Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science

On Apr 14, 2014, at 8:39 AM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > Recently I chanced to read the first few pages of a recent book on > Heidegger who is supposed to be phenomenologist, but the book never > mentioned Peirce's phenomenology (or phaneroscopy) who preceded Heidegger > by half a century. Was there a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How language began, a Ted talk by Dan Everett

> On Jun 14, 2018, at 6:06 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > I came across a Ted talk by Dan E with the title > "How language began". At the halfway mark (9 minutes) > he mentions Peirce and relates his semiotic to the issues: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFxg5vkaPgk > > My only comment would b

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

It’s worth noting that most evolutionary views of religion see much of it evolving intertwined with the evolution of government. To the point that it’s hard to separate the two. It’s true that particularly in evolutionary psychology religion has some key differences such as focus on the cognitio

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

> On Jun 19, 2018, at 8:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Hmm- I'm inclined to think that 'religions' - by which I am assuming a belief > in metaphysical powers, begins first at the individual psychological level, > where the individual becomes aware of his own finite nature and lack of power

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

> On Jun 19, 2018, at 2:38 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > > Christianity was particularly important to the European renaissance. Why? Not quite sure what you’re asking. Could there have been a different movement less tied to Christianity? Probably. If there was a tie I suspect it was primarily

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

> On Jun 20, 2018, at 4:31 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote: > > The Pragmaticist Maxim cuts through all these considerations and focuses on > the practical results of thinking, musing, etc Peirce designated aesthetics > and ethics as normative sciences. He was agapaic in his core understanding

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

> On Jun 19, 2018, at 10:49 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > >> "Not quite sure what you’re asking. Could there have been a different >> movement less tied to Christianity? Probably." > > I say probably not. And certainly not Islam. I guess it depends upon what one sees as important and/or essen

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

> On Jun 20, 2018, at 12:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > GF: It’s important to note that Stjernfelt’s definition of the immediate > object is a functional one--the immediate object plays an indexical role > within the functioning of a Dicisign ... > > According to Peirce, this is only

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

> On Jan 25, 2019, at 12:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > How should we characterize these various ways of uttering the same > Proposition? For example ... > We are going to the restaurant. > We are going to the restaurant? > We are going to the restaurant! > The only change here is the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 7, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > What you just wrote ("that the "womb of indeterminacy" is "the original > continuity which is inherent in potentiality," and habit as "a generalizing > tendency" emerges from that primordial continuity") reminded me that > Aristotle's not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 9, 2017, at 7:41 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > The surface is a vague boundary. All plants and animals have > exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark) > and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins). > > The outer layers are always mixed with liquids

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 8, 2017, at 10:46 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of > determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that "Ideas, > or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of 1ns, "whatever has > its B

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 10, 2017, at 12:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'? > What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it? I take it primarily as the problem of reference. While Peirce does have the index,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 12, 2017, at 8:15 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > CG >> I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t >> reducible to chemistry or physics... attempting to make the >> reduction... did perhaps help in getting biologists to think >> more carefully about the type of description

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 12, 2017, at 9:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > I'm guessing an engineer would have some acquaintance with > relational databases, which have after all a history going > back to Peirce, and I would recommend keeping that example > in mind for thinking about k-adic relations in general. I d

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier wrote: > > Some reductions are impossible because the functions are not computable, even > in Newtonian mechanics. Are you talking about the problem in mathematics of solving things like the three body problem? That’s not quite what I was thinking

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

> On Apr 15, 2017, at 10:28 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) > cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness > cannot determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other > direction.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

> On Apr 15, 2017, at 12:14 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > Clark, yes, that’s why I was careful to qualify my comments by saying “In > NDTR.” But when you say that “what happens actually affects what is > possible,” what you mean is that what happens now affects what can possibly > happen i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 20, 2017, at 9:32 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > After that one can consider > the fine points of generic versus degenerate cases, and that is > all well and good, but until you venture to say exactly *which* > monadic, dyadic, or triadic predicate you have in mind, you > haven't really said

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

> On May 30, 2017, at 2:49 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > I am not happy with tychism: Conservation laws require infinite exactness of > conservation: Energy or impulse before a reaction must be exactly the same > before and after a reaction. Though in a very small (quantum) scale it is not >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

> On Jun 6, 2017, at 11:55 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > Clark, List, > > You say: "So Peirce clearly didn’t see conservation of energy as universal > due to the role of chance. While I don’t think he put it in quite those > terms, I believe the implication is that chance breaks sy

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [Sadhu Sanga] Re: Is relativity theory holding back progress in science?

