On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 10:08 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 16 Jan 2014, at 22:01, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2014/1/16 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> > >> >> >> >> 2014/1/16 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> >> >>> >>> On 16 Jan 2014, at 10:28, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> 2014/1/16 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> >>> >>>> >>>> On 15 Jan 2014, at 21:02, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote: >>>> >>>>> There is still FPI going on in the "rogue" simulation - the one >>>>> where Glak emerges from an alternative-physics, as there are infinite >>>>> continuations from Glak's state(s) in the alternative physics. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You cannot change the FPI, as it is the same for all machines. You are >>>>> introducing a special physical continuation, which a priori does not make >>>>> sense. Glak, in his own normal world obeys the same laws of physics than >>>>> us, with a very different histories and geographies and biologies. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> I'm asking you, for the moment, and in apparent contradiction with the >>>> math, to suspend the AUDA entailment that there is a single physics. >>>> >>>> >>>> OK. >>>> >>> snip > > >>>> By UDA, it seems to me rather clear that you can only use an alternate >>>> geography. >>>> >>>> >>> Well... what's left to physics then ? >>> >>> >>> OK. That's an excellent question. I will try to answer. >>> >>> >>> >>> many world ? >>> >>> >>> Notably. And also indeterminacy, non-locality, non cloning, but also >>> white noise and white rabbits, a priori. >>> >>> >>> >>> because we can do virtual worlds with any physical laws we wish >>> >>> >>> I disagree. (see below) >>> >> >> You can disagree, but it's a fact, we can make video game, so we can make >> any rules we want in the created virtual worlds, nothing prevent us to do >> so. >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> and if comp is true we could make self aware inhabitant living in such >>> virtual worlds... >>> >>> >>> OK with this. >>> >>> >>> >>> so anything we can measure is a geographical fact and contingent... >>> >>> >>> That does not follow. That would have been the case if the hypostases >>> would have collapsed into classical logic. >>> But I will try to explain this without invoking the hypostases. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> seems to reduce physics not to math but to approximately nothing and >>> leave what we call physical laws as geography... because there is no proof >>> that the world we leave in is not such simulation, >>> >>> >>> No proof? Right. but it will not be a question of proof (which does not >>> exist in experimental science, but of evidence). >>> >>> >>> >>> so we cannot conclude anything from the weight of an electron we measure >>> in our "universe". >>> >>> >>> Perhaps, perhaps not. We have to compare the mass of the electron we >>> measure in our neighborhood, with the mass of the electron in the comp >>> physics. >>> >> >> Ok if you had any ways to extract such specific things from comp... >> > > So you agree with the main things, but believe that there is no clear > separation between physics and geography (like Smullyan in Forever > Undecided!). > > > > I'm not at all convince you can... and as we can construct any virtual >> world we want, I would like to know how you think you could extract that >> from integers + *. >> > > I will. It just happen that comp will "save" a great part of physics from > geography. So big that I call that "physics", and reserve the word > "geography" for what I cannot predict from comp (which will be of the type > "being the result of the comp indeterminacies"). > > > > >> >>> If the comp physics is agnostic on the electron mass, >>> >> >> It should be or we should be magically prevented to do "video games" >> virtual world with self aware inhabitants. >> > > I never said that this is not possible. I just said that if the self-aware > entities there have the time, and are ideally rational, they will soon or > later understand that there are in a simulation (or they will abandon comp). > It is very simple: if the mass of the electron *is* a physical law (and > not a geographical fact) then it is deducible from arithmetic, and the > self-aware entities will, by measuring the mass of the electron in their > physics find the discrepancy. > I guess you agree with this, but are just skeptical that we can derive > that from arithmetic. I am more optimistic on that, and the reason lies in > AUDA. > In a sense you don't believe in physical "laws". > > > >> >>> it means that the mass of electron is not a law, but a contingent >>> "geographical" fact. It means also that we can access in some ways place >>> where the electron has a different mass. >>> >> >> Yes, perhaps a.... virtual world of our creation ? >> > > Not really. It should mean we can build a rocket in our physics, and > physically access that reality. > > > > >> >>> >>> Physics is redefined by the UDA into a measure calculus on computations, >>> relative to a computational state. >>> >> >> I understand that... >> > > OK. > > > > but nowhere this you put evidence that our shared reality wins that... >> > > It has, unless we are in a simulation. > > > > > By RSSA, I expect *because I'm already in that reality*, to stay in that >> reality... that doesn't means this reality is the most probable for any >> self aware creature. >> > > "this" reality includes geography. This is stable "by the physical laws" > only. The laws is what maintain the stability of the geographies, but it is > different from all geographies. it must be laws, and those laws have to be > the same for all observers, as it is the math of the relative measure in > the whole of UD*. There is nothing in a geography (which lack "laws") > capable of maintaining such stability. > > > > > > > >> >>> >>> In the virtual physics emulated to fail Klagg, Klagg, who believes in >>> comp, can find the UD-Argument, like any Löbian machine, and extract that >>> physics from arithmetic, compare it with his own experimental result, and >>> if it does not fit, conclude that he is in a simulation (and be right). >>> >> >> I don't think such precise thing as electron mass could be extracted... >> and you provided no actual ways to do such things. >> > > I do. AUDA is all about that. > > > >> >>> >>> The physical laws could have trivial, and the physical law physics would >>> be geographical. >>> >> >> It seems that's the more likely. >> > > > Is it really? How could the physical laws, which involves the same > indeterminacy between all programs complete activities, be different from > two observers? That is not obvious. > > > > >> >>> That would be the case if all the modalities collapsed. Quine would have >>> been right on modal logic. []p = p = <>p. >>> >>> But incompleteness prevents this to happen for a very large class of >>> rational belief in arithmetic, and RE-extensions. Making, as UDA suggest, a >>> highly non trivial calculus. and the math, accepting some definitions >>> (sure) shows that it has already a quantum nature. >>> >> >> It's vague, only "many world" and other things like it are "extracted".... >> > > And, in AUDA, the mathematical structure of the observable, which are > already shown to be a quantum logic. And von Neumann provides some argument > that the right "quantum logic should determine all the relative > probabilities, something realized somehow by Gleason theorem. But comp has > not been able to get his Gleason theorem, but it is only a matter of work > in math to get it. > We get not just the many-worlds (and the indeterminacy, non locality, and > non cloning), we get all the quantum tautologies, and probably quantum > physics. Do we get the physical constant? That is an open problem to me. > If we get the constants, then to me that makes the apparent fine tuning very strange. If there is only one physics, and that includes only "these" constants, we ought to be astonished and delighted that they allowed life at all. Or are the constants that win also bounded by anthropic reasons? Jason > Do we get particles. I think we should get them, if we can extract the > universal group from the comp-quantum mathematics. > > > > > >> >>> >>> I guess the precise Hamiltonian might be geographical, but that its >>> symplectic symmetries and its quantum linear roots are physical, that is, >>> here, arithmetical and justified in arithmetic. Klagg and all Löbian >>> entities betting on comp can do that reasoning. >>> >>> Note also that when I mention Klagg, it is the one we see, or observe or >>> think about. Its a 3p Klagg (or 3-1p to be polite). From Klagg 1-p point of >>> view, he might not "stay" in the simulation for a long time. >>> >>> Physics is what gives the stable, persistent, differentiation laws of >>> consciousness. >>> >> >> Sure... but the physics you live in days to days must be selected by >> RSSA, not ASSA. ASSA could only be of use before being born at most... >> > > Which makes no sense for me. Not sure why you mention ASSA. It is because > the physics is chosen by RSSA, that physics is the same for all observers > or Löbian machine. > > I hope I will be able to clarify, after explaining the modal logic, why > comp put maximal constraints on the physical law, making all the rest > different instantiations of those laws. > > Your skepticism is welcome. I am just hesitating between trying to explain > more on this from the UDA, or begin to explain more on this from the AUDA > (which does the constructive work). > > Best, > > Bruno > > > >> Regards, >> Quentin >> >> >>> Those emerge from arithmetic, and as long as comp is true, you can fail >>> Löbian entities on them (in principle, given them infinite time, etc). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> Quentin >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I'm wondering if there's room in the math for an accounting of >>>> consciousness that goes beyond Lobian machines in such a way as to allow >>>> for alternate physics. >>>> >>>> >>>> Only if that alternate physics allows a non Turing emulable (at any >>>> level) brain. If Glak's brain is Turing emulable, it will be distributed in >>>> the UD*, like us, and if he look below its substitution level, he will have >>>> to use the same universal statistics, but of course relatively to its own >>>> comp state; which makes the difference of identity, geography, etc. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Terren >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The reason I am still unsure of your answer here Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It is a complex question. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> is that I can imagine a scenario where Glak is implemented in an >>>>> alternative physics - that is to say, knows herself as Glak and has >>>>> memories of being Glak - but Glak is not able to be implemented in "our" >>>>> physics. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> At which level? What does that mean? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> For example, in the alternative physics world, Glak's psychology is >>>>> embodied in a completely different kind of biology, a biology that is not >>>>> compatible with our physics. Now by comp, Glak's mind can be uploaded to a >>>>> simulation running in our physics, but it is no longer clear which measure >>>>> is more probable. It seems possible to me that Glak's measure is greatest >>>>> in the alternative physics. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No problem with that. Then we will not fail him from his first person >>>>> perspective, because he will go back there in a nanosecond. And the poor >>>>> 3p-I staying here with us, well, he will suspect something too, soon or >>>>> later, for the preview reasons. >>>>> >>>>> This should be clearer, hopefully, when I translate "probability" in >>>>> arithmetic. If Glak is Löbian, then it has the same physics than us, and >>>>> that can be approached by some modal logics related to arithmetical >>>>> self-reference. It is hard for me to really decide if UDA is more simple >>>>> or more complex than AUDA, on the heart of the subject. You might tell me, >>>>> soon or later :) >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Terren >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >>> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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