Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 8:14 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 6:58 PM, John Clark  wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
> >
> >>  if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit of
> >> information,
> >
> >
> > I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
> > identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
> > justified to give them different names.
>
> Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
> identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago. But things would get a bit
> confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue now.
>
> Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.
>
> Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from
> time passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't. Which one is
> it?
>

I'll give it a shot, but I could well be confusing things/levels:

Does that question make sense given complete arithmetization of
self-reference by Gödel (and whoever else did this or contributed) when we
assume comp? Because new and old John Clarks cannot be distinguished as we
can't distinguish between "particular" machines and copies.

This is related to the confusion recently on first person and third
person.The reasoning concerns 3p formalizable discourse of self-reference
of sufficiently rich machines. So the third person "I".

However, a particular copy (?) machine making self-referential statements
from 3rd person point of view, will communicate an account of some version
of its states, and so talking histories of Moscow etc. at this level, when
one copy of a machine is concerned in the thought experiment, is valid.

But as Moscow etc. is not part of formal self-reference provability, Gödel
does not arithmetize this knowledge of 1st person bit and I think
incompleteness refutes that we can because []p -> p would hold. That's how
I make sense or nonsense out of it anyway. PGC


> I suspect you think they are the same, but I also predict an attempt
> to avoid answering the question directly, possibly combined with
> comparing me to a baboon with below-average IQ and early onset
> dementia.
>
>

>

> >> > then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.
> >
> >
> > I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're
> > going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.
> >
> >
> >>> >> As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling
> >>> >> of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction,
> or any
> >>> >> other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does
> it
> >>> >> matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.
> >>
> >>
> >> > ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it makes
> >> > my point)
> >
> >
> > I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?
> >
> >   John K Clark
> >
> >
> > --
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Re: The I Concept, Analytically

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 04:25:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 13 Oct 2013, at 12:24, Russell Standish wrote:
> 
> >How do we know that those 3 hypostases exhaust the possibilities for
> >logics containing true but incommunicable sentences?
> 
> Who ever said that they exhaust them?
> 
> On the contrary, I have explained once that the 8 hypostases are
> really 4 + 4 * infinity hypostases. We get quantization also for the
> B^n p & D^t  nuances, which makes the quantum logic graded, and
> which I hoped that they could be exploited to get the "Temperley
> Lieb" algebra to get the emergence of a physical tridimensional
> (quantum) space (but the math get too much complex).
> 
> The 8 hypostases are only the most obvious one, but without Gödel
> incompleteness we would not have them at all. That's the miracle.
> That they exists and that machines can grasp them when looking
> inward.
> 

Fair enough.

> 
> >
> >I do think Craig has a point here.
> 
> Craig assumes them. The point is that there can be consequences of
> arithmetic + classical theory of knowledge (and/or comp).
> 

OK - let me explain what I think Craig's point is (which might be
wrong - he's not an easy fellow to understand).

The ?*/? distinction (replace ? with you favourite letter) is a neat
result showing the difference between private (incomunicable) and
public discourse.

Qualia is an example of a private discourse.

But it does not therefore follow that qualia is explained by one of
the eight hypostases we know about. It may be due to another
hypostase, or even due to some completely different mechanism giving
rise to private/public discourse.

I think where you are on stronger ground with the quantum logics you
get from the Goldblatt transform, but even so that still quite
speculative. Much needs to be done.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[John Mikes]

Dear Telmo,
in spite of my reluctance to spend time and energy on that nightmare of
teleportation-related follies - (probably a result of too heavy dinners
after which Q-physicists could not sleep/relax) - and with no intention to
protect John Clark (a decent partner anyway) I may draw a thick line
between the terms *"generating a new term" * and  *"experiencing
change"*in passing.

In my agnosticism I visualize the 'World' in constant dynamic change,
so *"nothing
stays the same"*. What does not mean that 'instant by instant' (if we
accept time as a reality-factor) everything becomes renewed
Changed: yes. (=My disagreement also against 'loops' in general).

Considering the changes: they may be 'essential' (as e.g. death, or at
least extended to 'major' parts of our organization) - or just
incidental/partial. The way I try to figure out changes? there is an
infinite complexity exercising (affecting) "our world" (i.e. the model we
constructed for our existence as of latest) providing the stuff to our
reductionist thinking ("That 'model' is *all* and we have to explain - fit
everything into it"). I arrived at this by Robert Rosen.
So: I am not a *'different person'* from what I was a second ago, YET I
feel identical to *THAT* person (maybe of decades ago) which underwent lots
of changes - keeping the "SELF"-feeling (whatever that may be).
It doesn't mean that I am identical to THAT person, who could run,
exercise, worked successfully in his conventional-reductionist science,
etc. etc. I just FEEL as the same person (though changed, what I realize).

In a doubling from 'Helsinki' to 'Moscow' (joke) it is not likely that all
those changes by the complexity-circumstances in Finnland would be
duplicated by the changes in Russia, so the 'doubled' (clone???) changes
into a different person. I leave it to the 'Everything' Friends to decide
whether that person feels still like the other one. I wouldn't.

Just musing. Respectfully
John Mikes


On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 2:14 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 6:58 PM, John Clark  wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
> >
> >>  if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit of
> >> information,
> >
> >
> > I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
> > identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
> > justified to give them different names.
>
> Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
> identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago. But things would get a bit
> confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue now.
>
> Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.
>
> Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from
> time passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't. Which one is
> it?
>
> I suspect you think they are the same, but I also predict an attempt
> to avoid answering the question directly, possibly combined with
> comparing me to a baboon with below-average IQ and early onset
> dementia.
>
>
> >> > then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.
> >
> >
> > I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're
> > going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.
> >
> >
> >>> >> As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling
> >>> >> of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction,
> or any
> >>> >> other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does
> it
> >>> >> matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.
> >>
> >>
> >> > ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it makes
> >> > my point)
> >
> >
> > I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?
> >
> >   John K Clark
> >
> >
> > --
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Re: In Bruno's Terms

[LizR]

