Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 19 Feb 2014, at 18:51, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, February 19, 2014 12:46:40 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Feb 2014, at 17:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18/02/2014, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: I think if I say consciousness is an epiphenomenon of biochemistry I should also say that life is. And should you not go on to say that biochemistry is an epiphenomenon of physics and physics is an epiphenomenon of well, something that is not itself epiphenomenal, I guess? The way you formulate the problem seems to tend to the conclusion that any and all appearances should strictly be considered an epiphenomenon of something more fundamental that cannot possibly be encountered directly. And, moreover, there is no entailment that any such something be straightforwardly isomorphic with any of those appearances. I'm not saying that this view is incoherent, by the way, but do you agree that something like this is entailed by what you say? I'm making a case for reductionism. If biochemistry necessarily leads to consciousness Biochemistry or anything Turing universal. then I don't think this is any different to the situation where biochemistry necessarily leads to life. Ah! But then life is clearly a 3p phenomenon, so why make consciousness an epiphenomenon? Of course consciousness is only a 1p phenomenon, but it can make sense (indeed as a sense maker or receptor). Unless my view is right and 1p consciousness is only a subset of p consciousness, and 3p is the (alienated, reduced) difference between p and 1p. This is accounted for my the difference between 1p and 1p plural. Physics is 1p-plural, but 1p-plural is also a local 3p. Your p-consciousness seems like élan vital, and if you use it to distinguish carbon creature from silicon creature, it seems like ad hoc élan vital to satisfy a sort of racist prejudice (based in the 3p shapes that you considered no more as alienated here). Bruno Craig Bruno If we imagine that the biochemistry is all there but no consciousness that would be like imagining that the biochemistry is all there but no life (which Craig can apparently do). -- Stathis Papaioannou -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Wikipedia-size maths proof too big for humans to check
On 19 Feb 2014, at 19:13, Telmo Menezes wrote: If no human can check a proof of a theorem, does it really count as mathematics? That's the intriguing question raised by the latest computer-assisted proof. It is as large as the entire content of Wikipedia, making it unlikely that will ever be checked by a human being. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn25068-wikipediasize-maths-proof-too-big-for-humans-to-check.html#.UwTytEJdV69 This reminded me of something that Bruno mentions frequently: the idea of deriving physics from the natural numbers, addition and multiplication. Should we expect wikipedia-size proofs (or worse)? Er well, people seems not quite aware of this, but the physics has already been derived, and it would take 50 pages, when done starting from zero, but it is shortened a lot by using Solovay's completeness theorems (on G and G*). Of course, the physics obtained might seem a bit abstract, and it remains many open problems. But the equation are there, and it remains only mathematical problems to solve. It would be astonishing that the first interview of the machine gives the correct physics, but up to now, it fits, and this at a place where many logicians predicted it would be miraculous that it would not be contradicted immediately. That's why they push me to publish and do a PhD thesis. Of course, comp can be false, and this might only be a bad lucky coincidence. This we can always say for any theory. I am actually explaining to Liz and others, how the physics is extracted (UDA explains already how physics needs to be redefine, and AUDA just do the math of that redefinition). I have to explain a bit of modal logic before, just to be able to give the enunciation of Solovay theorems. Best, Bruno Cheers, Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 19 Feb 2014, at 19:36, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the argument that you can't meet your doppelganger, So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic in doing so. No can do. You translate don't use the doppelganger argument by don't use logic. That is a rhetorical trick (I will count them). or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability calculus meaningless. If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed be meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does. But Bruno isn't trying to explain why Quantum Mechanics works, Sorry but this is exactly what I don and what UDA shows that we have to do. This is a second rhetorical trick. You attribute some goal to the opponent, which in fact is not existing. that's already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self, Not at all. Again the same error. I define precisely the 3p self and the 1p self using a simple definition in UDA, and using the Dx = xx method in AUDA. Computer science has already elucidate the notion of 3p self, and the theaetetus idea, which works in arithmetic thanks to incompleteness, is used in the math part to (re)define the 1p self, and this works remarkably well. We do find a non nameable knower verifying all the axioms fro consciousness in Brouwer theory, for example. and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with that; You repeat the rhetorical trick. The question is precisely on prediction and notably 1p prediction of 1p experiences. as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason. Exact at alst, and this is quite enough to say that you will survive in both city in the 3-1 view, but as comp makes it impossible to be simulatneously in two places at once, you know that you, in the 1p- sense, and using the definition just given in your quote, entails that in Helsinki, you cannot make a prediction more definite than W or M. And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent. According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever interacting with your doppelganger Assuming QM totally linear. If tomorrow we discover that QM is slightly non linear, we can meet the QM doppelganger. I doubt this is possible, but the point is logical, given that in comp we do not assume QM at all. Your argument is invalid. and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no problem; It has never caused any problem, as I distinguish clearly the 1 and 3 pronouns. Ecah time you have shown a problem, it is your wording which introduced an ambiguity only. but in Bruno's thought experiment you can interact with your doppelganger and that turns personal pronouns, which work fine in our everyday world without duplicating chambers, into a chaotic mass of ASCII characters with no clear meaning. This is just insane. To study what happens, you need only to keep in mind that the prediction is on the 1p, asked to the H-guy, and the confirmation of the prediction is asked to each individual copies. I use W and M, so that the doppelganger does not meet for some period of time, and distintinguish unambiguously the city in which they have been individually reconstituted. The chaotic mess of ASCII character exists only in your imagination, due to the failure of taking the given 1-3 nuances into account, as we have shown many times to you. All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain I loved Blade Runner too, one of the few things we can agree on. Blade runner is good, yes. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 19 Feb 2014, at 20:53, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the argument that you can't meet your doppelganger, So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic in doing so. No can do. That's not what I was asking, John seems to dialog with himself. He very often do that trick. I was asking that if you use your meet doppelganger argument, == read the next quote. or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability calculus meaningless. If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed be meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does. The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI case you accept probability calculus. Yes. But Bruno isn't trying to explain why Quantum Mechanics works, that's already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self, He does not, and certainly does not at step 3. Step 3 is just a simple step toward this. but I know we have to come back on this. and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works He does, that's what is showing FPI (which *of course* also exists under MWI) or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with that; It has all to do with that because it is specifically the question asked. yes. there is no problem with the notion of self in which I use simple definitions in UDA, and the standard notions in AUDA. Computer science, thanks to the Dx = xx method, excels on the notion of self. That is why I decide to be mathematicians, instead of biologist. as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason. As I have said before and before and before, that's not the question. It is the not the question, and in fact, here John gives the minimal correct account of the 1p-identity (memory, diary content) which leads directly to the FPI. And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent. They are from the probability POV. Exactly. John fails completely in showing how possibly meeting the doppelganger has any relevance on the probabilities. It is a well known rhetorical trick. Introduce something non relevant and accusing someone to not take it into account, without showing the relevance. But it is just plainly obvious that it cannot be relevant without adding magic connections between the doppelgangers, which are already sufficiently well separated in Moscow and Washington. According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever interacting with your doppelganger And what does it have to do with frequency and probability ? and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no problem; They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question asked. So I'll try one last time, and will try à la Jesse, with simple yes/no questions and explanation from your part. So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument that what we will do (duplicating you) is possible. So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a room with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be duplicated (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two times in two exactly identical room), the only difference in each room is that one has the left door open and one has the right door open... what do *you* expect to see when you'll press the button ? 1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No 2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you* expect to see both event simultaneously ? If you answer 'Yes' at the 2nd question, do you think you can put a probability to see the left door opened (or reversely the right door) ? Yes/No If you answer 'No', why can't you assign a probability to see each door ? As I see it, there are 2 possible events, so each as a 0.5 probability of occurence... If not why not ? Why in the MWI case, you accept the 0.5 probability ? If you follow strictly the protocol, MWI and this experiment are equivalent, and are not about your personal identity... If you answer both No to the 1st and 2nd question, please develop what you will expect to see when you press the button ? The worst is that we can imagine easily the type of rhetoric that John will use to evade the questioning. Bruno Quentin but in Bruno's
