Hi Bruno,

The WM experiment is easy to grasp. For me the difficulty lies, as Liz
guessed, with the infinity of possibilities. For continuation Cn does p(n)
stabilize as the number of computations approaches infinity? Are there an
infinity of possible continuations? Are they enumerable? I mean there is a
way of using intuition here but infinities have a way of making intuition
obsolete.

Terren
On Jan 11, 2014 3:28 AM, "Bruno Marchal" <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 11 Jan 2014, at 02:34, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me,
> that's it - how an infinity of emulations "condense" into a single
> conscious experience.
>
> I would be please to understand the problem. If you are OK with step 3,
> you know that the "condensation" is given by the probability measure on all
> computations going through your local current state, by the FPI.
>
> Your consciousness condenses into "here and now" for the same measure the
> guy in Washington feel to be in only once city after the WM-duplication.
>
> I am not sure to really see what you don't see.
>
> QM suggests a measure exists, but with comp, if the measure exists, we
> must derived it from arithmetic. If we can show that such a measure does
> not exist, then we know that comp is false.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Terren
> On Jan 10, 2014 8:04 PM, "Stephen Paul King" <stephe...@provensecure.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Dear Terren,
>>
>>   Yes, it is about the continuations and measures thereof. I am not
>> having much luck discovering how the measures are defined.
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 8:02 PM, Terren Suydam 
>> <terren.suy...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>> Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea
>>> (notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds would be
>>> separated as a result of the measure of stable continuations of those
>>> worlds... or were you making a different point?
>>>
>>> Terren
>>> On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, "meekerdb" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>>  On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined -
>>>> but only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and
>>>> only one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among
>>>> the infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
>>>> being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
>>>> unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
>>>> experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
>>>> experience.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But then if you ask, "Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and
>>>> vice-versa?" you see that the answer must be that it would be an improbable
>>>> continuation of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a different physics
>>>> and experience being Glak.  This is like the "white rabbit problem", except
>>>> in the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps
>>>> saying must have a solution (if comp is true).
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
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