date:20210127

On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 3:42 PM Pierz Newton-John  wrote:

> > On 28 Jan 2021, at 2:49 pm, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> > On 1/27/2021 5:11 PM, Pierz Newton-John wrote:
> >> I’m not saying decoherence is reversible. I’ve corrected myself (or
> accepted your correction) on that point. But my understanding of proposals
> for disconfirming MWI involve extending quantum coherence to larger and
> larger scales. Deutsch has argued that if we can get enough qubits into a
> quantum computation, we’ve effectively “proved” MWI since “where did all
> that information come from?".
> >
> > And Scott Aaronson has pointed out it all had to be in this world in
> order for interference to produce an answer.
> >
> That argument rests on the definition of world as a decohered branch, and
> Deutsch would not accept that definition.

I agree. Deutsch has his own idiosyncratic definition that does not accord
with common usage. The trouble is that the word 'world' has an ordinary,
everyday use, and if you make a technical definition of something that is
quite different from the everyday meaning, but use the same word, you open
yourself to equivocation and invalid arguments.

Deutsch is using a technical definition of 'world' which corresponds to the
notion of a distinct basis for a particular Hilbert space. So, in his
terms, there are separate 'worlds' for every possible basis. In common
usage, the word 'world' is reserved for bases that are singled out by
decoherence as the preferred, stable bases. If you use the word 'world' for
any and  every one of the infinite number of possible bases for any given
Hilbert space, then you have deprived the word of any sensible referent or
meaning. The word 'branch' is likewise unavailable to Deutsch, because it
has a similar everyday meaning to 'world ' in this context. He could use
the term 'Hilbert space basis', but that robs his catch phrase of its
impact : "Quantum computers work because every possible calculation is
performed in some basis of the Hilbert space." Bases in Hilbert space do
not evidently have the same computational resources as other worlds. So
Deutsch's argument rests on an equivocation between the meanings of
'world'. His argument is patently invalid.

I’m not sure if I agree with his argument, but I’m also not necessarily
> convinced by that definition of “world”. I mean, it’s perfectly good as far
> as it goes, but I’m not sure I’m happy with it being marshalled as an
> argument in this way. If there is a world W which contains an electron in
> an up/down superposition, then in the Deutsch picture, and I would say the
> Everett picture in general, that means some observer in W is unaware of
> which world he/she is in: the one where the electron is up or the one where
> it is down. Or rather (and this is Deutsch not Everett), the stack of
> worlds where it is up or the stack where it is down.The measurement leaks
> that information via decoherence, and the worlds diverge irretrievably at
> that point.
>

This is certainly a problem for Deutsch's interpretation of 'world'.
Because there are an infinite number of equivalent sets of basis vectors
available for every Hilbert space, it makes little sense to claim that an
observer is uncertain as to which basis he is in. He could choose any basis
whatsoever. But if he wants his choice to make sense in his lived life, he
would be wise to choose the basis that is singled out by decoherence as
stable against environmental degradation. In other words, he has to rely on
decoherence to solve the basis problem. Deutsch has no way of resolving the
preferred basis problem in his approach since, to him, all bases correspond
to equivalent 'worlds'.

Bruce

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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing




> On 28 Jan 2021, at 2:49 pm, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/27/2021 5:11 PM, Pierz Newton-John wrote:
>> I’m not saying decoherence is reversible. I’ve corrected myself (or accepted 
>> your correction) on that point. But my understanding of proposals for 
>> disconfirming MWI involve extending quantum coherence to larger and larger 
>> scales. Deutsch has argued that if we can get enough qubits into a quantum 
>> computation, we’ve effectively “proved” MWI since “where did all that 
>> information come from?".
> 
> And Scott Aaronson has pointed out it all had to be in this world in order 
> for interference to produce an answer.
> 
That argument rests on the definition of world as a decohered branch, and 
Deutsch would not accept that definition. I’m not sure if I agree with his 
argument, but I’m also not necessarily convinced by that definition of “world”. 
I mean, it’s perfectly good as far as it goes, but I’m not sure I’m happy with 
it being marshalled as an argument in this way. If there is a world W which 
contains an electron in an up/down superposition, then in the Deutsch picture, 
and I would say the Everett picture in general, that means some observer in W 
is unaware of which world he/she is in: the one where the electron is up or the 
one where it is down. Or rather (and this is Deutsch not Everett), the stack of 
worlds where it is up or the stack where it is down.The measurement leaks that 
information via decoherence, and the worlds diverge irretrievably at that point.

> Brent
> 
>> Other proposals similarly involve reversibility at large scales. If QM is 
>> not universal, then at some scale that will prove impossible not merely due 
>> to technological limits, but limits of the laws of physics. If such a limit 
>> were found, that would certainly disconfirm MWI.
> 
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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

2021-01-27 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 1/27/2021 5:11 PM, Pierz Newton-John wrote:
I’m not saying decoherence is reversible. I’ve corrected myself (or 
accepted your correction) on that point. But my understanding of 
proposals for disconfirming MWI involve extending quantum coherence to 
larger and larger scales. Deutsch has argued that if we can get enough 
qubits into a quantum computation, we’ve effectively “proved” MWI 
since “where did all that information come from?".


And Scott Aaronson has pointed out it all had to be in this world in 
order for interference to produce an answer.


Brent

Other proposals similarly involve reversibility at large scales. If QM 
is not universal, then at some scale that will prove impossible not 
merely due to technological limits, but limits of the laws of physics. 
If such a limit were found, that would certainly disconfirm MWI.


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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 12:11 PM Pierz Newton-John 
wrote:

> On 28 Jan 2021, at 12:02 pm, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>
> You can utilize technology to maintain quantum coherence over ever larger
> domains (as in quantum computers), but that domain can never extend to the
> whole universe; not even beyond the laboratory to the wider earth. This is
> not a technological limit -- the limit is in the laws of physics themselves.
>
> This actually has very little to do with the question of whether quantum
> physics is universal or not -- quantum mechanics can be the correct
> theory of everything in the universe, but it would still be the case that
> decoherence is irreversible in principle. This does not bear on the
> question whether Everett is correct or not.
>
>
> I’m not saying decoherence is reversible. I’ve corrected myself (or
> accepted your correction) on that point.
>

Good.

But my understanding of proposals for disconfirming MWI involve extending
> quantum coherence to larger and larger scales.
>

That is mistaken. The scale over which one can maintain quantum coherence
has no bearing on the truth or falsity of MWI.

Deutsch has argued that if we can get enough qubits into a quantum
> computation, we’ve effectively “proved” MWI since “where did all that
> information come from?".
>

Deutsch is simply wrong on this point. I know that he has been arguing that
quantum computers "prove" many worlds, "or else where did all the
computational power come from?". But other quantum computing experts, such
as Aaronson, disagree, and make the obvious point that quantum computers
work by interference, and interference necessarily all happens in this one
world -- separate worlds do not interfere.

Other proposals similarly involve reversibility at large scales. If QM is
> not universal, then at some scale that will prove impossible not merely due
> to technological limits, but limits of the laws of physics. If such a limit
> were found, that would certainly disconfirm MWI.
>

This is very confused. In principle irreversibility of quantum decoherence
occurs at all scales. As soon as some photons or air molecules hit the
laboratory walls from an experiment on any scale, there is irreversible
escape of thermal information to the wider environment, and ultimately to
IR photons out into space. The scale has nothing to do with quantum
universality, and such considerations can never confirm or disconfirm a
quantum interpretation, such as MWI.

Bruce

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Re: Evolution 2.0 Prize - $10 million

2021-01-27 Thread Lawrence Crowell

On Monday, January 18, 2021 at 11:03:38 AM UTC-6 use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:

> Am 18.01.2021 um 01:01 schrieb Lawrence Crowell: 
> > There are molecules that already do this. DNA and polypeptides are 
> > sequences that are in effect codes. 
>
> Yes, this is exactly the point by the prize. The question is to show how 
> something like this could happen spontaneously. 
>
> Evgeny 
>
>
I think it does involve something to do with the contact between the 
quantum and macroscopic world. Quantum mechanics is purely Markovian, in 
that fluctuations do not communicate information that is stored. Biology 
and by extension chemistry in an open thermodynamic setting are 
subMarkovian, which means that memory of the state of a system is possible. 
In some manner this occurs in some einselection of quantum states as large 
N unit of quantum action systems that are stable against environmental 
decoherence.

