On 25 Mar 2012, at 06:09, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Mar 24, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >Then what the hell IS the point you are making?
> That comp entails 1-indeterminacy.
Comp entails indeterminacy PERIOD.
Comp is widely known as a 3-deterministic theory.
Give me a example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by what
you call "3-view" but NOT identical by what you call "1-view", show
they deserve different names, do that and I might get a idea what
you're talking about; but don't give me that diaries business, if
the diaries are different a third party can see that just as well as
the individuals who wrote them. Just one clear non mystical example
where objectively 2 things are identical but subjectively they are
not, that's all I ask and I don't think it's a unreasonable request
as your proof depends on there being such a difference.
You ask me something impossible, and provably impossible once we
assume comp. It is not related to the 1-indeterminacy.
> I mean that's the pont of the step 3
And that's why I think it's a waste of time to even read step 4,
it's built on a distinction without a difference.
Where is such a thing? The 1-difference does not come from the 3-
difference between the copies, but between their reconstitution in
> The point of the whole UDA is to understand that physics is a
branch of arithmetic/computer science.
As I said before, although I'm not certain I think you could very
well be right about that, but you have not proven it because in your
proof you make a assumption that is not only far from obvious but
one that I believe is downright false, the assumption that 2
identical consciousness are not identical and thus need different
names, like view-1 and view-3.
I don't do that assumption. Tell me where. You have introduce that
idea, in a different thought experiences, and I said that I agree with
you. It is just non relevant.
>> when the diaries diverge the person will too and become 2, both
are the original person and neither is each other.
> Correct. That is part of the explanation of the comp indeterminacy.
I'm glad you agree that the one becomes 2 during the duplicating
process, then obviously you cannot predict a single unique
occurrence that those 2 things will experience because no such thing
exists to predict,
Of course those things exist, because the copies, by comp, are not
zombie, and, by comp, have both the same right to claim to be the
original. They are different because one live in W and the other live
two things can not be unique. All you're really saying in this 1-
indeterminism stuff is that 2 is not equal to one, you can not put 2
things (like you) into a one to one correspondence with one thing
(like Moscow or like Washington).
I might say that indeed. I just make it more precise. And explain the
All your confusion stems from the fact that you say "I have been
duplicated" but don't really mean it and still assume there is only
one "I". You say Bruno Marchal will feel he is in Washington only
and Bruno Marchal will feel he is in Moscow only but "I" will feel
like he is in one city and one city only, and that would be true if
there were only one "I", but there is not because *YOU* HAVE BEEN
This does not make sense. No 1-view can be duplicated. Both people in
the two cities feel one and entire. So they can say "I have been 3-
duplicated (like my body in Helsinki has been duplicated), but they
will add "but now I feel one and entire in W, and I could not have
The same, but more strikingly, with the movie-multiplication. Each
resulting copies will say I have been 3-multiplied every 1/24 second
for 90 minutes, but my personal experience is that I have seen one
definite and precise movie, and I have no clue how I could predict
which one I was about to see personally.
> There is a sense for the guy in W to say that he has been
annihilated in Helsinki and reconstituted in W.
Then you get annihilated every time you get on a bus going from
point A to point B. Do you really want to say that?
That will be indeed a consequence of comp. It can be said that quantum
mechanics, which I do not assume, *confirms* that aspect of comp. Good
> if you grasp the 1-indeterminacy, you grasp step 3,
I grasped indeterminacy long before I started talking with you, but
you claim that "1-indeterminacy" is different from "3-indeterminacy"
and from physical indeterminacy and from mathematical indeterminacy
and your claim is based on nothing more than the fact that the
number 1 is not the same as the number 2.
Like you were thinking that there is only one kind of random string,
you seems to believe that all indeterminacy are equivalent. But
phenomenologically identical indeterminacy does not need to have the
Just compare the multiplication-movie and the quantum corresponding
movie. The first explains the indeterminacy only through the comp 3-
determinacy (the fact that identical computational state leads to
determinate sequence of state when provided identical input) only, and
the second needs the specific quantum theory.
The 1-comp indeterminacy is not controversial, except for Sunday-
philosopher like Bill Taylor or some others who pretend that we cannot
reason through thought experience, and seems unaware of the difference
between valid and non valid reasoning.
The quantum indeterminacy is controversial, as Brent has recalled
recently. Indeed in most textbooks that indeterminacy is still
explained by the collapse of the wave, etc. Look at the literature.
You should not mix all the different kind of indeterminacies.
If you throw a coin, the P=1/2 indeterminacy is explain by classical
chaos, or ignorance of the precise initial condition.
If you throw a coin long enough, the same--phenomenolgically-- P= 1/2
indeterminacy is explained by quantum superposition, because the
quantum uncertainty will add up, leading to the superposition of the
two branches tail/faces.
The comp 1-indeterminacy P =1/2 is explained similarly by a
realisation of two situation, but occurring in the classical
deterministic frame. Those outside the boxes can predict all
observable, but those going insides the boxes cannot predict their
future personal experiences.
It might be that one day some indeterminacy explanation can be reduced
to another one, but we can't tell that in advance.