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 19 Feb 2014, at 21:53, John Mikes wrote: Another silly question: Bruno and List: how on Earth can we talk aboput TOE? (unless we restrict it to the presently knowable inventory of physically identified E). Why should we restrict ourselves to the knowable inventory of physically identified E. We can also assume some principle (like comp) and derive from its both the structure of the knowable and the unknowable. We might be unable to know if the principle is true, but that is the case will *all* theories. And the principle might appear falsifiable, so we might learn in the process. - TOE was so different in the past and assumably: will be so diffeent later on. Perhaps, or not. In my opinion the Pythagorean and Plotinian were close to the correct TOE, but then, after the closure of Plato Academy, we have come back to obscurantism and violence in the fundamental metaphysical or theological science. Your mind (or: being conscious?) begs the question of a live 1p. So the thermostat falls out. Define live? I define life by self-reproduction. Cigarette are alive, for example. They have a complex cycle of reproduction. Easy: a contraption with (your) consciousness (circular). (I presume you do not identify 'conscious' with the biological brain-activity?) I don't define consciousness. I assume we all know what it is. Only zombie does not know. Consciousness is what make pleasure 1p- pleasant, and pain 1p-unpleasant. Then again YOUR (Bruno) 'conscousness' is different from my vocabulary's entry (response to relations). MIND is believed to be an active, functional unit with memory and decisionmaking, I agree. but with comp, you can define mind by the 1p related to the machine. in my belief(?) nonlocal 3p non local? That is assuming a lot of complication. I tend to disbelieve that 3p non-locality can make sense. I like Einstein when he defines insanity by the belief in 3p non-locality. and our brain(functions) is the tool we use to apply MIND(function?) to ourselves (and the 'Everything' if you like). Absolutely. We agree here. Bruno On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 4:43 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). JM: What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE? BM: My consciousness. - It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. JM:Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not duplicate. It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable within today's inventory. BM: No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). ( Bruno, M Y consciousness is (my) 'response to relations' whatever show up. It includes lots of unknown items (with unknowable qualia?) beside the ones handled WITHIN my brain. So I do not trust the 'doctor's digital contraption to include ME - (total) - only my temporary brainfunction, i.e. knowledge-base of mine as of today. Your true theology is a mystery to me. How true can it be? Devising our physical world is a human effort due to the temporary status of our inventory. To think beyond it is sci-fi (cf my ref. to Liz about Jack Cohen and J. Stewart's Collapse of Chaos and Figment of Reality - the Zarathustrans). John M On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE? My consciousness. It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable within today's inventory. No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really know) and package it into 'mentality'. . I have no squalm against
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 19 Feb 2014, at 22:50, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Feb 2014, at 17:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18/02/2014, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: I think if I say consciousness is an epiphenomenon of biochemistry I should also say that life is. And should you not go on to say that biochemistry is an epiphenomenon of physics and physics is an epiphenomenon of well, something that is not itself epiphenomenal, I guess? The way you formulate the problem seems to tend to the conclusion that any and all appearances should strictly be considered an epiphenomenon of something more fundamental that cannot possibly be encountered directly. And, moreover, there is no entailment that any such something be straightforwardly isomorphic with any of those appearances. I'm not saying that this view is incoherent, by the way, but do you agree that something like this is entailed by what you say? I'm making a case for reductionism. If biochemistry necessarily leads to consciousness Biochemistry or anything Turing universal. then I don't think this is any different to the situation where biochemistry necessarily leads to life. Ah! But then life is clearly a 3p phenomenon, so why make consciousness an epiphenomenon? Of course consciousness is only a 1p phenomenon, but it can make sense (indeed as a sense maker or receptor). Bruno Maybe the 1p/3p distinction is a failure of imagination. What could that mean? The diary of the M-guy and of the W-guy do differentiate, and are different from the memory and records of the observer which does not enter in the telebox. I am not sure what sense to give to your statement. Likewise, the math 3p ([]p) and 1p ([]p p) *does* obey different logic. And, yes, it is due to a failure of the machine to see that they are equivalent (as seen by G*), but it is not a failure of imagination, it is a requirement to remain consistent. It's obvious that the phenomenon of life is no more than the biochemistry, Actually I disagree with this. Life can be implemented in biochemistry, but is much more than biochemistry, for the same reason that Deep blue chess abilities is much more than the logic of NAND used to implement it. Life and chess ability can be implemented by other means, and *are* implemented by infinitely many other means in arithmetic. Eventually we face the problem of justifying biochemistry, and matter appearance, from a statistic on arithmetic, and this can explain where matter appearance come from. To say hat life is no more than biochemistry makes local sense, but if taken too much seriously, you will condemn yourself to say that biochemistry is no more than addition and multiplication of integers, or is no more than reduction and application of combinators. but maybe if we could simulate the biochemistry in our heads we would intuitively see any 1p aspect it has as well. Are you not doing Searle error? A person can simulate the chinese person does not entail that the person can experience the chinese person feeling. Robinson Arithmetic can simulate Peano Arithmetic, but this does not entail that Robinson Arithmetic can prove what Peano Arithmetic can prove. And all the points of view will depend on proof, not on computation or imitation, even if they play a big role. I hope I will be able to clarify this important point in the modal thread. You seem to push reductionism too far (too far with respect to computationalism). Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 20 Feb 2014, at 05:06, meekerdb wrote: On 2/18/2014 7:10 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 02:34:57PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 19/02/2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: Which ones? How can unobserved facts exist? You can observe their consequences without observing the facts. E.g. millions of people have observed that the sun shines without understanding or knowing about nuclear fusion. Yes - but obviously nuclear fusion is an observed fact (somewhere in the Multiverse). No, it's part of our best theory of the world. But maybe you mean how can facts exist that are not grounded in observation at some point? Yes, that is what I mean. But Brent talked about unobserved facts, so we'd better let him elaborate what he means. Facts are often inferred, as who murdered Nicole Simpson, it's hard to even say what constitutes a fact without invoking a theory. So sure there are, on the same theory that allows us to infer facts, facts that are not observed. I think we're talking past one another. You're talking about ontology as the ur-stuff that's really real. I'm talking about the stuff that is assumed as fundamental in a theory. That's how I define primitive. It is the intended meaning of the primitive object assumed in the theory. That definition allows some unimportant convention. For example, we might say, with PA, that the primitive object is just 0. And consider that s(0), s(s(0)), ... are already emergent. Of we can assume all numbers, and then say that the notion of prime number is emergent, or we can accept as primitive all notions definable by a first order arithmetical formula, in which case '[]p itself is primitive, and yet []p p is still emergent. By default I prefer to see 0, s(0), etc. as primitive, and the rest as emergent. But note this: physicalism or materialism usually assumes some UR matter as primitive in this sense. In that case, the two notions referred in your paragraph coincide. I am not sure what Russell means by a fact needing to be observed to be a fact. 111...1 (very long but definite) is either prime or not, despite I will, plausibly, never been able to know or observe which it is. Even with comp, there might be entire physical universe without any self-aware or conscious observers in them, and despite the fact that matter arise from machine self-reference in arithmetic. Those of course will be non accessible to us, but might play some indirect role in the FPI statistics. Our own computations can be very mong and eep with martge period of non presence of observers. It is hard to say a priori. I might also miss what Russell intends to mean. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 20 Feb 2014, at 06:59, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 08:53:23PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: On 2/19/2014 8:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 08:06:31PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: I think we're talking past one another. You're talking about ontology as the ur-stuff that's really real. I'm talking about the stuff that is assumed as fundamental in a theory. Brent Yes, to me an ontology is a statement about what's really real. The ur-stuff, as you say. I've never heard of ontology as something that any theory has. That's how Quine uses it. OK. But Quine is very naive on this. He does not doubt about physicalism. Physicalism makes UR stuff into primitive (have to be assumed) stuff. I am close to Quine philosophy, but of course a long way from his physicalism. OK - yet another thing to clarify when I get around to the MGA revisited paper, as the step 8 argument definitely refers to the former meaning of ontology, and not the latter (Quine version). This should be put in context, as MGA assumes things for a reductio ad absurdum. In the physicalist context I identify primitive matter with matter that we have to assume, or matter which we assume to be non derivable from simpler non material things, like number relations and self-reference. Bruno Sigh. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 20 Feb 2014, at 02:57, chris peck wrote: Hi Quentin They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question asked. So I'll try one last time, and will try à la Jesse, with simple yes/no questions and explanation from your part. So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument that what we will do (duplicating you) is possible. Quentin, that pronouns pose problems in the thoughtexperiment is clearly illustrated by your need to distinguish between 'you' and '*you*'. So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a room with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be duplicated (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two times in two exactly identical room), Can you clarify. you say that when '*you*' is duplicated, 'you' is destroyed and 'you' is recreated two times. Is 'you' who gets destroyed and recreated '*you*' who presses the button? or someone different? Afterall, you explicitly introduced the distinction to make things clear, so Im not sure if you just made a typo. if not where did 'you' come from? I feel like huge violence is being done to the pronoun you here. I say you so that you can distinguish between you, 'you' and '*you*'. All are now in play. when I say you rather than 'you' or '*you*' I will be meaning you. When you are in Helsinki, before pushing the button, we describe everything from outside, so it is the non ambiguous 3-you, or 1-you, which are co-extensional before the duplication. Then, as we know there is a duplication of the 3-you, and as we know the copies will feel to be unique in only one city, by comp, we are forced to realize that from their 1p perspective, one outcome among both will be selected, and that by contradicting any specific prediction. the only difference in each room is that one has the left door open and one has the right door open... what do *you* expect to see when you'll press the button ? I thought '*you*' presses the button, but here you say : ' when you'll press the button' Did '*you*' or 'you' press the button? ie. did you mean 'when *you*'ll press the button'? Just before. Even one week before, if you want. look at this bit: 1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No 2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you* expect to see both event simultaneously ? In the questions 1 and 2 you are talking about what 'you' expect to see, but then in the follow on question you ask about what '*you*' expect to see. Are you asking about 'you', 'you' or '*you*' or all three? It seems to me that 'you' can expect to see one room or the other, Exclusive or. this shows that you grasped the FPI. You can move on step 4. and 'you' (the other 'you', there being two 'you' and one '*you*') can expect to see one room or the other, and '*you*' can expect to see both if 'you','you' and '*you*' bear the identity relation that is stipulated by the yes doctor assumption, you see? So from the FPI, you can infer which you notion was involved. It is asked to the 1-you in Helsinki, coexistencial with the 3-you in Helsinki. And the question bears on which next 1-you H-you will feel to be, or equivalently, which city you will feel to be reconstituted in. The 3-you == 1-you in Helsinki knows that there will be only one, from his future pov. Note that in predicting to see both, '*you*' is not predicting 'you' or 'you' will see both. The result of the probability calculus ... actually, lets not call it calculus because its just a way of bigging up what infact is very little ... Sure. It is a simple and obvious step. yet, if you proceed, you will grasp that it entails we cannot know in which computations we are, among an infinity existing (in arithmetic), and that physics will be recovered by that innocent probability calculus. the result of the probability sum that '*you*' conducts is different from the result of the sum 'you' and 'you' conduct, because '*you*' is going to be duplicated but neither 'you' nor 'you' are. Exactly. This is a point on which I insist in many post to Clark but that he simply fail to take into account. The 1p is simply not duplicable *from his 1p perspective. Like in Everett, we can't feel the split. '*you*' has to bear in mind that both 'you' and 'you' are '*you*' in some sense. Exactly. 'you' and 'you' don't need to worry about that. And infact to get any other result than zero from the sum, this identity relation between '*you*', 'you' and 'you' must stand, which brings us to another point: as Clark points out, preservation of identity is central to this thought experiment. OK. But only the notion of identity already clarified when
