On 17 May 2012, at 14:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On May 17, 5:49 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 16 May 2012, at 17:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On May 16, 10:41 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 15 May 2012, at 19:44, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On May 15, 1:03 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
But a deterministic world, if rich enough to add and multiply,
thus to contain universal internal observers, leads already to
indeterminist first person realities (even without comp,
is simpler to use comp to justify this).
If a wave washes one pile of sand onto another, thereby 'adding'
together, why does that generate universal internal observers?
Adding is not enough. You need multiplication, and iteration.
Then universal digital creatures appear, by logical consequences,
as always, reflect themselves and all universal creatures,
and non digital, which leads them to harder and harder problems
Even if that's true, from where do they appear? To say they appear
to admit that they are not themselves contained within addition or
They are. Anything Turing emulable appears, and reappears in
arithmetic, related to bigger and bigger natural numbers.
The appearance is contingent though, upon something being able to
recognize the pattern which is appearing to them.
That's correct. It is contingent of the universal number, and the
universal numbers making the first one more relatively probable. But
all that exist in arithmetic.
What are the properties of arithmetic contingent on?
The idea is that such properties are not contingent.
You could take any universal system, instead of arithmetic. From the
computability perspective, they are equivalent.
recognition is not automatically guaranteed by any arithmetic logic.
In your non-comp theory.
We need a physical machine that remembers that it can remember,
That's "Bp -> BBp". Universal machine are like that.
Those are just letters and symbols. What or who makes them mean
something and why?
Bp means that some universal machine utters p. Absolutely.
Independently of you and me.
BBp means that the same universal machine now utters Bp.
For any arithmetic (or equivalent) proposition, Bp > BBp, means that
if that machine utters p, it will soon or later utters Bp. And that is
a theorem of arithmetic, making it true independently of you and me.
can experience that memory as an event. It needs to know what
strings of remembered digits constitute a meaningful pattern, or
there could even be such a thing as a pattern. To say that patterns
appear and reappear in arithmetic takes the appearance of pattern
itself for granted, then usurps the primacy of the sense experience
which provides it.
Not really, for it appears and reappears only in the mind of
numbers. It makes sense for them, and indeed they will be astonished
that apparent material can lead to that sense. But although locally
true, this is globally wrong. Sense is necessarily a first person
notion, and relies on the abstract but real configuration involving
infinities of arithmetical relations.
I don't think sense is a first person notion, it is the very capacity
to define first person and third person as separate (opposite) on one
level, and united on another. Sense creates the arithmetical
relations, but not infinitely. Arithmetical relations are derived a
posteriori of sense embodiments.
You confuse arithmetic and the human's apprehension of arithmetic.
Sense generates the capacities,
intentions, symmetries, and rhythms that underlie recursive
enumeration, as well as frames the context of all sequence and
consequence. It all has to make sense.
We need only the idea that a reality can exists beyond human sensing.
This is what I assume by making explicit the arithmetical realism, and
that can be shown enough when we assume that we work locally as
machine, at some description level.
As I already told you, to make this false, you need to build an
explicit non computable and non Turing recoverable function having a
genuine role for the mind. This unfortunately only makes more complex
both mind and matter, making your non-comp hypothesis looking like a
construct for making impossible to reason in that field.
Not everything has to make
numbers. Dizzy doesn't make numbers, but it makes sense.
But numbers does not make only numbers. They make and develop sense
for many things far more complex than numbers, that is the point.
Arithmetical truth itself is far beyond of numbers, yet numbers can
relatively develop some intuition about those kind of things.
You just seems stuck in a reductionist conception of numbers and
machines. We know such conception are wrong.
It is a
sensation that makes sense to an embodied animal, but not to a
How could we know that? Why should we believe that?
To say they are creatures implies a creation.
Why not. You could say that they are created by the addition and
multiplication laws. You need only to bet that 1+1=2 and alike does
not depend on us.
Because there's no mathematical logic to how or why that creation
But there is.
What is it?
That the existence of universal numbers, and their many dreams, is a
consequence of logic and arithmetic.
If we posit a universe of arithmetic realism, how can we
accept that it falls off a cliff when it comes to the arithmetic of
it's own origins? What makes 1+1=2? Sense.
Truth requires sense.
Not everything that makes sense is true (fiction
for example), but everything that is true makes sense.
Why do you want someone to assess the truth for something being
true. That is anthropomorphic.
