date:20121130


On 11/30/2012 10:44 AM, John Clark wrote:
Now let's do the more usual two-split experiment and put the film back in. The universe 
splits just as it did before when it passed the two slits, but when the photon hits the 
film and it no longer exists in either universe then the 2 are identical and the 
universes fuse back together again. Looking back we find evidence that the photon (or 
electron) went through slit X only and evidence it went through slit Y only and this 
causes an interference pattern. Again there is nothing special about an observer in 
this, the same thing would happen if nobody looked at the film, or even if you used a 
brick wall instead of film, because the important thing is not that the photon makes a 
record (whatever that is) but simply that it is destroyed.


But you can do the experiment with electrons too, and the electrons are not 
destroyed.

Brent

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Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm


On 11/30/2012 10:02 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

And a transcendent truth could be arithmetic truth or
the truth of necessary logic.


True in logic and formal mathematics is just marker "T" that is preserved by the rules of 
inference.  In applications it is interpreted as if it were the correspondence meaning of 
'true'.  But like all applications of mathematics, it may be only approximate.


Brent

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Re: the many faces of truth


On 11/30/2012 6:05 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

the many faces of truth
I believe that there are many forms of truth,
each form depending on how it is defined.
So I guess I am a nominalist. Or a pragmatist.
Same difference.
Russell's and Aristotle's form of truth would
be "truth by correspondence".
There is also "pragmatic truth", which has
nothing to do with correpondence,  it is
what results when a well-defined protocol,
such as a scientific experiment, is carried out.
Scientific truth would then be pragmatic,
such as a force is the reaction obtained
when a mass is accelerated.
Then there is the Christian trinity,  which
gives us three more faces of truth.


Why stop there? The Kabala's truth.  The Koran's truth.  The Marxist truth.  Hindu and 
Taoist truth.  Socialist and capitalist truth.  Zoroastrian truth and Bushido truth


Brent

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Jesse Mazer

On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>> > Richard,
>> >
>> >
>> > On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>> >
>> >> Bruno,
>> >> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
>> > arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.
>> >
>> > Bruno
>> >
>>
>> Since energy is what makes things happen
>> then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
>> Richard
>>
>>
>>
> If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum production in
> a program and solve the world's energy problem. Instead, we find that in
> all real implementations of computing, comp invariably consumes net energy.
> Why would that be? Does comp allow anti-comp? Maybe we could run our
> computers backwards and get some kilowatt hours back.
>
> Craig
>
>
Seems like this argument is confusing levels of simulations. If you have
one simulated world on a computer which is complex enough to have its own
simulated oil production, as well as simulated physical computers, then
those computers could be used to simulate another world, a
simulation-within-the-simulation. But obviously having petroleum production
in the simulation-within-the-simulation is not going to provide any energy
to the original simulated world, despite the fact that they are both
computer simulations. So, the fact that we cannot get energy from
simulations of oil production, and don't get wet from simulations of
rainstorms and such, is no argument against the idea that our own universe
might just be a computational system.

Jesse

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Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

Hi Stephen P. King 

No, we can grasp truth by correspondence.

And a transcendent truth could be arithmetic truth or
the truth of necessary logic. 

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-30, 11:17:12
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 11/30/2012 9:10 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King 

Hintakka's concept of truth is what is called "pragmatic truth",
or "scientific truth". It's the same as Peirce's-- namely, what 
results when you carry out a particular protocol.

Dear Roger,

Sure, I agree. My point is that such is the only notion of truth that is 
within our ability to grasp. We obtain the transcendent notions of truth by 
abstraction in some infinite limit of the pragmatic truths.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-02, 18:20:11
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his concept 
>> of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations.
>
> I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all.
> I do appreciate his linking of intention and intension, but it is a 
> bit trivial in the comp theory.
>
Dear Bruno,

 Hintikka's idea is to show how truth values can be coherently 
considered to be the result of a process and not necessarily just some a 
priori valuation. This makes Truth an emergent valuation, just as I 
content all definite properties are emergent from mutual agreements 
between entities. Properties, in the absence of the possibility of 
measurement or apprehension of some type, do not exist; they are what 
the 1p project onto existence. Nothing more.

--

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Re: Against Mechanism

Hi meekerdb 

I missed the thought experiment, but IMHO thought is an intentioned 
expression of some kind. Intentioned  means that there is a living self to 
do the intentioning. Then one might think of thinking as a paste board on which
one can paste and manipulate representations of the thoughts in the
form of symbols, signs or icons. 

This is what Peirce's semiotics is like.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: meekerdb 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-30, 13:37:46
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism


On 11/30/2012 4:42 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
Hi Jason Resch 
?
What does physics (and multiple world theory) have to do with 
emulating human thinking ? Physics is deterministic, human thought
is not.

That's what Bruno's trying to explain with his thought-experiment.? "Comp" 
implies that if physics is deterministic then human thought is too, but "you" 
is indeterminate (as John Clark insists at length). If physics is not 
deterministic then neither is human thought, but it may be approximately so by 
statistics.

Brent 

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-30 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Nov 29, 2012  Jason Resch  wrote:

>> Yes, if Everett is correct then the photon hit every point on that
>> photographic plate, but for every point on the plate there is also a John
>> Clark who, after developing the plate, sees that the photon hit that
>> particular point right there and no other point. Thus the 2 slit experiment
>> produces a result, it may seem a odd result to human beings but it is a
>> definite  result to every one of the infinite number of John Clarks, and to
>> any other observer who happens to be living in that same world. And that
>> makes it profoundly different from Bruno's experiment.
>>
>>  > Now this is the most blatant inconsistency I have seen from you thus
> far.
>

If that is true then what you have seen from me has been very consistent
indeed.