> On Jul 20, 2017, at 6:24 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > I have been following new developments in physics for many years, > and I am also interested in Peirce's views on the subject. But I > agree with the summary below by Kashyap V Vasavada. > > I would prefer not to have these emails stuff my

[PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

The recent discussion raised some thoughts I’d not entertained in some time. We know that there are huge differences between what Husserl called phenomenology and Peirce’s project. Indeed Peirce explicitly criticized Husserl for psychologism. There’s nothing really like the reduction or bracketi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Jul 28, 2017, at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > By the 20th century Peirce will have somewhat changed his terminology; but > from 1902 on I believe he always refer to three branches of logica docens, or > logic as semeiotic: namely speculative grammar, critic, and methodeutic (or, > s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Jul 31, 2017, at 12:52 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > In my view Gary R. is gravely wrong in assuming that CSP was all his life > after SIGNS. That was earlier. Later he was after meanings. > > Heidegger was never attempting to create any theory of SIGNS. He was after > meanings. Thus

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Jul 31, 2017, at 4:41 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > But I consider Kirsti's notion that "CSP was all his life after SIGNS. That > was earlier. Later he was after meanings" itself, if not 'gravely', at least > completely in wrong. Peirce was actively thinking about signs and semiotics > th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion of this > classification recently discussed here was an important part of his letters > to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his discussion of and expansion > of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Aug 6, 2017, at 2:06 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > > As evidence backing up interpretations on CSP's then current main interests, > works at hand, I find Welby correspondence necessarily weak. Not strong, that > is. Again I’ve not kept carefully up on the nuances of what was innovat

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Aug 5, 2017, at 8:36 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Actually, there are many "strange states" of matter, for which that > three-way distinction is extremely oversimplified. I’d just add to your great comments that really these are just folk science distinctions. They happen to work most of th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Aug 7, 2017, at 10:21 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > Clark, > > Kirsti has presented zero evidence that the sign classifications Peirce > detailed in the 1908 Welby letters are summaries of earlier work rather than > current work on his part. In fact, if you actually read the material

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Aug 9, 2017, at 7:18 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > But there is another side of the question revealed in Peirce’s 1909 letter to > Welby (SS 118): > “My studies must extend over the whole of general Semeiotic. I think, dear > Lady Welby, that you are in danger of falling into some erro

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 11:17 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > On your suggestions, let's make some smaller steps. You say: "Now, as others > have pointed out, Peirce did not introduce the distinction between immediate > and dynamic object until around 1904, and I think his clearest expla

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 20, 2016, at 12:56 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > First, thanks for providing those many Peirce snippets on the three > interpretants. May I ask, how did you do that, that is, find so many so > quickly? Or, perhaps, you've been gathering them for some time? Or did you > found them some

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 20, 2016, at 3:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > ET: I don't see that the Immediate Object is internal to that external > Dynamic Object! Not at all. > > Again, no one is arguing otherwise. Clark's comment was that the Dynamic > Object virtually contains the Immediate Object, w

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 1:59 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > >> As for Clark's comment 'that the Dynamic Object virtually contains the >> Immediate Object' - I still don't see this, for how could the Dynamic Object >> determine how I, or the pla

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 1:45 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > > While he doesn’t make this distinction clearly until the 19th century I tend > to think it is there in his earlier thought latently. Especially in his > notions of continuity with signs. The connection between synechism a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 2:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > If this is the case, then what accounts for Peirce's consistent assignment of > "Dynamic" to the actual Object and Interpretant, rather than the possible > (Immediate) Object and Interpretant? Because the possible objects and inter

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 4:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: Because the possible objects and interpretants are determined by this > original object. So the potential is in this original. > > Since the original object determines the possible objects and interpretants, > would it not be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 10:48 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > What makes something virtual is that it has potential--it possesses the > possibility of realizing certain capacities--but it is not actually or really > a thing of that kind. I’d say one has to be cautious with the “not rea