It's ontologically necessary. What is a truth without it being
detectable in some way to something?
It is an unknown truth. A billion digit numbers can be prime without
us being able to know it. Some universal machine does not stop on some
argument without anyone being able to prove or know it. Some pebble on
some far away planet can be eroded without anyone knowing it.
Th greek get well that point, and
originate the whole scientific enterprise from there, as in the
conclusion of this video:
Great video, but now you are the one anthropomorphizing. Just because
the released man doesn't create the outside world by seeing it doesn't
mean that the outside world can exist without being held together by
experienced sense relations on every level. My computer doesn't create
the internet, but that doesn't mean that the internet isn't created on
But where the first observer come from?
If not, it is the whole idea of a reality which makes no more sense,
and we get solipsist or anthropomorphic.
That's where sense comes in. Sense divides the totality into
solipsistic/anthropomorphic and objective/mechanemorphic on one level,
but bleeds through that division on another level, thus creating a
diffracted continuum that oscillates through time but remains
continuous across space (and vice versa).
Time and space, looks concrete, thanks to millions years of evolution,
but are much more sophisticated notion than elementary addition and
multiplication to me.
Numbers are a synthetic
analysis of that process, distilled to a nearly meaningless but nearly
omnipotent extreme of universality (qualitative flatness). Numbers are
the opposite of the solipsistic personal experience (qualitative depth
asymptotic to 'Selfness' itself). They are the least appropriate tools
to describe feeling.
Atoms, fields, space, time seems as much.
Not primitive sense either,
but high order cognitive abstraction. There is no '1' or '2'
literally, they are ideas about our common sense - what we have in
common with everything. Numbers are literally 'figures', symbols
can be applied mentally to represent many things,
No. That's number description. Not numbers.
I'm not talking about the characters "1" or "2", I'm talking about
what they represent. The concept of numbers defines them as figurative
entities, but you make them literal. That's ok with me if you are
doing that for mathematical purposes since it is a powerful way to
approach it, through the negative symmetry, but just as you might
trace a picture better if it's upside down, eventually you should turn
it right side up when you finish. To say that numbers literally exist
but matter does not is the logo-morphic position, orthogonal to both
anthropomorphic and mechanemorphic, but it is still as pathologically
unreal if taken literally. Again, thats ok with me, we need
surrealists too, I'm just saying, when the rubber hits the road, it's
and to deploy
orderly control of some physical systems - but not everything can be
reduced to or controlled by numbers.
But that's what number can discover by themselves.
In your logopomorphic theory of comp.
Once you are at the
treshold of numbers, the complexity of the relations (even just
between numbers) get higher than what you can describe with numbers.
the numbers already know that, with reasonable account of what is
If the complexity exceeds the capacity of numbers, then you need to
invoke even more complexity in the form of additional forms of
expression of that complexity...out of thin air?
It develops from intuition. Numbers, relatively to universal numbers,
can develop intuition, due to the true relation existing between
numbers, including the truth that they cannot rationally justified. So
it comes from truth.
complexity is generated recursively from bottom up entropy, while
simplicity pulls from the top down toward unity as significance.
Evolution is the interference pattern between them.
necessary logic turns a nuclear chain reaction (addition and
multiplication) into a nursery for problem solving sentience?
The same logic making tiny system Turing universal. Usually some
part of classical logic is enough.
Why would any kind of universality or logic entail the automatic
development of sentience? What is logical about sentience?
The illogicality of sentience. From the point of view of numbers,
they look at themselves, they discover, for logical reason, that
is something non logical about them.
If there is something non logical about numbers (which are really the
embodiment of pure logic), why does that truth have to be 'discovered'
Because truth extend logics, and number are constrained by truth,
before what they can believe.
In our development as children, do we not discover logic out
of the chaos of infancy rather than the other way around? Do we not
learn numbers rather than learn feelings?
Because we have brains which sum up millions years of teaching in nine
month, making us believe that walking and seeing is simpler than
trigonometry. Later we can understand that is the contrary.
Then the comp act of faith
appears to be the simplest way to restore logic, except for that act
of faith and the belief in addition and multiplication.
What kind of faith does a Turing machine have?
If she is correct, it looks like it is plotinian sort of faith. But a
machine can also develop a faith in mechanism, by surviving back-up,
and be led, with occam, to a more pythagorean sort of faith.
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