LC
 

>
> > LC 
> > 
> > On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:28:18 PM UTC-6 use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: 
> > 
> >> "How do you get from chemicals to code? How do you get a code without 
> >> designing one?" 
> >> 
> >> "What You Must Do to Win The Prize 
> >> 
> >> You must arrange for a digital communication system to emerge or 
> >> self-evolve without "cheating." The diagram below describes the system. 
> >> Without explicitly designing the system, your experiment must generate 
> >> an encoder that sends digital code to a decoder. Your system needs to 
> >> transmit at least five bits of information. (In other words it has to 
> be 
> >> able to represent 32 states. The genetic code supports 64.) " 
> >> 
> >> https://www.herox.com/evolution2.0 
> >> 
> > 
>
>

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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing



> On 28 Jan 2021, at 12:02 pm, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 11:47 AM Pierz Newton-John  > wrote:
> On 28 Jan 2021, at 11:32 am, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 11:20 AM Pierz Newton-John > > wrote:
>> On 28 Jan 2021, at 11:03 am, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 10:44 AM smitra >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> FAPP, therefore not well defined at all. Sticking to FAPP you could 
>>> never have discovered Special Relativity, General Relativity, found the 
>>> correct way to resolve Maxwell's Demon paradox, etc. etc.
>>> 
>>> FAPP is well-defined for all practical purposes. That is all that you 
>>> require for special and general relativity, statistical mechanics, and the 
>>> rest of physics. You cannot point me to any physical result that is not 
>>> FAPP -- we have only limited measurement precision, after all. And that is 
>>> good enough for real-world physics.
>>> 
>> Bruno’s point IIUC is that FAPP is OK for the physics you have now, but 
>> possibly not for the next physics. "Irreversible FAPP” means irreversible 
>> today. It’s true that there does come a point with decoherence where the 
>> state is irreversible, but that point is arbitrary and depends on the 
>> technology you have available.
>> 
>> That is not true. Decoherence ultimately involves the emission of IR photons 
>> into outerspace -- through heat dissipated in the atmosphere if no other 
>> way. Such effects are truely irreversible, not just FAPP, because once you 
>> have lost photons to space there is no way to get them back -- you can't 
>> chase after them and turn them around.
>> 
>> The point about decoherence is that the irreversibility is ultimately a 
>> matter of the laws of physics. FAPP is just for laboratory purposes, but in 
>> the wider context, the irreversibility is absolute, not just FAPP.
> 
> That’s true - decoherence by definition means something escaped the 
> experimental boundaries and then it’s game over.  I should have said that 
> where decoherence begins is technologically determined.
> 
> That is not really true. Decoherence begins with the interaction with 
> environmental degrees of freedom. If you limit this interaction 
> technologically, then you might be able to reverse things in particular 
> cases, but that does not really prove anything because, as I have pointed out 
> in the general case, the interaction with the environmentultimately produces 
> heat, and some of that escapes to outer space. You can't travel faster than 
> these IR photons rto turn them round, or harvest them. So the laws of physics 
> themselves, relativity and thermodynamics, mandate that quantum events are in 
> general irreversible.
> 
> You can utilize technology to maintain quantum coherence over ever larger 
> domains (as in quantum computers), but that domain can never extend to the 
> whole universe; not even beyond the laboratory to the wider earth. This is 
> not a technological limit -- the limit is in the laws of physics themselves.
> 
> This actually has very little to do with the question of whether quantum 
> physics is universal or not -- quantum mechanics can be the correct theory of 
> everything in the universe, but it would still be the case that decoherence 
> is irreversible in principle. This does not bear on the question whether 
> Everett is correct or not.

I’m not saying decoherence is reversible. I’ve corrected myself (or accepted 
your correction) on that point. But my understanding of proposals for 
disconfirming MWI involve extending quantum coherence to larger and larger 
scales. Deutsch has argued that if we can get enough qubits into a quantum 
computation, we’ve effectively “proved” MWI since “where did all that 
information come from?". Other proposals similarly involve reversibility at 
large scales. If QM is not universal, then at some scale that will prove 
impossible not merely due to technological limits, but limits of the laws of 
physics. If such a limit were found, that would certainly disconfirm MWI. 

> 
> Bruce
> 
>  
> The point is that the bounds of what is reversible or not depend on what we 
> are  technologically capable of. After all that’s the problem of quantum 
> computers - maintaining larger and larger superpositions in a controlled 
> state. In the future it’s to be hoped that we can extend those bounds to the 
> point where the question of whether QM is universal or not can be resolved. 
> Surely that is a meaningful question and surely the only way to answer it is 
> through something like what I am describing. If we can be confident that QM 
> is universal, then we can get closer to an answer on whether MWI is the right 
> interpretation.
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google 
> Groups "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing



On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 9:20:15 AM UTC-7 Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> On 17 Jan 2021, at 03:03, Pierz Newton-John  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, 17 Jan 2021 at 3:49 am, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
>> *What would be the mechanism or process for other worlds to interact with 
>> each other, that is to interfere with each other? This is the gorilla in 
>> the room that many MWI enthusiasts ignore; awesome speculation with zero 
>> grounding in empirical evidence. Something definitely awry with this pov. 
>> AG*
>
>
> I’m not an “enthusiast”. It’s a physical theory not a football team. If 
> anything I dislike the idea of all those alternative variants of me and my 
> life. If MWI is disproved I’ll be perfectly happy. It’s just that it 
> unfortunately makes more sense in my assessment than any other alternative, 
> so I entertain it as the most likely explanation for the observed data. To 
> say it has zero grounding in empirical data is simply false  - it’s the 
> theory that simply takes the empirical data to its logical conclusion 
> without adding a collapse postulate. The wave function is the whole thing. 
> Asking what the mechanism is for worlds to interfere with one another is 
> the same as asking what the mechanism is for the Schrödinger wave function 
> to interfere with itself. In the dual slit experiment it’s an observed 
> fact. It makes no sense for it to behave that way if we stick to the old 
> view of matter as little hard balls, but there you go. When we talk of 
> “worlds”, it just refers to a ramifying quantum state, and it is in the 
> nature of quantum states to interfere with themselves per the dual slit 
> experiment, even if they become large and complex. Interference ceases when 
> two branches of the universal quantum state diverge far enough that they 
> completely decohere. When you say “what is the mechanism?” that really 
> means “what is the mathematical description?” in physics. Anything else is 
> just imprecise circumlocution like the word “world” in this context. So the 
> mechanism for interference is the Schrödinger equation, which predicts such 
> interference. MWI adds precisely nothing to that mathematical description.
>
>
>
> Yes. To avoid the MWI, the early founders of QM *added* an axiom: the wave 
> collapse postulate. But it introduce a non intelligible dualism with an 
> unknown theory of mind. It makes everything more complicated, for reason of 
> philosophical taste, which is alway dubious. Occam Razor favour the theory 
> with as much axioms as possible.
>
> Especially if one believe in Mechanism. This asks us to believe that 2+2=4 
> & Co., which entails the existence of all computations, with a 
> extraordinary complex redundancy of those computations, implying the 
> existence of a (Lebgues) Measure on their first person limit (the 
> “observer” cannot be aware of the number of steps of the universal 
> dovetailing (which occur in all models of any  theory of arithmetic). So ...
>
> Bruno
>

*Are irrational numbers, other than say PI or e, and possibly a few others, 
computable? AG *

>
>
>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 9:32:49 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 1:23:52 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>
 On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 2:18 pm, Alan Grayson  
 wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, January 15, 2021 at 6:16:25 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>
>> On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 5:56 am, Alan Grayson  
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:36:39 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>
 On Fri, 15 Jan 2021 at 4:01 pm, Alan Grayson  
 wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>
 On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 
 agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 
 agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 
>>> johnk...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 11:47 AM Pierz Newton-John 
wrote:

> On 28 Jan 2021, at 11:32 am, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 11:20 AM Pierz Newton-John 
> wrote:
>
>> On 28 Jan 2021, at 11:03 am, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 10:44 AM smitra  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> FAPP, therefore not well defined at all. Sticking to FAPP you could
>>> never have discovered Special Relativity, General Relativity, found the
>>> correct way to resolve Maxwell's Demon paradox, etc. etc.
>>>
>>
>> FAPP is well-defined for all practical purposes. That is all that you
>> require for special and general relativity, statistical mechanics, and the
>> rest of physics. You cannot point me to any physical result that is not
>> FAPP -- we have only limited measurement precision, after all. And that is
>> good enough for real-world physics.
>>
>> Bruno’s point IIUC is that FAPP is OK for the physics you have now, but
>> possibly not for the next physics. "Irreversible FAPP” means irreversible
>> today. It’s true that there does come a point with decoherence where the
>> state is irreversible, but that point is arbitrary and depends on the
>> technology you have available.
>>
>
> That is not true. Decoherence ultimately involves the emission of IR
> photons into outerspace -- through heat dissipated in the atmosphere if no
> other way. Such effects are truely irreversible, not just FAPP, because
> once you have lost photons to space there is no way to get them back -- you
> can't chase after them and turn them around.
>
> The point about decoherence is that the irreversibility is ultimately a
> matter of the laws of physics. FAPP is just for laboratory purposes, but in
> the wider context, the irreversibility is absolute, not just FAPP.
>
>
> That’s true - decoherence by definition means something escaped the
> experimental boundaries and then it’s game over.  I should have said that
> where decoherence begins is technologically determined.
>

That is not really true. Decoherence begins with the interaction with
environmental degrees of freedom. If you limit this interaction
technologically, then you might be able to reverse things in particular
cases, but that does not really prove anything because, as I have pointed
out in the general case, the interaction with the
environmentultimately produces heat, and some of that escapes to outer
space. You can't travel faster than these IR photons rto turn them round,
or harvest them. So the laws of physics themselves, relativity and
thermodynamics, mandate that quantum events are in general irreversible.

