On 19 Oct 2012, at 23:41, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/19 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 19 Oct 2012, at 12:26, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
A few discoveries of evolutionary psichology may help. According
with EP the mind is composed of many functional modules, each one
for a different purpose. many of them are specific of each specie.
Each of these modules is the result of the computation of certain
areas of the brain. A functional module in the mind has´nt to be an
area of the brain. Because the model of the mid in EP assumes comp,
and assumes an specific, testable model for mind-brain design
(natural selection) it is well suited for issues like this.
Severe autists lack a module called "theory of mind" . this module
make you compute the mental states of other people. It gather
information about their gestures, acts etc. It makes people
interesting object to care about. Autists can learn rationally
about the fact that other humans are like him, they can learn to
take care of them. But they are not naturally interested in people.
They dont care about if you have a mind, because they do not know
what means a mind in another being. they just experience their own.
For them, yuou are robot that they do not understand.
That is possible, but I would say that "empathy", your module of a
"theory of mind" is already present for all universal machine
knowing that they are universal. Autist, in your theory, would be a
L¨bian entity with some defect in that module, with respect to its
local representation/body. Possible.
But the theory of mind in the case of an universal machine conscious
of himself lack the strong perception of another selves that humans
have from the visual clues of the gestures and reactions of others.
The human theory of mind is not an abstract theory of mind, but a
human theory of mind, which evoques mirror feelings like worry,
compassion, anger that we would never have when contemplating a
machine. It´s not a philosophical-rational notion, but a instinctive
one. And because this, it does not permits to fall into solipsism.
Unless a robot mimic an human, he can never trigger this instinctive
perception.
Yes. It is a general theory of the consciousness and matter of all
universal (Löbian) machines. Humans are special case.
In the other side an autist may have the rational theory of mind of
an universal machine, but lack the strong perception of "there are
others like me around". This is a very important difference for
practical matter but also for theoretical ones, since the abstract,
rational theory of mind is a rationalization that builds itself from
our instinctive perception of a soul-mind in others.
No. The rational and the non rational is part of all Löbian machine.
In a sense Löbianity requires two universal machines, in front of each
others. And one will dominate on the rational part of the truth, and
the other will dominate on the not completely rational part.
The lobian machine can recognize another machine, even when alone. Of
course nature has exploited this a lot at many levels, and even more
so with the mammals, including especially the humans.
Bruno
We ask ourselves about the existence of the mind in others because
we have a innate capacity for perceiving and feeling the mind in
other. However, a robot without human gestures, without human
reactions would not excite our theory of mind module, and we would
not have the intuitive perception of a mind in that cold thing.
However this has nothing to do with the real thing.The theory of
mind module evolved because it was very important for social life.
But this is compatible with a reality in with each one of us live
in an universe of zombies (some of them with postdoc in philosophy,
church pastors etc) where we have the only soul. Of course I dont
belive that. I have the "normal" belief. But this is one of the
most deep and most widespread beliefs, because it is innate and you
must fight against it to drop it out. This belief save you from a
paralizing solipsism. That´s one of the reasons why I say "I
believe, therefore I can act"
I follow you well. I agree. Comp is the inverse of solipsim, as it
attributes a soul to a larger class of entity than usually thought:
machines, and even relative numbers in arithmetic.
Bruno
2012/10/17 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
Hi Bruno Marchal
Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
believes about the p-zombie.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
"A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
perception is a hypothetical being
that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that
it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a
zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel
any pain though it behaves
exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from
the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say
that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in
typing the first part of this sentence.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/17/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of
overlycomplexcomputations ?
On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
the level of noncomputability. He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.
ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
Hi Roger,
IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of
the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...
So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the
existence of p-zombie?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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