Bruno and Kim: what "SELF" would you consider in e.g. ants? if we realize the highly merged (individualized?) *group-self* - the answer is different from taking the present individual (simplified DOWN to functional minimum composition units) *'ant'* and trying to assign a *'self*' to such *partial(?)* entity. We may see the beginnings of such communalization in human societies as well. We "feel" as part of a larger unit in certain aspects. (a weird idea: did Lenin think of his further evolved 'communist man' - the one capable of unselfishly participate in achieving the common good - as an ant? Definitely as a partial intermediate to it without so identifying).
On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 2:38 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > I will send a longer comment. here are just some precision. > > On 22 Jul 2014, at 11:28, Kim Jones wrote: > > >> >> On 20 Jul 2014, at 10:54 pm, Kim Jones, then Bruno Marchal < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >> I don't think, along with Russell Standish, that ants are conscious, for >>>> example - but individuals may share in a group 'self'. Selfhood is >>>> independent of minds or of contents of minds or the precision or mental >>>> acuity (perception) of minds. It appears to be the kind of knowledge of >>>> something that cannot be demonstrated in any 3p way. >>>> >>> >>> I think that ants are conscious, but probably not self-conscious. That >>> comes with the spider, cuttlefishes, ... perhaps. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >> >> >> So like me you observe there are two "flavours" of consciousness? >> >> 1. The non self-aware >> >> 2. The self-aware >> > > yes. I usually call them > > 1. The conscious > > 2. The self-conscious > > In most context aware and conscious are equivalent to me. Both 1 and 2 > implies a self, but the self-conscious has more cognities abilities. It is > also the difference between RA and PA. Self-conscious corrrespond to the > Löbian machine. > > > > > >> It appears that not noticing that you have a self does not mean you don't >> have one. >> > > Agreed. Amoeba have 3-self, and 1-self, but absolutely no conception of > it, as far as I know. > > > > >> This is good news for all living things. You have a self. You may not >> have noticed it but you have one. >> > > Hmm.... My coffee machine has a self also, but a priori no conception at > all of it too. > > > > This >> Is the following true: >> >> Self-awareness = self-consciousness (?) >> > > OK. Both involves the 1p. But the []p gives a notion of 3p self-awareness, > plausibly not conscious, like a machine which can assert simple (correct) > belief about itself in the 3p sense, like an altimeter in a plane. > > > > >> The latter sounds more like Freud's Superego to me, another ego that >> confronts the ego within the same psyche. I'm sure this demonstrates that >> consciousness is not unitary. >> > > Not sure what you mean. What do you mean by consciousness is not unitary? > I might agree or not according to different possible meanings here. > > Bruno > > > > > >> K >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