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 24, 2016, at 6:15 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > 'Semiotic realism' is good - could we extend it to 'triadic semiotic process > realism' ? While some see semiotic just as thirdness I think typically those using it consider all three categories are always at work. But I agree that there’

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 24, 2016, at 6:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Agreed - all three categories are fundamental to semiosis; I don't see how > anyone can view 'semiotic just as Thirdness'. But I think that the definition > of realism isn't so much about Thirdness or any 'undue privileging' [??] but >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 24, 2016, at 6:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > Agreed - all three categories are fundamental to semiosis; I don't see how > anyone can view 'semiotic just as Thirdness'. But I think that the definition > of realism isn't so much about Thirdness or any 'u

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 6:45 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > 1) Continuity is an integral component of 'community'. I've never heard of a > 'finite community, at least in the natural world. The artificial world that > includes 'identity politics' and their 'finite communities' is a different > s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 8:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > EDWINA: I understand your point but I'll have a problem with the > identification of 'community' only in the present tense. The very nature of > Thirdness is its focus on the future existentiality of the 'type' - a type > developed wi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 8:20 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > I don’t think so. What makes a Dynamic Object dynamic — and efficient — (as > in “efficient cause”) — is its genuine Secondness to the sign, and the > Immediate Object has only a degenerate secondness to it. I think the specific > ex

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 9:04 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > > GF: “Virtual Object” would not serve to replace “Immediate Object” here, > because a virtual object would have the “efficiency” of an object without > being one, while the immediate objects of both question and reply here ARE >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 10:24 AM, wrote: > > in the case of Peirce’s conversation with his wife about the weather, the > immediate object of his reply (“the notion of the present weather so far as > this is common to her mind and mine”) will partially determine what words he > will choose to r

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 10:06 AM, Bev Corwin wrote: > > Hello everyone, I follow the discussions somewhat, however, not consistently. > Many interesting thoughts and wondering how they would apply in situational > case scenarios. So I have a question: How would you apply some of these > Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:23 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: The immediate object would be the environment of speakers relevant to > the use. > > How do we reconcile this with the Immediate Object being internal to the Sign? I don’t see the problem. Don’t confuse the sign with the sign

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > My outline of the same situation brings in the categories, where > > 1) The Dynamic Object is the existential nature of the weather - which > interacts with my eyes [both are dynamic objects]; both are interacting in > the Mode of S

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark, list - thanks, I see your point, but my quibble is with the > interpretation of the 'Immediate Object'. > > I see it as a personal rather than common meaning. That is - you define the > immediate object as the average nature'

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 12:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: Don’t confuse the sign with the sign-vehicle. > > I generally avoid the term "sign-vehicle," because Peirce did not use it. > The closest I could find was in CP 1.339 (undated), where he wrote, "A sign > stands for something

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 4:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > I'm not referring to the action of communication but to the triadic semiosic > process of developing meaning. > > Let's say that I hear a frog. That frog or rather, the sound of the frog, is > the Dynamic Object. [The frog's croak it

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 12:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: We say the immediate object is internal to the sign because it’s in > understanding in use. > > I do not understand what you mean here. Please clarify, or perhaps provide > citations from Peirce that illustrate what you take

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 8:33 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > JS: As for the Final Interpretant, "I confess [with Peirce] that my own > conception of this interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536, > 1906); but I am starting to think of it as perhaps the habit of feeling, > act

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 27, 2016, at 7:30 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > Clark, > > I don’t think this approach clarifies the matter, because it seems to > overlook a couple of Peirce’s specifications. First, in reference to the sign > “It is a stormy day,” he says that “Its Immediate Object is the noti

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Sorry. I meant to include this quote of Peirce’s and neglected to. This I think is the textual evidence for what I’m saying. Emphasis mine. …it is easy to see that the object of the sign, that to which it virtually at least professes to be applicable, can itself only be a sign. For example, the

Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> But you’re quite right, there is more than one way to analyze these things, > and different analyses sometimes appear to describe semiosis differently. I > don’t think Peirce was ever satisfied to stick with a single mode of > analysis, and that the immediate/dynamic object distinction was a s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 30, 2016, at 10:37 AM, wrote: > > I agree, and likewise the Dynamic Interpretant determines the Final > Interpretant in the sense that it constrains the possible habits resulting > from its repetition; at least, that is my hypothesis at the moment I think that was Peirce’s view. At

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 30, 2016, at 12:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Just to clarify, I am actually the one who wrote what is quoted below from > Gary F.'s subsequent reply. > > CG: What Peirce wants to argue is that ultimately a kind of convergence at > infinity happens ... it seems to me that Pe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [Sadhu Sanga] "Sentient Science," "Spiritual Biology"--what is our "program"?

