> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
>>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
>>> simulations of stories of them …
>> 
>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”. 
>> If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can 
>> infer that either:
>> 
>> Mechanism is false, or
>> You are dreaming, or
>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>> 
>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
> 
> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical universe 
> is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low that we 
> need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable one) to 
> get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical to me.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as the 
>> fundamental elements of nature.
> 
> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. 
> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses 
> pull the car?
> 
> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of nature 
> comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not the 
> metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
> inconsistent with mechanism.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) 
>> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
> 
> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant of 
> provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the existence 
> of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both consciousness and 
> matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
> 
> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
> hypothesis.
> 
> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To avoid 
> repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a conclusion 
> because we have another theory is not that much interesting, especially when 
> the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as your use of many 
> links illustrates).
> 
> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in matter 
> and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go in the 
> opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary matter 
> that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, Mechanism 
> would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a 
> surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)


When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do not 
defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any universal 
machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they are 
universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.



> 
> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a possible 
> denotational semantics for experiential processing, which takes place in 
> matter.

That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough for 
this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it 
appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, it 
will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism false, but that is, 
before having evidences, quite speculative, and conceptually unclear. It is 
almost like invoking a god in an explanation, to avoid an explanation. 

You added: <<A better way: Matter does explain consciousness, once the true 
nature of matter is appreciated.>>

What is the true nature of matter? By making matter primitive, it looks we 
avoid the question of its “true nature”, which with mechanism is purely 
phenomenological.


Bruno




> 
> (But that still can be a contribution, but it is by no means the complete 
> picture.)
> 
> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
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