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 20 February 2014 09:58, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Feb 2014, at 05:06, meekerdb wrote: On 2/18/2014 7:10 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 02:34:57PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 19/02/2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: Which ones? How can unobserved facts exist? You can observe their consequences without observing the facts. E.g. millions of people have observed that the sun shines without understanding or knowing about nuclear fusion. Yes - but obviously nuclear fusion is an observed fact (somewhere in the Multiverse). No, it's part of our best theory of the world. But maybe you mean how can facts exist that are not grounded in observation at some point? Yes, that is what I mean. But Brent talked about unobserved facts, so we'd better let him elaborate what he means. Facts are often inferred, as who murdered Nicole Simpson, it's hard to even say what constitutes a fact without invoking a theory. So sure there are, on the same theory that allows us to infer facts, facts that are not observed. I think we're talking past one another. You're talking about ontology as the ur-stuff that's really real. I'm talking about the stuff that is assumed as fundamental in a theory. That's how I define primitive. It is the intended meaning of the primitive object assumed in the theory. I suspect that this is one of the things that leads to the constant confusion in the discussions with Craig. He seems to feel that the ontological postulate can only be the really real thing as distinct to a primitive theoretical object. And the consequence is, in effect, that he thinks he can dismiss both the theoretical object and anything derivable from it as not really real from the outset. I don't (really) know how to resolve this confusion in our discussions. That definition allows some unimportant convention. For example, we might say, with PA, that the primitive object is just 0. And consider that s(0), s(s(0)), ... are already emergent. Of we can assume all numbers, and then say that the notion of prime number is emergent, or we can accept as primitive all notions definable by a first order arithmetical formula, in which case '[]p itself is primitive, and yet []p p is still emergent. By default I prefer to see 0, s(0), etc. as primitive, and the rest as emergent. But note this: physicalism or materialism usually assumes some UR matter as primitive in this sense. In that case, the two notions referred in your paragraph coincide. I am not sure what Russell means by a fact needing to be observed to be a fact. 111...1 (very long but definite) is either prime or not, despite I will, plausibly, never been able to know or observe which it is. Even with comp, there might be entire physical universe without any self-aware or conscious observers in them, and despite the fact that matter arise from machine self-reference in arithmetic. I would like to ask something here that is stimulated by my recent discussions with Craig and Stathis. It is clear that any viable theory must be able to resolve what would otherwise lead to paradoxes of reference and and indeed of causal relations. If matter, or its appearance, manifests to us as a consequence of self-reference wherein lies the *specific* justification, in the comp theory, for our ability to refer to and apparently interact with those appearances? It occurs to me here that the usual understanding of CTM is that thought is computed by the brain, which I note you avoid by stipulating rather that consciousness will be invariant for a digital substitution. One who studies the UDA might be tempted to suppose that the reversal of physics-machine psychology necessitated to retain CTM also salvages the notion that thought is computed by the brain, but this move doesn't seem capable of avoiding the paradoxes. Rather, when you say that if we are a machine we cannot know which machine we are this seems to imply that a brain, or any computations it might be supposed to instantiate, cannot directly represent the machine that we are. Rather we find expression through the FPI filtration of the statistics of computations that are capable of reconciling both the appearance of matter, including brains and bodies, and our causal and ostensive relations with it. IOW the brain and the body, as you sometimes say, are the means by which the person is able to manifest with respect to a particular reality. So I guess my question, assuming I haven't got hold of the wrong end of the stick entirely, is which aspects of the hypostases address these extraordinarily complex and subtle referential issues? snip Our own computations can be very mong and eep with martge period of non presence of observers. I have to say that these are some of your most delightful unintentional malapropisms - they read almost like Edward Lear :) I think I can intuit what mong and eep may be (actually they sound
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Liz, On 20 Feb 2014, at 08:49, LizR wrote: On 19 February 2014 23:00, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Liz, Others, I was waiting for you to answer the last questions to proceed. Any problem? Well, nothing apart from going on a mini holiday with an old friend for the last 4 days. Sadly she hasn't changed over the last 30 years, so it wasn't much fun, but she'd flown all the way from the UK to NZ so I couldn't really refuse. Actually my brain has died after all the nonsense I have been through over the last few days. It may take a little while to come back. I will try to answer this post properly, maybe tomorrow. Thanks for letting me know. Take your time, as the fun is what matter the most. Feel free to do meta-remarks, or to suggest that I change the pedagogy, or that I sum up better where we are going. You have no problem in understanding logical (modal or not) semantics, but I know, from older posts, that you do have some weakness in deducibility. deducing is usually not an easy task, but you will never been obliged to deduce, only to understand what is a deduction, why they can be automated, and checked mechanically, and above all, what are their relation with semantics. Then we will be able to begin the interview of the Löbian machine in arithmetic, and the derivation of physics. that's the real thing, and eventually you will see that modal logic is what make possible to be quite short on this. Take the time needed for your brain to recover. Thanks for telling me, so that I avoid any paranoia, like did I say something impolite or what Kind regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 20 Feb 2014, at 11:55, David Nyman wrote: On 20 February 2014 09:58, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Feb 2014, at 05:06, meekerdb wrote: On 2/18/2014 7:10 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 02:34:57PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 19/02/2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: Which ones? How can unobserved facts exist? You can observe their consequences without observing the facts. E.g. millions of people have observed that the sun shines without understanding or knowing about nuclear fusion. Yes - but obviously nuclear fusion is an observed fact (somewhere in the Multiverse). No, it's part of our best theory of the world. But maybe you mean how can facts exist that are not grounded in observation at some point? Yes, that is what I mean. But Brent talked about unobserved facts, so we'd better let him elaborate what he means. Facts are often inferred, as who murdered Nicole Simpson, it's hard to even say what constitutes a fact without invoking a theory. So sure there are, on the same theory that allows us to infer facts, facts that are not observed. I think we're talking past one another. You're talking about ontology as the ur-stuff that's really real. I'm talking about the stuff that is assumed as fundamental in a theory. That's how I define primitive. It is the intended meaning of the primitive object assumed in the theory. I suspect that this is one of the things that leads to the constant confusion in the discussions with Craig. He seems to feel that the ontological postulate can only be the really real thing as distinct to a primitive theoretical object. And the consequence is, in effect, that he thinks he can dismiss both the theoretical object and anything derivable from it as not really real from the outset. I don't (really) know how to resolve this confusion in our discussions. Yes. Craig confuses regularly a theory of qualia with a qualia. He would dismiss E = mc^2 by arguing that you cannot boil water with m, c and 2 and multiplication, and exponentiation. Of course, in comp, the artificial brain is not a metaphor, and so Craig's confusion here does not simplify the matter in the extreme. here S4Grz and the X logics, should help him, if he did the work, as the confusion is not possible. S4grz literally talk about something which cannot be captured in any 3p way, except by God. Unfortunately he uses his prejudicial theory to avoid that kind of work at the start. That definition allows some unimportant convention. For example, we might say, with PA, that the primitive object is just 0. And consider that s(0), s(s(0)), ... are already emergent. Of we can assume all numbers, and then say that the notion of prime number is emergent, or we can accept as primitive all notions definable by a first order arithmetical formula, in which case '[]p itself is primitive, and yet []p p is still emergent. By default I prefer to see 0, s(0), etc. as primitive, and the rest as emergent. But note this: physicalism or materialism usually assumes some UR matter as primitive in this sense. In that case, the two notions referred in your paragraph coincide. I am not sure what Russell means by a fact needing to be observed to be a fact. 111...1 (very long but definite) is either prime or not, despite I will, plausibly, never been able to know or observe which it is. Even with comp, there might be entire physical universe without any self-aware or conscious observers in them, and despite the fact that matter arise from machine self-reference in arithmetic. I would like to ask something here that is stimulated by my recent discussions with Craig and Stathis. It is clear that any viable theory must be able to resolve what would otherwise lead to paradoxes of reference and and indeed of causal relations. OK. If matter, or its appearance, manifests to us as a consequence of self-reference wherein lies the *specific* justification, in the comp theory, for our ability to refer to and apparently interact with those appearances? It occurs to me here that the usual understanding of CTM is that thought is computed by the brain, which I note you avoid by stipulating rather that consciousness will be invariant for a digital substitution. One who studies the UDA might be tempted to suppose that the reversal of physics-machine psychology necessitated to retain CTM also salvages the notion that thought is computed by the brain, but this move doesn't seem capable of avoiding the paradoxes. Rather, when you say that if we are a machine we cannot know which machine we are this seems to imply that a brain, or any computations it might be supposed to instantiate, cannot directly represent the machine that we are. Actually, it can, at the relevant local level. But we cannot justify this. That's why we need some irredcatibla act of faith in front of the
Re: Wikipedia-size maths proof too big for humans to check
