On 19 Mar 2011, at 18:04, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

on 19.03.2011 08:32 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 18 Mar 2011, at 21:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Not at all. I said exactly that. See the quote above. It is *because* they have the same right, that we have to listen to both copies, and
can define the indeterminacy from what they can all expected. In

Sorry then I have not understood you.

This however somewhat contradicts with you recent statement that there
should be just a single first person view:

"So I will be franc. The problem of interaction is not solved at all, even between third person describable objects. And the problem of how
many first person “really” exist is also an open problem, although I
tend more and more to believe that there is only one first person: the
universal person described by the arithmetical hypostases. Although
personal consciousness is not an illusion, self-identity can be. But,
please note that I am speculating here. And there do exist some
evidence that the numbers of person could be at least two. That would
be the case if the “whole truth” is a sort of person. Very complex

Could you please clarify this?

To understand that physics has to be derived from computer science, once
we assume digital mechanism, you have to consider the immediate
subjective experience(s) that you can have in some duplication experience. For example, you are here, and now, scanned, and then annihilated, and
then reconstituted in two places, W and M, say. Your immediate future
will be "I feel to be in W" or "I feel to be in M". You will not feel to be in both W and M *at once*, and if you have to predict, here and now, just before the duplication is taking place, what you *will* feel, you will be undecided about the outcome of the experience: it will be W or
it will be M, and you cannot predict the result in advance. Once in M
you can ask yourself why you feel to be the one in M, and the same for W.

OK? That is the first person indeterminacy.

Here I agree. If we accept that duplication is possible, then we must consider two copies as independent.


Having said this, you know in M that a version of you is also in W, and that he has the same right as you to pretend to be the original person. So personal identity might be an illusion, and beyond the first person
indeterminacy, this is what such duplication experiment also does
illustrate. And then Evgenii and Bruno also result from the same single initial amoeba, and although we are more different than the duplicated
person in W and M, we are descendant of that same amoeba, and we can,
*intellectually* conceive that Evgenii and Bruno are the same person,
*in that sense*. This changes nothing to the first person indeterminacy,
which concerns the immediate subjective outcome of an
experiment/experience. It concerns our deeper identity. We can go as far
as thinking that we are all the same person, the same Löbian machine,
but living different histories and context, and in that case the number
of person would be one, a bit like in some theory there is only one
electron in the universe, but by traveling in time it would be able to
manifest itself in multiple places and roles in the material
constitution of the stuff.

Tell me is this helps. You were confusing two levels of the discussion. The first person indeterminacy concerns practical prediction of precise
experience done in a relative context. The ultimate number of person
concerns the notion of person identity in the absolute. And this is not relevant for the prediction problem and the derivation of physics from
digital machine's theory.

I agree that here we have another level of discussion indeed. Yet, in my view they are somewhat related. When we say that we have two independent first person views after duplication, then immediately we have a problem how they interact with each other.

That's a human problem. Some told me they would not dare to meet their doppelganger. Other told me that they would very much appreciated the company of their doppelganger. But this has nothing to with the reasoning for showing that physics is necessarily, with comp, a branch of theoretical computer science/number theory/machine's epistemology/ theology (words are not easy to choose here).

At this point I am not sure that I agree with oneness of the mind.

I have no certainty about this, *even* in the comp frame. The only quasi-certainty is that physics is a projection of arithmetical truth done from inside arithmetical truth by Löbian numbers.

If you understand the first person indeterminacy (that's step 3 of the UDA), what about step 4? 5? 6?, and 7? With 7 normally you see that if the physical (primary or not) universe is *robust* enough to run a UD, then the reversal physics/computer science is accomplished (in a constructive way(*)). Step 8 eliminates the assumption of robustness and "primary existence".


(*) it leads to an algorithm to extract the logic of the observable (that is AUDA, the splitting between G/G* provide the splitting between the communicable and the non communicable, the nuance ("Dt") separate first person and first person plural, etc. That approach justifies and explains, in some sense, the qualia, and the quanta as special qualia. I did not expect this, but it is coherent with the fact that comp + non solipsism entails "many-words" (that is multiplication of populations of machines histories). What is lacking is an arithmetical tensor product. But we cannot add it, we have to extract it from arithmetic if we want to keep the theory correct with respect to the qualia. The math of self-reference is well developed to at least formulate the problems.

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