On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> Why - in numerical reality (UD) - can't there be vampires, werewolves, >> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer >> simulations of stories of them … >> >> >> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of >> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of >> observable, you can infer that either: >> >> Mechanism is false, or >> You are dreaming, or >> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry >> descendent who want to fail us on reality). >> >> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see >> exactly what mechanism predicts. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > > Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. > > > That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical > universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low > that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable > one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical > to me. > > > > > But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as > the fundamental elements of nature. > > > You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing > theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. > What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses > pull the car? > > Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of > nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not > the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is > inconsistent with mechanism. > > > > > Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) > machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) > experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine. > > > With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant > of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the > existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both > consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal? > > > > > The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up > stories about vampires and werewolves. > > > The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist > hypothesis. > > Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To > avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a > conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, > especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as > your use of many links illustrates). > > All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in > matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go > in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary > matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, > Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves > Mechanism. > > Bruno > > >
I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.) At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes place in matter*. (But that still can be a contribution, but it is by no means the complete picture.) - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