On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 9:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: But is it possible to write program checking the proof (not finding it) ? I guess it must be, because a proof, is just following rules... so it should be possible to devise two independent different proof checker... if these proof checker are smaller than the proof itself (and they should be), then it will be easier to prove that they are correct, and if they agree on the proof itself, we should really be confident that the proof is correct, even if not checked manually by a human. Hi Quentin, Yeah, I agree with you. I think the premise of the article is silly (that proofs made by machines don't count as math). I meet similar resistance with some work I do using genetic programming to discover network growth models. Even hardheaded scientists seem to have this almost mystical attachment to the human mind, as if it has some magical property that gives hypothesis or proofs more credence. Cheers, Telmo. Regards, Quentin 2014-02-19 19:13 GMT+01:00 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com: If no human can check a proof of a theorem, does it really count as mathematics? That's the intriguing question raised by the latest computer-assisted proof. It is as large as the entire content of Wikipedia, making it unlikely that will ever be checked by a human being. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn25068-wikipediasize-maths-proof-too-big-for-humans-to-check.html#.UwTytEJdV69 This reminded me of something that Bruno mentions frequently: the idea of deriving physics from the natural numbers, addition and multiplication. Should we expect wikipedia-size proofs (or worse)? Cheers, Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Wikipedia-size maths proof too big for humans to check
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Feb 2014, at 19:13, Telmo Menezes wrote: If no human can check a proof of a theorem, does it really count as mathematics? That's the intriguing question raised by the latest computer-assisted proof. It is as large as the entire content of Wikipedia, making it unlikely that will ever be checked by a human being. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn25068-wikipediasize-maths-proof-too-big-for-humans-to-check.html#.UwTytEJdV69 This reminded me of something that Bruno mentions frequently: the idea of deriving physics from the natural numbers, addition and multiplication. Should we expect wikipedia-size proofs (or worse)? Hi Bruno, Er well, people seems not quite aware of this, but the physics has already been derived, and it would take 50 pages, when done starting from zero, but it is shortened a lot by using Solovay's completeness theorems (on G and G*). Of course, the physics obtained might seem a bit abstract, and it remains many open problems. But the equation are there, and it remains only mathematical problems to solve. It would be astonishing that the first interview of the machine gives the correct physics, but up to now, it fits, and this at a place where many logicians predicted it would be miraculous that it would not be contradicted immediately. I have to admit, I think I follow the main ideas you've been explaining on the mailing list, but here you just sound mysterious... Have you published any of this? That's why they push me to publish and do a PhD thesis. Of course, comp can be false, and this might only be a bad lucky coincidence. This we can always say for any theory. I am actually explaining to Liz and others, how the physics is extracted (UDA explains already how physics needs to be redefine, and AUDA just do the math of that redefinition). I have to explain a bit of modal logic before, just to be able to give the enunciation of Solovay theorems. Ok, I've been silently following your modal logical class as time permits. Thanks for that, by the way! Telmo. Best, Bruno Cheers, Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
Liz, More notes from the asylum? What is your mouth for LIz? If you claim it's not for communicating with external reality perhaps it needn't be wagged so much? Edgar On Wednesday, February 19, 2014 10:21:16 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 20 February 2014 08:31, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:wrote: Ghibbsa and Russell, There can be absolutely no doubt of an external reality independent of humans. As I said, all of common sense, and all of science makes this fundamental assumption. We have eyes, and other sense organs, so we can sense that external reality. Do you deny we have eyes? If not, then what are they for? According to this argument, the white rabbit with a pocket watch I dreamt about last night is part of an external reality. And eyes aren't for anything, at least not according to evolutionary theory. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
The Road to MSR: Philosophy of Mind Flowchart
http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/flowchartfinal.jpg http://multisenserealism.com/2014/02/20/philosophy-of-mind-flowchart/ The idea here is that if we want to take the full spectrum of phenomena into account, we have to either begin with a reductionist realism and work upward, or a holistic idealism and work downward. When we suppose that consciousness is a phenomenon that arises out of unconscious phenomena, we are saying that mechanism, through some act of emergence (generally by complexity), the mechanism in question (generally physical or computational mechanism) becomes enchanted with itself. In this case, as David Chalmers famously points out, there would have to be some threshold beyond which it would be impossible to tell the difference between a real person and a machine which acts just like a real person (a philosophical zombie). Finding this unacceptable, he suggests instead some variety of panpsychism should be explored, including perhaps, what I would call a promiscuous or ‘leaky’ panpsychism in which devices such as thermostats would have to be considered aware in some sense. Finding both of these alternatives unacceptable, I suggest that we move over to the right side and begin with a downward facing ideal absolute. For the spiritually inclined, this could be called by any number of theistic names, however, it can also be conceived of equally well in completely non-spiritual, atheistic terms. When we suppose that awareness itself is inescapable and inevitable in all possible or theoretical universes, we are saying that through some divergence or illusion, awareness takes on a temporary solid appearance. In MSR, I suggest that this is a more plausible option than brute emergence from nothingness…modulated constraint within everythingness.* Rather than positing an appeal to future scientific understanding to explain the emergence of aesthetic realism from mechanism, the divergence of mechanism from total awareness can be made palatable through a nested modulation of insensitivity. Intentionally partitioning intention itself so that it appears unintentional given a certain amount of insensitivity. This could be viewed either in the religious sense of ‘God’s divine plan is not visible to us’, or in a more conservative sense of ‘Shit happens coincidentally, but coincidental shit also happens to be meaningful from some perspective’. If anyone is interested in what the crazy pink cone and all that is, I can explain in more detail, but briefly, if we take the MSR road from disenchanted idealism (the conservative ‘Shit happens’ option), then instead of the Chalmers dilemma of zombies vs leaky panpsychism, we get a continuum in which local sense is selectively blinded to the sense of non-human experiences, through a combination of frame rate mismatch (time scale difference cause entropy and local sense approximates) and distance (literal spatial scale difference, as well as experiential unfamiliarity).** The other ten dollar words there, ‘tessellated monism’ and ‘eigenmetric diffraction’ both refer to the juxtaposition of sensitivity and insensitivity, through which a kind of metabolism of accumulating significance (solitrophy) in the face of fading sense (entropy) and fading motive (gravity). *I call this cosmology the Sole Entropy Well hypothesis and it has to do with reversing Boltzmann’s solution to Loschmidt’s paradox so that entropy is a bottomless absolute, like c, in which local ranges of entropy and extropy stretch and multiply in a fractal-like reproduction. **I call this aspect of MSR Eigenmorphism, which has to do with things appearing to be more doll-like and less familiar from a distance. This makes, for example, the presence of atoms and solar systems in our experience more similar to each other than either of them seems like a tree or a cell. The limits of our perception coincide with the simplicity of ontology, and they are, in a sense, the same thing (given eigenmorphism). As a rule of thumb, distance = the significance of insignficance. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Cool Cuttlefish footage
On Thursday, February 20, 2014 9:00:25 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Feb 2014, at 19:54, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Wednesday, February 19, 2014 4:42:57 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Feb 2014, at 23:53, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, February 16, 2014 10:23:27 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Feb 2014, at 23:17, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 11:08:07AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 20:47, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: I find cuttlefish fascinating. They are social, relatively intelligent, can communicate, able to grasp and manipulate things. It seems like they were all set to become the dominant large life form (instead of humans). A mystery: they don't live a long time. Usually intelligence go with a rather long life, but cuttlefishes live one or two years. Yes - I find that surprising also. Hard for them to dominate, also, as they have few protections, no shelter, and are edible for many predators, including humans. One could say the same about early home 2 millions years ago. The invention of the throwable spear changed all that. Yes. They survive by hiding and fooling. They can hunt with hypnosis (as you can see in the video). I feel privileged that these wonderful animals (giant cuttlefish) can be found less than 200 metres from my house. I have often observed them when snorkling or scuba diving. You are privileged indeed. I had to laugh at the Texan prof's comment that they are as least as smart as fish. That is weird indeed. fish are not known to be particularly clever. I do have a habit of underestimating fish intelligence, Me too ... but IMHO their intelligence equals that of some mammals or birds, and clearly outclasses fish. I agree. I think I mentioned the anecdote which convinced me they exhibit a second order theory of the mind, which may well be sufficient for consciousness. Which I call self-consciousness, and I think this is already Löbianitty. I do think that all animals have the first order consciousness, they can feel pain, and find it unpleasant, but can't reflect on it, nor assess I feel pain. they still can react appropriately. I m not sure, but it fits better with the whole picture. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Allowing that brain science is a lot nearer the end of the beginning than the beginning of the end, all the functional evidence suggests humans and animals are much more alike in their experiences toward the lower levels of instinct, in its broader sense to include emotion and pain, anger, fear, bluff. It makes sense we experience that level of things pretty much the same. I think so. I might even think that this is common for all Löbian machines (or quasi-Löbian). Those machines have elementary beliefs and some induction beliefs (in the Peano sense). Neither animals nor humans are able to 'remember' agonizing pain. Really? Have you references? I procrastinate videos on interview of tortured people. I really don't know, and I am astonished of your saying. Brutal amputation can lead to pathological pain hypermnesy and deformed type of pain. I'm not clear this point has need for references in that sense. There isn't actually a necessary contradiction between the above two comments mine and yours. It's biology. The structures are always much the same. The distinctions being which level or ends between simplicity and increasingly more complex structures that by repeats grow out of simplicity. I mentioned a simple reality of the type of messaging that pain falls in with. It's a signal, not a cognition. Not every kind of message has access to centres like memory. How would a memory of an existential signalling be captured? No need for referencing. If you think you can recall pain, then do it now, feel the pain existentially. Let me know how it goes, I'll accept your testimony. You won't be able to do it though. Not generically. I think I can. Even up to the point of not being able to stop the pain quickly. I can't help myself to feel that this is not good to practice. And it can hurt badly, even if it is less vivid, and ask for some works, than when in a pain is related to some real wounds. Since sometimes I have realized that human differs a lot in imagination abilities. Mine seems to be strong as I don't know any qualia which I cannot instantiate by the will, including smell. Many people cannot apparently instantiate smells through imagination. Of course this is 1p, and I don't ask you to believe any of this, but I answered your question. I do believe it. You are obviously a remarkable person, there's lots of indication around that. Also, it isn't unprecedented, anything you are saying.