On 13 October 2013 19:35, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> *
> Presumption of repeatability* (PR) - By overlooking the possibility of
> absolute uniqueness, comp must conceive of all events as locally documented
> stereotypes of a Platonic template rather than true originals. This
> contradicts our intuitions about the proprietary nature of identity and
> would seem to counterfactually predict a very low interest in qualities
> such as individuality and originality, and identification with trivial
> personal preferences. Of course, what we see the precise opposite, as all
> celebrity it propelled by some suggestion unrepeatability and the fine
> tuning of lifestyle choices is arguably the most prolific and successful
> feature of consumerism.
>

I think the answer to this is that most people don't know about comp, and
have no idea that their experiences are the product of an infinite sheaf of
identical computations. (Also, since the computations are identical, they
are experienced as a single unique moment, giving the appearance that every
moment we experience is unique - cue "tears in the rain" speech). Hence
even if comp does imply that  one shouldn't value originality (which I
can't see myself) there is no reason *within most people's knowledge* that
would lead them not to do so.

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

[meekerdb]

On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are 
these universes distinct from one another?   Do they divide into two infinite subsets 
on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some 
branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems 
with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers 
that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a 
Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel "experiences", (then), 
disappearing, please do.


I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer to?  And 
you're asking why they disappeared?


The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious on the 
observer"


I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so superpositions are just 
something that happens in the mathematics.










When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the "quantum wave" 
describes only psychological states, but they concern still a *many* 
dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many self-multiplication.


There is no "many" in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal subjective 
probabilities of contemplated futures.


I notice the plural of "futures". Are those not "many"?


Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.

I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the superposition 
disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not a problem for me. there are 
still "many".



Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I think Fuchs view 
of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at the end of his book "The Evolution 
of Reason" - a probabilistic extension of logic. This is essentially the view he defends 
at length in "Interview with a Quantum Bayesian", arXiv:1207.2141v1










It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal) physical reality. 
Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.


Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is the knower, the 
observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of solipsism, and it can generate 
some strong "don't ask" imperative.


You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.


I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.



I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think you do 
the same).




Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally comfortable with not 
explaining everything.


Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using.


What's your explanation for the existence of persons?  So far what I've heard is that it's 
an inside view of arithmetic - which I don't find very enlightening.  Fuchs, correctly I 
think, says an 'interpretation' of a theory, the story that goes along with the 
mathematics, is important insofar as it gives you insight into how to apply the 
mathematics and to extend your theories.  He is critical of Everett's MWI for not doing 
that, or at least not doing it well.


Brent



Bruno





Brent
"I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of 
integrity."
--- Fredrick Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols"

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 6:58 PM, John Clark  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>  if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit of
>> information,
>
>
> I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
> identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
> justified to give them different names.

Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not
identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago. But things would get a bit
confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue now.

Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark.

Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from
time passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't. Which one is
it?

I suspect you think they are the same, but I also predict an attempt
to avoid answering the question directly, possibly combined with
comparing me to a baboon with below-average IQ and early onset
dementia.


>> > then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.
>
>
> I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're
> going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.
>
>
>>> >> As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling
>>> >> of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction, or any
>>> >> other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does it
>>> >> matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.
>>
>>
>> > ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it makes
>> > my point)
>
>
> I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[John Clark]

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

 if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit of
> information,
>

I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not
identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes
justified to give them different names.

> then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.
>

I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're
going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago.

>> As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling of
>> self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction, or any other
>> prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does it matter if
>> the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.
>>
>
> > ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it makes
> my point)
>

I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point?

  John K Clark

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Re: Note to Russell Standish

[Richard Ruquist]

Bruno,

Even in my Metaverse String cosmology I can understand how from the
beginning of the Metaverse how its machine can generate all Lobian numbers
including arithmetic humans and aliens long before our universe exists and
evolves conscious physical beings. What I do not understand is why those
physical beings are needed.

You say they are needed as much a a particular number is needed. But that I
do not understand. Particular numbers I presume are included in all the
Lobian numbers. so why are physical beings needed?


It seems to me, especially in view of MWI, that the machine generates
everything to begin with including the passage of time. But you seem to
claim that physical beings are needed to generate all Lobian numbers. That
I do not understand at all.
Richard


On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 10:47 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 13 Oct 2013, at 12:56, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Bruno: ? The answer is the Löbian number (the so called sufficiently rich
> theories, which exists in arithmetic, in a variety of relative way).
>
> Richard: If the Lobian number exists, why are humans or aliens needed at
> all?
>
>
> They are needed like the number 1879600442671119229 is needed.
>
> Once all löbian numbers exist, humans and aliens exists because they are
> Löbian numbers, among many.
>
>
>
>
>
> Bruno: I was just referring to the fact that the UD will generates a
> program emulating you, before generating the complete emulation of the
> possible quantum vacuum fluctuation leading to the actual story of the
> universe.
>
> Richard: Are you saying that I existed before the universe? In what realm
> did I exist?
>
>
> In the realm of elementary arithmetic.
>
> It contains infinitely many computations going through you actual states.
>
> Apparently we share many of those computations. We have to explain why.
> We can succeed only in deriving the physical laws from that complex
> computations statistics.
>
> That's the result:  a problem for the computationalist.
>
> I illustrate how to solve the problem in a way which takes into account
> what machines (us) can really justify about us, and what is true about us,
> but that we cannot justify.
> This takes unavoidable intensional nuances which are helpful to avoid the
> elimination of consciousness and persons, and to provide an arithmetical
> interpretation of Plotinus and Plato.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 3:42 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 12 Oct 2013, at 19:40, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>> Bruno: We need only a good dreamer, and the discovery of the relative
>> universal numbers
>>
>> Richard: Who other than humans can do that?
>>
>>
>> ? The answer is the Löbian number (the so called sufficiently rich
>> theories, which exists in arithmetic, in a variety of relative way).
>>
>> We might argue that only humans can build huge telescopes and see the far
>> away galaxies, but this would not imply that those galaxies needs humans to
>> exist.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno: The UD generates the human before evolution. Do you claim that
>> humans change the past?
>>
>>
>> No, because the physical past is an indexical which eventually subsume
>> the whole UD*, and thus some part of arithmetic.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Richard: So humans do not evolve. Sounds like creationism.
>>
>>
>> I was just referring to the fact that the UD will generates a program
>> emulating you, before generating the complete emulation of the possible
>> quantum vacuum fluctuation leading to the actual story of the universe.
>>
>> Evolution, is, most plausibly a statistically exact account of our local
>> history.
>>
>>
>>
>> So far you have not dismissed my inference that comp needs humans to work.
>>
>>
>> Some alien can also bet that they have a brain, and that it is Turing
>> emulable. In arithmetic there are infinities of numbers which, relatively
>> to some universal number arrives at that same conclusion (and in this case
>> we know that they are correct).
>> Do you think we need humans for having the truth that 1+1=2? If you agree
>> we don't, then we don't humans to have the larger set of löbian numbers and
>> their dreams, from which physical realities emerges.
>>
>>
>>
>> IMO if true, that in itself dismisses comp as contrary to established
>> science.
>>
>>
>> We need humans only to explain comp to humans, but comp is basically the
>> idea that machine/numbers can manifest consciousness in their relevant
>> relative environment/computations.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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Re: In Bruno's Terms

