On 6/25/2012 2:29 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/25/2012 10:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
For the reasoning, we don't have to attribute two first person povs to one 3-viewed machine, but to attribute one first person povs to two different 3-viewed machine, and eventually number relations.

It looks like you want me to believe that the relation of mind and machine is one-one, by telling me to give an example of 2 different minds for one machine, which we agree is impossible,

But of course we can have two minds attributed to the same brain - just not at the same (3p) time. A computer can be used to run two different AI programs, and even mutlitask them. And some people exhibit mutliple-presonality disorder. If thoughts are discrete things, do they come with markers. If you had multiple-personalities would you always know which personality you were at a given moment?

but this does not mean that we cannot attach one mind to two different machines, or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in different environment, like Sidney and Beijing, for example.

It is crucially important, because machine cannot know in which computations there are among the infinities which exists in the solution of a universal diophantine equation, and in a sense, she belongs to all those computations that she cannot distinguishes. That makes a big infinity.

An infinite-personality disorder.


Hi Brent,

Bingo! This is the problem of Immaterialism, an 'infinite-personality disorder". It cannot know what it is therefore it is nothing at all. Only the transitive (non-infinitely persistent) association with a physical system breaks the infinite perfect symmetry of the Nothingness of the Immaterial soul. In Buddhism we see the reversal idea: One seeks to stop existing by escaping the recursive incarnation in the physical.



"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to