On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 12:16:33 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Why - in numerical reality (UD) - can't there be vampires, werewolves, >>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer >>> simulations of stories of them … >>> >>> >>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of >>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of >>> observable, you can infer that either: >>> >>> Mechanism is false, or >>> You are dreaming, or >>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry >>> descendent who want to fail us on reality). >>> >>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see >>> exactly what mechanism predicts. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. >> >> >> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical >> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low >> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable >> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical >> to me. >> >> >> >> >> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as >> the fundamental elements of nature. >> >> >> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an >> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without >> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if >> invisible horses pull the car? >> >> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of >> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not >> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is >> inconsistent with mechanism. >> >> >> >> >> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing >> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) >> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine. >> >> >> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary >> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail >> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both >> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal? >> >> >> >> >> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up >> stories about vampires and werewolves. >> >> >> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist >> hypothesis. >> >> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To >> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a >> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, >> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as >> your use of many links illustrates). >> >> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in >> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go >> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary >> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, >> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves >> Mechanism. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > > > I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be > a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.) > > At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a > possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes > place in matter*. > > (But that still can be a contribution, but it is by no means the complete > picture.) > > > - pt > > > A better way: *Matter does explain consciousness, once the true nature of matter is appreciated.*
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