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Oct 2013, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, October 13, 2013 6:04:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Oct 2013, at 08:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Maybe this will help. Here are two criticisms of comp, and two  
hypotheses which aim for a more mathematical treatment of PIP  
principles under MSR.


Presumption of repeatability (PR) - By overlooking the possibility  
of absolute uniqueness,


?
0, s(0), ... are unique.

By absolute uniqueness I mean that something could be utterly  
inconceivable before its appearance, and unrepeatable in any way  
thereafter. Numbers cannot be created from scratch, they can only be  
recycled from the pool of combinatory possiblities. To be unique is  
to be immune from precedent or repetition - inherently non-emulable  
by definition.


Like the first person experience of here and now. That is non  
repeatable, as it supervenes on *all* its 3p repetition.
So, thanks to comp and the FPI, I can make sense of what you say. But  
that is first person experience only.








comp must conceive of all events as locally documented stereotypes  
of a Platonic template rather than true originals.


"true original" is too much fuzzy.

I think it could not be more clear? An original which has no  
possible precedent. The number one would be a true original, but all  
other integers represent multiple copies of one. All rational  
numbers are partial copies of one. All prime numbers are still  
divisible by one, so not truly prime. A true original must be  
indivisible and unrepeatable, i.e. one can never be 'new' again, but  
the novelty.


OK, OK. In comp, it is probably given by the experiences themselves.  
Even in a rotating Gödelian universe with cylclic time, the first  
person experience don't repeat.





The first variable (lets call Alpha-X) is original, but all other  
variables duplicate the idea of Alpha-X (yellow is an idea which  
cannot be duplicated or divided). What I am trying to say is that to  
access awareness mathematically I suggest that we would have to  
begin with the opposite of cardinality rather than cardinality. Each  
moment is neither repeatable nor unrepeatable, quantifiable or  
unquantifiable. Transcardinality provides for a leaky primitive, or  
primitive of self-modulating leakiness. It is not digital or fluid,  
but intimations of waving and granularity are reflected back as  
echoes.


No problem. To be short that what the machines explains when you  
listen to them.









This contradicts our intuitions


And?

And deserves to be investigated. Our intuitions should, by default,  
be treated as the most locally relevant branch of arithmetic truth.


We start from intutions, yes, but then we face the counter-intuitive,  
a bit like we start from the self, but then meet the others.









about the proprietary nature of identity


No, this is confirmed, nit contradicted. The first persons too are  
unique, and non divisible, necessarily so from their perspective.


If you believe in comp maybe.


Believing in the classical theory of knowledge is enough.

Classical logic +
Kp -> p
K(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq)
+ (for reflexive enough machine) Kp -> KKp

When Kp is defined by Bp & p (Theaetetus in arithmetic) we get such a  
theory (extended by the knowledge version of Löb's formula, the  
Grzegorczyk formula  B(B(p->Bp)->p)->p. It entails an abstract  
asymmetry.







That assumes that numbers can conjure non-numerical results.


No. Comp assumes that. But arithmetic confirms. Beliefs predicate  
obeys modal laws.




There is nothing that I can see that supports the idea that  
computation can generate new ontologies.


That is not an argument for saying there are none.








and would seem to counterfactually predict a very low interest in  
qualities such as individuality and originality,


Gratuitous opportunistic assertion.

How so? Why would 1p experience value novelty if it is just an  
outcropping of a machine that by definition can create only  
trivially 'new' combinations of copies?


That is not the case. Machine looking inward, in the standard Gödel  
sense, get creative, and and only more surprised when digging deeper.




456098209093457976534 is different from 45609420909345797353, but  
why does that difference seem insignificant to us, but the  
difference between a belt worn by Elvis and a copy of that belt to  
be demonstrably significant to many people.


Sure.






and identification with trivial personal preferences. Of course,  
what we see the precise opposite, as all celebrity it propelled by  
some suggestion unrepeatability and the fine tuning of lifestyle  
choices is arguably the most prolific and successful feature of  
consumerism.


That is not argument. Looks like propaganda to me.

That's not a counter-argument. Looks like you're defensive to me.


Sure I am. I defend the right of my sun in law to get his steak.










Presumption of finite simplicities - Because comp provides  
uni

Re: Note to Russell Standish

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Oct 2013, at 12:56, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: ? The answer is the Löbian number (the so called sufficiently  
rich theories, which exists in arithmetic, in a variety of relative  
way).


Richard: If the Lobian number exists, why are humans or aliens  
needed at all?


They are needed like the number 1879600442671119229 is needed.

Once all löbian numbers exist, humans and aliens exists because they  
are Löbian numbers, among many.







Bruno: I was just referring to the fact that the UD will generates a  
program emulating you, before generating the complete emulation of  
the possible quantum vacuum fluctuation leading to the actual story  
of the universe.


