2014/1/16 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>

>
> On 16 Jan 2014, at 10:28, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2014/1/16 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
>
>>
>> On 15 Jan 2014, at 21:02, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>>  There is still FPI going on in the "rogue" simulation - the one where
>>> Glak emerges from an alternative-physics, as there are infinite
>>> continuations from Glak's state(s) in the alternative physics.
>>>
>>>
>>> You cannot change the FPI, as it is the same for all machines. You are
>>> introducing a special physical continuation, which a priori does not make
>>> sense. Glak, in his own normal world obeys the same laws of physics than
>>> us, with a very different histories and geographies and biologies.
>>>
>>>
>> I'm asking you, for the moment, and in apparent contradiction with the
>> math, to suspend the AUDA entailment that there is a single physics.
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>>
>> What I'm suggesting is that Glak's identity is constructed from something
>> more than its characterization as a "mere" Lobian machine.
>>
>>
>> That is right, unless he smokes something, or get a strike on the head or
>> something,  and get highly amnesic.
>>
>>
>>
>>  There is a reason why I will suddenly never wake up to be Bruno
>> Marchal.
>>
>>
>> Yes, and it is the same as the reason why you will see a pen falling on
>> the grounds.
>>
>>
>>
>> Even if we are both Lobian machines, there is a lot more that goes
>> through our consciousness,
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>>
>> in order to arrive at the unique subjective experience and identity of
>> Bruno or Terren, than mere Lobianity. I'm taking that further by
>> hypothesizing the example of Glak, whose subjective experience and identity
>> must be bound to a *particular* physics/biology,
>>
>>
>> A particular biology? No doubt.
>> A particular physics? This is what will lost his meaning. Of course,
>> after the UDA, we have to redefine physics, which is the measure (or
>> science trying to find that measure) on all (relative) computations, which:
>> 1) emulates my body (including my personal memory, my "identity") below
>> the substitution level
>> 2) and winning the measure (= are the most probable).
>>
>> Take an electron in some orbital. The orbital gives the map of those
>> winning computation (in case our level is given by the uncertainty
>> relation, to simplify).
>>
>>
>>
>> in such a way that a being who self-identifies as Glak, with all of
>> Glak's memories etc, could not possibly manifest in "our" physics.
>>
>>
>> What would that mean. If comp is correct, Glak can in principle be
>> emulated in our neighborhood, although perhaps not in real time.
>>
>>
>>
>> The sticking point of the AUDA for me has always been the identity of us,
>> as human beings, with the idealized machines being interviewed. We are
>> clearly Lobian, in some sense, but it also seems clear to me that our
>> consciousness, our subjective experience, integrates its embodiment.
>>
>>
>> Yes. But all effective extension of PA is Löbian. AUDA applies to all
>> Löbian machines, and that is why they will have the same physics (given by
>> S4Grz1, or/and Z1*, or /and X1*).
>> Anything NOT derivable in those mathematics will be defined as
>> geographical. If Glak's electron are more heavy, it means that the mass of
>> the electron depends on contingent aspect of the physical reality.
>>
>> our identity is not physical, but historico-geographical. The physics is
>> only what makes such historico-geographical apperance quite stable or
>> relatively numerous. Physics is what multiply the comp histories; That is
>> why Everett saves comp from solipsism.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Our (apparent) bodies are part of our identities, and through sensory
>> interfaces shape our subjective experience... and as our bodies are part of
>> physics,
>>
>>
>> Part. Only part. the contingent part.
>>
>>
>>
>> then Glak's body in an alternative physics is likewise a part of Glak's
>> identity,
>>
>>
>> Only what is above his substitution level, and the physics must be the
>> same as us, as, under the substitution level, he can only see what result
>> from the universal measure, which must exist by comp and the UD argument.
>>
>>
>> and the measure of the most probable continuations for Glak, I think,
>> require that alternative body, which require an alternative physics.
>>
>>
>> By UDA, it seems to me rather clear that you can only use an alternate
>> geography.
>>
>>
> Well... what's left to physics then ?
>
>
> OK. That's an excellent question. I will try to answer.
>
>
>
> many world ?
>
>
> Notably. And also indeterminacy, non-locality, non cloning, but also white
> noise and white rabbits, a priori.
>
>
>
> because we can do virtual worlds with any physical laws we wish
>
>
> I disagree. (see below)
>

You can disagree, but it's a fact, we can make video game, so we


>
>
>
>
>
> and if comp is true we could make self aware inhabitant living in such
> virtual worlds...
>
>
> OK with this.
>
>
>
> so anything we can measure is a geographical fact and contingent...
>
>
> That does not follow. That would have been the case if the hypostases
> would have collapsed into classical logic.
> But I will try to explain this without invoking the hypostases.
>
>
>
>
> seems to reduce physics not to math but to approximately nothing and leave
> what we call physical laws as geography... because there is no proof that
> the world we leave in is not such simulation,
>
>
> No proof? Right. but it will not be a question of proof (which does not
> exist in experimental science, but of evidence).
>
>
>
> so we cannot conclude anything from the weight of an electron we measure
> in our "universe".
>
>
> Perhaps, perhaps not. We have to compare the mass of the electron we
> measure in our neighborhood, with the mass of the electron in the comp
> physics.
>

Ok if you had any ways to extract such specific things from comp... I'm not
at all convince you can... and as we can construct any virtual world we
want, I would like to know how you think you could extract that from
integers + *.


