> On 9 May 2019, at 19:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/9/2019 3:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 3 May 2019, at 19:09, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> I think that is right. But when you consider some simplified cases, e.g. a >>> computation written out on paper (or Bruno's movie graph) it becomes >>> apparent that consciousness must ultimately refer to other things. Much is >>> made of "self-awareness" but this is usually just having an internal model >>> of one's body, or social standing or some other model of the self. It is >>> not consciousness of consciousness...that is only a temporal reflection: "I >>> was conscious just now." In general terms we could say consciousness is >>> awareness of the evironment, where that includes one's body. Damasio >>> identifies emotions as awareness of the bodies state. The point is that >>> the stuff of which we are aware and which we find agreement with other >>> people's awareness is what we infer to be the physical world. It might be >>> possible to be conscious in some sense without a physical world, but it >>> would be qualitatively different. >> >> How could a brain make a person aware that his brain is implemented in a >> ontological physical reality, or in the arithmetical reality? >> >> Only the observation will differ, and only if mechanism is false. >> >> Why assume matter, when the illusion ion matter can be explained, without >> it, and *cannot be explained* with it, unless bringing infinities in the >> ontology? > > "Ontology" is just a philosopher's fancy word for "what I think exists”.
Yes. Theologian (the serious one) call that God. > Reality is what it is. In a theory about Reality, it is what you have to assume. But there are many different theories a,d type of theories (idealist, materialist, dualist, etc.) > There cannot be physical reality vs arithmetical reality. Did you never read > Stanislaw Lem's story in which to prevent a sadistic king from torturing his > subjects, Trurl the constructor creates a simulated world in which the king > can torture simulated subjects. But then it is pointed that the pain of the > simulated subjects is real too. Yes, I love Stanislas Lem. Then if you study what a computations is, all computations are in arithmetic, and in a very complex mathematical structure, just a bit simpler for the Digital Mechanist machine, thanks to that limitation to the sigma-1 sentence. If the pain of the simulated subject is real, they have to be real in the arithmetical reality too. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> On 5/3/2019 6:27 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated >>>> with the way information is processed. This is substrate independent - the >>>> fact that a brain is physical is beside the point. You could implement a >>>> brain in software, and insofar as the same kinds of information processing >>>> occur, it would be conscious in the same kind of way. >>>> >>>> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and >>>> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for >>>> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines. All that's >>>> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to >>>> occur. >>>> >>>> Terren >>>> >>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, [email protected] <> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, [email protected] <> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of >>>>>> particles. >>>>> >>>>> Then you're not a materialist. You think there is matter plus something >>>>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" >>>>> and add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call >>>>> yourself a materialist. >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as >>>>> physicalism (not materialism): >>>>> Physicalism and materialism >>>>> >>>>> Reductive physicalism >>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductive_physicalism>...is normally >>>>> assumed to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism >>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism>, if held to be distinct from >>>>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties >>>>> >>>> >>>> What mental properties? intention? reflection? remembering? That's what >>>> I mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled >>>> half-measure. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> >>>> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, >>>> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria .. are matter. >>>> >>>> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... . >>>> >>>> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties. >>>> >>>> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is >>>> perhaps the worst idea ever invented. >>>> >>>> @philipthrift >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5FB4F9DA-97C5-418D-9415-A4A6C472C4E6%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5FB4F9DA-97C5-418D-9415-A4A6C472C4E6%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/61f62599-a432-fe3a-44e0-f4cd7fa83556%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/61f62599-a432-fe3a-44e0-f4cd7fa83556%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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