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week. But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed. and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees neither Washington nor Moscow. So, this is my first post to you, Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is. despite I remember having sent other post? The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to Mr. I remember the exact same thing. If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died, If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words death and he are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it should be noted that invented languages make communication with others difficult, just look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep philosophical discussions are difficult enough as they are even if conducted in a mutually agreed upon language, so more obstacles to understanding are not needed. and then comp is false. That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you call comp is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything. Then the word died doesn't mean much. In AUDA this is a confusion You have forgotten IHA. between []p and []p t. How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p t especially if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertible to help them get around town? you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic discovery Not to me it wouldn't! I don't care if comp is true or false because I don't believe comp is worth a bucket of warm spit. Pronouns does not introduce any problem, Personal pronouns like all pronouns are just a sort of shorthand that were invented to save time and for no other reason, they generally cause no trouble as long as the referent is clear. And yet it is a fact that Bruno Marchal is simply incapable of expressing ideas about the unique nature of personal identity without using personal pronouns. Why? Could it be because by using them and the assumption of uniqueness of identity they engender it makes it much easier to prove the uniqueness of identity? After all it is well known that proofs become somewhat easier to write if Bruno Marchal just assumes what Bruno Marchal is trying to prove. And if ideas are unclear the language should be too; a bad idea clearly expressed is easy to identify as bad, but a bad idea expressed in murky language can sometimes sound impressive if it's murky enough. when you agree that after the duplication we are both copies in the 3p view Yes. And you once said something abut the future 1p of the Helsinki man, well that description would fit 2 people because both remember being the Helsinki man. and only one of them, in the 1p view. Only one? So which one is the phony, the Washington Man or the Moscow Man? I am happy you think it is a world class discovery, but let us be modest, it is a reminder that the mind-body problem is not solved, and that science has not decided between Aristotle and Plato. The discovery (the thesis) is in the math part I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as yours. Not very. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2014 7:15 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating On 20 February 2014 00:20, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: They may never have provided any electricity in the first place. I have read, at length, some nuclear engineering papers, concerning accelerator driven reactors, subcritical thorium, and bluntly, they are like fusion reactors, they don't exist. There is research in a couple of places like the UK and Belgium, maybe India and China, but its been over-sold, as we don't have solid working models to evaluate. The closest working reactors would be Canadian CANDU reactors. Taking this attitude, we would never have discovered powered flying machines, or invented agriculture. Assuming the things would work in theory, as far as we know, then we need to at least build a prototype before deciding it can't be done. The MSRE MSBR experimental molten salt reactors operated at Oak Ridge for almost ten years. These were LFTR reactor types, and as far as I know the only LFTR reactors ever actually built. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liquid_fluoride_thorium_reactor -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Wikipedia-size maths proof too big for humans to check
Hi Telmo, On 20 Feb 2014, at 13:40, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Feb 2014, at 19:13, Telmo Menezes wrote: If no human can check a proof of a theorem, does it really count as mathematics? That's the intriguing question raised by the latest computer-assisted proof. It is as large as the entire content of Wikipedia, making it unlikely that will ever be checked by a human being. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn25068-wikipediasize-maths-proof-too-big-for-humans-to-check.html#.UwTytEJdV69 This reminded me of something that Bruno mentions frequently: the idea of deriving physics from the natural numbers, addition and multiplication. Should we expect wikipedia-size proofs (or worse)? Hi Bruno, Er well, people seems not quite aware of this, but the physics has already been derived, and it would take 50 pages, when done starting from zero, but it is shortened a lot by using Solovay's completeness theorems (on G and G*). Of course, the physics obtained might seem a bit abstract, and it remains many open problems. But the equation are there, and it remains only mathematical problems to solve. It would be astonishing that the first interview of the machine gives the correct physics, but up to now, it fits, and this at a place where many logicians predicted it would be miraculous that it would not be contradicted immediately. I have to admit, I think I follow the main ideas you've been explaining on the mailing list, but here you just sound mysterious... Have you published any of this? Yes. In the original long 'belgian version, UDA is just UDP, that is the paradox of the universal dovetailer, and it is just a motivation for the mathematical definition ([]p p), for the mathematicians. The original thesis is mainly AUDA, the translation of UDA in arithmetic. Here the formulation provides the solution, a bit like a differential equation gives its solution(s). Quentin made a genuine point, already done by J.P. Delahaye, that physics is redefined, and that it might have been trivial, only geography, but the whole point is that there is a core non trivial physics, which is natural, as it is the laws on the statistical combinations of *all* computations, below the substitution level. Physics is redefined by universal machine observable, and this can be translated (in platonia, i.e. in arithmetic) by p sigma_1 (p - []p, and []p t). That gives already the quantum tautologies, and the comparison match up to now. That's why they push me to publish and do a PhD thesis. Of course, comp can be false, and this might only be a bad lucky coincidence. This we can always say for any theory. I am actually explaining to Liz and others, how the physics is extracted (UDA explains already how physics needs to be redefine, and AUDA just do the math of that redefinition). I have to explain a bit of modal logic before, just to be able to give the enunciation of Solovay theorems. Ok, I've been silently following your modal logical class as time permits. Thanks for that, by the way! You are welcome, I will try soon to send a long post explaining the main gist of the whole AUDA. It is really consequences of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem (and Löb's theorem, and the Solovay theorems), for machines which are simple enough so that we can know them to be correct, and rich enough (having enough induction power) to know their own turing universality, and be Löbian. Bruno Telmo. Best, Bruno Cheers, Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 2/20/2014 1:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Feb 2014, at 05:06, meekerdb wrote: On 2/18/2014 7:10 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 02:34:57PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 19/02/2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: Which ones? How can unobserved facts exist? You can observe their consequences without observing the facts. E.g. millions of people have observed that the sun shines without understanding or knowing about nuclear fusion. Yes - but obviously nuclear fusion is an observed fact (somewhere in the Multiverse). No, it's part of our best theory of the world. But maybe you mean how can facts exist that are not grounded in observation at some point? Yes, that is what I mean. But Brent talked about unobserved facts, so we'd better let him elaborate what he means. Facts are often inferred, as who murdered Nicole Simpson, it's hard to even say what constitutes a fact without invoking a theory. So sure there are, on the same theory that allows us to infer facts, facts that are not observed. I think we're talking past one another. You're talking about ontology as the ur-stuff that's really real. I'm talking about the stuff that is assumed as fundamental in a theory. That's how I define primitive. It is the intended meaning of the primitive object assumed in the theory. That definition allows some unimportant convention. For example, we might say, with PA, that the primitive object is just 0. And consider that s(0), s(s(0)), ... are already emergent. Of we can assume all numbers, and then say that the notion of prime number is emergent, or we can accept as primitive all notions definable by a first order arithmetical formula, in which case '[]p itself is primitive, and yet []p p is still emergent. By default I prefer to see 0, s(0), etc. as primitive, and the rest as emergent. I would say that the relations and operators, like s() and [], are also part of the ontology. But note this: physicalism or materialism usually assumes some UR matter as primitive in this sense. But this is an example of what you accuse of atheists of doing with respect to God: you defend a view of physics in order to criticize it. Materialist physics doesn't assume any particular ur-stuff and in fact, as Russell points out, doesn't much care what it is. It's just concerned with the relations and dynamics and predictions that come from it. Physicists have hypothetically considered particles, fields, strings, spacetime loops, information, etc as the ur-stuff. Brent In that case, the two notions referred in your paragraph coincide. I am not sure what Russell means by a fact needing to be observed to be a fact. 111...1 (very long but definite) is either prime or not, despite I will, plausibly, never been able to know or observe which it is. Even with comp, there might be entire physical universe without any self-aware or conscious observers in them, and despite the fact that matter arise from machine self-reference in arithmetic. Those of course will be non accessible to us, but might play some indirect role in the FPI statistics. Our own computations can be very mong and eep with martge period of non presence of observers. It is hard to say a priori. I might also miss what Russell intends to mean. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 20 Feb 2014, at 14:36, David Nyman wrote: On 20 February 2014 11:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Feb 2014, at 11:55, David Nyman wrote: snip I think we're talking past one another. You're talking about ontology as the ur-stuff that's really real. I'm talking about the stuff that is assumed as fundamental in a theory. That's how I define primitive. It is the intended meaning of the primitive object assumed in the theory. I suspect that this is one of the things that leads to the constant confusion in the discussions with Craig. He seems to feel that the ontological postulate can only be the really real thing as distinct to a primitive theoretical object. And the consequence is, in effect, that he thinks he can dismiss both the theoretical object and anything derivable from it as not really real from the outset. I don't (really) know how to resolve this confusion in our discussions. Yes. Craig confuses regularly a theory of qualia with a qualia. He would dismiss E = mc^2 by arguing that you cannot boil water with m, c and 2 and multiplication, and exponentiation. Of course, in comp, the artificial brain is not a metaphor, and so Craig's confusion here does not simplify the matter in the extreme. here S4Grz and the X logics, should help him, if he did the work, as the confusion is not possible. S4grz literally talk about something which cannot be captured in any 3p way, except by God. Unfortunately he uses his prejudicial theory to avoid that kind of work at the start. Yup. That definition allows some unimportant convention. For example, we might say, with PA, that the primitive object is just 0. And consider that s(0), s(s(0)), ... are already emergent. Of we can assume all numbers, and then say that the notion of prime number is emergent, or we can accept as primitive all notions definable by a first order arithmetical formula, in which case '[]p itself is primitive, and yet []p p is still emergent. By default I prefer to see 0, s(0), etc. as primitive, and the rest as emergent. But note this: physicalism or materialism usually assumes some UR matter as primitive in this sense. In that case, the two notions referred in your paragraph coincide. I am not sure what Russell means by a fact needing to be observed to be a fact. 111...1 (very long but definite) is either prime or not, despite I will, plausibly, never been able to know or observe which it is. Even with comp, there might be entire physical universe without any self-aware or conscious observers in them, and despite the fact that matter arise from machine self-reference in arithmetic. I would like to ask something here that is stimulated by my recent discussions with Craig and Stathis. It is clear that any viable theory must be able to resolve what would otherwise lead to paradoxes of reference and and indeed of causal relations. OK. If matter, or its appearance, manifests to us as a consequence of self-reference wherein lies the *specific* justification, in the comp theory, for our ability to refer to and apparently interact with those appearances? It occurs to me here that the usual understanding of CTM is that thought is computed by the brain, which I note you avoid by stipulating rather that consciousness will be invariant for a digital substitution. One who studies the UDA might be tempted to suppose that the reversal of physics- machine psychology necessitated to retain CTM also salvages the notion that thought is computed by the brain, but this move doesn't seem capable of avoiding the paradoxes. Rather, when you say that if we are a machine we cannot know which machine we are this seems to imply that a brain, or any computations it might be supposed to instantiate, cannot directly represent the machine that we are. Actually, it can, at the relevant local level. But we cannot justify this. That's why we need some irredcatibla act of faith in front of the doctor. I think. So, very succinctly, are you saying that: 1) Whatever computations are ultimately responsible for emulating the apparent physics of the brain are the same computations that are responsible for emulating the thoughts, feelings etc. that are correlated with that brain. If this works, the primitively material brain appearance is a 1p plural sum on all finite pieces of all computations. This should allow stable geographies. Phase randomization does this in the Everett quantum theory, but it is an open problem with comp. that might seem impossible, but the arithmetical quantization shows at the least that such an idea is consistent (and unavoidable in its []p t sense). 2) These computations are in some sense hidden from us because the brain can only appear to us as a physical object and we can never be certain of the level at which that object instantiates the relevant computations. Is that
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Hi ghibbsa, On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:19, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014 2:59:50 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Bruno, You've said somewhere in this thread that by logic comp cannot be incomplete because it's a religious position. Hmm... OK. No doubt you have your reasons for seeing things this way. But, it doesn't change anything, that you have declared a link in your world view, religious. It is a believe in a technological form of reincarnation, and then related to a form of immortality, with some natural Pythagorean neoplatonist interpretation. It is a religion, with its canonical theology. OK. This means also that you have the right to say no to the doctor, a bit like Jehovah Witness (as we call them here) can (or not, in some country) refuse a sanguine transfusion for their kids. If it's religious, it's religious. You can't have science, science, science, religious, science, science That just makes everything equal to, religious. That is a vast subject, but I think we can handle all questions with the scientific attitude, which consists in putting clear cards on the table, and clear means of verification, testing, etc. Even theology. It is just a bad contingencies that theology has not yet come back to non confessional academies. When you said it, the other guy was trying on his intuition that something is partial or incomplete in comp, and if that's the case, it's a legitimate position to want more evidence before saying yes to the doctor. Yes, but comp predicts that the soul of the machine will ask for an infinity of evidence, and the honest doctor must say, I don't know, it is your choice. In fact such a skeptic appears in the proof of Solovay theorem. There is guy there asking for a proof that he will not access a cul-de-sac world, before buying its accessibility ticket. All follows from the fact that he will just never buy the ticket. And I am not here to defend comp, or even allude that it might be true. I don't know. i just display the consequences. That's a reasonable scientific position if he can say what evidence he wants, and that can be shown to be realistic and resolvable in real time scales by scientific progress. The problem is that there are no evidence at all for non-comp either. I got the comp intuition by reading book of molecular biology, biochemistry, long before reading Gödel. He doesn't have to show where your logic is wrong. It'd be good if he could but he doesn't have to. Not if he can say a standard that is a reasonable scientific expectation for the claims you are making. He has the right to say no. We can give tuns of evidences, be we must warn him that those evidences are not proof. We must encourage him to not brag that he knows that comp is true, in case he uses classical teleportation every day, because, even for him, that is not a proof (although a string 1p evidence). So here's a standard that is reasonable. Show us proto-consciousness in a computer. Show an instance of emergence in a computer system, Show an instance of true evolution in a computer. I think that I describe this, but not at the level you want, but at the level where the physical laws themselves evolve. I show that all Löbian numbers have a rich science and a rich theology. They are conscious, but so different from us, that you have to do some work to trigger the empathy. Also, answer: Let's say, in 20 years a whole new computational paradigm emerges, that totally transforms the hardware and softare paradigm, including totally new technology for hardware based on totally new principles. Let's say that emerges from breakthrough science in brain studies. I Now. Would the reality of that new paradigm be saying no to the doctor? Or, is it impossible that this can ever happen? Is it impossible that the brain and the mysteries of Evolution, have nothing more to tell us, despite us knowing very little about its secrets in empirical terms? In front of a theory you can always speculate on a different theory. I am not sure if I see the point. It looks like you still attribute me some faith in something. I do, but not publicly. I just show the consequence of an hypothesis. You can speculate that Church's thesis is wrong, or that we are non Turing emulable entities, but it is up to you to be a little more constructive. The result can be seen as a non go theorem: you cannot have both materialism and computationalism, but comp provides the means to be tested; so why not look at it. Bruno - these are scientific concerns, and scientific standards. Religion - no problem. If you believe it and you have faith that's all well and good. I never say so. I am a scientist. I just say that if you believe in comp, then there is that reversal Plato/Aristotle, and that it has testable
Re: Cool Cuttlefish footage
On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:58, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014 9:00:25 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Feb 2014, at 19:54, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, February 19, 2014 4:42:57 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Feb 2014, at 23:53, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, February 16, 2014 10:23:27 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Feb 2014, at 23:17, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 11:08:07AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 20:47, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: I find cuttlefish fascinating. They are social, relatively intelligent, can communicate, able to grasp and manipulate things. It seems like they were all set to become the dominant large life form (instead of humans). A mystery: they don't live a long time. Usually intelligence go with a rather long life, but cuttlefishes live one or two years. Yes - I find that surprising also. Hard for them to dominate, also, as they have few protections, no shelter, and are edible for many predators, including humans. One could say the same about early home 2 millions years ago. The invention of the throwable spear changed all that. Yes. They survive by hiding and fooling. They can hunt with hypnosis (as you can see in the video). I feel privileged that these wonderful animals (giant cuttlefish) can be found less than 200 metres from my house. I have often observed them when snorkling or scuba diving. You are privileged indeed. I had to laugh at the Texan prof's comment that they are as least as smart as fish. That is weird indeed. fish are not known to be particularly clever. I do have a habit of underestimating fish intelligence, Me too ... but IMHO their intelligence equals that of some mammals or birds, and clearly outclasses fish. I agree. I think I mentioned the anecdote which convinced me they exhibit a second order theory of the mind, which may well be sufficient for consciousness. Which I call self-consciousness, and I think this is already Löbianitty. I do think that all animals have the first order consciousness, they can feel pain, and find it unpleasant, but can't reflect on it, nor assess I feel pain. they still can react appropriately. I m not sure, but it fits better with the whole picture. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Allowing that brain science is a lot nearer the end of the beginning than the beginning of the end, all the functional evidence suggests humans and animals are much more alike in their experiences toward the lower levels of instinct, in its broader sense to include emotion and pain, anger, fear, bluff. It makes sense we experience that level of things pretty much the same. I think so. I might even think that this is common for all Löbian machines (or quasi-Löbian). Those machines have elementary beliefs and some induction beliefs (in the Peano sense). Neither animals nor humans are able to 'remember' agonizing pain. Really? Have you references? I procrastinate videos on interview of tortured people. I really don't know, and I am astonished of your saying. Brutal amputation can lead to pathological pain hypermnesy and deformed type of pain. I'm not clear this point has need for references in that sense. There isn't actually a necessary contradiction between the above two comments mine and yours. It's biology. The structures are always much the same. The distinctions being which level or ends between simplicity and increasingly more complex structures that by repeats grow out of simplicity. I mentioned a simple reality of the type of messaging that pain falls in with. It's a signal, not a cognition. Not every kind of message has access to centres like memory. How would a memory of an existential signalling be captured? No need for referencing. If you think you can recall pain, then do it now, feel the pain existentially. Let me know how it goes, I'll accept your testimony. You won't be able to do it though. Not generically. I think I can. Even up to the point of not being able to stop the pain quickly. I can't help myself to feel that this is not good to practice. And it can hurt badly, even if it is less vivid, and ask for some works, than when in a pain is related to some real wounds. Since sometimes I have realized that human differs a lot in imagination abilities. Mine seems to be strong as I don't know any qualia which I cannot instantiate by the will, including smell. Many people cannot apparently instantiate smells through imagination. Of course this is 1p, and I don't ask you to believe any of this, but I answered your question. I do believe it. You are obviously a remarkable person, there's lots of indication around that. Also, it isn't unprecedented, anything you are saying. Humanity does seem to produce remarkable individuals. Go to a