> and so tell me what you think about step 4 .
I don't see the point in going to step 4 if step 3 is silly.
If you get the point in step 4, it might help you to see what you
missed or misinterpret in step 3. To refute step three, by definition,
you have to give an algorithm predicting the specific *experience*
that you will live (like the specific movie in the movie-
multiplication experience) and this in a way such that all copies agree.
> It is enough to interview each copies, they understand
automatically what we mean by "you".
Fine, "you" have been duplicated
The "3-you" has been duplicated. Not the 1-you.
so now there are 2 "you",
2 3-you. Only for the observer from outside, who can see the two
bodies, from outside. But the 1-view are not duplicated from their 1-
pov. Each of them feel entire in one city, and believes in the other
only because they believe in the protocol, not by personal knowledge.
The 1-view are defined by that personal knowledge, which in this case
correspond simply to the content of their personal diaries. No person
can ever seen its own diary duplicated, with the protocol of those
ONE "you" will say Moscow and ONE "you" will say Washington so "you"
will be in Moscow AND Washington because 1+1 = 2.
1 3-you + 1 3-you gives 2 3-you. yes.
But the 1-you feels unique, and feels to live a unique experience, and
the 1-indeterminacy bears on those personal experiences.
Here, you just show that you miss or avoid the difference between the
1-view and the 3-view. This is a non controversial notion in
elementary cognitive science or in philosophy of mind.
> You are the only one having a problem with this.
Great, then I can claim priority in finding the error in your proof,
or at least that particular error; and I've got to tell you, holding
a minority opinion is not a new experience for me.
I will give you all credits for that. I thank you for trying. Usually
those who dismiss the proof dismiss the dialog and just ignore the
whole thing. I am only told that they dismiss it. So it is a pleasure
for me to discuss all that. Unfortunately it seems that you are just
missing the definition I gave, for 1-view, 3-view, and you miss that
the question bears on personal experiences. So I'm afraid you will
convince the same usual opponents which dismiss consciousness and
philosophy of mind as being crackpot per se.
> It might be phenomenologically identical with other indeterminacy,
but it has a simpler explanation
It can't explain why you can't know the momentum and position of a
particle with arbitrary precision
You don't know that. That's an open problem. But if you get the 8
steps (or even just the seven steps), you will understand that if comp
is true, it has to explain those physical things. So if you can show
that it *cannot* explain them, by UDA, you will refute comp.
Unless you find a flaw in UDA, but as other told you, you are only
misinterpreting the question asked, by confusing the 3-you (your
body), and the 1-you (the owner of the specific personal experience).
That one is 3-duplicated, yes, but not from his 1-pov. The
doppelganger is like another person, like a twin brother, except that
he share the same memories up to the duplication experience.
and it can't explain why the only way to know if a Turing Machine
will stop or not is to watch it
Note that this has never been called "indeterminacy" in the
literature, although in some other context I might accept that
qualification. It is called "unsolvability". In the present context,
calling it "indeterminacy" can only add to the confusion.
and see what it does and the only thing it does say is that life is
like a box of chocolates you never know what you're going to get,
and I already knew that.
In that last sentences you mix all the notion of indeterminacies, and
you remain quite vague if you accept the first person indeterminacy or
If you get it, try step 4. If not try to be clearer on the person pov,
for your "refutation" mix them badly.
I answer your other post here:
> In the WM experience(s), what causes the first person difference
is the first person differentiation, into living in W and living in M.
Yes, but then the 2 will have different experiences and have
different memories and their brain would be physically different,
Exactly. That's the point.
but that's not the assumption you made in your proof.
Of course it is. It is mainly the definition I give of comp.
To win this argument all you have to do us give me a non-mystical
example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by what you call
"3-view" but NOT identical by what you call "1-view",
So you ask me to contradict comp?
But I assume comp at the start.
in other words identical objectively but not subjectively.
We both agree that this does not exist, and I have not the slightest
idea why you insist that I would have said (where?) the contrary.
Show me why they are so different they deserve different names.
Two functionally equivalent machine, at their substitution level, will
have the same 1-view. That is a fortiori true for identical brain.
If that was not true, comp would make no sense at all. Comp precisely
asserts that consciousness (the 1-view) remains invariant for
functional digital substitution. How could we ever say "yes" to the
doctor if that was not true. All this is explained at the step "zero",
the definition of comp.
The 1-indeterminacy comes only from the fact that those identical
brain will be running in different environment.
The point is that in Helsinki you are given all the 3-p description of
the experiment, and despite this, from all your possible future 1-
points of view, none where specifically predictable, not even by a
God. The point is that the 3-comp-determinacy entails logically the
strong 1-comp-indeterminacy. It is "strong" for it is clear at the
start that no hidden variable or any theory or God can make the
In QM, it took 50 years before someone (John Bell) gives the first
rigorous proof that no local hidden variables can explain the
indeterminacy away, and then he pleaded for non local variable à-la-
Bohm, for he rejects the QM indeterminacies. With Everett, a case can
be made that the QM indeterminacy is a particular case of the comp
indeterminacy, but then UDA shows that we have to retrieve the SWE
from computer science/arithmetic.
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