> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer simulations 
>> of stories of them …
> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”. If 
> you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can infer 
> that either:
> Mechanism is false, or
> You are dreaming, or
> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
> exactly what mechanism predicts.
> Bruno
> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.

That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical universe 
is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low that we need 
to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable one) to get “my” 
consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical to me.

> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as the 
> fundamental elements of nature. 

You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. What 
if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses pull the 

Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of nature 
comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not the 
metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
inconsistent with mechanism.

> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) 
> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.

With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant of 
provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the existence 
of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both consciousness and 
matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?

> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
> stories about vampires and werewolves.

The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 

Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To avoid 
repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a conclusion 
because we have another theory is not that much interesting, especially when 
the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as your use of many 
links illustrates).

All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in matter 
and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go in the 
opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary matter that 
I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, Mechanism would be 
judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.


> - pt 
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