> If the comp physics is agnostic on the electron mass,
>

It should be or we should be magically prevented to do "video games"
virtual world with self aware inhabitants.


>  it means that the mass of electron is not a law, but a contingent
> "geographical" fact. It means also that we can access in some ways place
> where the electron has a different mass.
>

Yes, perhaps a.... virtual world of our creation ?


>
> Physics is redefined by the UDA into a measure calculus on computations,
> relative to a computational state.
>

I understand that... but nowhere this you put evidence that our shared
reality wins that... By RSSA, I expect *because I'm already in that
reality*, to stay in that reality... that doesn't means this reality is the
most probable for any self aware creature.


>
> In the virtual physics emulated to fail Klagg, Klagg, who believes in
> comp, can find the UD-Argument, like any Löbian machine, and extract that
> physics from arithmetic, compare it with his own experimental result, and
> if it does not fit, conclude that he is in a simulation (and be right).
>

I don't think such precise thing as electron mass could be extracted... and
you provided no actual ways to do such things.


>
> The physical laws could have trivial, and the physical law physics would
> be geographical.
>

It seems that's the more likely.


> That would be the case if all the modalities collapsed. Quine would have
> been right on modal logic. []p = p = <>p.
>
> But incompleteness prevents this to happen for a very large class of
> rational belief in arithmetic, and RE-extensions. Making, as UDA suggest, a
> highly non trivial calculus. and the math, accepting some definitions
> (sure) shows that it has already a quantum nature.
>

It's vague, only "many world" and other things like it are "extracted"....


>
> I guess the precise Hamiltonian might be geographical, but that its
> symplectic symmetries and its quantum linear roots are physical, that is,
> here, arithmetical and justified in arithmetic. Klagg and all Löbian
> entities betting on comp can do that reasoning.
>
> Note also that when I mention Klagg, it is the one we see, or observe or
> think about. Its a 3p Klagg (or 3-1p to be polite). From Klagg 1-p point of
> view, he might not "stay" in the simulation for a long time.
>
> Physics is what gives the stable, persistent, differentiation laws of
> consciousness.
>

Sure... but the physics you live in days to days must be selected by RSSA,
not ASSA. ASSA could only be of use before being born at most...

Regards,
Quentin


> Those emerge from arithmetic, and as long as comp is true, you can fail
> Löbian entities on them (in principle, given them infinite time, etc).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> Quentin
>
>
>>
>>
>> I'm wondering if there's room in the math for an accounting of
>> consciousness that goes beyond Lobian machines in such a way as to allow
>> for alternate physics.
>>
>>
>> Only if that alternate physics allows a non Turing emulable (at any
>> level) brain. If Glak's brain is Turing emulable, it will be distributed in
>> the UD*, like us, and if he look below its substitution level, he will have
>> to use the same universal statistics, but of course relatively to its own
>> comp state; which makes the difference of identity, geography, etc.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  Terren
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The reason I am still unsure of your answer here Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>> It is a complex question.
>>>
>>>
>>> is that I can imagine a scenario where Glak is implemented in an
>>> alternative physics - that is to say, knows herself as Glak and has
>>> memories of being Glak - but Glak is not able to be implemented in "our"
>>> physics.
>>>
>>>
>>> At which level? What does that mean?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> For example, in the alternative physics world, Glak's psychology is
>>> embodied in a completely different kind of biology, a biology that is not
>>> compatible with our physics. Now by comp, Glak's mind can be uploaded to a
>>> simulation running in our physics, but it is no longer clear which measure
>>> is more probable. It seems possible to me that Glak's measure is greatest
>>> in the alternative physics.
>>>
>>>
>>> No problem with that. Then we will not fail him from his first person
>>> perspective, because he will go back there in a nanosecond. And the poor
>>> 3p-I staying here with us, well, he will suspect something too, soon or
>>> later, for the preview reasons.
>>>
>>> This should be clearer, hopefully, when I translate "probability" in
>>> arithmetic. If Glak is Löbian, then it has the same physics than us, and
>>> that can be approached  by some modal logics related to arithmetical
>>> self-reference.  It is hard for me to really decide if UDA is more simple
>>> or more complex than AUDA, on the heart of the subject. You might tell me,
>>> soon or later :)
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Terren
>>>
>>>
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>>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
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>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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