On 05 Jan 2014, at 18:47, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Jan 5, 2014 at 12:20 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Bell's theorem holds only under a certain set of assumptions,
True. As I've said many times Bell made exactly 3 assumptions:
1) High School algebra and trigonometry works.
2) Things are local.
3) Things are realistic.
If those 3 assumptions are valid then Bell's inequality can NEVER
be violated.
Yes, that is correct. You showed this correctly indeed.
But from experiment we know that Bell's inequality IS violated.
In our branch. Not in the multiverse. You can interpret the violation
of Bell's inequality as a "local" phenomena, due to our absence of
consideration of the bigger (multiversal) structure.
Aspect experience confirms the existence of the many worlds, for
someone believing in the wave-realism, and locality.
EPR and Bell worked in the Copenhagen QM: they assume the projection
postulate when they apply QM to reality. Without collapse, there is
only entanglements which spreads at speed lower than c. There is no
action at a distance, although there would be huge one, if realism is
correct, and if there is only one branch of the wave.
Therefore at least one of those three assumptions must be wrong.
> assumptions which are not made in Everett's theory.
Exactly. Everett did not make assumption #2, if he had then MWI
would be as dead as a doornail; but he didn't so it's not. We still
don't know for sure that MWI is true but because he didn't make the
same assumptions that Bell did we know that Everett's theory still
might be correct.
Everett already analyses in his long thesis, the locality question
(assumption #2), and he explains already how the MWI restores
locality. More rigorous argument have been provided since.
That is what is interesting with Everett: MW restores 3p determinacy,
and it restores 3p locality (and it restores physical realism). Like
in comp, both the non locality and the indeterminacy are 1p plural,
shared or passed by the linear entanglement. And this without special
boundary conditions, nor selection principle.
The UDA shows that if we assume comp, we have still to justify the
wave itself, in the same way Everett justifies the 1p phenomenology of
a collapse, though. I show why and how.
Bruno
John K Clark
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