Richard: Are you saying that I existed before the universe? In what  
realm did I exist?


In the realm of elementary arithmetic.

It contains infinitely many computations going through you actual  
states.


Apparently we share many of those computations. We have to explain why.
We can succeed only in deriving the physical laws from that complex  
computations statistics.


That's the result:  a problem for the computationalist.

I illustrate how to solve the problem in a way which takes into  
account what machines (us) can really justify about us, and what is  
true about us, but that we cannot justify.
This takes unavoidable intensional nuances which are helpful to avoid  
the elimination of consciousness and persons, and to provide an  
arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus and Plato.


Bruno






On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 3:42 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 12 Oct 2013, at 19:40, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: We need only a good dreamer, and the discovery of the  
relative universal numbers


Richard: Who other than humans can do that?


? The answer is the Löbian number (the so called sufficiently rich  
theories, which exists in arithmetic, in a variety of relative way).


We might argue that only humans can build huge telescopes and see  
the far away galaxies, but this would not imply that those galaxies  
needs humans to exist.






Bruno: The UD generates the human before evolution. Do you claim  
that humans change the past?


No, because the physical past is an indexical which eventually  
subsume the whole UD*, and thus some part of arithmetic.






Richard: So humans do not evolve. Sounds like creationism.


I was just referring to the fact that the UD will generates a  
program emulating you, before generating the complete emulation of  
the possible quantum vacuum fluctuation leading to the actual story  
of the universe.


Evolution, is, most plausibly a statistically exact account of our  
local history.




So far you have not dismissed my inference that comp needs humans  
to work.


Some alien can also bet that they have a brain, and that it is  
Turing emulable. In arithmetic there are infinities of numbers  
which, relatively to some universal number arrives at that same  
conclusion (and in this case we know that they are correct).
Do you think we need humans for having the truth that 1+1=2? If you  
agree we don't, then we don't humans to have the larger set of  
löbian numbers and their dreams, from which physical realities  
emerges.




IMO if true, that in itself dismisses comp as contrary to  
established science.


We need humans only to explain comp to humans, but comp is basically  
the idea that machine/numbers can manifest consciousness in their  
relevant relative environment/computations.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: The I Concept, Analytically

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Oct 2013, at 12:24, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 11:05:46AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Oct 2013, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, October 12, 2013 3:54:29 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/12/2013 12:49 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:

Yes, but you see, even the food we get from the restaurant, is
delicious. Why would it be delicious, assuming COMP. How could
the primary modalities of things be good or bad assuming COMP? I
know most people here think Craig is a hand waver, but I
honestly cannot understand how qualia emerge from quantia,
including their(meaning, my experiences) magically "emerge" from
the many quants that Bruno's idea seems to require.


Emergence is a description of how we think about our models of the
world - not something in the world.  So Bruno has a theory in
which some parts are true but incommunicable.  He identifies these
with qualia because that is (supposedly) a characteristic of
qualia.  That's actually how all scientific theories work: you
hypothesize a model, including connections to observations and see
if it has explanatory and predictive power.

Isn't the the characteristic of "true but incommunicable" math a
rather thin premise to suggest that the incommunicability of some
truth = the appearance of flavors, colors, sounds, etc?


"true but incommunicable" applies to three hypostases, and thus get
three different logics. How do you know in advance that one of them
will not throw some light on the qualia problem? Try to answer this
without begging the question.

Bruno



How do we know that those 3 hypostases exhaust the possibilities for
logics containing true but incommunicable sentences?


Who ever said that they exhaust them?

On the contrary, I have explained once that the 8 hypostases are  
really 4 + 4 * infinity hypostases. We get quantization also for the  
B^n p & D^t  nuances, which makes the quantum logic graded, and which  
I hoped that they could be exploited to get the "Temperley Lieb"  
algebra to get the emergence of a physical tridimensional (quantum)  
space (but the math get too much complex).


The 8 hypostases are only the most obvious one, but without Gödel  
incompleteness we would not have them at all. That's the miracle. That  
they exists and that machines can grasp them when looking inward.





I do think Craig has a point here.


Craig assumes them. The point is that there can be consequences of  
arithmetic + classical theory of knowledge (and/or comp).


Bruno




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Re: In Bruno's Terms

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, October 13, 2013 6:04:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Oct 2013, at 08:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Maybe this will help. Here are two criticisms of comp, and two hypotheses 
> which aim for a more mathematical treatment of PIP principles under MSR.
> *
> Presumption of repeatability* (PR) - By overlooking the possibility of 
> absolute uniqueness, 
>
>
> ?
> 0, s(0), ... are unique. 
>

By absolute uniqueness I mean that something could be utterly inconceivable 
before its appearance, and unrepeatable in any way thereafter. Numbers 
cannot be created from scratch, they can only be recycled from the pool of 
combinatory possiblities. To be unique is to be immune from precedent or 
repetition - inherently non-emulable by definition.


>
> comp must conceive of all events as locally documented stereotypes of a 
> Platonic template rather than true originals. 
>
>
> "true original" is too much fuzzy.
>

I think it could not be more clear? An original which has no possible 
precedent. The number one would be a true original, but all other integers 
represent multiple copies of one. All rational numbers are partial copies 
of one. All prime numbers are still divisible by one, so not truly prime. A 
true original must be indivisible and unrepeatable, i.e. one can never be 
'new' again, but the novelty.

The first variable (lets call Alpha-X) is original, but all other variables 
duplicate the idea of Alpha-X (yellow is an idea which cannot be duplicated 
or divided). What I am trying to say is that to access awareness 
mathematically I suggest that we would have to begin with the opposite of 
cardinality rather than cardinality. Each moment is neither repeatable nor 
unrepeatable, quantifiable or unquantifiable. Transcardinality provides for 
a leaky primitive, or primitive of self-modulating leakiness. It is not 
digital or fluid, but intimations of waving and granularity are reflected 
back as echoes.


>
> This contradicts our intuitions 
>
>
> And?
>

And deserves to be investigated. Our intuitions should, by default, be 
treated as the most locally relevant branch of arithmetic truth.
 