> You can see the John Clarks duplicated by the wave function experience a
> certain definite result
>

Yes, the 2 slit experiment produces a rock solid result, quantum mechanics
could only predict probabilities but the experiment produces a definite
result, it says the photon hit right at that point with 100% certainty.

> either the photon took the left slit or the right slit
>

This is a bit of a tangent and it's more difficult to do but the 2 slit
experiment can be set up in such a way that you can tell which slit the
photon went through, but if you do that then the photons will not produce a
interference pattern on the film. In my example I assumed the usual 2 slit
setup where you don't know which slit the photon went through and many
photons will produce a interference pattern on the film and quantum
mechanics can only give a probability on where a single photon is likely to
hit the photographic plate. There are other ways to do the setup that can
be instructive.

Do the two-slit experiment but instead of using film to stop the photon
after it pass the slits, let it head out into infinite space. If Many
Worlds is correct then the entire universe splits into 2 when the photon
hit's the 2 slits, and never recombines. There is nothing special about you
the observer, you split just like everything else, you know that the photon
went through one and only one slit, but of course you have no way of
knowing which one. This is like Bruno's experiment, doing the 2 slit
experiment without film produces no result.

Now let's do the more usual two-split experiment and put the film back in.
The universe splits just as it did before when it passed the two slits, but
when the photon hits the film and it no longer exists in either universe
then the 2 are identical and the universes fuse back together again.
Looking back we find evidence that the photon (or electron) went through
slit X only and evidence it went through slit Y only and this causes an
interference pattern. Again there is nothing special about an observer in
this, the same thing would happen if nobody looked at the film, or even if
you used a brick wall instead of film, because the important thing is not
that the photon makes a record (whatever that is) but simply that it is
destroyed.  Mind has nothing to do with any of this so I don't need to
explain it, or measurement, or record, or observation, or consciousness.
That is a very very big advantage! The key point is that universes split
when they become different and merge when they become the same, and
measurement doesn't enter into it.

> yet you are blind to the definite result of self localization after a
> single duplication.  Why is that?
>

Bruno said that "you" know that when the button is pushed "you" will see
one city and one city only, Bruno also said that no theory can predict if
the city will be W or M that "you" will see.  Fine, but my question was
after the experiment was over what was the definite result, was it W or M
that "you" saw? I asked Bruno to do the equivalent of developing the
photographic plate and report what was seen, W or M.  But Bruno couldn't
tell me the outcome and neither could anybody else.

> > How many points (where the photon struck) will any of the infinite John
> Clarks see once the photographic plate is developed?
>

One.

>Do you agree each of them sees only one outcome?
>

Yes.
Does Jason Resch agree that the number of Washingtons that John Clark will
see after John Clark pushes that button is one?
Does Jason Resch agree that the number of Moscows that John Clark will see
after John Clark pushes that button is one?
Does Jason Resch know who the hell the single unique being called "you" is
supposed to be after the button is pushed in Bruno's thought experiment?
Does Jason Resch know which one and only one city "you" will see after the
button is pushed?

John Clark would very much like to be informed about the answer to the last
two questions because Bruno clearly doesn't know.  Does Jason Resch?

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism


On 11/30/2012 4:42 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Jason Resch
What does physics (and multiple world theory) have to do with
emulating human thinking ? Physics is deterministic, human thought
is not.


That's what Bruno's trying to explain with his thought-experiment.  "Comp" implies that if 
physics is deterministic then human thought is too, but "you" is indeterminate (as John 
Clark insists at length). If physics is not deterministic then neither is human thought, 
but it may be approximately so by statistics.


Brent

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Re: "Reason is, and ever ought to be, the slave of passion."


On 11/30/2012 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hume uses that argument
as a basis for his dictum:
"Reason is, and ever ought to be, the slave of passion."
Meaning that one should not kill just because it is logical, etc.


I agree. The heart knows, reason can. But this leads to some problem. In fact we can 
argue that the conflict between heart and reason is with us since the start, and is 
unavoidable for ever, even in heaven, even for ideally sound machines.


But Hume was pointing out that there is no conflict between passion and reason.  Reason 
can only reach decisions based on values, and it is passion that assigns values.  The 
conflict is between different passions: work and leisure, security and adventure,...  
Reason gets blamed because it brings the bad news that you can't have it all.


Brent

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Re: Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-30 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 Roger Clough  wrote:

> >Physics is deterministic,
>

I said it before I'll say it again, it's astonishing how many people expect
to make deep philosophical discoveries while remaining totally ignorant
about what science has accomplished since the year 1900, if not 1800.

>  > human thought is not.
>

So your thoughts happen for no reason whatsoever and are thus random and
chaotic. That may actually explain a lot.

  John K Clark

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Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

2012-11-30 Thread Stephen P. King

On 11/30/2012 9:10 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King
Hintakka's concept of truth is what is called "pragmatic truth",
or "scientific truth". It's the same as Peirce's-- namely, what
results when you carry out a particular protocol.

Dear Roger,

Sure, I agree. My point is that such is the only notion of truth 
that is within our ability to grasp. We obtain the transcendent notions 
of truth by abstraction in some infinite limit of the pragmatic truths.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
11/30/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
*From:* Stephen P. King 
*Receiver:* everything-list 
*Time:* 2012-11-02, 18:20:11
*Subject:* Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his
concept
>> of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations.
>
> I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all.
> I do appreciate his linking of intention and intension, but it is a
> bit trivial in the comp theory.
>
Dear Bruno,

 Hintikka's idea is to show how truth values can be coherently
considered to be the result of a process and not necessarily just
some a
priori valuation. This makes Truth an emergent valuation, just as I
content all definite properties are emergent from mutual agreements
between entities. Properties, in the absence of the possibility of
measurement or apprehension of some type, do not exist; they are what
the 1p project onto existence. Nothing more.

--

--
Onward!