You can utilize technology to maintain quantum coherence over ever larger
domains (as in quantum computers), but that domain can never extend to the
whole universe; not even beyond the laboratory to the wider earth. This is
not a technological limit -- the limit is in the laws of physics themselves.

This actually has very little to do with the question of whether quantum
physics is universal or not -- quantum mechanics can be the correct
theory of everything in the universe, but it would still be the case that
decoherence is irreversible in principle. This does not bear on the
question whether Everett is correct or not.

Bruce

> The point is that the bounds of what is reversible or not depend on what
> we are  technologically capable of. After all that’s the problem of quantum
> computers - maintaining larger and larger superpositions in a controlled
> state. In the future it’s to be hoped that we can extend those bounds to
> the point where the question of whether QM is universal or not can be
> resolved. Surely that is a meaningful question and surely the only way to
> answer it is through something like what I am describing. If we can be
> confident that QM is universal, then we can get closer to an answer on
> whether MWI is the right interpretation.
>

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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing



> On 28 Jan 2021, at 11:32 am, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 11:20 AM Pierz Newton-John  > wrote:
> On 28 Jan 2021, at 11:03 am, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 10:44 AM smitra > > wrote:
>> 
>> FAPP, therefore not well defined at all. Sticking to FAPP you could 
>> never have discovered Special Relativity, General Relativity, found the 
>> correct way to resolve Maxwell's Demon paradox, etc. etc.
>> 
>> FAPP is well-defined for all practical purposes. That is all that you 
>> require for special and general relativity, statistical mechanics, and the 
>> rest of physics. You cannot point me to any physical result that is not FAPP 
>> -- we have only limited measurement precision, after all. And that is good 
>> enough for real-world physics.
>> 
> Bruno’s point IIUC is that FAPP is OK for the physics you have now, but 
> possibly not for the next physics. "Irreversible FAPP” means irreversible 
> today. It’s true that there does come a point with decoherence where the 
> state is irreversible, but that point is arbitrary and depends on the 
> technology you have available.
> 
> That is not true. Decoherence ultimately involves the emission of IR photons 
> into outerspace -- through heat dissipated in the atmosphere if no other way. 
> Such effects are truely irreversible, not just FAPP, because once you have 
> lost photons to space there is no way to get them back -- you can't chase 
> after them and turn them around.
> 
> The point about decoherence is that the irreversibility is ultimately a 
> matter of the laws of physics. FAPP is just for laboratory purposes, but in 
> the wider context, the irreversibility is absolute, not just FAPP.

That’s true - decoherence by definition means something escaped the 
experimental boundaries and then it’s game over.  I should have said that where 
decoherence begins is technologically determined. The point is that the bounds 
of what is reversible or not depend on what we are  technologically capable of. 
After all that’s the problem of quantum computers - maintaining larger and 
larger superpositions in a controlled state. In the future it’s to be hoped 
that we can extend those bounds to the point where the question of whether QM 
is universal or not can be resolved. Surely that is a meaningful question and 
surely the only way to answer it is through something like what I am 
describing. If we can be confident that QM is universal, then we can get closer 
to an answer on whether MWI is the right interpretation.
> 
> 
> Proposals for testing MWI involve extending that point further and further. 
> If you can reverse a quantum state that has evolved to macroscopic 
> complexity, you can get interference and you’re on your way to showing that 
> QM is indeed universal, and that MWI may be the best theory. FAPP is just 
> giving up on testing, say, the Frauchiger-Renner experiment, which may prove 
> to be tomorrow's equivalent of testing Bell’s theorem - not possible when the 
> theorem was created, but possible later on.
> 
> I think you have failed to understand the physics underlying FAPP. It is not 
> just a matter of technology. FAPP is for laboratory convenience, but 
> ultimately, the irreversibility is built into the laws of physics.
> 
> Bruce
> 
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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 11:20 AM Pierz Newton-John 
wrote:

> On 28 Jan 2021, at 11:03 am, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 10:44 AM smitra  wrote:
>
>>
>> FAPP, therefore not well defined at all. Sticking to FAPP you could
>> never have discovered Special Relativity, General Relativity, found the
>> correct way to resolve Maxwell's Demon paradox, etc. etc.
>>
>
> FAPP is well-defined for all practical purposes. That is all that you
> require for special and general relativity, statistical mechanics, and the
> rest of physics. You cannot point me to any physical result that is not
> FAPP -- we have only limited measurement precision, after all. And that is
> good enough for real-world physics.
>
> Bruno’s point IIUC is that FAPP is OK for the physics you have now, but
> possibly not for the next physics. "Irreversible FAPP” means irreversible
> today. It’s true that there does come a point with decoherence where the
> state is irreversible, but that point is arbitrary and depends on the
> technology you have available.
>

That is not true. Decoherence ultimately involves the emission of IR
photons into outerspace -- through heat dissipated in the atmosphere if no
other way. Such effects are truely irreversible, not just FAPP, because
once you have lost photons to space there is no way to get them back -- you
can't chase after them and turn them around.

The point about decoherence is that the irreversibility is ultimately a
matter of the laws of physics. FAPP is just for laboratory purposes, but in
the wider context, the irreversibility is absolute, not just FAPP.


Proposals for testing MWI involve extending that point further and further.
> If you can reverse a quantum state that has evolved to macroscopic
> complexity, you can get interference and you’re on your way to showing that
> QM is indeed universal, and that MWI may be the best theory. FAPP is just
> giving up on testing, say, the Frauchiger-Renner experiment, which may
> prove to be tomorrow's equivalent of testing Bell’s theorem - not possible
> when the theorem was created, but possible later on.
>

I think you have failed to understand the physics underlying FAPP. It is
not just a matter of technology. FAPP is for laboratory convenience, but
ultimately, the irreversibility is built into the laws of physics.

Bruce

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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

> On 28 Jan 2021, at 11:03 am, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 10:44 AM smitra  > wrote:
> 
> FAPP, therefore not well defined at all. Sticking to FAPP you could 
> never have discovered Special Relativity, General Relativity, found the 
> correct way to resolve Maxwell's Demon paradox, etc. etc.
> 
> FAPP is well-defined for all practical purposes. That is all that you require 
> for special and general relativity, statistical mechanics, and the rest of 
> physics. You cannot point me to any physical result that is not FAPP -- we 
> have only limited measurement precision, after all. And that is good enough 
> for real-world physics.
> 

Bruno’s point IIUC is that FAPP is OK for the physics you have now, but 
possibly not for the next physics. "Irreversible FAPP” means irreversible 
today. It’s true that there does come a point with decoherence where the state 
is irreversible, but that point is arbitrary and depends on the technology you 
have available. Proposals for testing MWI involve extending that point further 
and further. If you can reverse a quantum state that has evolved to macroscopic 
complexity, you can get interference and you’re on your way to showing that QM 
is indeed universal, and that MWI may be the best theory. FAPP is just giving 
up on testing, say, the Frauchiger-Renner experiment, which may prove to be 
tomorrow's equivalent of testing Bell’s theorem - not possible when the theorem 
was created, but possible later on.

> Bruce
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 10:44 AM smitra  wrote:

>
> FAPP, therefore not well defined at all. Sticking to FAPP you could
> never have discovered Special Relativity, General Relativity, found the
> correct way to resolve Maxwell's Demon paradox, etc. etc.
>

FAPP is well-defined for all practical purposes. That is all that you
require for special and general relativity, statistical mechanics, and the
rest of physics. You cannot point me to any physical result that is not
FAPP -- we have only limited measurement precision, after all. And that is
good enough for real-world physics.

