On 11 January 2014 17:41, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 1/10/2014 7:36 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 11 January 2014 16:08, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 1/10/2014 6:01 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me, >>> that's it - how an infinity of emulations "condense" into a single >>> conscious experience. >>> >> If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell the >> experiences apart. They would be "fungible", like the infinite identical >> copies that exist in the MWI prior to branching / differentiation. So they >> would just be one experience, even if it was generated an infinite number >> of times. I guess this is the "capsule theory" of identity, like Fred Hoyle >> and "his pigeon holes and flashlight" view of consciousness in "October the >> first is too late". From the viewpoint of the experiencer, it wouldn't >> matter if millions of pigeon holes were identical, with identical notes in >> them, and others only appeared once. >> >> >> But might their number provide a kind of probability measure for the >> continuation of your consciousness? >> > > I don't know. I assume that it continues in all possible continuations, > > > Sure, but it is quite likely that you experience some things and almost > impossible that you experience others. One of the problems with Everett's > quantum mechanics is explaining this. I think Deutsch has argued that the > probability has to be proportional to the number of continuations: So when > you observed a quantum event that was only half as likely as its complement > there must be three continuations. But then what is the probability is > 1/pi? If you just assume there IS a probability measure then you can show > it must be the Hilbert space norm; but that corresponds to assigning a real > numbered weight to each "world". >
Well, exactly. Not a "but" (again) but another "and" - see the rest of my post quoted below, in which I am equally perplexed by the same topic. I think the MWI has to assume that the multiverse is a continuum, and that it is infinitely differentiable (to semi-answer your earlier question about whether the continuum exists, I suppose). That allows for arbitrary division, and gives a measure to all quantum outcomes, even ones that have a probability of 1/pi (if there are any that do). > > Brent > > if that isn't a tautology, but there's definitely a measure problem here - > why are "white rabbits" far, far less common? So what do you think? Does > the measure mean that I'm more likely to remain me rather than > spontaneously morphing into the ruler of the World? (dammit!) I think my > mind is starting to boggle just thinking about this... > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
