlist
• 2009/08/11 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
• 2009/08/11 FW: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Jason Resch
• 2009/08/11 Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/11 Re: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/11 RE: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Jason Resch
• 2009/08/11 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
• 2009/08/11 RE: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Jason Resch
• 2009/08/11 RE: [tahoe-dev] cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption isOverrated Jason Resch
• 2009/08/11 brute force physics Was: cleversafe... Alexander Klimov
• 2009/08/09 Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Jerry Leichter
• 2009/08/09 Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/09 All your notebook belong to us Jerry Leichter
• 2009/08/09 Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/09 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
• 2009/08/09 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
• 2009/08/09 Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated james hughes
• 2009/08/06 RE: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Thomas Hardjono
• 2009/08/06 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• 2009/08/06 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Peter Gutmann
• 2009/08/06 Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome? James A. Donald
• 2009/08/06 Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Ben Laurie
• 2009/08/06 Re: Attacks against GOST? Was: Protocol Construction Joseph Ashwood
• 2009/08/05 ANNOUNCE: New book on software protection Christian Collberg
• 2009/08/05 Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/05 Client Certificate UI for Chrome? Ben Laurie
• 2009/08/04 Re: Malware using good crypto mhey...@gmail.com
• 2009/08/04 Vulnerable keyboards Jerry Leichter
• 2009/08/03 Re: New Attacks against AES-256 Robert Holmes
• 2009/08/03 Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Peter Gutmann
• 2009/08/03 New Attacks against AES-256 I)ruid
• 2009/08/03 Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Philipp Gühring
• 2009/08/03 Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Ali, Saqib
• 2009/08/03 Re: unattended reboot (was: clouds ...) John Denker
• 2009/08/03 Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Richard Salz
• 2009/08/03 Attacks against GOST? Was: Protocol Construction Alexander Klimov
• 2009/08/03 Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Darren J Moffat
• 2009/08/03 Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) lists
• 2009/08/03 Re: Unattended reboots james hughes
• 2009/08/03 Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Arshad Noor
• 2009/08/03 Re: Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Richard Salz
• 2009/08/02 Unattended reboots (was Re: The clouds are not random enough) Arshad Noor
• 2009/08/02 Re: The clouds are not random enough Ben Laurie
• 2009/08/02 GPGPU MD5 collision search shown at Black Hat Perry E. Metzger
• 2009/08/02 Protocol Construction WAS Re: Fast MAC algorithms? Joseph Ashwood
• 2009/08/02 Re: Fast MAC algorithms? Joseph Ashwood
• 2009/08/02 Re: AES, RC4 Joseph Ashwood
• 2009/08/02 ANNOUNCING Tahoe, the Lofty-Atmospheric Filesystem, v1.5 Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/02 Re: Fast MAC algorithms? James A. Donald
• 2009/08/02 AES, RC4 PETER SCHWEITZER
• 2009/08/02 Re: The clouds are not random enough Jerry Leichter
• 2009/08/02 Re: Fast MAC algorithms? Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
• 2009/08/01 Re: Fast MAC algorithms? Joseph Ashwood
• 2009/08/01 Manipulation and abuse of the consumer credit reporting agencies Jerry Leichter
• 2009/08/01 The clouds are not random enough Ali, Saqib
• 2009/07/31 Re: cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn

• Earlier messages
• Later messages