Stephen

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Leibniz's primitive as a time-portable semantic (semiotic)


Leibniz's primitive is the monad or substance, which is non-extended in space.
A complete concept. This would make Leibniz's monad
semantic, semiotic, not merely logical. But not all objects
are monads, only unitary corporeal bodies.

It contains present as well as future properties, so it is time-portable.

Monads are unique nondivisible (therefore nonextended) 
corporeal bodies which have no parts, but may have variations within. 

  
http://www.iep.utm.edu/leib-met/#H8
  

"8. Substance as Monad  

   
"Around the end of the Seventeenth Century, Leibniz famously began to use the 
word monad 
as his name for substance. Monad means that which is one, has no  
parts and is therefore indivisible. These are the fundamental existing things, 
according to Leibniz.  His theory of monads is meant to be a superior 
alternative to the 
theory of atoms that was becoming popular in natural philosophy at the time.  
Leibniz has many reasons for distinguishing monads from atoms. The easiest to 
understand is perhaps that while atoms are meant to be  
the smallest unit of extension out of which all larger extended things are 
built, 
monads are non-extended (recall that space is an illusion on Leibniz's view).  

Monads and Complete Concepts  

We must begin to understand what a monad is by beginning from the idea of a 
complete concept.  
previously stated, a substance (that is, monad) is that reality which the 
complete concept represents.  
A complete concept contains within itself all the predicates of the subject of 
which it is the concept, 
and these predicates are related by  sufficient reasons into a vast single 
network of explanation. 

So, relatedly, the monad must not only exhibit properties, but contain within 
itself virtually or potentially all the properties  
it will exhibit in the future, as well as contain the trace of all the 
properties it did exhibit in the past.
 In Leibniz's extraordinary phrase, found frequently in his later work, the 
monad is pregnant  
with the future and laden with the past (see, for example, Monadology 22). All 
these properties are 
folded up within the monad; they unfold when they have sufficient reason to do 
so  
(see, for example,Monadology 61). Furthermore, the network of explanation is 
indivisible; 
to divide it would either leave some predicates without a  
sufficient reason or merely separate two substances that never belonged 
together in 
the first place. Correspondingly, the monad is one, simple and indivisible."  

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
10/12/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:
>
> On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal 
> > 
> wrote: 
> > Richard, 
> > 
> > 
> > On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: 
> > 
> >> Bruno, 
> >> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic? 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from 
> > arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct. 
> > 
> > Bruno 
> > 
>
> Since energy is what makes things happen 
> then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe. 
> Richard 
>
>
>
If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum production in a 
program and solve the world's energy problem. Instead, we find that in all 
real implementations of computing, comp invariably consumes net energy. Why 
would that be? Does comp allow anti-comp? Maybe we could run our computers 
backwards and get some kilowatt hours back.

Craig
 

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dreams and solipsism

Hi Stephen P. King 

"Once upon a time, I, Chuang Chou, dreamt I was a butterfly, 
fluttering hither and thither, to all intents and purposes a butterfly. 
I was conscious only of my happiness as a butterfly, unaware that I was Chou. 
Soon I awaked, and there I was, veritably myself again. Now I do not know 
whether 
I was then a man dreaming I was a butterfly, or whether I am now a butterfly, 
dreaming I am a man. "

-wikipedia

There follows a pregnant comment: Between a man and a butterfly there is 
necessarily a 
distinction. The transition is called the transformation of material things. 

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-03, 08:00:10
Subject: Re: (mathematical) solipsism


On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

[SPK] In the absence of a means to determine some property, it is incoherent 
and sometimes inconsistent to claim that the property has some particular value 
and the absence of all other possible values. 


In math this is called (mathematical) solipsism.


Dear Bruno,

How is it solipsism? Solipsism is: "Solipsism is the philosophical idea 
that only one's own mind is sure to exist. The term comes from the Latin solus 
(alone) and ipse (self). Solipsism as an epistemological position holds that 
knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure. The external world and 
other minds cannot be known, and might not exist outside the mind. As a 
metaphysical position, solipsism goes further to the conclusion that the world 
and other minds do not exist."  

My point is that numbers, by your notion of AR, are solipsistic as there is 
literally nothing other than the numbers. I reject AR because of this! Numbers 
alone cannot do what you propose.

This post argues similar to my point: 
http://mathforum.org/kb/message.jspa?messageID=5944965

"Conventional solipsism is a logical philosophy whose underlying views
apply equally to mathematical philosophies of neopythagoreanism and
neoplatonism as well as mathematical realism and empiricism generally.

The well established philosophical principle of solipsism is that only
the individual is or can be demonstrated to exist. But the problem is
that if this principle were actually demonstrably true it would also
make it false because the "truth" established would ipso facto make
the principle beyond control of any individual.

Nobody really thinks solipsism is true. But the difficulty is no one
can prove or disprove the concept because no one can prove the
foundations of truth in absolute, necessary, and universal terms."


This article 
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=philo
 argues against the claim that Intuitionism is solipsistic. I reject 
Intuitionism as a singular coherent theory of mathematics, but I do accept it 
as a member of the pantheon of "interpretations" of mathematics.

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Richard Ruquist

On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> Richard,
>
>
> On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>> Bruno,
>> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?
>
>
>
> Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
> arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.
>
> Bruno
>

Since energy is what makes things happen
then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
Richard

>
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



 On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>How exactly does the comparison occur?
>>
>>
>> By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation
>> (the
>> quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive
>> operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization,
>> which
>> exists already.
>> 
>
>
>
> UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are
> machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be
> justified by
> the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.



 Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of
 iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface
 between
 pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be
 matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can
 we
 use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?



 Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
 On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The question though is how does that happen?
>>>
>>>
>>> Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why
>>> and
>>> how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics.
>>> With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain
>>> why
>>> numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey
>>> apparent
>>> laws
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> How do tangible things interface with logic -
>>>
>>>
>>> I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some
>>> amount of consistency.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through
>>> what
>>> capacity can they express that obedience?
>>>
>>>
>>> With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities
>>> (actually
>>> 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.
>>>
>>> The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide
>>> 6,
>>> for example.
>>>
>>>
>>>






>
>
>
>
> Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption
> of
> logic?
>
>
> At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic
> quite
> a lot.



 I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even
 worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited
 logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is
 it
 that you are reducing it from?


 ?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,
>>>
>>>
>>> It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a
>>> universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork
>>> loin?
>>>
>>>
>>> Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu
>>> assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about
>>> it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or
>>> anything other than what they actually are)?
>>>
>>>
>>> By the decoding process, like 10001100 can be decoded into add 0 to
>>> the
>>> content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the "real
>>> case"
>>> of the "roasted pork smelly experiences".
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>






>
> Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple
> substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.



 Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like
 this:

 C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"


 We can't. But we can

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation


Richard,


On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,
Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?



Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from  
arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.


Bruno




On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:



On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:




   How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from  
observation (the
quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear  
positive
operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical  
quantization, which

exists already.




UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we  
are
machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be  
justified by

the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.



Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a  
piece of
iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface  
between
pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have  
to be
matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone.  
Can we
use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we  
feel?



Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.



The question though is how does that happen?


Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know  
why and
how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in  
physics.
With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can  
explain why
numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey  
apparent

laws



How do tangible things interface with logic -


I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for  
some

amount of consistency.



how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and  
through what

capacity can they express that obedience?


With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities  
(actually

0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.

The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to  
divide 6,

for example.















Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the  
presumption of

logic?


At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in  
logic quite

a lot.



I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it  
even
worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very  
limited
logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then  
what is it

that you are reducing it from?


?



If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,


It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a
universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.



then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need  
the pork

loin?


Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological  
sense, bu
assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers  
about

it.



Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or  
shapes or

anything other than what they actually are)?


By the decoding process, like 10001100 can be decoded into add  
0 to the
content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the  
"real case"

of the "roasted pork smelly experiences".













Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only  
simple

substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.



Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It  
sounds like

this:

C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"


We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic.
(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).



We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not
everything that makes sense is logical.


You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least,  
and with

UDA: at most.











B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any  
logic. All

you really need is logic."



You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that  
you don't
need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The  
arithmetic (or

equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.



What does logic and arithmetic need?


?
Nothing, I would say.












Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a
machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the  
existence of
such machine does not require the belief or assumpt

Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

Hi Stephen P. King 

Hintakka's concept of truth is what is called "pragmatic truth",
or "scientific truth". It's the same as Peirce's-- namely, what 
results when you carry out a particular protocol.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-02, 18:20:11
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his concept 
>> of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations.
>
> I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all.
> I do appreciate his linking of intention and intension, but it is a 
> bit trivial in the comp theory.
>
Dear Bruno,

 Hintikka's idea is to show how truth values can be coherently 
considered to be the result of a process and not necessarily just some a 
priori valuation. This makes Truth an emergent valuation, just as I 
content all definite properties are emergent from mutual agreements 
between entities. Properties, in the absence of the possibility of 
measurement or apprehension of some type, do not exist; they are what 
the 1p project onto existence. Nothing more.

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

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the many faces of truth

the many faces of truth 

I believe that there are many forms of truth,
each form depending on how it is defined.
So I guess I am a nominalist. Or a pragmatist.
Same difference.

Russell's and Aristotle's form of truth would
be "truth by correspondence".

There is also "pragmatic truth", which has
nothing to do with correpondence,  it is
what results when a well-defined protocol,
such as a scientific experiment, is carried out.
Scientific truth would then be pragmatic,
such as a force is the reaction obtained
when a mass is accelerated.

Then there is the Christian trinity,  which
gives us three more faces of truth.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-02, 18:07:35
Subject: Re: Communicability


On 11/2/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 22:34, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 11/1/2012 11:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 


On 01 Nov 2012, at 01:01, Stephen P. King wrote: 


Dear Bruno, 

  Exactly what do these temporal concepts, such as "explain", "solve", 
"interacting" and " emulating", mean in an atemporal setting? You are mixing 
temporal and atemporal ideas. ... 


Study a good book in theoretical computer science. You told me that you have 
the book by Matiyazevich. he does explicitly emulate Turing machine, which have 
a quite physical look, with a moving head, and obeying instruction is a 
temporal manner, and yet they can be shown to be emulated by a the existence or 
non existence of solution of Diophantine equations. 


Dear Bruno, 

   That book, full of wonderful words and equations, is a physical object. 


True, but non relevant. 


Dear Bruno,

Yes it is relevant as it is the essence of my proof. But let me quote 
Russell: http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus12.html


"..a belief is true when it corresponds to a certain associated complex, and 
false when it does not. Assuming, for the sake of definiteness, that the 
objects of the belief are two terms and a relation, the terms being put in a 
certain order by the 'sense' of the believing, then if the two terms in that 
order are united by the relation into a complex, the belief is true; if not, it 
is false. This constitutes the definition of truth and falsehood that we were 
in search of. Judging or believing is a certain complex unity of which a mind 
is a constituent; if the remaining constituents, taken in the order which they 
have in the belief, form a complex unity, then the belief is true; if not, it 
is false. 
Thus although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs, yet they are in a 
sense extrinsic properties, for the condition of the truth of a belief is 
something not involving beliefs, or (in general) any mind at all, but only the 
objects of the belief. A mind, which believes, believes truly when there is a 
corresponding complex not involving the mind, but only its objects. This 
correspondence ensures truth, and its absence entails falsehood. Hence we 
account simultaneously for the two facts that beliefs (a) depend on minds for 
their existence, (b) do not depend on minds for their truth. 
We may restate our theory as follows: If we take such a belief as 'Othello 
believes that Desdemona loves Cassio', we will call Desdemona and Cassio the 
object-terms, and loving the object-relation. If there is a complex unity 
'Desdemona's love for Cassio', consisting of the object-terms related by the 
object-relation in the same order as they have in the belief, then this complex 
unity is called the fact corresponding to the belief. Thus a belief is true 
when there is a corresponding fact, and is false when there is no corresponding 
fact. 
It will be seen that minds do not create truth or falsehood. They create 
beliefs, but when once the beliefs are created, the mind cannot make them true 
or false, except in the special case where they concern future things which are 
within the power of the person believing, such as catching trains. What makes a 
belief true is a fact, and this fact does not (except in exceptional cases) in 
any way involve the mind of the person who has the belief. "