Bruce

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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 10:46 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 1/27/2021 3:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 9:51 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 1/27/2021 2:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 3:08 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Also, worlds interfere statistically, by do not interact at all. A term
>>> in a superposition cannot interact with any other terms, but we can make
>>> them interfering, like with the two slits.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Your grasp of the relevant physics is rather tenuous, I'm afraid Bruno.
>> The idea of "worlds interfering statistically without interacting" is just
>> a nonsense.  There can only be interference if there is an interaction. And
>> there certainly is an interaction between the photons on the two possible
>> paths in the two slit experiment. The two paths arrive at the screen with
>> different amplitudes and phases -- if the signs are the same, they add. But
>> if the signs are different they cancel -- partially or completely depending
>> on the relative amplitudes.
>>
>> The trouble is that David Deutsch has really screwed up the understanding
>> of "worlds" for a lot of people. He has talked as though each path in the
>> two slit case is a separate "world", and then has to resort to magic to
>> reproduce the interference. The Everett concept of a "world" is a "relative
>> state", in which an "observer" sees a definite result. This idea was made
>> more precise with the introduction of the idea of decoherence, and
>> generalized entanglement with the environment. If "worlds" are defined as
>> the result of decoherent histories, then Deutsch's confusion should not
>> arise. A "world" is the result of (FAPP irreversible) decoherence. There is
>> no decoherence at the slits in the two slit experiment, so no separate
>> "worlds" are formed. If you induce decoherence by measuring at the slits,
>> then the interference pattern disappears -- you have certainly created a
>> separate "world" for each path, but these can no longer interfere. That is
>> part of the definition of the "worlds" that are created by irreversible
>> decoherence.
>>
>>
>> That's where I think there is still a gap in the theory.  We know that in
>> the C60 double slit experiment the interference is wiped out because
>> sufficiently short wavelength IR photons from the buckyballs record their
>> position in the environment, presumably when they are absorbed in the
>> laboratory walls.  But what would happen if they weren't registered any
>> where.  What if the experiment were in outer space and the IR photons just
>> went off into infinity in a spherically symmetric wavefunction that never
>> "collapsed"?
>>
>
>
> I thought that was answered in one of Zeilinger's delayed choice
> experiments.  The idler photons that carry the 'welcher weg' information do
> not have to be measured or intercepted. As long as they exist anywhere in
> the universe, the interference is destroyed. You have to actually 'quantum
> erase' the 'welcher weg' information they carry in order to restore the
> interference.
>
>
> As I recall, the experiment showed that you could erase the welcher weg
> information *after *the Young's slits photons were already recorded,  but
> there was no test of not registering them at all...which is understandably
> hard to arrange.  That's why I had to postulate an experiment in outer
> space.  I suppose you could interpret the experiment as saying welcher weg
> photons flying off into space will be registered somewhere sometime and
> certainly won't have their information erased and so the experiment shows
> that the interference pattern would be wiped out.  But it's not actually
> true that the idler photons will necessarily be registered somewhere
> sometime.  We see photons from the CMB.   So photons can just get
> redshifted so far that they no longer carry the necessary information.
>

I am not so sure that they didn't test the possibility of not registering
the welcher weg photons at all. Calibration runs in which these photons are
not detected always lead to the loss of interference. Photons interact only
weakly with each other and with the atmosphere (and open space). That is
why photons are useful for these experiments -- they don't lose coherence
all that easily. So sending them out the window aimed at the sky is
effectively to not ever detect them. The reddening due to the expansion of
the universe does not destroy the information -- radio waves can still be
polarized/detected or whatever.

Bruce

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Re: Evolution 2.0 Prize - $10 million

2021-01-27 Thread smitra

People working in this field wrongly think that a primitive form of 
biology can work with only simple chemical compounds and that you can 
extend biology this way to the very beginning. This idea has been 
rigorously disproved theoretically and also the lack of experimental and 
observational evidence for a more primitive biology demonstrates this. 
Why are people pursuing this if it doesn't work? This is because of the 
argument that that sufficiently early in the universe there were only 
simple molecules and it is (wrongly) thought that the only way one can 
get to very large and complex organic molecules is via biological 
processes.


Saibal


On 21-01-2021 00:52, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

For Chemistry, specifically biochemistry, we still cannot after 70
years(?) go beyond the Stanley Miller-Harold Urey experiment to see if
the can run a chemical process that starts with elements and leads to
even simple life. I am not asserting religion here, but what have we
missed? This is worse than nuclear fusion's time-lag, or Waiting for
Godot.

-Original Message-
From: smitra 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wed, Jan 20, 2021 12:32 am
Subject: Re: Evolution 2.0 Prize - $10 million

That's an interesting paper! Note that the theoretical physicist Paul
Davies is the one who took the initiative to set up this prize and he
is
strong skeptic against all current approaches in prebiotic chemistry.
I've read the work of his research group (Paul Davies and Sara
Walker),
their no-go arguments are quite strong, but they don't propose
solutions
that I find all that attractive. That led me to do my own work in this

field.

Saibal

On 19-01-2021 18:01, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

I do not know if you have seen this paper:

Molecular Codes in Biological and Chemical Reaction Networks


https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0054694


They claim that in random chemical networks one can find some

semantic:


"High semantic capacity was found in the studied biochemical systems
and in random reaction networks where the number of second order
reactions is twice the number of species."

I guess that they should apply for the prize.

Evgeny

Am 19.01.2021 um 00:58 schrieb smitra:

On 18-01-2021 18:03, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Am 18.01.2021 um 01:01 schrieb Lawrence Crowell:

There are molecules that already do this. DNA and polypeptides

are

sequences that are in effect codes.


Yes, this is exactly the point by the prize. The question is to

show

how something like this could happen spontaneously.

Evgeny



It requires violating local thermodynamic equilibrium. I'm working

on

an article and a few presentations for upcoming conferences where I



explain this in detail. This then proves that none of the current
models for prebiotic chemistry can explain the origin of life. A
viable scenario is to get to a large random organic structure

forged

in an interstellar ice grain, where organic molecules at low
temperatures under UV irradiation will only interact with nearest
neighbors. Thermodynamic equilibrium is never reached, the system
moves farther and farther away from this as the reactions under UV
radiation continue. This way one gets to large so-called

percolation

clusters of organic molecules that have a random structure.

Such random organic structures look totally useless to explain the
origin of life, because what you want are the very specific

molecules

that are involved in the biochemical processes in living organisms.



However, the structure of these random organic molecules is such

that

it has interior structures with compartments containing large

random

polymers and random interior surface structures. These can then

serve

as micro-environments within which prebiotic chemistry under normal



local thermodynamic equilibrium conditions can work. With a finite
number of N structures in a compartment one will break symmetries

such

as chiral symmetry at a level of 1/sqrt(N). Small molecules can

escape

the compartments via pores in the random structure while large
molecules get trapped inside.

Saibal





LC

On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:28:18 PM UTC-6 use...@rudnyi.ru
wrote:


"How do you get from chemicals to code? How do you get a code
without
designing one?"

"What You Must Do to Win The Prize

You must arrange for a digital communication system to emerge or
self-evolve without "cheating." The diagram below describes the
system.
Without explicitly designing the system, your experiment must
generate
an encoder that sends digital code to a decoder. Your system

needs

to
transmit at least five bits of information. (In other words it

has

to be
able to represent 32 states. The genetic code supports 64.) "

https://www.herox.com/evolution2.0







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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

2021-01-27 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 1/27/2021 3:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 9:51 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:


On 1/27/2021 2:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 3:08 AM Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:


Also, worlds interfere statistically, by do not interact at
all. A term in a superposition cannot interact with any other
terms, but we can make them interfering, like with the two slits.



Your grasp of the relevant physics is rather tenuous, I'm afraid
Bruno. The idea of "worlds interfering statistically without
interacting" is just a nonsense.  There can only be interference
if there is an interaction. And there certainly is an interaction
between the photons on the two possible paths in the two slit
experiment. The two paths arrive at the screen with different
amplitudes and phases -- if the signs are the same, they add. But
if the signs are different they cancel -- partially or
completely depending on the relative amplitudes.

The trouble is that David Deutsch has really screwed up the
understanding of "worlds" for a lot of people. He has talked as
though each path in the two slit case is a separate "world", and
then has to resort to magic to reproduce the interference. The
Everett concept of a "world" is a "relative state", in which an
"observer" sees a definite result. This idea was made more
precise with the introduction of the idea of decoherence, and
generalized entanglement with the environment. If "worlds" are
defined as the result of decoherent histories, then Deutsch's
confusion should not arise. A "world" is the result of (FAPP
irreversible) decoherence. There is no decoherence at the slits
in the two slit experiment, so no separate "worlds" are formed.
If you induce decoherence by measuring at the slits, then the
interference pattern disappears -- you have certainly created a
separate "world" for each path, but these can no longer
interfere. That is part of the definition of the "worlds" that
are created by irreversible decoherence.


That's where I think there is still a gap in the theory. We know
that in the C60 double slit experiment the interference is wiped
out because sufficiently short wavelength IR photons from the
buckyballs record their position in the environment, presumably
when they are absorbed in the laboratory walls.  But what would
happen if they weren't registered any where.  What if the
experiment were in outer space and the IR photons just went off
into infinity in a spherically symmetric wavefunction that never
"collapsed"?



I thought that was answered in one of Zeilinger's delayed choice 
experiments.  The idler photons that carry the 'welcher weg' 
information do not have to be measured or intercepted. As long as they 
exist anywhere in the universe, the interference is destroyed. You 
have to actually 'quantum erase' the 'welcher weg' information they 
carry in order to restore the interference.


As I recall, the experiment showed that you could erase the welcher weg 
information /after /the Young's slits photons were already recorded,  
but there was no test of not registering them at all...which is 
understandably hard to arrange.  That's why I had to postulate an 
experiment in outer space.  I suppose you could interpret the experiment 
as saying welcher weg photons flying off into space will be registered 
somewhere sometime and certainly won't have their information erased and 
so the experiment shows that the interference pattern would be wiped 
out.  But it's not actually true that the idler photons will necessarily 
be registered somewhere sometime.  We see photons from the CMB.   So 
photons can just get redshifted so far that they no longer carry the 
necessary information.