>
>
>
> about the proprietary nature of identity 
>
>
> No, this is confirmed, nit contradicted. The first persons too are unique, 
> and non divisible, necessarily so from their perspective.
>

If you believe in comp maybe. That assumes that numbers can conjure 
non-numerical results. There is nothing that I can see that supports the 
idea that computation can generate new ontologies.
 

>
>
>
> and would seem to counterfactually predict a very low interest in 
> qualities such as individuality and originality, 
>
>
> Gratuitous opportunistic assertion.
>

How so? Why would 1p experience value novelty if it is just an outcropping 
of a machine that by definition can create only trivially 'new' 
combinations of copies? 456098209093457976534 is different from 
45609420909345797353, but why does that difference seem insignificant to 
us, but the difference between a belt worn by Elvis and a copy of that belt 
to be demonstrably significant to many people.
 

>
>
> and identification with trivial personal preferences. Of course, what we 
> see the precise opposite, as all celebrity it propelled by some suggestion 
> unrepeatability and the fine tuning of lifestyle choices is arguably the 
> most prolific and successful feature of consumerism. 
>
>
> That is not argument. Looks like propaganda to me.
>

That's not a counter-argument. Looks like you're defensive to me.
 

>
>
>
> *Presumption of finite simplicities* - Because comp provides uniqueness 
> only in the form of the relative scarcity of vastly complex numbers, it can 
> be said to allow for the possibility of novelty only in one direction; that 
> of more quantity. New qualities, by comp, must arise on the event horizons 
> of the UD,
>
>
> Which is were we live here and now.
>

That would be true under comp, sure.
 

>
>
> yet qualia inherently speaks in a language of rich simplicity instead of 
> cumbersome computables. 
>
>
> That is not an argument.
>

No, it's a factual observation. The smell of oranges is rich and simple 
without any experienced computation, other than in connecting the smell 
with the rest of our associations with oranges.
 

>
>
>
> With comp, there is no new 'one', but in reality, every human experience 
> is exactly that.
>
> Hypothesis:
>
> *Diagonalization of the unique* - Because computation lags behind 
> experience, no simulation of a brain can catch up to what a natural person 
> *can be*, 
>
>
> ?
>
>
>
> since the potential for their uniqueness is immeasurable and 
> unprecedented. Also, nothing can be copied before it is unique, 
>
>
> ?
>
>
> so PIP flips the presumption of repeatability (PR) so that all novelty 
> exists as an absolutely new simplicity as well as a relatively new 
> complexity, such that the continuum of novelty extends in both directions. 
>
> The false dichotomy posed by comp in which 

Re: Note to Russell Standish

[Richard Ruquist]

Bruno: ? The answer is the Löbian number (the so called sufficiently rich
theories, which exists in arithmetic, in a variety of relative way).

Richard: If the Lobian number exists, why are humans or aliens needed at
all?

Bruno: I was just referring to the fact that the UD will generates a
program emulating you, before generating the complete emulation of the
possible quantum vacuum fluctuation leading to the actual story of the
universe.

Richard: Are you saying that I existed before the universe? In what realm
did I exist?


On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 3:42 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 12 Oct 2013, at 19:40, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Bruno: We need only a good dreamer, and the discovery of the relative
> universal numbers
>
> Richard: Who other than humans can do that?
>
>
> ? The answer is the Löbian number (the so called sufficiently rich
> theories, which exists in arithmetic, in a variety of relative way).
>
> We might argue that only humans can build huge telescopes and see the far
> away galaxies, but this would not imply that those galaxies needs humans to
> exist.
>
>
>
>
> Bruno: The UD generates the human before evolution. Do you claim that
> humans change the past?
>
>
> No, because the physical past is an indexical which eventually subsume the
> whole UD*, and thus some part of arithmetic.
>
>
>
>
> Richard: So humans do not evolve. Sounds like creationism.
>
>
> I was just referring to the fact that the UD will generates a program
> emulating you, before generating the complete emulation of the possible
> quantum vacuum fluctuation leading to the actual story of the universe.
>
> Evolution, is, most plausibly a statistically exact account of our local
> history.
>
>
>
> So far you have not dismissed my inference that comp needs humans to work.
>
>
> Some alien can also bet that they have a brain, and that it is Turing
> emulable. In arithmetic there are infinities of numbers which, relatively
> to some universal number arrives at that same conclusion (and in this case
> we know that they are correct).
> Do you think we need humans for having the truth that 1+1=2? If you agree
> we don't, then we don't humans to have the larger set of löbian numbers and
> their dreams, from which physical realities emerges.
>
>
>
> IMO if true, that in itself dismisses comp as contrary to established
> science.
>
>
> We need humans only to explain comp to humans, but comp is basically the
> idea that machine/numbers can manifest consciousness in their relevant
> relative environment/computations.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: The I Concept, Analytically

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 11:05:46AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 13 Oct 2013, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> 
> >
> >
> >On Saturday, October 12, 2013 3:54:29 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
> >On 10/12/2013 12:49 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
> >>Yes, but you see, even the food we get from the restaurant, is
> >>delicious. Why would it be delicious, assuming COMP. How could
> >>the primary modalities of things be good or bad assuming COMP? I
> >>know most people here think Craig is a hand waver, but I
> >>honestly cannot understand how qualia emerge from quantia,
> >>including their(meaning, my experiences) magically "emerge" from
> >>the many quants that Bruno's idea seems to require.
> >
> >Emergence is a description of how we think about our models of the
> >world - not something in the world.  So Bruno has a theory in
> >which some parts are true but incommunicable.  He identifies these
> >with qualia because that is (supposedly) a characteristic of
> >qualia.  That's actually how all scientific theories work: you
> >hypothesize a model, including connections to observations and see
> >if it has explanatory and predictive power.
> >
> >Isn't the the characteristic of "true but incommunicable" math a
> >rather thin premise to suggest that the incommunicability of some
> >truth = the appearance of flavors, colors, sounds, etc?
> 
> "true but incommunicable" applies to three hypostases, and thus get
> three different logics. How do you know in advance that one of them
> will not throw some light on the qualia problem? Try to answer this
> without begging the question.
> 
> Bruno
> 

How do we know that those 3 hypostases exhaust the possibilities for
logics containing true but incommunicable sentences?