I do not see Russell accepting the idea that Truths have definite valued in 
the absence of beliefs and the definiteness of belief in the absence of minds. 
Why do you accept such an idea? Facts require possible worlds.




That physical object is, in my thinking, an example of an implementation of the 
"emulation of a Turing Machine..." just as the image on my TV of Rainbow Dash 
and her friends is a physical implementation of magical Ponies. You seem to 
ignore the obvious... 


You assume physical objects, but this contradict your own theory (on which you 
point to, but without ever giving it). 


I do not pretend to have a "theory of Everything". I am merely trying to 
show you where there is an obstruction in your result that

Re: Moral evaluations of harm are instant and emotional, brain study shows

2012-11-30 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Friday, November 30, 2012 3:37:35 AM UTC-5, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>
> This speed in the evaluation is a consequence of evolutionary pressures: A 
> teleological agent that is executing a violent plan against us is much more 
> dangerous than a casual accident.

Only if there are teleological agents in the first place. There are some 
people around here who deny that free will is possible. They insist (though 
I am not sure how, since insisting is already a voluntary act) that our 
impression that we are agents who can plan and execute plans is another 
evolutionary consequence.

The problem with retrospective evolutionary psychology is that it is 
unfalsifiable. Any behavior can be plugged into evolution and generate a 
just-so story from here to there. If the study showed just the opposite - 
that human beings can't tell the difference between acts of nature and 
intentional acts, or that it is very slow, why that would make sense too as 
a consequence of evolutionary pressure as well. You would want to be *sure* 
that some agent is intentionally harming you lest you falsely turn on a 
member of your own social group and find yourself cast out. This would 
validate representational theories of consciousness too - of course it 
would take longer to reason out esoteric computations of intention than it 
would take to recognize something so immediately important as being able to 
discern emotions in others face. That way you could see if someone was 
angry before they actually started hitting you and have a survival 
advantage. Evolutionary psychology is its own built in confirmation bias. 
Not that it has no basis in fact, of course it does, but I can see that it 
is psychology which is evolving, not evolution which is psychologizing.

> because the first will continue harming us, so a fast reaction against 
> further damage is necessary, while in the case of an accident no stress 
> response is necessary. (stress responses compromise long term health)

Yes, but it's simplistic. There are a lot of things in the environment 
which are unintentional but continue to harm us which we would be better 
off developing a detector for. There is no limit to what evolution can be 
credited with doing - anything goes. If we had a way of immediately 
detecting which mosquitoes carried malaria, that would make perfect sense. 
If we could intuitively tell fungus were edible in the forest, that would 
make sense too.

> That distinction may explain the  consideration of natural disasters as 
> teleological: For example earthquakes or storms: The stress response 
> necessary to react against these phenomena make them much more similar 
> to teleological plans of unknown agents than  mere accidents. 
>

The study shows the opposite though. It shows that we specifically and 
immediately discern the intentional from the unintentional. The top 
priority is making that distinction.

>
> Hence, it is no surprise that the  natural disasters are considered 
> as teleological  and moral . For example, as deliberated acts of the goods 
> against the corruption of the people, or currently, the response of "the 
> planet" against the aggression of the immorally rich countries that deplete 
> the resources.
>

It's not a bad hypothesis, but I see the more plausible explanation being 
that by default consciousness is tuned to read meta-personal 
(super-signifying) meanings as well as personal and sub-personal (logical) 
meanings. Except for the last few centuries among Western cultures, human 
consciousness has been universally tuned to the world as animistic and 
teleological. The normal state of human being is to interpret all events 
that one experiences as a reflection on one's own efforts, thoughts, etc. 
This is why religion is such an easy sell to this day. By default, we are 
superstitious, not necessarily out of evolution, but out of the nature of 
consciousness itself. Superstition is one of the ways that the psyche 
detects larger, more diffuse ranges of itself. Intuition taps into longer 
views of the present - larger 'nows', but at the cost of logic and personal 
significance.

More on the failure of HADD here: http://s33light.org/post/1499804865

"I submit that this Hyperactive Agency Detection Device is a weak 
hypothesis for explaining the subjective bias of subjectivity. *To me, it 
makes more sense that religion originates not as mistaken agency detection, 
but rather as an exaggerated or magnified reflection of its source, a 
subjective agent*. Human culture is nothing if not totemic. Masks, puppets, 
figurative drawings, voices and gestures, sculpture, drama, dance, song, 
etc reflect the nature of subjectivity itself - it’s expression of 
character and creating stories with them. "

Thanks,
Craig

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Life is nonphysical

Hi Hal,

You seem to be saying that life is a form of, or is related to, energy.
But one way of defining life is that of all the components in the universe,
it has the ability to extract energy (or order) from chaos or randomness.

Maxwell's Demon is a symbolic representation of that process,
but what makes the demon similar to life is his intelligence .

So in my book, intelligence, if not life itswelf, is a sign of life.

