On 11 January 2014 17:41, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  On 1/10/2014 7:36 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 11 January 2014 16:08, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>   On 1/10/2014 6:01 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me,
>>> that's it - how an infinity of emulations "condense" into a single
>>> conscious experience.
>>>
>> If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell the
>> experiences apart. They would be "fungible", like the infinite identical
>> copies that exist in the MWI prior to branching / differentiation. So they
>> would just be one experience, even if it was generated an infinite number
>> of times. I guess this is the "capsule theory" of identity, like Fred Hoyle
>> and "his pigeon holes and flashlight" view of consciousness in "October the
>> first is too late". From the viewpoint of the experiencer, it wouldn't
>> matter if millions of pigeon holes were identical, with identical notes in
>> them, and others only appeared once.
>>
>>
>>  But might their number provide a kind of probability measure for the
>> continuation of your consciousness?
>>
>
>  I don't know. I assume that it continues in all possible continuations,
>
>
> Sure, but it is quite likely that you experience some things and almost
> impossible that you experience others.  One of the problems with Everett's
> quantum mechanics is explaining this.  I think Deutsch has argued that the
> probability has to be proportional to the number of continuations: So when
> you observed a quantum event that was only half as likely as its complement
> there must be three continuations.  But then what is the probability is
> 1/pi?  If you just assume there IS a probability measure then you can show
> it must be the Hilbert space norm; but that corresponds to assigning a real
> numbered weight to each "world".
>

Well, exactly. Not a "but" (again) but another "and" - see the rest of my
post quoted below, in which I am equally perplexed by the same topic.

I think the MWI has to assume that the multiverse is a continuum, and that
it is infinitely differentiable (to semi-answer your earlier question about
whether the continuum exists, I suppose). That allows for arbitrary
division, and gives a measure to all quantum outcomes, even ones that have
a probability of 1/pi (if there are any that do).

>
> Brent
>
> if that isn't a tautology, but there's definitely a measure problem here -
> why are "white rabbits" far, far less common? So what do you think? Does
> the measure mean that I'm more likely to remain me rather than
> spontaneously morphing into the ruler of the World? (dammit!) I think my
> mind is starting to boggle just thinking about this...
>
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