I do think Craig has a point here.

-- 


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: In Bruno's Terms

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Oct 2013, at 08:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Maybe this will help. Here are two criticisms of comp, and two  
hypotheses which aim for a more mathematical treatment of PIP  
principles under MSR.


Presumption of repeatability (PR) - By overlooking the possibility  
of absolute uniqueness,


?
0, s(0), ... are unique.


comp must conceive of all events as locally documented stereotypes  
of a Platonic template rather than true originals.


"true original" is too much fuzzy.



This contradicts our intuitions


And?




about the proprietary nature of identity


No, this is confirmed, nit contradicted. The first persons too are  
unique, and non divisible, necessarily so from their perspective.




and would seem to counterfactually predict a very low interest in  
qualities such as individuality and originality,


Gratuitous opportunistic assertion.


and identification with trivial personal preferences. Of course,  
what we see the precise opposite, as all celebrity it propelled by  
some suggestion unrepeatability and the fine tuning of lifestyle  
choices is arguably the most prolific and successful feature of  
consumerism.


That is not argument. Looks like propaganda to me.




Presumption of finite simplicities - Because comp provides  
uniqueness only in the form of the relative scarcity of vastly  
complex numbers, it can be said to allow for the possibility of  
novelty only in one direction; that of more quantity. New qualities,  
by comp, must arise on the event horizons of the UD,


Which is were we live here and now.


yet qualia inherently speaks in a language of rich simplicity  
instead of cumbersome computables.


That is not an argument.



With comp, there is no new 'one', but in reality, every human  
experience is exactly that.


Hypothesis:

Diagonalization of the unique - Because computation lags behind  
experience, no simulation of a brain can catch up to what a natural  
person can be,


?



since the potential for their uniqueness is immeasurable and  
unprecedented. Also, nothing can be copied before it is unique,


?


so PIP flips the presumption of repeatability (PR) so that all  
novelty exists as an absolutely new simplicity as well as a  
relatively new complexity, such that the continuum of novelty  
extends in both directions.


The false dichotomy posed by comp in which we are forced to choose  
between the truth of Church-Turing and the existence of an  
infinitely low level of substitution for human personhood is exposed  
because under PIP, computation is a public repetition of what is  
irreducibly unrepeatable and private. Computation can never get  
ahead of experience, because computation is an a posteriori  
measurement of it.


The computer model of what an athlete will do on the field that is  
based on their past performance will always fail to account for the  
possibility that the next performance will be the first time that  
athlete does something that they never have done before. Natural  
identities are not only self-diagonalizing, natural identity itself  
is self-diagonalization. The emergence of the unique always cheats  
prediction, since all prediction belongs to the measurements of an  
expired world which did not yet contain the next novelty.


?




Pushing UD - My admittedly limited understanding of UDA gives me a  
picture of the UD as a program which pulls the experienced universe  
behind it as it extends the computed realm ahead of local  
appearances. It assumes a priori arithmetic truth which simply 'is'  
which produces the future from a fixed past.


?



All phenomena are built bottom up from generic, interchangeable  
bits. The hypothesis under PIP is that awareness is pushing the UD,  
not being pulled by it. Each new number is the residue of an  
unprecedented experience as it decays from immeasurable private  
qualia into quantifiable public reflections. Every measure requires  
a ruler. Some example which is presented as an index for comparison.  
A "new Michael Jordan". A third world war. The uniqueness comes  
first, and the computability follows - fudging and filling as  
necessary, including ways which could be interpreted as supernatural  
(retrocausational discontinuities, mysterious lucky coincidences,  
etc).


?

Hmm...

You write too well, and that does not help you. It looks like bad  
politics. Your approach avoids the problems by deeming them as not  
solvable at any level. This kills at the start all possibility of  
progressing. *all* your sentences needs a lot of clarification and  
justification.


Bruno






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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 13 October 2013 15:29, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>>> Perform to whose satisfaction? A cadaver can be made to twitch, or
>>> propped up to stand.
>>
>>
>> Perform to the satisfaction of anyone you care to nominate. A committee of
>> humans examine two people who have had a haircut, one from a human and the
>> other from a computer, and try to decide which is which. This is repeated
>> several times. If they can't tell the difference then we say the computer
>> has succeeded in cutting hair as well as a human. Is there any task you
>> think a computer will never be able manage as well as a human in this sort
>> of test?
>
>
> What does performing tasks have to do with anything? We are talking about
> the capacity to feel, experience, and care. If you could replace your hands
> with machines that would do everything your hands could do and quite a bit
> more, but would have no feeling in them at all, would you say that the robot
> hands were just as good to you as human hands? If your tongue could detect
> any chemical in the universe accurately and provide you with precise
> knowledge of it, but never allow you to taste any flavor or feel anything
> with your tongue again, would that be equivalent?

I understand that you don't think computers can have feelings, but I
was asking if if computers can perform all tasks that a human can
perform, or if there are some tasks they just won't be able to do. If
there are, then this suggests a test for consciousness.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The I Concept, Analytically

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Oct 2013, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, October 12, 2013 3:54:29 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/12/2013 12:49 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Yes, but you see, even the food we get from the restaurant, is  
delicious. Why would it be delicious, assuming COMP. How could the  
primary modalities of things be good or bad assuming COMP? I know  
most people here think Craig is a hand waver, but I honestly cannot  
understand how qualia emerge from quantia, including their(meaning,  
my experiences) magically "emerge" from the many quants that  
Bruno's idea seems to require.


Emergence is a description of how we think about our models of the  
world - not something in the world.  So Bruno has a theory in which  
some parts are true but incommunicable.  He identifies these with  
qualia because that is (supposedly) a characteristic of qualia.   
That's actually how all scientific theories work: you hypothesize a  
model, including connections to observations and see if it has  
explanatory and predictive power.