And unlike energy, intelligence is nonphysical. As is life.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-01, 23:49:57
Subject: Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum


On 10/31/2012 9:48 PM, Hal Ruhl wrote:
> Hi Everyone:
>
> I would like to restart my participation on the list by having a discussion 
> regarding the aspects of what we call ?ife? in our universe starting in a 
> simple manner as follows: [terms not defined herein have the usual ?aws of 
> Physics? definition]
>
> 1) Definition (1): Energy (E) is the ability to subject a mass to a force.
>
> 2) There are several types of energy currently known:
>
> a) Mass itself via the conversion: [M <=> E/(c*c)]
> b) Gravitational
> c) Electromagnetic
> d) Nuclear [Strong and Weak forces]
> e) Dark Energy

Hi Hal,

 Nice post! Any way that the energy/force/work relation can be 
considered as a broken symmetry restoration concept?

>
> 3) Definition (2) Work (W) Work is the flow of energy amongst the various 
> types by means of a change in the spatial configuration, dynamics and/or 
> amount of mass in a system brought about by an actual application of a force 
> to a mass.
>
> 4) The exact original distribution of energy amongst the various types can? 
> be reestablished and the new configuration can? do as much work as the prior 
> configuration was capable of doing. [Second Law of Thermodynamics]

 Isn't the maximum entropy of a system a type of symmetry, where all 
equiprobable states "look the same"?

>
> 5) Time is not a factor: Once a flow of energy is possible it will take place 
> immediately.
>
> 6) Conclusion (1): Since life is an energy flow conduit, wherever the 
> possibility of life exists life will appear as rapidly as possible. The 
> ?rigin? of life herein.

 Let me refer you to a very old paper of mine: 
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/life.html

>
> 7) Some energy flows are prevented by what are known [in my memory] as ?nergy 
> Flow Hang-up Barriers? such as nuclear bonding coefficient issues, spatial 
> configuration, spin, other spatial dynamics, ignition temperature 
> requirements, electromagnetic repulsion, etc. [?nergy Flow Hang-up Barriers? 
> is not my terminology ? I think there was a twenty year or so old article in 
> Scientific American I am looking for and a quick Internet search found a 
> discussion of the repulsion hang-up in ?osmology The Science of the Universe? 
> by Edward Robert Harrison.
>
> 8) Once life is present it will immediately punch as many holes in as many 
> Energy Hang-up Barriers as the details of the particular life entity involved 
> allows ? this is how it realizes its energy flow conduit character. The 
> ?urpose? of life herein. In other words life? purpose is to hasten the heat 
> death of its host universe.
>
> 9) Now add in evolution which is a random walk with a lower but no upper 
> bound.

 Do you see mutation as a one-to-many map and selection as a many 
-to-one map?

>
> A discussion of the possible consequences [such as qualia levels of 
> particular life entities - like degrees of consciousness] should await a 
> critique and possibly a revision of the above.
>
> Comments are eagerly sought.
>
> Thank you
>
 Nice!

-- 
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems

Hi Russell Standish 

Thanks.  Causality has enormous importance, especially
if you can differentiate it from correspondence. 

I sometimes think that the rise of the stock market is 
causally related to the price of gold.  Or the value of the dollar.
Historical inflation of the value of the dollar at least corresponds
to the tonnage of gold mined over the years.

Politicians, depending on which point of view they want
you to believe, generally make false claims of causality. 
A particular case in point is the question of whether
tax cuts enrich the economy.

And I wonder if there are studies that differentiate 
global warming/ CO2 as a correlation or is casual.

Another one is whether Israeli attacks on Palestine
are cause by Palestinian attacks on Israel or
vice versa.  A timeline study of attacks should show this.

 


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Russell Standish 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-01, 17:59:10
Subject: Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems


The distinction between correlation and causality occasionally comes
up in this discussion group, so I thought this paper might be of
interest.

Disclaimer - I haven't read it, but it is published in Science, and
one of the authors (Robert May) I have the utmost respect for.

Let me know if you can't find a non paywalled version. I will probably
be able to get it from my institution's e-library.


- Forwarded message from Complexity Digest Administration 
 -



Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems

  Identifying causal networks is important for effective policy and management 
recommendations on climate, epidemiology, financial regulation, and much else. 
We introduce a method, based on nonlinear state space reconstruction, that can 
distinguish causality from correlation. It extends to nonseparable weakly 
connected dynamic systems (cases not covered by the current Granger causality 
paradigm). The approach is illustrated both by simple models (where, in 
contrast to the real world, we know the underlying equations/relations and so 
can check the validity of our method) and by application to real ecological 
systems, including the controversial sardine-anchovy-temperature problem.


Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems
George Sugihara, Robert May, Hao Ye, Chih-hao Hsieh, Ethan Deyle, Michael 
Fogarty, Stephan Munch

Science 26 October 2012:
Vol. 338 no. 6106 pp. 496-500
http://unam.us4.list-manage2.com/track/click?u=0eb0ac9b4e8565f2967a8304b&id=9e44b3450a&e=d38efa683e

See it on Scoop.it 
(http://www.scoop.it/t/papers/p/3161484398/detecting-causality-in-complex-ecosystems)
 , via Papers (http://www.scoop.it/t/papers)



-- 


Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-30 Thread Jason Resch

On Nov 30, 2012, at 6:42 AM, "Roger Clough" wrote:

Hi Jason Resch

What does physics (and multiple world theory) have to do with
emulating human thinking ? Physics is deterministic, human thought
is not.

Good question.  Below I make the point that the observed laws of  
physics are dependent on the statistics of ones mind's numerous  
manifestations throughout reality.  Physics is not at the bottom of  
the explanatory pyramid as is often believed.   Instead the mind and  
theories of computation are at the bottom.  This is what Bruno's  
Universal Dovetailer Argument shows.  That a universal dovetailer (a  
program that runs all programs), or anything which cobtains one, such  
as arithmatical truth, becomes a practical theory of everything.