Running the idler photons into the wall is not quantum erasure.


I think I explicitly said that.

Brent



Bruce


So the concept of "world" is, indeed, well-defined in physics. It
might not be defined in logic or metaphysics, but this is of no
concern to the working physicist -- we know perfectly well what
we mean by "a world". And we can readily tell when someone is
talking nonsense by claiming that "worlds interfere statistically
without interacting". The superposition of the paths in the two
slit case extends right to the screen: that is what produces the
interference -- superposition means that the two components are
added together with their intrinsic phases intact. If you destroy
the superposition at any point, such as by interacting with the
paths at the slits, there is no more interference -- you have
produced separate "worlds" that can no longer interact so there
is no interference. As Scott Aaronson is fond of saying: quantum
computers work by interferenc

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

2021-01-27 Thread smitra

On 27-01-2021 23:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 3:08 AM Bruno Marchal
wrote:

Also, worlds interfere statistically, by do not interact at all. A
term in a superposition cannot interact with any other terms, but we
can make them interfering, like with the two slits.

Your grasp of the relevant physics is rather tenuous, I'm afraid
Bruno. The idea of "worlds interfering statistically without
interacting" is just a nonsense. There can only be interference if
there is an interaction. And there certainly is an interaction between
the photons on the two possible paths in the two slit experiment. The
two paths arrive at the screen with different amplitudes and phases --
if the signs are the same, they add. But if the signs are different
they cancel -- partially or completely depending on the relative
amplitudes.

The trouble is that David Deutsch has really screwed up the
understanding of "worlds" for a lot of people. He has talked as though
each path in the two slit case is a separate "world", and then has to
resort to magic to reproduce the interference. The Everett concept of
a "world" is a "relative state", in which an "observer" sees a
definite result. This idea was made more precise with the introduction
of the idea of decoherence, and generalized entanglement with the
environment. If "worlds" are defined as the result of decoherent
histories, then Deutsch's confusion should not arise. A "world" is the
result of (FAPP irreversible) decoherence. There is no decoherence at
the slits in the two slit experiment, so no separate "worlds" are
formed. If you induce decoherence by measuring at the slits, then the
interference pattern disappears -- you have certainly created a
separate "world" for each path, but these can no longer interfere.
That is part of the definition of the "worlds" that are created by
irreversible decoherence.

So the concept of "world" is, indeed, well-defined in physics. It
might not be defined in logic or metaphysics, but this is of no
concern to the working physicist -- we know perfectly well what we
mean by "a world". And we can readily tell when someone is talking
nonsense by claiming that "worlds interfere statistically without
interacting". The superposition of the paths in the two slit case
extends right to the screen: that is what produces the interference --
superposition means that the two components are added together with
their intrinsic phases intact. If you destroy the superposition at any
point, such as by interacting with the paths at the slits, there is no
more interference -- you have produced separate "worlds" that can no
longer interact so there is no interference. As Scott Aaronson is fond
of saying: quantum computers work by interference, so the computations
must all occur in one "world". As Scott recently posted: "BREAKING:
President Biden signs executive order banning people from saying
"Quantum computers solve problems by just trying all possible
solutions in parallel"."

FAPP, therefore not well defined at all. Sticking to FAPP you could
never have discovered Special Relativity, General Relativity, found the
correct way to resolve Maxwell's Demon paradox, etc. etc.

Saibal

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 9:51 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 1/27/2021 2:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 3:08 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> Also, worlds interfere statistically, by do not interact at all. A term
>> in a superposition cannot interact with any other terms, but we can make
>> them interfering, like with the two slits.
>>
>
>
> Your grasp of the relevant physics is rather tenuous, I'm afraid Bruno.
> The idea of "worlds interfering statistically without interacting" is just
> a nonsense.  There can only be interference if there is an interaction. And
> there certainly is an interaction between the photons on the two possible
> paths in the two slit experiment. The two paths arrive at the screen with
> different amplitudes and phases -- if the signs are the same, they add. But
> if the signs are different they cancel -- partially or completely depending
> on the relative amplitudes.
>
> The trouble is that David Deutsch has really screwed up the understanding
> of "worlds" for a lot of people. He has talked as though each path in the
> two slit case is a separate "world", and then has to resort to magic to
> reproduce the interference. The Everett concept of a "world" is a "relative
> state", in which an "observer" sees a definite result. This idea was made
> more precise with the introduction of the idea of decoherence, and
> generalized entanglement with the environment. If "worlds" are defined as
> the result of decoherent histories, then Deutsch's confusion should not
> arise. A "world" is the result of (FAPP irreversible) decoherence. There is
> no decoherence at the slits in the two slit experiment, so no separate
> "worlds" are formed. If you induce decoherence by measuring at the slits,
> then the interference pattern disappears -- you have certainly created a
> separate "world" for each path, but these can no longer interfere. That is
> part of the definition of the "worlds" that are created by irreversible
> decoherence.
>
>
> That's where I think there is still a gap in the theory.  We know that in
> the C60 double slit experiment the interference is wiped out because
> sufficiently short wavelength IR photons from the buckyballs record their
> position in the environment, presumably when they are absorbed in the
> laboratory walls.  But what would happen if they weren't registered any
> where.  What if the experiment were in outer space and the IR photons just
> went off into infinity in a spherically symmetric wavefunction that never
> "collapsed"?
>


I thought that was answered in one of Zeilinger's delayed choice
experiments.  The idler photons that carry the 'welcher weg' information do
not have to be measured or intercepted. As long as they exist anywhere in
the universe, the interference is destroyed. You have to actually 'quantum
erase' the 'welcher weg' information they carry in order to restore the
interference. Running the idler photons into the wall is not quantum
erasure.

Bruce

So the concept of "world" is, indeed, well-defined in physics. It might not
> be defined in logic or metaphysics, but this is of no concern to the
> working physicist -- we know perfectly well what we mean by "a world". And
> we can readily tell when someone is talking nonsense by claiming that
> "worlds interfere statistically without interacting". The superposition of
> the paths in the two slit case extends right to the screen: that is what
> produces the interference -- superposition means that the two components
> are added together with their intrinsic phases intact. If you destroy the
> superposition at any point, such as by interacting with the paths at the
> slits, there is no more interference -- you have produced separate "worlds"
> that can no longer interact so there is no interference. As Scott Aaronson
> is fond of saying: quantum computers work by interference, so the
> computations must all occur in one "world". As Scott recently posted:
> "BREAKING: President Biden signs executive order banning people from saying
> "Quantum computers solve problems by just trying all possible solutions in
> parallel"."
>
> Bruce
>
>

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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

2021-01-27 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 1/27/2021 2:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 3:08 AM Bruno Marchal > wrote:

Also, worlds interfere statistically, by do not interact at all. A
term in a superposition cannot interact with any other terms, but
we can make them interfering, like with the two slits.

The trouble is that David Deutsch has really screwed up the
understanding of "worlds" for a lot of people. He has talked as though
each path in the two slit case is a separate "world", and then has to
resort to magic to reproduce the interference. The Everett concept of
a "world" is a "relative state", in which an "observer" sees a
definite result. This idea was made more precise with the
introduction of the idea of decoherence, and generalized entanglement
with the environment. If "worlds" are defined as the result of
decoherent histories, then Deutsch's confusion should not arise. A
"world" is the result of (FAPP irreversible) decoherence. There is no
decoherence at the slits in the two slit experiment, so no separate
"worlds" are formed. If you induce decoherence by measuring at the
slits, then the interference pattern disappears -- you have
certainly created a separate "world" for each path, but these can no
longer interfere. That is part of the definition of the "worlds" that
are created by irreversible decoherence.

That's where I think there is still a gap in the theory. We know that
in the C60 double slit experiment the interference is wiped out because
sufficiently short wavelength IR photons from the buckyballs record
their position in the environment, presumably when they are absorbed in
the laboratory walls. But what would happen if they weren't registered
any where. What if the experiment were in outer space and the IR
photons just went off into infinity in a spherically symmetric
wavefunction that never "collapsed"?

Brent

Bruce
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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 3:08 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> Also, worlds interfere statistically, by do not interact at all. A term in
> a superposition cannot interact with any other terms, but we can make them
> interfering, like with the two slits.
>

Your grasp of the relevant physics is rather tenuous, I'm afraid Bruno. The
idea of "worlds interfering statistically without interacting" is just a
nonsense.  There can only be interference if there is an interaction. And
there certainly is an interaction between the photons on the two possible
paths in the two slit experiment. The two paths arrive at the screen with
different amplitudes and phases -- if the signs are the same, they add. But
if the signs are different they cancel -- partially or completely depending
on the relative amplitudes.