Isn't the the characteristic of "true but incommunicable" math a  
rather thin premise to suggest that the incommunicability of some  
truth = the appearance of flavors, colors, sounds, etc?


"true but incommunicable" applies to three hypostases, and thus get  
three different logics. How do you know in advance that one of them  
will not throw some light on the qualia problem? Try to answer this  
without begging the question.


Bruno





Craig


Brent



On Saturday, October 12, 2013 1:00:38 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/11/2013 9:44 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Sometimes, Bruno, I get the feeling as though you are a chef at a  
restaurant with a wonderful menu, but whenever anyone orders an  
item on it, all you can do is give them exactly the same picture  
of the item they ordered from the menu, but never the real thing!!!
By the way, I do think your restaurant in terms of philosophical  
and intellectual satisfaction is one of the best in town!


Metaphysics is a restaurant where they give you a 30,000 page menu  
and no food.

--- Robert Pirsig

Brent
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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Oct 2013, at 06:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, October 12, 2013 12:27:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Oct 2013, at 09:49, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On Saturday, October 12, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Friday, October 11, 2013 11:32:49 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:


On Saturday, October 12, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Friday, October 11, 2013 5:37:52 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:


On Oct 11, 2013, at 8:19 PM, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:





On Thursday, October 10, 2013 8:58:30 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On 9 October 2013 05:25, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303492504579115310362925246.html


> A lot of what I am always talking about is in there...computers  
don't
> understand produce because they have no aesthetic sensibility. A  
mechanical
> description of a function is not the same thing as participating  
in an

> experience.

This is effectively a test for consciousness: if the entity can
perform the type of task you postulate requires aesthetic  
sensibility,

it must have aesthetic sensibility.


Not at all. That's exactly the opposite of what I am saying. The  
failure of digital mechanism to interface with aesthetic presence  
is not testable unless you yourself become a digital mechanism.  
There can never be a test of aesthetic sensibility because testing  
is by definition anesthetic. To test is to measure into a system  
of universal representation. Measurement is the removal of  
presence for the purpose of distribution as symbol. I can draw a  
picture of a robot correctly identifying a vegetable, but that  
doesn't mean that the drawing of the robot is doing anything. I  
can make a movie of the robot cartoon, or a sculpture, or an  
animated sculpture that has a sensor for iodine or magnesium which  
can be correlated to a higher probability of a particular  
vegetable, but that doesn't change anything at all. There is still  
no robot except in our experience and our expectations of its  
experience. The robot is not even a zombie, it is a puppet playing  
back recordings of our thoughts in a clever way.


OK, so it would prove nothing to you if the supermarket computers  
did a better job than the checkout chicks. Why then did you cite  
this article?


Because the article is consistent with my view that there is a  
fundamental difference between quantitative tasks and aesthetic  
awareness. If there were no difference, then I would expect that  
the problems that supermarket computers would have would not be  
related to its unconsciousness, but to unreliability or even  
willfulness developing. Why isn't the story "Automated cashiers  
have begun throwing temper tantrums at some locations which are  
contagious to certain smart phones that now become upset in  
sympathy...we had anticipated this, but not so soon, yadda yadda"?  
I think it's pretty clear why. For the same reason that all  
machines will always fall short of authentic personality and  
sensitivity.


So you would just say that computers lack authentic personality and  
sensitivity, no matter what they did.


Beyond question, yes. I wouldn't just say it, I would bet my life  
on it, because I understand it completely.


Do you believe that computers can perform any task a human can  
perform? If not, what is an example of a relatively simple task  
that a computer could never perform?


I thought Craig just made clear that computers might performs as  
well as humans, and that even in that case, he will not attribute  
sense and aesthetic to them.
This was already clear with my sun-in-law (who got an artificial  
brain, and who can't enjoy a good meal at his restaurant).


He call them puppets, but he believes in philosophical zombies.

I don't believe in philosophical zombies. I use puppet because a  
puppet implies an absence of conscious presence, which is an  
ordinary condition of macrocosmic objects as we seem them, because  
the sensation associated with them belongs to a distant frame  
(microcosm).


All object are conscious?



A zombie is supernatural because rather than the seeming absence of  
presence (normal), they imply the presence of absence,


?



which is unnatural and cannot exist. There can be no undead, only  
the unlive.



He is coherent, but invalid in his debunking of comp. He debunks  
only the 19th century conception of machines (controllable physical  
beings).


I think that I also debunk the 21st century reality of machines. The  
promissory mechanism offered by comp is purely a theoretical  
futurism -


Not at all. It is here and now. I have already interview such machines.



which I would not object to at all, but in this case, it so happens  
that it is not applicable to the universe that we actually live in.


Let me say it simply: I don't believe in universe(s). I have few doubt  
that there is a physical reality, but I have no evidence it comes from  
something like an (aristotelian) universe.




It is 

Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On Sunday, 13 October 2013, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Oct 2013, at 09:49, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Because the article is consistent with my view that there is a  
fundamental difference between quantitative tasks and aesthetic  
awareness. If there were no difference, then I would expect that  
the problems that supermarket computers would have would not be  
related to its unconsciousness, but to unreliability or even  
willfulness developing. Why isn't the story "Automated cashiers  
have begun throwing temper tantrums at some locations which are  
contagious to certain smart phones that now become upset in  
sympathy...we had anticipated this, but not so soon, yadda yadda"?  
I think it's pretty clear why. For the same reason that all  
machines will always fall short of authentic personality and  
sensitivity.


So you would just say that computers lack authentic personality and  
sensitivity, no matter what they did.


Beyond question, yes. I wouldn't just say it, I would bet my life  
on it, because I understand it completely.


Do you believe that computers can perform any task a human can  
perform? If not, what is an example of a relatively simple task  
that a computer could never perform?


I thought Craig just made clear that computers might performs as  
well as humans, and that even in that case, he will not attribute  
sense and aesthetic to them.
This was already clear with my sun-in-law (who got an artificial  
brain, and who can't enjoy a good meal at his restaurant).


He call them puppets, but he believes in philosophical zombies.

He is coherent, but invalid in his debunking of comp. He debunks  
only the 19th century conception of machines (controllable physical  
beings).