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week. But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed. Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we have to interview all the copies. and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees neither Washington nor Moscow. So, this is my first post to you, Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is. On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in the 1p we are one of them. That is what they all say. They have they own permanent atomic memories like WWMWMM. Say. despite I remember having sent other post? The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to Mr. I remember the exact same thing. Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p and comp, we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That is why if the H-guy predicted W v M, all its copies win the bet, and if he predicted W M, all the copies admits this was wrong (even if correct for the 3-1 view, but clearly false from their 1-views). If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died, If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words death and he are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it should be noted that invented languages make communication with others difficult, just look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep philosophical discussions are difficult enough as they are even if conducted in a mutually agreed upon language, so more obstacles to understanding are not needed. You quote and comment yourself! and then comp is false. That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you call comp is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is the quite standard hypothesis that the brain, or whatever responsible for my consciousness manifestation here and now, is Turing emulable. It is not my invention. comp abbreviates computationalism. I show the consequence, and you stop at step 3 for reason that you do not succeed to communicate. We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything. Then the word died doesn't mean much. That was a consequence of your saying. In AUDA this is a confusion You have forgotten IHA. I told you more than five times what AUDA means. Stop joking, and try to be serious. AUDA is the Arithmetical UDA, also called interview of the universal machine in sane04. It is the main part of the thesis in computer science. If you doubt that it means that you do repeat hearsay. between []p and []p t. How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p t especially if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertible to help them get around town? Mocking does not help you. you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic discovery Not to me it wouldn't! I don't care if comp is true or false because I don't believe comp is worth a bucket of warm spit. That contradicts your saying yes to step 0, 1 and 2. Pronouns does not introduce any problem, Personal pronouns like all pronouns are just a sort of shorthand that were invented to save time and for no other reason, they generally cause no trouble as long as the referent is clear. And yet it is a fact that Bruno Marchal is simply incapable of expressing ideas about the unique nature of personal identity without using personal pronouns. I did it, but you are the one caming back with ambiguous pronouns in your refutation. There is no ambiguity at all. Just keep the 1-3 distinction in all the uses. Why? Could it be because by using them and the assumption of uniqueness of identity they engender it makes it much easier to prove the uniqueness of identity? After all it is well known that proofs become somewhat easier to write if Bruno Marchal just assumes what Bruno Marchal is trying to prove. And if ideas are unclear the language should be too; a bad idea clearly expressed is easy to identify as bad, but a bad idea expressed in murky language can sometimes sound impressive if it's murky enough. Stop doing irrelevant meta-remarks to hide your absence of arguments. Focus on your point, if there is one, of move top step 4, if only to get the idea. when you agree that after the duplication we are both copies in the 3p view Yes. And
Re: What are numbers? What is math?
On 21 February 2014 02:13, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Liz, More notes from the asylum? What is your mouth for LIz? If you claim it's not for communicating with external reality perhaps it needn't be wagged so much? I see you're still being rude, unpleasant and stupid. OK, I will confine my communication to people with courtesy and brains from now on. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 21 February 2014 00:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Thanks for telling me, so that I avoid any paranoia, like did I say something impolite or what Never that! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Liz Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be transported :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why? My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : small chance. Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small chance) as far as I am concerned. Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of their own, the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : 1. So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100 On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week. But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed. Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we have to interview all the copies. and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees neither Washington nor Moscow. So, this is my first post to you, Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is. On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in the 1p we are one of them.That is what they all say. They have they own permanent atomic memories like WWMWMM. Say. despite I remember having sent other post? The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to Mr. I remember the exact same thing. Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p and comp, we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That is why if the H-guy predicted W v M, all its copies win the bet, and if he predicted W M, all the copies admits this was wrong (even if correct for the 3-1 view, but clearly false from their 1-views). If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died, If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words death and he are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it should be noted that invented languages make communication with others difficult, just look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep philosophical discussions are difficult enough as they are even if conducted in a mutually agreed upon language, so more obstacles to understanding are not needed. You quote and comment yourself! and then comp is false. That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you call comp is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is the quite standard hypothesis that the brain, or whatever responsible for my consciousness manifestation here and now, is Turing emulable.It is not my invention. comp abbreviates computationalism. I show the consequence, and you stop at step 3 for reason that you do not succeed to communicate. We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything. Then the word died doesn't mean much. That was a consequence of your saying. In AUDA this is a confusion You have forgotten IHA. I told you more than five times what AUDA means. Stop joking, and try to be serious. AUDA is the Arithmetical UDA, also called interview of the universal machine in sane04. It is the main part of the thesis in computer science.If you doubt that it means that you do repeat hearsay. between []p and []p t. How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p t especially if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertible to help them get around town? Mocking does not help you. you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic discovery Not to me it wouldn't! I don't care if comp is true or false because I don't believe comp is worth a
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Bruno By and large you didn't get my response to Quentin and largely the comments you made didn't actually address the comments I was making, or the questions I was asking Quentin. It seems more as if you were addressing comments you hoped I was making but didn't. With respect then I've just passed all that stuff by. I thought this was worth commenting on though: So from the FPI, you can infer which you notion was involved. It is asked to the 1-you in Helsinki, coexistencial with the 3-you in Helsinki. And the question bears on which next 1-you H-you will feel to be, or equivalently, which city you will feel to be reconstituted in. The 3-you == 1-you in Helsinki knows that there will be only one, from his future pov. No, (3-you == 1-you) knows he has 2 future povs. He knows he will feel to be in both Washington and Moscow. How can I make this clear for you that this is a 1-p expectancy? Because I think you have things completely the wrong way around. You say that it takes an act of intellectual and 3-p reasoning to draw the conclusion that I will be in both W and M, and that more naturally from the 1-p perspective I will only expect to see 1 city. I say, no. Before the trip to both M and W I will day dream about walking through the corridors of the white house in Washington AND day dream about walking through the corridors of the Kremlin in moscow. I will imagine meeting and talking to Obama but also dream of meeting and talking to Putin. I'll sit at my work desk planning what I would say to each of them if we actually did meet. At night I wil dream of doing these things and wake up surprised that I am not actually in Moscow and not actually in Washington yet. And these dreams will be as 1-p as any common-all-garden dream. If I stop and think about things, if I intellectualize the matter from a 3-p perspective, then I will realize that my two future selves will be unique and separate and therefore will only see one or the other, but from my current non-duplicated perspective this will seem odd and hard to imagine. when I relax and let my mind wander I will expect to see both and dream of seeing both. So, when you ask me where I will expect to be, of course I will answer that i expect to be in Moscow and Washington. And if you tell me that I will in fact only experience one or the other, I will demand my money back or at least half of it. All the best Chris. From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:48:43 + Hi Liz Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be transported :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why? My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : small chance. Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small chance) as far as I am concerned. Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of their own, the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : 1. So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100 On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week. But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed. Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we have to interview all the copies. and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees neither Washington nor Moscow. So, this is my first post to you, Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is. On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in the 1p we are one of them.That is what they all say. They have they own permanent atomic memories like
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 03:48:43AM +, chris peck wrote: My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : small chance. Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small chance) as far as I am concerned. Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of their own, the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : 1. So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. This contradicts Kolmogorov's 4th axiom of probability, namely that the probability of the certain event = 1. In your probabilities, the probability of the certain event of seeing either solar system A or seeing solar system B, or something else entirely different again ends up being greater than or equal to 2. So maybe you can give meaning to your measure, but it aint probability as we known it. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How does acceleration curve space? Can anyone provide an answer?