The trouble is that David Deutsch has really screwed up the understanding
of "worlds" for a lot of people. He has talked as though each path in the
two slit case is a separate "world", and then has to resort to magic to
reproduce the interference. The Everett concept of a "world" is a "relative
state", in which an "observer" sees a definite result. This idea was made
more precise with the introduction of the idea of decoherence, and
generalized entanglement with the environment. If "worlds" are defined as
the result of decoherent histories, then Deutsch's confusion should not
arise. A "world" is the result of (FAPP irreversible) decoherence. There is
no decoherence at the slits in the two slit experiment, so no separate
"worlds" are formed. If you induce decoherence by measuring at the slits,
then the interference pattern disappears -- you have certainly created a
separate "world" for each path, but these can no longer interfere. That is
part of the definition of the "worlds" that are created by irreversible
decoherence.

So the concept of "world" is, indeed, well-defined in physics. It might not
be defined in logic or metaphysics, but this is of no concern to the
working physicist -- we know perfectly well what we mean by "a world". And
we can readily tell when someone is talking nonsense by claiming that
"worlds interfere statistically without interacting". The superposition of
the paths in the two slit case extends right to the screen: that is what
produces the interference -- superposition means that the two components
are added together with their intrinsic phases intact. If you destroy the
superposition at any point, such as by interacting with the paths at the
slits, there is no more interference -- you have produced separate "worlds"
that can no longer interact so there is no interference. As Scott Aaronson
is fond of saying: quantum computers work by interference, so the
computations must all occur in one "world". As Scott recently posted:
"BREAKING: President Biden signs executive order banning people from saying
"Quantum computers solve problems by just trying all possible solutions in
parallel"."

Bruce

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Re: What top we assume at the start (Re: Born's rule from almost nothing)

On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 2:30 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> The term “world” is hard to define. For logician, it usually mean an
> element of some non empty set, for a metaphysician, it means the objet of
> the ontological commitment.
>


The trouble, Bruno, is that your world is too small.

Bruce

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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing


> On 17 Jan 2021, at 15:39, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> One of the postulates of the MWI is that everything that can happen, must 
> happen. I just applied it to a horse race. Are you denying that? AG

It is hard to imagine how you will prepare the superposition of the 9 races. I 
have translated this mentally with some more reasonable quantum superposition. 
It is just a bit naïve to say that all that can happen must happen. Only when 
you have prepare the superposition in advance. What you might do is this: you 
decide to give some efficacious drug to one horse choose among all the horse in 
that completion by using some quantum coins, and that case each horse will have 
the drug in “one” world/history, and you reasoning will go through, but of 
course, you cannot predict which horse will get the drug and win. Each of you 
will believe that it is this or that horse, and decoherence will prevent the 
practical “decoherence”, so that you lost the information “said to leak in the 
environment” (not so in a quantum computer, if we succeed to tackle the 
decoherence, as the theory shows that we can, at least in principle (like with 
anyon in condensed matter, or with topological quantum computer).

Bruno




> 
> On Sunday, January 17, 2021 at 4:53:50 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Sun, 17 Jan 2021 at 10:15 pm, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 9:55:50 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Sun, 17 Jan 2021 at 3:10 pm, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 7:28:14 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Sun, 17 Jan 2021 at 3:49 am, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> What would be the mechanism or process for other worlds to interact with each 
> other, that is to interfere with each other? This is the gorilla in the room 
> that many MWI enthusiasts ignore; awesome speculation with zero grounding in 
> empirical evidence. Something definitely awry with this pov. AG
> 
> I’m not an “enthusiast”. It’s a physical theory not a football team. If 
> anything I dislike the idea of all those alternative variants of me and my 
> life. If MWI is disproved I’ll be perfectly happy.
> 
> It can't be disproved because it makes no verifiable predictions! AG
>  
> It’s just that it unfortunately makes more sense in my assessment than any 
> other alternative, so I entertain it as the most likely explanation for the 
> observed data. To say it has zero grounding in empirical data is simply false 
>  - it’s the theory that simply takes the empirical data to its logical 
> conclusion without adding a collapse postulate. The wave function is the 
> whole thing. Asking what the mechanism is for worlds to interfere with one 
> another is the same as asking what the mechanism is for the Schrödinger wave 
> function to interfere with itself. In the dual slit experiment it’s an 
> observed fact.
> 
> The SE, when solved, give us the WF, which can be decomposed into a 
> superposition of eigenstates in some appropriate vector space. But this 
> superposition is not unique. So in what sense does the SE give us "an 
> observed fact"? In fact, with numerous distinct possible superpositions, the 
> worlds of the MWI seem ill-defined. AG
> 
> I have wondered myself whether basis selection is a problem for MWI. I’m less 
> sure now that it is. Environmental einselection may resolve the basis 
> problem. We set up an experimental apparatus to select some basis, but that’s 
> just a special case of what happens naturally, whereby the characteristics of 
> the environment select the basis. 
>  
> It makes no sense for it to behave that way if we stick to the old view of 
> matter as little hard balls, but there you go. When we talk of “worlds”, it 
> just refers to a ramifying quantum state, and it is in the nature of quantum 
> states to interfere with themselves per the dual slit experiment, even if 
> they become large and complex. Interference ceases when two branches of the 
> universal quantum state diverge far enough that they completely decohere. 
> When you say “what is the mechanism?” that really means “what is the 
> mathematical description?” in physics. Anything else is just imprecise 
> circumlocution like the word “world” in this context. So the mechanism for 
> interference is the Schrödinger equation, which predicts such interference. 
> MWI adds precisely nothing to that mathematical description.
> 
> The problem, of course, is that the MWI offers no concept of the process of 
> interference among OTHER worlds, so it's no surprise that it adds nothing to 
> the mathematical description. AG  (More at end of this confusing file.)
> 
> there you go with “of course” again as if your argument were self evident. 
> Theres no distinction between worlds (this or other) so of course there is 
> interference on and among the other branches too. I don’t know what you’re 
> talking about.
> 
> I strongly disagree. IMO, it is self-evident. My response is at end of this 
> file. AG 
> 
> The ontological status of those OTHER

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing


> On 17 Jan 2021, at 12:15, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 9:55:50 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Sun, 17 Jan 2021 at 3:10 pm, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 7:28:14 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Sun, 17 Jan 2021 at 3:49 am, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> What would be the mechanism or process for other worlds to interact with each 
> other, that is to interfere with each other? This is the gorilla in the room 
> that many MWI enthusiasts ignore; awesome speculation with zero grounding in 
> empirical evidence. Something definitely awry with this pov. AG
> 
> I’m not an “enthusiast”. It’s a physical theory not a football team. If 
> anything I dislike the idea of all those alternative variants of me and my 
> life. If MWI is disproved I’ll be perfectly happy.
> 
> It can't be disproved because it makes no verifiable predictions! AG
>  
> It’s just that it unfortunately makes more sense in my assessment than any 
> other alternative, so I entertain it as the most likely explanation for the 
> observed data. To say it has zero grounding in empirical data is simply false 
>  - it’s the theory that simply takes the empirical data to its logical 
> conclusion without adding a collapse postulate. The wave function is the 
> whole thing. Asking what the mechanism is for worlds to interfere with one 
> another is the same as asking what the mechanism is for the Schrödinger wave 
> function to interfere with itself. In the dual slit experiment it’s an 
> observed fact.
> 
> The SE, when solved, give us the WF, which can be decomposed into a 
> superposition of eigenstates in some appropriate vector space. But this 
> superposition is not unique. So in what sense does the SE give us "an 
> observed fact"? In fact, with numerous distinct possible superpositions, the 
> worlds of the MWI seem ill-defined. AG
> 
> I have wondered myself whether basis selection is a problem for MWI. I’m less 
> sure now that it is. Environmental einselection may resolve the basis 
> problem. We set up an experimental apparatus to select some basis, but that’s 
> just a special case of what happens naturally, whereby the characteristics of 
> the environment select the basis. 
>  
> It makes no sense for it to behave that way if we stick to the old view of 
> matter as little hard balls, but there you go. When we talk of “worlds”, it 
> just refers to a ramifying quantum state, and it is in the nature of quantum 
> states to interfere with themselves per the dual slit experiment, even if 
> they become large and complex. Interference ceases when two branches of the 
> universal quantum state diverge far enough that they completely decohere. 
> When you say “what is the mechanism?” that really means “what is the 
> mathematical description?” in physics. Anything else is just imprecise 
> circumlocution like the word “world” in this context. So the mechanism for 
> interference is the Schrödinger equation, which predicts such interference. 
> MWI adds precisely nothing to that mathematical description.
> 
> The problem, of course, is that the MWI offers no concept of the process of 
> interference among OTHER worlds, so it's no surprise that it adds nothing to 
> the mathematical description. AG  (More at end of this confusing file.)
> 
> there you go with “of course” again as if your argument were self evident. 
> Theres no distinction between worlds (this or other) so of course there is 
> interference on and among the other branches too. I don’t know what you’re 
> talking about.
> 
> I strongly disagree. IMO, it is self-evident. My response is at end of this 
> file. AG 
> 
> The ontological status of those OTHER worlds is problem, but that's not 
> exactly what I am saying. Rather, I am saying is that the MW hypothesis leads 
> nowhere. It has no predictive value that I can discern. It's just a form of 
> possibly consistent ideology. Compare it to Einstein's postulate of the 
> invariance of the SoL. It's really quite paradoxical when you think about; 
> that the SoL does not depend on the motion of source or recipient. But from 
> it we get the LT and a host of verifiable predictions. SR is a scientific 
> theory since it can be disproven. I don't see that anything verifiable is 
> predicted by the MWI. As such, it shouldn't be regarded as a scientific 
> theory. It can't be so considered since it offer no path for being disproven. 
> AG 
> 
> That is not what you said in your initial argument at all.
> 
>  It was about Born's rule failing in the MWI because the OTHER worlds don't 
> interact. AG
>  
> But to run with it, falsifiability is definitely a problem for MWI, but it’s 
> not as straightforward as you make out. There are proposals for falsifying it 
> but they are technically too difficult to carry out at the moment. 
> Falsifiability is not an intrinsic property of a theory but a property of the 
> theory in relation to the current state of knowledge and technology. Pop