Craig is neither clear


I can accept that.



nor coherent.


I was just saying that he was coherent in his belief in some primary  
nature, and his disbelief in computationalism.





For example, he suggests above that the inadequacies of supermarket  
computers are due to their unconsciousness, which implies that there  
are some things an unconscious entity cannot do, and therefore there  
cannot be philosophical zombies. However, he says (I think - he is  
not clear) there is no test to tell the computers apart from the  
humans. This is inconsistent.


OK. I think he is incoherent by opportunism. he want to use result in  
the literature, but those result concerns behavior. There he is indeed  
often incoherent, as you illustrate well.


You are confronted with the task of explaining to someone incoherent  
that he is incoherent: a very difficult if not impossible task.  
Incoherent people can answer all questions very easily. Eventually he  
will (and already has) just refer to its own understanding. Like "I  
know that ...", etc.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a  
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement,  
or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some  
branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not  
see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable  
subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).


And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule  
derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for  
example, Chris Fuchs?


If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel "experiences",  
(then), disappearing, please do.


I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you  
refer to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?


The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be  
contagious on the observer"








When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes  
the "quantum wave" describes only psychological states, but they  
concern still a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including  
the many self-multiplication.


There is no "many" in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the  
personal subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.


I notice the plural of "futures". Are those not "many"?
I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the  
superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is  
not a problem for me. there are still "many".








It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.

We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)  
physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.


Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what  
is the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic  
form of solipsism, and it can generate some strong "don't ask"  
imperative.


You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.


I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.



Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally  
comfortable with not explaining everything.


Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using.

Bruno





Brent
"I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system  
is a lack of integrity."

--- Fredrick Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols"

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Re: Note to Russell Standish

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Oct 2013, at 21:28, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno, I can't help it: I liked Richard's interjection. Arithmetics  
(even in your fundamental vision - I suppose) needs 'human logic' to  
propagate etc.,


Yes. Like galaxies needs human teacher in astronomy to propagate in  
human children knowledge or beliefs.




no matter how the elements may be thought to pre-date humans. Does a  
stone, or the 'root' of a plant, a microbe, or a cloud follow  
(evolve? apply?) your math- equations? I mean: not in their  
'existence', but AS MATH (observing numbers, i.e. arithmetix)?


Does a stone obey to the gravitation law before the humans appears?



Did you mean that (by UD) did humans got generated into logically  
thinking creatures? Where in Nature would you detect (whole-sale)  
arithmetics?


Nature is an emerging pattern from arithmetic seen from inside by  
(relative) numbers, in case comp is correct.




(Meaning: beyond the 1, a pair, ~many etc. generalities? Prime  
numbers??)
That would make us UNIQUE - not just a level in Nature. (Children of  
God -

the Creator?)


No, because we are ourselves emergent pattern of the additive- 
multiplicative number structure.


Bruno




JM


On Sat, Oct 12, 2013 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 12 Oct 2013, at 15:24, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Human intelligence seems to be required for comp to work.


?

We need only Löbian-Turing intelligence which exists as a  
consequence of elementary arithmetic.


The theory is:

identity logic +
((K, x), y) = x
(((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z))

Where do you see an assumption about humans?

Well, a best know but equivalent (with respecto the Everything goal)  
theory is:


classical logic +
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Again, where do you see an assumption about human.

Human are used in UDA, of course, to explain comp to humans, but the  
result is that the theories above, although quite incomplete with  
respect to the arithmetical truth, are complete for the ontology  
needed to explain physics and consciousness.
We need only a good dreamer, and the discovery of the relative  
universal numbers (in the sense of Post, Turing, Church, etc.)  
provides an excellent candidate, especially with comp, of course.






So how did evolution happen before humans existed?


The UD generates the human before evolution, but their statistical  
weight is probably not relevant. Eventually the UD has to emulate  
some very long histories and the humans get a deeper and deeper past.


Bruno






On Sat, Oct 12, 2013 at 3:39 AM, freqflyer07281972 > wrote:

Dear Russell,

Back in 2012, you made the following claims regarding my general  
attack on Bruno's

"mathematical reductionism":

1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness

2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich  
and
complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle),  
but

not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."

3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity is
one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler
initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation,
that evolution is the only creative (or information generating)
process.

4) Evolutionary processes work with populations, so automatically,
you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and
consequently inter-subjectivity.


My question to you, as basic as it might seem, is... have you  
changed your

mind about any of these presuppositions?

Yours forever in the multiverse,
Dan

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Re: Note to Russell Standish

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Oct 2013, at 19:40, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: We need only a good dreamer, and the discovery of the  
relative universal numbers


Richard: Who other than humans can do that?


? The answer is the Löbian number (the so called sufficiently rich  
theories, which exists in arithmetic, in a variety of relative way).


We might argue that only humans can build huge telescopes and see the  
far away galaxies, but this would not imply that those galaxies needs  
humans to exist.






Bruno: The UD generates the human before evolution. Do you claim  
that humans change the past?


No, because the physical past is an indexical which eventually subsume  
the whole UD*, and thus some part of arithmetic.






Richard: So humans do not evolve. Sounds like creationism.


I was just referring to the fact that the UD will generates a program  
emulating you, before generating the complete emulation of the  
possible quantum vacuum fluctuation leading to the actual story of the  
universe.


Evolution, is, most plausibly a statistically exact account of our  
local history.




So far you have not dismissed my inference that comp needs humans to  
work.


Some alien can also bet that they have a brain, and that it is Turing  
emulable. In arithmetic there are infinities of numbers which,  
relatively to some universal number arrives at that same conclusion  
(and in this case we know that they are correct).
Do you think we need humans for having the truth that 1+1=2? If you  
agree we don't, then we don't humans to have the larger set of löbian  
numbers and their dreams, from which physical realities emerges.




IMO if true, that in itself dismisses comp as contrary to  
established science.


We need humans only to explain comp to humans, but comp is basically  
the idea that machine/numbers can manifest consciousness in their  
relevant relative environment/computations.


Bruno



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