Jason

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Jason Resch
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-01, 17:19:07
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism

On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 3:25 PM, John Clark   
wrote:
On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 2:21 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> In most physics experiments, even very advanced ones at CERN, the  
experimenter himself is not duplicated so in the question "What  
particle do you expect to see?" it's clear who "you" is;

> Only if you assume that the universe does not contain Boltzman  
brains, or a universal  dovetailer,

It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not. In physics  
experiments not involving self duplications which "you" is involved  
is obvious, and it can be proven to be correct by observing that  
when "you" predicts what "you" will see using physical laws the  
prediction usually proves to be true, so all the yous must have been  
assigned correctly.

Physics is all about predicting observations. � Let's say an experim 
enter creates a new kind of particle using an accelerator that has n 
ever before existed in the history of the universe, and wants to mea 
sure its half-life. 燦ow let's presume that in 999 out of 1,000 almos 
t identical standard models that exist in string theory, the half-li 
fe is 1 us. 燘ut in 1 out of those 1,000, the half life is 10 us.

If you are the experimenter what can physics tell you about the  
particle's half life? 營t is not implied by the laws of physics becau 
se there are many laws of physics. 燯ntil the experiment is performed 
, even the laws of physics are not in stone. 燭his is a main point of 
 Bruno's result: physics is not at the bottom of the explanatory lad 
der, the laws of physics depend on the distribution of observers sim 
ilar to your current state of mind throughout its infinite manifesta 
tions in reality.

Jason
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Re: Re: Against Mechanism

Hi Jason Resch 

What does physics (and multiple world theory) have to do with 
emulating human thinking ? Physics is deterministic, human thought
is not.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Jason Resch 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-01, 17:19:07
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism

On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 3:25 PM, John Clark  wrote:

On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 2:21 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> In most physics experiments, even very advanced ones at CERN, the 
>> experimenter himself is not duplicated so in the question "What particle do 
>> you expect to see?" it's clear who "you" is;

> Only if you assume that the universe does not contain Boltzman brains, or a 
> universal dovetailer,

It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not. In physics experiments not 
involving self duplications which "you" is involved is obvious, and it can be 
proven to be correct by observing that when "you" predicts what "you" will see 
using physical laws the prediction usually proves to be true, so all the yous 
must have been assigned correctly.

Physics is all about predicting observations. ? Let's say an experimenter 
creates a new kind of particle using an accelerator that has never before 
existed in the history of the universe, and wants to measure its half-life. ?ow 
let's presume that in 999 out of 1,000 almost identical standard models that 
exist in string theory, the half-life is 1 us. ?ut in 1 out of those 1,000, the 
half life is 10 us.

If you are the experimenter what can physics tell you about the particle's half 
life? ?t is not implied by the laws of physics because there are many laws of 
physics. ?ntil the experiment is performed, even the laws of physics are not in 
stone. ?his is a main point of Bruno's result: physics is not at the bottom of 
the explanatory ladder, the laws of physics depend on the distribution of 
observers similar to your current state of mind throughout its infinite 
manifestations in reality.

Jason
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iconic reasoning for semantic purposes

Hi everything-list

Perhaps Penrose's emphasis of intution, and the noncomputability thereof,
is that intuition is is closely related to meaning, to semantics.
I think that a necessary feature of any machine to emulate human thought 
is to be able to understand meaning, the science of which is called semantics. 

My limited understanding of current semantics is that meaning is represented
syntactically (sentence diagramming).  Peirce seems to have abandoned arithmetic
reasoning (I may have overstated that) in favor of a new, semiotic or 
graphics-based
reasoning (semiotics), which is as vital to understand as it is difficult.
One can even conceive of an iconic- or  graphics-based
computer.

See below for an alternate discussion of this topic:
 
http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/33/40/HTML/index.html

"The central idea developed in Peirce's account of necessary deductive 
reasoning is that it proceeds by constructions of diagrams, which are a species 
of icons. This is as true for logical reasoning as it is for mathematical 
reasoning, which is in fact the paradigm of deduction. Such a conception has 
important bearings not only for a conception of iconic logic, but for certain 
peculiarities that are attached to mathematical deduction as well.
 
 3.1 The main characters of the icon
 
An icon is a sign which 'refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue 
of characters of its own, and which it possesses just the same, whether any 
such Object actually exists or not' (2. 247). "



"The first things I found out were that all mathematical reasoning is 
diagrammatic and that all necessary reasoning is mathematical reasoning, no 
matter how simple it may be. By diagrammatic reasoning, I mean reasoning which 
constructs a diagram according to a precept expressed in general terms, 
performs experiments upon this diagram, notes their results, and expresses them 
in general terms. This was a discovery of no little importance, showing as it 
does, that all knowledge comes from observation. "
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

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Re: Against Mechanism

On 29 Nov 2012, at 23:00, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Nov 29, 2012 at 2:21 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:
>> OK, you know more about your homemade word that I do so I defer  
to your greater expertise, I don't believe in this thing called  
"comp".

> From your reply to Craig, I think that you do. Unless you have  
change your mind.

I haven't changed my mind on this matter recently and until one year  
ago and I joined this list I had never heard of "comp", so I defer  
to your greater expertise on the meaning of your homemade word. It  
now appears that I do believe in this thing called "comp".

I have always insisted that comp is just an abbreviation for  
computationalism in the cognitive science. It is the idea that the  
brain is a machine, and that if you emulate it at some enough low  
level on a computer, my subjective experience remains unchanged.

>> you predicted it would turn out to be W or M but not both, so to  
confirm your prediction and claim victory all you have to do is tell  
me how the experiment turned out, was it W or M?

> OK. My prediction is "W or M but not both". In that case both  
confirms.

