On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> Why - in numerical reality (UD) - can't there be vampires, werewolves, >> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer >> simulations of stories of them … >> >> >> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of >> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of >> observable, you can infer that either: >> >> Mechanism is false, or >> You are dreaming, or >> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry >> descendent who want to fail us on reality). >> >> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see >> exactly what mechanism predicts. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > > Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. > > > That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical > universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low > that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable > one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical > to me. > > > > > But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as > the fundamental elements of nature. > > > You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing > theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. > What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses > pull the car? > > Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of > nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not > the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is > inconsistent with mechanism. > > > > > Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) > machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) > experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine. > > > With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant > of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the > existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both > consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal? > > > > > The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up > stories about vampires and werewolves. > > > The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist > hypothesis. > > Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To > avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a > conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, > especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as > your use of many links illustrates). > > All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in > matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go > in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary > matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, > Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves > Mechanism. > > Bruno > > >
I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.) At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes place in matter*. (But that still can be a contribution, but it is by no means the complete picture.) - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
