On 17 Mar 2011, at 15:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

on 16.03.2011 17:14 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 15 Mar 2011, at 22:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

I do not follow the relationship between replication and the movie,


My naive viewpoint is that after duplicating there are two
different first person views that are not related to each other any

That's correct (assuming comp). The question is what do you predict,
about your future subjective experience, before the duplication is

well they have the same diary before duplicating but that's it.

And they have different diaries after! And you can predict this
before the duplication, and you expect to survive (assuming comp). So
you know in advance that both copy will describe specific but
different outcome (like W or M). So you cannot predict which one
specifically with certainty in advance (if you predict W, the one in
M will understand that was wrong), and vice versa. By comp, they have
both the right of asserting that they are "Evgenii Rudnyi".

So if someone multiplicate 2^(16180 * 10000) copies, then there are
that number of first person views that are however again
independent from each other.

Sure. So they can predict that they will be in front of some random
image. And then this is repeated 24 times per second during 1 our and
one half, so they can predict some random noise, or white snow for
that period of time. Only few exception will be deluded by seeing
"Space Odyssey (say)". Those will correspond to "white rabbits
events", with probability = 1/ 2^(16180*10000*90*60*24)

So I still do not see the difference with the situation that I have
described. When I travel to somewhere there is some nonzero
probability that I awake in some other place and I have just to ask
where I am.

Exactly. That was the point. That is the first person indeterminacy.
The only difference, is that in the travel example, you might have to
just ask where, because you are not aware of the "protocol" in its
entirety, but in the comp duplication, (like in the quantum example)
you are aware of the whole protocol, and still completely undecided
about where you will feel to be personally reconstituted.

I agree with this. The difference I guess that I do believe that after duplication both copies have the right to assert that they are "Evgenii Rudnyi" and it seems that you do not.

Not at all. I said exactly that. See the quote above. It is *because* they have the same right, that we have to listen to both copies, and can define the indeterminacy from what they can all expected. In particular, when the duplication is repeated a big number of time, the majority of the resulting copies get random (even incompressible) histories. This is not the case in front of the Universal dovetailing, which is far subtler than the iteration of of self-duplication (that's why comp is not (yet?) refuted!).

So you understand UDA at least up to step three. And you understand the first person comp indeterminacy. Do you understand that the delays in the reconstitution don't change the uncertainty calculus? That we don't need to eliminate the original for having 1-indeterminacy, et ... Do you understand the seventh step, which makes physics a branch of computer science/number theory in case the physical universe is "big enough to run a UD"?

I am still waiting if Andrew and Peter, and perhaps 'digital- physics', get or not that point. Andrew, Peter did you see the point or not?



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