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing


> On 17 Jan 2021, at 03:03, Pierz Newton-John  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sun, 17 Jan 2021 at 3:49 am, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
> What would be the mechanism or process for other worlds to interact with each 
> other, that is to interfere with each other? This is the gorilla in the room 
> that many MWI enthusiasts ignore; awesome speculation with zero grounding in 
> empirical evidence. Something definitely awry with this pov. AG
> 
> I’m not an “enthusiast”. It’s a physical theory not a football team. If 
> anything I dislike the idea of all those alternative variants of me and my 
> life. If MWI is disproved I’ll be perfectly happy. It’s just that it 
> unfortunately makes more sense in my assessment than any other alternative, 
> so I entertain it as the most likely explanation for the observed data. To 
> say it has zero grounding in empirical data is simply false  - it’s the 
> theory that simply takes the empirical data to its logical conclusion without 
> adding a collapse postulate. The wave function is the whole thing. Asking 
> what the mechanism is for worlds to interfere with one another is the same as 
> asking what the mechanism is for the Schrödinger wave function to interfere 
> with itself. In the dual slit experiment it’s an observed fact. It makes no 
> sense for it to behave that way if we stick to the old view of matter as 
> little hard balls, but there you go. When we talk of “worlds”, it just refers 
> to a ramifying quantum state, and it is in the nature of quantum states to 
> interfere with themselves per the dual slit experiment, even if they become 
> large and complex. Interference ceases when two branches of the universal 
> quantum state diverge far enough that they completely decohere. When you say 
> “what is the mechanism?” that really means “what is the mathematical 
> description?” in physics. Anything else is just imprecise circumlocution like 
> the word “world” in this context. So the mechanism for interference is the 
> Schrödinger equation, which predicts such interference. MWI adds precisely 
> nothing to that mathematical description.


Yes. To avoid the MWI, the early founders of QM *added* an axiom: the wave 
collapse postulate. But it introduce a non intelligible dualism with an unknown 
theory of mind. It makes everything more complicated, for reason of 
philosophical taste, which is alway dubious. Occam Razor favour the theory with 
as much axioms as possible.

Especially if one believe in Mechanism. This asks us to believe that 2+2=4 & 
Co., which entails the existence of all computations, with a extraordinary 
complex redundancy of those computations, implying the existence of a (Lebgues) 
Measure on their first person limit (the “observer” cannot be aware of the 
number of steps of the universal dovetailing (which occur in all models of any  
theory of arithmetic). So ...

Bruno


> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 9:32:49 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 1:23:52 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 2:18 pm, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 15, 2021 at 6:16:25 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 5:56 am, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:36:39 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Fri, 15 Jan 2021 at 4:01 pm, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com <> 
> wrote:
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com <> 
> wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com <> 
> wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com <> 
> wrote:
> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> > The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for 
> > subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as 
> > trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. 
>  
> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what? In one 
> world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, in another 
> world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right, other than 
> that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one was the "SAME 
> OTHER world"?
> 
> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee [...]
> 
> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with 
> probability.  
> 
> > I don't think you

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing


> On 16 Jan 2021, at 17:49, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> What would be the mechanism or process for other worlds to interact with each 
> other, that is to interfere with each other? This is the gorilla in the room 
> that many MWI enthusiasts ignore; awesome speculation with zero grounding in 
> empirical evidence. Something definitely awry with this pov. AG

0 world, 1 world, 2 worlds, … aleph_0 worlds, aleph_1 worlds, etc.. ALL of them 
are as much speculation than any other.

Also, worlds interfere statistically, by do not interact at all. A term in a 
superposition cannot interact with any other terms, but we can make them 
interfering, like with the two slits.

Mechanism makes this simpler: there are 0 world, and there is an apperaance of 
1 world above the substitution level, and of infinity of worlds below the 
substitution level. ((Digital)Mechanism is the assumption that there is a level 
of substitution of you such that you survive a body part substitution made at 
that (digital) level).

Bruno




> 
> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 9:32:49 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 1:23:52 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 2:18 pm, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 15, 2021 at 6:16:25 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Sat, 16 Jan 2021 at 5:56 am, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:36:39 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Fri, 15 Jan 2021 at 4:01 pm, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com <> 
> wrote:
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com <> 
> wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com <> 
> wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com <> 
> wrote:
> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> > The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for 
> > subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as 
> > trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. 
>  
> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what? In one 
> world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, in another 
> world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right, other than 
> that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one was the "SAME 
> OTHER world"?
> 
> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee [...]
> 
> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with 
> probability.  
> 
> > I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. 
> 
> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can have 2 
> meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so much.  
> 
> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into existence. Same 
> other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third trial, etc? Where 
> does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME other worlds? Unless it 
> does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these worlds. No probability 
> exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of measurements exist in these 
> other world. AG
>  
> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The worlds 
> that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and one way only: 
> the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different eigenvalues will 
> then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the consequences of that 
> singular difference ramifies, causing the different worlds generated by the 
> original experimental difference to multiply. "World" really means a unique 
> configuration of the universal wave function, so two worlds at different 
> trials can't possibly be the "same world", and yes, there is only one 
> measurement in each.
> 
> This is what I have been saying all along! AG
> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one measurement 
> outcome in each world. However this business about "same other worlds" 
> betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI "doesn't guarantee" 
> that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. It's that the whole 
> notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this context and has no 
> bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 twice whether we 
> are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the "SAME ones" at each 
> addition. If mathematics can't guarantee th

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing


> On 16 Jan 2021, at 10:37, 'scerir' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> "They show that MWI is inconsistent, in the Schroedinger picture. 
> https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00763476";
> 
> the paper (pdf) is here: 
> 
> http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~jabarret/bio/publications/ToBeAWorld.pdf
> 
Thanks. It is indeed interesting. It still lacks some attempt to be precise on 
the notion of world that they debunk, and it could say more on a comparison 
with the notion of histories of Griffith and Omnès. I might say more later.

Bruno 



> 
> 
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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing


> On 16 Jan 2021, at 10:15, 'scerir' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Pierz wrote: "If you want to argue against the internal logic of MWI, you 
> have to start by accepting what it proposes then proceeding to demonstrate 
> how that leads to internal inconsistency."
> 
> They show that MWI is inconsistent, in the Schroedinger picture. 
> https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00763476
> 
> 


That papers seem interesting, and might be related to what I just say to 
Grayson, as it cites Hartle-Gell’man, but also Omnes, which in my opinion 
refine rather well the notion of “worlds” through the notion of (consistent) 
histories (unfortunately the term “consistent” here has not the same meaning 
than the term consistent in logic, but mechanism relates them in some way.

Bruno



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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 16:04, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 6:26:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 13:38, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 5:14:33 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>


 Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 12:19, Alan Grayson  a
 écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 3:56:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 11:54, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11
 agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements,
>>> for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER 
>>> worlds as
>>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *
>>
>>
>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as
>> what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron 
>> go left,
>> in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go 
>> right,
>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which 
>> one was
>> the "SAME OTHER world"?
>>
>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee
>>> [...]
>>
>>
>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with
>> probability.
>>
>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't
>>> complicated. *
>>
>>
>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can
>> have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not
>> so much.
>>
>
> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into
> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in 
> third
> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME 
> other
> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these
> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble 
> of
> measurements exist in these other world. AG
>

 You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds.
 The worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way 
 and
 one way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different
 eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the
 consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the 
 different
 worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply.
 "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave 
 function,
 so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", 
 and
 yes, there is only one measurement in each.

>>>
>>> *If there is only one measurement in each other world -- which has
>>> been my claim throughout -- how can Born's rule be satisfied in the 
>>> MWI? AG*
>>>
>>
>> Every world has a past... So if you do n experiments after n trials
>> you have 2^n number of worlds each having a past of n trials.
>>
>
> *On the second trial and another splitting, what is the assurance that
> the new other world is the same as that created on the first splitting, so
> a sequence of measurement history exists? AG*
>

>>>
 It has the same past, if you say you'll do 9 trials in advance, then
 most "worlds" after your 9 trials will have done 9 trials(without
 considering ultra low probability worlds) and all nine worlds will share
 the same past before any trials.

