On Sun, Mar 25, 2012 at 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:


>> Give me a example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by what you
>> call "3-view" but NOT identical by what you call "1-view", show they
>> deserve different names, do that and I might get a idea what you're talking
>> about; but don't give me that diaries business, if the diaries are
>> different a third party can see that just as well as the individuals who
>> wrote them. Just one clear non mystical example where objectively 2 things
>> are identical but subjectively they are not, that's all I ask and I don't
>> think it's a unreasonable request as your proof depends on there being such
>> a difference.
>>
>
> > You ask me something impossible
>

I agree it is impossible, so this distinction between "3-view" and "1-view"
that is so important in your proof turns out to be rather silly.

> They are different because one live in W and the other live in W.
>

I previously said that it is probably meaningless to talk about the
position of a consciousness and you agreed with me, so all the above means
is that one consciousness forms memories caused by images of Moscow the
other forms memories caused by images of Washington, the images are
different so the memories are different, so the consciousness of the two is
different so they become different people. The thing that differentiates
the minds is not position but different memories, if Washington and Moscow
were identical cities then there would still be just one consciousness, but
the cities are very different so the two minds are two. Everybody agrees
that if 2 minds are different then there are 2 different minds, but I
insist that if 2 minds are identical then there is really only one mind
(not to be confused with brains) while your proof is built on the
assumption that if 2 minds are identical they are still distinguishable at
least to themselves, and that is the reason I don't think its productive to
study your proof after that point.

> No 1-view can be duplicated.
>

Why the hell not?

> Both people in the two cities feel one and entire.
>

Both people will feel IDENTICALLY until differences between Moscow and
Washington cause them to form different memories.

>>> There is a sense for the guy in W to say that he has been annihilated
>>> in Helsinki and reconstituted in W.
>>>
>>
>> >> Then you get annihilated every time you get on a bus going from point
>> A to point B. Do you really want to say that?
>>
>
> > That will be indeed a consequence of comp. It can be said that quantum
> mechanics, which I do not assume, *confirms* that aspect of comp. Good
> point.
>

So you have redefined the word "annihilated" so that it now means pretty
much nothing at all, and thus  we will need to invent a new word if we wish
to communicate the old meaning of "annihilated".

> The 1-comp indeterminacy is not controversial
>

If this thing you call "1-comp indeterminacy" were untrue then we would
always know what the environment was going to throw at us next and we could
always predict our actions, very obviously this is untrue so of course
"1-comp indeterminacy" is not controversial. It's not new or deep either.

> The quantum indeterminacy is controversial,
>

The explanation for quantum indeterminacy is controversial but the fact
that we observe quantum indeterminacy is not.

> Indeed in most textbooks that indeterminacy is still explained by the
> collapse of the wave, etc.
>

The Copenhagen theory does explain it. And the non-local hidden variable
pilot wave theory explains it. And the Many Worlds theory explains it. We
have too many explanations, and although they are very different at least
so far they all predict the same experimental results. I admit to having a
personal preference for Many Worlds but that's not how truth is determined,
the Universe doesn't care if I approve of it or not.

>> "you" have been duplicated
>>
>
> > The "3-you" has been duplicated. Not the 1-you.
>

Right there is the key to our disagreement. In my symmetrical duplicating
room thought experiment even the "1-you" can not tell the difference
between the "3-you" and the "1-you"! The copy appears back to back with the
original a equal distance from the center of the room, both are watching a
video display from a camera in the center of the ceiling of the cylindrical
room. You insist that you are the original but so does the copy (or maybe
he really is the original and you are the copy), you raise your right hand
and you see on the video monitor the both images do too, you jump up and
down but you see both images jump up and down. Not only can't you tell if
you are the copy or the original you can't even tell which image on that
video screen is you and which is the other fellow. If subjectively there is
no difference and objectively there is no difference then there is no
difference between "3-you" and "1-you".

> you just show that you miss or avoid the difference between the 1-view
> and the 3-view.
>

Between IDENTICAL beings you bet I can't see the difference between the
1-view and the 3-view! And you can't explain why there should be a
difference either.

>>>   It might be phenomenologically identical with other indeterminacy,
>>> but it has a simpler explanation
>>>
>>
>> >>  It can't explain why you can't know the momentum and position of a
>> particle with arbitrary precision
>>
>
> > You don't know that. That's an open problem.
>

I know that you can not explain how "1-indeterminacy" brings that about,
nor can it explain why you can not know the amount of energy something has
and the amount of time it has it with arbitrary precision, so it is NOT a
open question, we know for certain that this thing you call "1-
indeterminacy" cannot explain physical indeterminacy, and in fact can
explain nothing at all. There is only regular old indeterminacy.

> you remain quite vague if you accept the first person indeterminacy or
> not.
>

Vague? I thought I was quite clear. This thing you call "first person
indeterminacy" just means a person doesn’t always know what they will see
or what they will do next, that's it; and people had discovered this fact
of life many thousands of years before Heisenberg or Godel or Turing or you
were born.

> In the WM experience(s), what causes the first person difference is the
> first person differentiation, into living in W and living in M.
>

Yes, but then the 2 will have different experiences and have different
memories and their brain would be physically different.

> The 1-indeterminacy comes only from the fact that those identical brain
> will be running in different environment.
>

If they are in a different sensory environments then they have different
memories and are no longer identical, and all "1-indeterminacy" means is
different things are different. I already knew that.

> The point is that in Helsinki you are given all the 3-p description of
> the experiment, and despite this, from all your possible future 1-points of
> view, none where specifically predictable, not even by a God.
>

I don't understand what you want me to predict. I can predict with 100%
certainty that if I see images of Moscow I will become the Moscow man and
if I see images of Washington I will become the Washington man. Why isn't
the Moscow man the Washington man? Because he saw Moscow not Washington.
The indeterminacy comes entirely from the unpredictable nature of their
environment, you don't know if it will be more like Washington or more like
Moscow, just as you don't know if a electron will go through slot X or slot
Y.

John K Clark

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