> On Aug 31, 2016, at 10:20 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > I have tried several times to get through on this list with the third point > you have. But I think some of my mails on fundamentalism has been censured > away. We must be aware when we pass from empirically based science to > philosophy

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 6, 2016, at 3:18 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >> If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this >> compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is >> in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of >> thought i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

My sense is that there’s some equivocation (perhaps even by Peirce) over the term existence. It seems to me that Peirce’s use of “real” is really about predication. Part of the confusion is things like mathematical objects. To follow Quine you can quantify over them but as soon as you start usi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Thank you for your comments. I cited the first part of that quote earlier to > show that Peirce considered "Real" and "Reality" to be the adjective and noun > for the same basic concept. The excerpt from Ben is also relevant and > he

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 8, 2016, at 4:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Clark wrote: The old joke of 90% of any philosophical argument consists of > coming to agreement over the semantics of terms is all too often true. > > And in a logically narrow sense, this is what Peirce suggests is the purpose > and val

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > My use of the term 'universal' refers to its use in the analysis of reality. > > i frequently refer to that 4.551 quote about Mind - but, in my view, Mind is > not the same as Thirdness. Thirdness is a semiosic process, one of the thre

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 10, 2016, at 7:57 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Edwina wrote: And I recall a Nobel Laureate in physics, in a conference, > declaring that Peircean semiotics was a vital analytic framework for physics. > > This might very well have been Ilya Prigogine, the Belgian physical chemist > wh

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 10, 2016, at 8:03 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > I wonder, though, how many Peirceans even know what Prigogine means by > pluralism in physical laws, never mind physicists. I confess I had to look it up even though it’s right down my alley. Latour and Prigogine have some overlap in many

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 10, 2016, at 8:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Thank you for sharing these helpful reflections. As others have pointed out > before, how we talk about the categories depends on what type of analysis we > are performing. I am content to accept your correction of my third bullet

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On 9/13/2016 3:29 AM, John Collier wrote: >> I used Peirce’s ideas fairly prominently in my philosophy of science courses >> in the 1980s and 90s. I also used his work to cast light on Kuhnian issues >> both in my classes and in my doctoral dissertation. Although the last was >> accepted enth

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

While I couldn’t find the Peirce quote I was searching for I did find this from Joe Ransdell: Qualities are not what philosophers sometimes call "the given" to which "interpretation" is somehow to be added to form cognitive units; for qualities are not objects of predication but rather that whi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

(Sorry I thought I sent this before I left my office yesterday only to find it still on my screen. I know the discussion has moved on but I figured I’d post it anyway) > On Sep 13, 2016, at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark- yes, I think that the disagreements in interpretation of Pei

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 16, 2016, at 11:28 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > This to me suggests that at least some of the force of the NA is “extracted” > not from the concept of God as defined by Peirce but from the vernacular > concept. Peirce does distinguish between the two concepts, right at the > begi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 18, 2016, at 4:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > I appreciate the suggestion, and Chiasson's article is interesting. However, > I find it rather implausible that a work entitled "A Neglected Argument for > the Reality of God" was somehow intended to be more about "the attitude an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 19, 2016, at 9:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark- thanks for your very nice outline of the NA - I certainly agree with > your view, that as Chiasson says, it's not just about a 'belief in God', > because it's not deductive but is, as noted, abductive. Abduction inserts > freedo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 22, 2016, at 3:09 AM, Ben Novak wrote: > > I went to Craigslist where I found a laptop with a Vista operating system, > called the seller, and drove 50 miles to test it out. It worked like a charm. > For $70, and a hundred miles worth of gasoline, I have my Intelex investment > back.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 23, 2016, at 2:24 PM, Eugene Halton wrote: > > And what if you allowed yourself to enter the realm of musement > and found your Indo-European or related noun-centered language left behind? A > realm where your noun-God, your concept-God, could not enter? You have > entere