The prediction was not confirmed because after the experiment was  
over nobody said "I saw W or M".

?

Both can confirm that they saw "W or M".

"P v Q" is true if P is true.
"P v Q" is true if Q is true.

And anyway only one of them is of interest because only one of them  
is "you" according to Bruno Marchal,

No. They are both me. But from the 1-person view, I can only  
experience being one of them. But in the 3p view, they are both me  
(which leads to the idea that we are both the "initial amoeba", but  
that's another topic).

otherwise the question "which ONE did you see?" would be nonsense,  
it's as if I had 2 apple pies and I asked "which ONE is a apple  
pie?". You predicted  W or M but not both, so which did it turn out  
to be?

W but for the "me" opening the door in W,
and
M for the "me" opening the door in M.

Both confirms "W or M". None confirms your "W & M". Given that the  
question is on the first person view.

  >> So which was it W or M?

> W for the W-couples, and M for the M couples.

I was pleased to note that you said "and" not "or".

I say it since the beginning as we describe here the 3-view on the 1- 
view.  I am pelased you see that both describe only one city, and this  
confirmed the 1-indeterminacy.

>> Before QM says the photon will hit here or there but AFTER the  
experiment you know with 100% certainty that the photon hit the  
photographic plate here and not there,

> before, in Helsinki you have probability, but after pushing on the  
button, then, in all circumstances you see a definite result

In the two slit experiment the definite result was the that photon  
hit the photographic plate right there and not over there and no  
probability or theory was used or needed, all that was needed was a  
darkroom to develop the plate. So what was the definite result of  
your experiment, W or M?

W but for the "me" opening the door in W,
and
M for the "me" opening the door in M.

This entails "W or M" for both.
This refuted "W and M" for both. Given that "W" and "M" refer to the 1- 
views.

>before, in Helsinki you have probability, but after pushing on the  
button, then, in all circumstances you see a definite result

AND I'M ASKING WHAT IT WAS, W OR M

W but for the "me" opening the door in W,
and
M for the "me" opening the door in M.

Again:

This entails "W or M" for both.
This refuted "W and M" for both. Given that "W" and "M" refer to the 1- 
views.

>> and so we can test theories. In your thought experiment you used  
your theory and said it would be W or M but not both, AFTER the  
experiment you claim that all you can still say is W or M,

> In your imagination only. All the copies can say where they are  
after the experience. You attribute me statements that I have never  
said.

John Clark is not interested in "all the copies" John Clark is only  
interested in "you", Bruno Marchal predicted that "you" will only  
see ONE city so which ONE was "you"? Was "you" in W or was "you" in M?

You have to take into account all copies, to get the statistics right,  
exactly like in QM without collapse.

It's OK to say "or" in making a prediction but not in reporting a  
experimental result.

Read the answer that I have repeated above.

> You can test the probability, by iterating the experience,

Tell me how to do this. How do you do the counting? You say that  
after each iteration you can put a mark next to W or M but not both,  
so tell me where to put the mark.

Once you are duplicated, I have to interview all the copies, of  
course. the point is that they give all a definite city, and none  
could have predicted them. So the H-guy knows with certainty that he  
cannot predict where he will find himself after pushing the button.

It is hard for me to see if you have a genuine mi

Re: Against Mechanism

On 29 Nov 2012, at 19:54, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 7:51 PM, Jason Resch
wrote:

> The experiment requires that you place yourself in the place of
someone about to be duplicated and ask yourself what you expect to
experience after that duplication.

Various people expect all sorts of screwy things, often they are
absolutely certain of it and sometimes they even turn out to be
correct, but as I've said before what "you" expect to experience is
irrelevant in this matter,

Of course it is relevant. the question explicitly refers to it. Here
we can see why you are stuck in step 3. You believe the question is
irrelevant.

So please answer the question asked, and not a transformation of it.
Then at the next steps you will eventually grasp why it is relevant
(indeed crucial).

Bruno

what "you" do experience is not. And that can only be determined by
remembering the past not by predicting the future.

John K Clark

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Against Mechanism

On 29 Nov 2012, at 19:42, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 meekerdb wrote:

> Bruno (and most people on this "Everything" list) think that the
photon hits in many different places, but these events happen in
different 'worlds' per Hugh Everett's interpretation of QM.

Yes, if Everett is correct then the photon hit every point on that
photographic plate, but for every point on the plate there is also a
John Clark who, after developing the plate, sees that the photon hit
that particular point right there and no other point. Thus the 2
slit experiment produces a result, it may seem a odd result to human
beings but it is a definite result to every one of the infinite
number of John Clarks, and to any other observer who happens to be
living in that same world. And that makes it profoundly different
from Bruno's experiment.

In Bruno's thought experiment he predicts that the outcome when the
experiment is all over will be W or M but not both,

You must add here, "from the 1-person pov of the subject.

however even after the experiment is all over when he does the
equivalent of developing the photographic plate not one of the
infinite number of Brunos in a infinite number of worlds can say if
the final result was W or M.

I say the contrary.

Bruno tries to get out of this mess by saying its a statistical
matter, you perform the experiment lots of times and count up all
the Washingtons and Moscows and then he claims his theory will have
been proven to have made the correct probability prediction; but how
do you do the counting? Bruno says the the result will be W or M but
not both but before during or even after the experiment he still
can't say if the outcome was W or M, and probability studies can't
be done if there is no data.

> The point of Bruno's argument is to show how this kind of QM could
be realized by a computation that computes everything computable

But afterwards neither quantum mechanics nor computation is needed
to know where the photon hit that photographic plate, you just
develop it and see. The trouble with Bruno's experiment is that
unlike the 2 slits one this experiment has no outcome,

The contrary. You still miss the 1/3 distinction.

Bruno

and a experiment that produces no results isn't much of a experiment.

John K Clark

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Comp and causality