Hi Richard Ruquist
1) The is no master string to govern the strings,
so strings are unlike monads.
2) Strings are theoretical constructions, which have no meanings.
Monads have meanings derived from the bodies they refer to.
This goes way beyond algebra.
3) Monads can perceive (although indirectly) and act (although indirectly).
They are agents. Strings are not agents and have none of these qualities.
4) Monads are alive, are homunculi, strings are not.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/18/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Richard Ruquist
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-18, 10:50:37
Subject: Re: Russell's possibly defective understanding of Leibniz. Or was
itLeibniz's fault ?
Roger,
In string theory the monads are responsible for the creation of space via
compactification of the extra dimensions of space. I have never understood why,
especially on the Mind/Brain forum where we already went thru all of you
present thinking, why you never accepted the compact manifolds of string theory
as the basis of Leibniz's monads. Instead you just decided the monads were
mathematical and not substantial.
Richard
On Sat, Aug 18, 2012 at 10:41 AM, Roger <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Admittedly, the more I dig into Leibniz, the more questions I have.
But I won't abandon him yet, thinking I misunderstood one of his
statements. Or perhaps Russell misunderstood what Leibniz meant.
According to Russell, "Complete set of predicates" means "sufficient, complete
in a minimal sense".
Like "sufficient reason" I suppose. Or Occam's razor. Or the truth should
be simple. Thus "Socrates was a man" is a proposition which is, as a
proposition,
thus a substance. This is tied into necessary reason, always either true or
false.
So I think the better definition is "Complete and unchanging set of predicates"
So because "The horse was lame" may not always have been true,
it is possibly contingent (is only a current fact), so as a proposition
it cannot be a substance as far as we know.
None of this can be true, however, since most things will change with time.
The conclusion is that Russell may be wrong, that nothing be a substance.
Yet Leibniz says the universe is made up
entirely of monads, and monads are substances by definition.
"For Leibniz, the universe is made up of an infinite number of simple
substances ... "
Perhaps Leibniz meant "the world I refer to in my philosophy..."
He did not count time and space for excample as monads.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/18/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-18, 09:51:15
Subject: Re: Cs. Knowing that one knows.
On 18 Aug 2012, at 14:47, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Being might be defined as =, meaning "is". It is a state, not a thing.
Then if a state, it is a state relative to some other state. L says that a more
dominant monad (superior state) will act on and will always act on a
less dominant monad. Darwinism, if you like, before Darwin.
Survival of the fittest.
Hmm... May be the monads would be better described by the universal
numbers/machines. But it is only in a very local sense, embedded in some
computation(s), than we can give sense to "survival" of the fittest.
There may indeed be problems with understanding what Leibniz's substance is.
Benson Mates, in his book "The Philosophy of Leibniz" says that he, Mates, does
not understand what Leibniz's substance is ! Mates teaches philosophy at
Berkeley.
OK.
What is certain is that L's substance is not physical, it is logical, but
points to something
outside of itself. So "mind" as a word is a substance, it is real pointing to
the phenomenal mind,
the phenomenal mind being the experiencing consciousness.
OK.
Bertrand Russell has written a book on Leibniz's logic, and I think he defines
substance there as
anything with a complete set of predicates. IMHO Easy to say, hard to kanow
when you have a complete set.
Complete in which sense?
Bruno
Also, predicates such as "man" in "Socrates was a man" are said to be
(logically ) inside the subject "Socrates" .
Also, a subject or substance cannot be a predicagte, a predicate cannot be a
subject.
I tend to think of substances as kingdoms. Complete in their own selves.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/18/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-18, 06:51:36
Subject: Re: Cs. Knowing that one knows.
On 17 Aug 2012, at 22:26, Roger wrote:
1) For wine-tasting -- What one must have is knowing that one knows that the
wine tastes good.
Such as one can prove that 1+1 =2 but one still has to accept that as true.
Yes. In fact the proof that "1+1=2" will lead to the truth of "1+1=2", for you,
if you agree on the truth of the axioms you re using, and if you believe that
the rules of inference of your theory preserves truth.
2) mo?ad (mnd)
n.
1. Philosophy An indivisible, impenetrable unit of substance viewed as the
basic constituent element of physical reality in the metaphysics of Leibniz.
Substance: A being that subsists by itself; a separate or distinct thing.
OK, but what is a being? This notion of subtance beg the question.
Contingent truth: A truth whose opposite is possible
OK. In modal logic p is contingent will be written p & D~p. (or p & <> ~p
(~ = NOT)).
Or p & ~Bp (p & ~[]p)
Entelechy: Something having in it "a certain perfection", a completeness- a
term taken from Aristotle's definition of the soul
Hmm... "certain perfection" is rather fuzzy.
Appetition: The internal principle which prepares for change; rudimentary
"desire".
Monad: The simple substance. Blind and passive by itself, but obtains its
perceptions
from God who also can animate it and cause it to feel.
I can make sense of this, perhaps in too much incompatible ways, in comp. But
OK.
Bruno
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/17/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-16, 11:40:34
Subject: Re: ?
On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:21, Roger wrote:
BRUNO: I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual
self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid.
ROGER: What point ? And emulate in what sense ? Ie could a computer ever be a
good wine taster ?
As I said, it seems they are. the french have succeeded in making a wine
testing machine which according to experts in the field is better than the
average qualified wine tester.
Does such machine get the human qualia of drinking wine. i doubt so, for this
you need to have a longer human history, and higher reflexive abilities. But
there is no reason why machine could'n get them in principle (obvious for a
computationalist which bet that he is himself a machine relatively to its more
probable neighborhood).
BRUNO: If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite
regression.
ROGER: Infinite regression of what ? Consciousness ? The monad does away with
that problem,
except of course it's just philosophy, not hardware.
It might be math, also. Could you explain what a monad is without too much
jargon?
BRUNO: It might have a solution, but it begs the question of comp/non-comp, and
you are just saying
(without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are substantial
actual infinities.
ROGER: I think I said and believe what you said I said, but I don't understand
your main point
just above, even vaguely. At any rate, emulation is not the real thing.
If the brain is a universal emulator, as it surely is at least, then when a
computer emulates an emulation done by the brain, at the right level, emulation
is the real thing.
Bruno
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/16/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-15, 03:53:59
Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to
computersinAIordescribing life
On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:47, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
You say, "a non living computer can supported a living self-developing life
form"
Do you mean support instead of supported ? Or what do you mean ?
I mean "support". Sorry.
I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual self-modifying
version of itself, so that your point is not valid.
If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite
regression. It might have a solution, but it beg the question of comp/non-comp,
and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that
souls are substantial actual infinities.
Bruno
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-12, 05:17:45
Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers
inAIordescribing life
On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:07, Roger wrote:
Hi Russell Standish
When I "gave in" to the AI point of view that computers can posess intelligence,
I had overlooked the world of experience, which is not quantitative. Only
living things can experience the world.
You are right. But a non living computer can supported a living self-developing
life form, unless you postulate that infinitely complex substances are at play
in the mind.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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