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we > variously may think for our own parts. I do think it’s worth asking how the argument itself fares given the social changes in the intervening century

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Thank you for this helpful breakdown of different approaches to Peirce's > writings. I wonder if my dispute with Edwina earlier in this thread was > rooted in either misunderstanding or genuine disagreement between us about > whe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:13 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > I'd like to emphasize again that it's a distinction that makes a difference: > methodeutical promise is not the same thing as plausibility or (instinctual) > assurance of truth. Many years ago here at peirce-l, Howard Callaway argued >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:01 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, "Methodeutic has a > special interest in abduction, or the inference which starts a scientific > hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a > justifiable

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 1:09 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Yes, methodeutical reasoning can itself be abductive, and if one builds a > house of abductive inferences none of which are quite compelling, then it's > guesswork, it could be a house of cards. > > In the end we base all our reasoning

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark, list - yes, I agree with you that one's beliefs about religion do > affect one's interpretation of the NA. After all, as Peirce wrote, we cannot > begin with an empty mind but begin with our beliefs. Jon, who self-describes > a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 28, 2016, at 7:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not abduction; which is > why it contributes to security, but not to uberty. I wonder if another way > to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to logical critic, but >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another new book, this one with texts by Peirce

> On Oct 5, 2016, at 9:39 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Richard Atkins also has a brand-new book out, Peirce and the Conduct of Life: > Sentiment and Instincts in Ethics and Religion, from Cambridge University > Press > (http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/nineteenth-c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 20, 2016, at 10:23 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > I can find no easy way from phenomenology alone - not even from Peirce’s > triadic phaneroscophy - to the reality of an outer world and other embodied > conscious subjects. I do not think Peirce solves this problem. Do you? When you say t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 21, 2016, at 11:55 AM, John F Sowa > wrote: > > But the modern word has become specialized to the single sense of efficient > cause. I’d add that we have to distinguish the idea of efficient causation as determinate from what came to be seen through a more pr

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

> On Oct 20, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Now we have "Modes of Being" or "modes of reality" that are identified as > "three Universes" and correspond to "Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or > Freedom from Destiny)." We also have "Realms for

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 21, 2016, at 1:30 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > That is true of all the sciences, especially physics. When I used > the word 'modern', I meant the informal use by Hume. But as early > as the 17th century, physicists discovered that the differential > equations by Newton and Leibniz (loca

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 11:47 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > All conceptual knowledge need language of some sort and -as Wittgenstein > says – there are no private language. Thus you must assume the existence of > other embodied experiential conscious subject in language, - and you must > assume s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 8:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within > a collection of bits of unorganized matter. > > Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is nothing. It’s worth noting

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 10:14 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > As far as I can tell, Peirce never stopped talking about the categories in > the context of the phenomenology or phaneroscopy. Furthermore, he never > stopped talking about the categories in the context of the semiotics. I w

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > The problem is, Gary, that you and Jon are both theists and both of you > reject the 'Big Bang'. I am an atheist and support the 'Big Bang'. Therefore, > both sides in this debate select sections from Peirce to which we feel > compatib

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme. > On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I find > Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 10:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the > spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the > ones to which he was responding, which I have reproduced below. As we have > pre

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions. My > understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that > she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and > Thirdnes

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within matter/concepts? Depends. Are numbers real even when not embedded within matter/concepts? After all there are numbers that have never been formally thought yet it’s pretty com

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 10:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Clark, List: > > At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the > spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the > ones to which he was responding, which I have reproduced below.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 25, 2016, at 9:43 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > I’m slowly working through the posts I missed. Allow me to repost the > relevant quote. This is 6.202-209. I think you quoted the paragraph referring > to platonism. (See the other quotes at the bottom of this post too that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 25, 2016, at 10:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CP 6.185-213 is the manuscript text for the eighth and final Cambridge > Conferences lecture and actually dates from 1898, not 1892-1893--thus coming > after Peirce became a full-blown three-category realist, according to Fisch.

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