On 2/19/2014 10:09 AM, Jesse Mazer wrote: On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 12:42 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: There is no sense in which an observer in an accelerating elevator in the flat spacetime of special relativity could correctly conclude that spacetime has any curvature What you say is true but only according to Einstein's 1905 Special Relativity because that theory says nothing about gravity and only deals with special cases, objects in uniform motion; that's why it's called special. It's true that SR says nothing about gravity, but incorrect that it deals only with objects in uniform motion. Special relativity can handle acceleration just fine too, either by analyzing it in the context of an inertial frame, or by using a non-inertial coordinate system like Rindler coordinates. See for example this section of the Usenet Physics FAQ, hosted on the site of physicist John Baez: http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/Relativity/SR/acceleration.html It is a common misconception that Special Relativity cannot handle accelerating objects or accelerating reference frames. It is claimed that general relativity is required because special relativity only applies to inertial frames. This is not true. Special relativity treats accelerating frames differently from inertial frames but can still deal with them. Accelerating objects can be dealt with without even calling upon accelerating frames. Are you claiming the above is incorrect? If you could never tell experimentally if spacetime was curved or not then the very idea of curved spacetime would become an idea as as useless as the concept of the luminiferous aether. I didn't say in the post you're responding to that you could never tell experimentally if spacetime was curved or not, I said you couldn't tell *if* you were only measuring the laws of physics to the first order, and *if* were only measuring in an infinitesimally small region, both of which are conditions for the equivalence principle to apply (as mentioned in the references I provided at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/xOpw-X9J2MY/wTDTy1Dr7s4J ). I said specifically that the guy in the elevator *could* measure curvature if he wasn't restricted in such ways: In fact the observer inside the elevator should have ways of measuring curvature if he can measure second-order effects, or if the size of the elevator is taken as non-infinitesimal, and in either case he could definitely conclude that spacetime was *not* curved within an elevator accelerating in flat SR spacetime. But you can tell. Pick any 3 points inside that sealed elevator. Place a Laser pointer at each of the 3 points and form a triangle with the light beams. Measure the 3 angles of the triangle in degrees. Add up the 3 measurements. If the sum comes out to be exactly 180 then you know that the spacetime within your sealed elevator is flat. Do you have any reference for the idea that this is a valid way to measure spacetime curvature in general relativity? According to a poster at http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=454705 who I've found to be quite knowledgeable on the subject of GR, To measure actual curvature, rather than 'non inertial motion through spacetime', J.L. Synge has a proof in his book on GR that you need a minimum of 5 points. He then defines an idealized 5 point curvature detector. I don't know how easy it is to get this book, but I don't really want to type in the whole discussion. It is fun though - he even carries it out to producing ideal rods, trying to arrange them in a certain way, and the last one minutely fails to fit if there is actual curvature. Presumably this is referring to the section on p. 408 of Relativity: The General Theory which you can see a brief excerpt of here: http://books.google.com/books?id=CqoNAQAAIAAJfocus=searchwithinvolumeq=detector I would also guess that one of the conditions needed for building a valid curvature detector would be that all the components are in free-fall, though without having that section of the book available I can't verify that this is true for the one suggested by Synge. The guy in an upward accelerating elevator in Minkowski space can measure the difference in clock rate between a clock at the top of the elevator and one at the bottom and infer a gravitational field, i.e. a non-flat metric: ds^2=(1+gz/c^2)dt^2 - dx^2 - dy^2 - dz^2 Or even simpler he can toss one clock up and catch it (so it follows a geodesic for a short time) and compare the interval to a clock he continued to hold. But what the equivalence principle says is that */within a sufficiently small region/* acceleration is indistinguishable from a uniform gravitational field. It doesn't say that acceleration IS a gravitational field. And in fact they are obviously different as soon as
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Russel This contradicts Kolmogorov's 4th axiom of probability, namely that the probability of the certain event = 1. Yes it does doesnt it. But thats ok. Im not convinced Kolmogorov had MWI in view when he dreamt up his axioms and Im too green behind the ears vis a vis probability axioms to know whether it matters much. But that 4th axiom does look like it might need revising. So maybe you can give meaning to your measure, but it aint probability as we known it. sure and thats fine by me. Particularly if these thought experiments are intended as analogies for MWI then I think probability loses meaning from both frog and bird's eye views. In fact, for any TofE where all possibilities are catered for probability is the first casualty. Its the logic of the situation that does violence to the concept of probability not the manner in which the plenitude is realized. What i think is unusual about my position is that I stand fast against uncertainty in frogs as well as birds. Thank goodness there are academics out there like Hilary Graves who think in tune with me, its an unusual position but not a unique one. All the best Chris. Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 16:19:47 +1100 From: li...@hpcoders.com.au To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 03:48:43AM +, chris peck wrote: My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : small chance. Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small chance) as far as I am concerned. Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of their own, the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : 1. So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. This contradicts Kolmogorov's 4th axiom of probability, namely that the probability of the certain event = 1. In your probabilities, the probability of the certain event of seeing either solar system A or seeing solar system B, or something else entirely different again ends up being greater than or equal to 2. So maybe you can give meaning to your measure, but it aint probability as we known it. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 21 Feb 2014, at 05:36, chris peck wrote: Hi Bruno By and large you didn't get my response to Quentin and largely the comments you made didn't actually address the comments I was making, or the questions I was asking Quentin. It seems more as if you were addressing comments you hoped I was making but didn't. With respect then I've just passed all that stuff by. Without specific comment, this looks like wordplay. I thought this was worth commenting on though: So from the FPI, you can infer which you notion was involved. It is asked to the 1-you in Helsinki, coexistencial with the 3-you in Helsinki. And the question bears on which next 1-you H-you will feel to be, or equivalently, which city you will feel to be reconstituted in. The 3-you == 1-you in Helsinki knows that there will be only one, from his future pov. No, (3-you == 1-you) knows he has 2 future povs. He knows he will feel to be in both Washington and Moscow. He knows that, after pushing the button, he will be in both W and M in the third person pov. But he knows about comp, and so he knows that what will actually be the case, is that in the 3-1 view, he will feel to be unique in W and he will feel to be unique in M. But those feeling correspond to incompatible event, and indeed each diary will contain only W or only M, from both 1-view. As the question bears on those 1-views, the answer has to be be: W or M, with an exclusive or. How can I make this clear for you that this is a 1-p expectancy? Because I think you have things completely the wrong way around. You say that it takes an act of intellectual and 3-p reasoning to draw the conclusion that I will be in both W and M, and that more naturally from the 1-p perspective I will only expect to see 1 city. I say, no. Before the trip to both M and W I will day dream about walking through the corridors of the white house in Washington AND day dream about walking through the corridors of the Kremlin in moscow. OK, you can do that. I will imagine meeting and talking to Obama but also dream of meeting and talking to Putin. OK. But unless you ignore comp, you will not daydream that you will meet both Obama and Putin, together. I'll sit at my work desk planning what I would say to each of them if we actually did meet. At night I wil dream of doing these things and wake up surprised that I am not actually in Moscow and not actually in Washington yet. And these dreams will be as 1-p as any common-all-garden dream. If I stop and think about things, if I intellectualize the matter from a 3-p perspective, then I will realize that my two future selves will be unique and separate and therefore will only see one or the other, but from my current non- duplicated perspective this will seem odd and hard to imagine. when I relax and let my mind wander I will expect to see both and dream of seeing both. Not simultaneously. That is the point. Or you are just wrong on computationalism. If you write W and M, you can, in Helsinki, know in advance that both copies will have to admit having been wrong. So, when you ask me where I will expect to be, of course I will answer that i expect to be in Moscow and Washington. So you write W and M in the diary. And after pushing the button, both copies will realize they were wrong, or not answering the question asked. It is very simple to see that the prediction W v M will be verified by both copies. And if you tell me that I will in fact only experience one or the other, I will demand my money back or at least half of it. Then if you predict the spin of an electron that we will both see in some experience that we do together, in the MWI, you should predict that we will see both. We do the experience, and we see spin up. You were wrong and if you bet something on this, you lose. You are just using the pronouns in the ambiguous way of Clark, and like him, just describe the 3-1 views, instead of the 1-1 views asked. Best, Bruno All the best Chris. From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:48:43 + Hi Liz Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be transported :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why? My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, If I know that
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 21 Feb 2014, at 00:30, LizR wrote: On 21 February 2014 00:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Thanks for telling me, so that I avoid any paranoia, like did I say something impolite or what Never that! OK, thanks. Best, Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Ok, then you simply reject probability usage in both scenario... then you're consistent unlike John... but if you reject such usage, that's throwing an axe on MWI explanation... then I can't see how you could still agree with many world interpretation and reject probability, that's not consistent... unless of course, you reject MWI. Quentin 2014-02-21 4:48 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com: Hi Liz *Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be transported :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why?* My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : small chance. Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small chance) as far as I am concerned. Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of their own, the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : 1. So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. All the best Chris. -- From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100 On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week. But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed. Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we have to interview all the copies. and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees neither Washington nor Moscow. So, this is my first post to you, Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is. On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in the 1p we are one of them. That is what they all say. They have they own permanent atomic memories like WWMWMM. Say. despite I remember having sent other post? The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to Mr. I remember the exact same thing. Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p and comp, we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That is why if the H-guy predicted W v M, all its copies win the bet, and if he predicted W M, all the copies admits this was wrong (even if correct for the 3-1 view, but clearly false from their 1-views). If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died, If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words death and he are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it should be noted that invented languages make communication with others difficult, just look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep philosophical discussions are difficult enough as they are even if conducted in a mutually agreed upon language, so more obstacles to understanding are not needed. You quote and comment yourself! and then comp is false. That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you call comp is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is the quite standard hypothesis that the brain, or whatever responsible for my consciousness manifestation here and now, is Turing emulable. It is not my invention. comp abbreviates computationalism. I show the consequence, and you stop at step 3 for reason that you do not succeed to communicate. We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything. Then the word died doesn't mean much. That was a consequence of your saying. In AUDA this is a confusion You have forgotten IHA. I told you more than five times what AUDA means. Stop joking, and try to be serious. AUDA is the Arithmetical UDA, also called interview of the universal machine in sane04. It is the main