>>>
>>> *So the assurance I seek is simply your claim that it is so? AG *
>>>
>>
>> No that's what MWI claims... if you claim otherwise... well simply that's
>> not MWI... but your own theory... that you can't use to say anything about
>> MWI because your theory is not MWI.
>>
>
> *I am asking how you get that claim from the SWE, if it's not an
> independent postulate. AG *
>

That all results are realized... so at every trials all possible results
results.. and each worlds "split/differentiate" at each moments and
each worlds has a past.

So starting at time t... at t1 you have all possible split having t has
ancestor... etc... no independent postulate needed... but your theory that
a world exists with

What top we assume at the start (Re: Born's rule from almost nothing)

> On 27 Jan 2021, at 08:36, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, January 26, 2021 at 9:27:43 AM UTC-7 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 15 Jan 2021, at 23:34, Alan Grayson > > wrote:
>> 
>> Why not assume the wf applies only before the measurement?
> 
> That’s Bohr idea. But it means that measurement are no more describe by QM, 
> and this introduces a dualism in the the possible theory of mind that you 
> need to use. The élégance if the MWI is that QM applies to both the observed 
> and the observer, again, like it has to do assuming mechanism.
> 
> 
> 
>> Or why not withhold judgement on a phenomenon not yet understood? Instead 
>> you totally dismiss empirical evidence that no one ever observes a split. AG
> 
> We still observe the result predicted when accepting the superposed wave 
> going through all slit. The fact that we don’t feel the split is entirely 
> explained by the wave evolution and the self-duplication thought experiment. 
> Occam razor favours the simplest conceptual explanation, or we add add as 
> many “epicycle” to favour any interpretation, up to the super determinism, 
> which I take as an abandon of rationality…
> 
> Bruno
> 
> Yeah, "entirely explained", except for the huge gorilla in the room. Where's 
> the beef, I mean the energy to create those other worlds? Is it in the 
> non-computable irrational numbers?  AG

The term “world” is hard to define. For logician, it usually mean an element of 
some non empty set, for a metaphysician, it means the objet of the ontological 
commitment.

The problem here is that some metaphysical assumption are done implicitly. I 
prefer to avoid any ontological commitment bigger than what we need when we do 
metaphysics, and with Mechanism, I can explain that we need only a universal 
machinery (in the sense of the logicians, Turing, Kleene). It happens that for 
the ontology, the very elementary arithmetic is enough. It is given by the 
usual classical predicate calculus and the axioms:

1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Then an observer is defined by any machine/number having those axioms as 
belief, together with the scheme of axioms of induction, the set of 
rationally-believable proposition of the agent contains all formula, with A an 
arbitrary arithmetical formula:

[A(0) & for all n (A(n) -> (A(s(n)) ] -> for all n A(n)

Note that the observer has many more axioms than what we need for the ontology.

In the ontological theory, we can define what is a universal machine, and what 
is a computation. The Digital Mechanist hypothesis entails that the ontology is 
enough to get *all* computations, and it makes the machine non determined with 
respect to which computations support it. But the machine can do reasoning, and 
indeed the observer can prove that if mechanism is correct, the observable 
(“physics”) can arise only from a statistic on all computations, and the math 
indicates already that this will obey a quantum logic quite close to the 
quantum logic based on the Hartle-Graham, or Griffith-Omnes (see also Isham) 
logic of alternate (but first person fungible) histories.

It is up to a materialist (or a believer in some god) to explain how matter (or 
god) can select histories in the set of all histories.
An history here is defined by a computation as seen by some observer (as 
defined above, with observable being defined by an intensional (modal variant 
of the Gödel-Löb-Solovay logic G* (in the study of arithmetical self-reference).

We cannot use the usual brain-mind identity principle (it is false with 
Mechanism, and unclear in most interpretation of QM). We can attach some person 
to a machine, but no person can attach his own mind to a “particular machine”, 
only to all digital machines occurring in arithmetic and getting the state of 
that observer (there are infinitely many).

The “beef” is what I want to explain, and the result is that there is no beef, 
only sets of “dreams of beef”, and the math explain why such set get structured 
into physical persistent observable. 

Einstein said that time is an illusion, albeit a persistent one! Mechanism go 
farer, and explains that the whole physicalness is an illusion by number, and 
explain its persistence and its apparent localisation as part of the machine 
reference and self-reference relatively to infinitely many universal numbers.

The advantage of this approach is twofold: 
1) it does not rely on an ontological commitment different than the term we 
need to define a machine (of course, we have to still postulate elementary 
arithmetic (this can be explained not deducible from less or equivalent).
2) we get a natural explanation of the difference between quanta and qualia. 
Both are measurable numbers, but only the quanta are first person plural 
sharable. The qualia are irreducibly NON sharable, and not perceivable as 
numbers, but as different sort of sensations.

It is hard for me to

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing



On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 6:26:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 13:38, Alan Grayson  a 
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 5:14:33 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 12:19, Alan Grayson  a 
>>> écrit :
>>>


 On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 3:56:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux 
 wrote:

>
>
> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 11:54, Alan Grayson  a 
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com 
 wrote:

> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, 
>> for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER 
>> worlds as 
>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *
>
>  
> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as 
> what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go 
> left, 
> in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go 
> right, 
> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one 
> was 
> the "SAME OTHER world"?
>
> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee 
>> [...]
>
>
> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with 
> probability.  
>
> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't 
>> complicated. *
>
>
> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can 
> have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not 
> so much.  
>

 In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into 
 existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in 
 third 
 trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME 
 other 
 worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these 
 worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble 
 of 
 measurements exist in these other world. AG

>>>  
>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The 
>>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and 
>>> one 
>>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different 
>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the 
>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the 
>>> different 
>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply. 
>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave 
>>> function, 
>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", 
>>> and 
>>> yes, there is only one measurement in each. 
>>>
>>  
>> *If there is only one measurement in each other world -- which has 
>> been my claim throughout -- how can Born's rule be satisfied in the MWI? 
>> AG*
>>
>
> Every world has a past... So if you do n experiments after n trials 
> you have 2^n number of worlds each having a past of n trials.
>

 *On the second trial and another splitting, what is the assurance that 
 the new other world is the same as that created on the first splitting, so 
 a sequence of measurement history exists? AG*

>>>  
>>
>>> It has the same past, if you say you'll do 9 trials in advance, then 
>>> most "worlds" after your 9 trials will have done 9 trials(without 
>>> considering ultra low probability worlds) and all nine worlds will share 
>>> the same past before any trials.
>>>
>>
>> *So the assurance I seek is simply your claim that it is so? AG *
>>
>
> No that's what MWI claims... if you claim otherwise... well simply that's 
> not MWI... but your own theory... that you can't use to say anything about 
> MWI because your theory is not MWI. 
>

*I am asking how you get that claim from the SWE, if it's not an 
independent postulate. AG *

>

>>
>>  
>>
>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum 
>>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per 
>>> the 
>>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two 
>>> worlds 
>>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version 
>>> knowing 
>>> nothing about the other. So, in the "objective world" (the view from 
>>> outsid

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 13:38, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 5:14:33 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 12:19, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 3:56:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>


 Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 11:54, Alan Grayson  a
 écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

 *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements,
> for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER 
> worlds as
> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *


 I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as
 what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go 
 left,
 in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go 
 right,
 other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one 
 was
 the "SAME OTHER world"?

 > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee
> [...]


 Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with
 probability.

 *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. *


 Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can
 have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so
 much.

>>>
>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into
>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third
>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME 
>>> other
>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these
>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of
>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG
>>>
>>
>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The
>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and 
>> one
>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different
>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the
>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different
>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply.
>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave 
>> function,
>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", and
>> yes, there is only one measurement in each.
>>
>
> *If there is only one measurement in each other world -- which has
> been my claim throughout -- how can Born's rule be satisfied in the MWI? 
> AG*
>

 Every world has a past... So if you do n experiments after n trials you
 have 2^n number of worlds each having a past of n trials.

>>>
>>> *On the second trial and another splitting, what is the assurance that
>>> the new other world is the same as that created on the first splitting, so
>>> a sequence of measurement history exists? AG*
>>>
>>
>
>> It has the same past, if you say you'll do 9 trials in advance, then most
>> "worlds" after your 9 trials will have done 9 trials(without considering
>> ultra low probability worlds) and all nine worlds will share the same past
>> before any trials.
>>
>
> *So the assurance I seek is simply your claim that it is so? AG *
>

No that's what MWI claims... if you claim otherwise... well simply that's
not MWI... but your own theory... that you can't use to say anything about
MWI because your theory is not MWI.

>
>>>
>
>
>
>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum
>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per 
>> the
>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds
>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing
>> nothing about the other. So, in the "objective world" (the view from
>> outside the whole wave function as it were), no probability is involved.
>> But if you repeat this experiment many times, each version of you will
>> record an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction 
>> of
>> what happens in the next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 
>> 1
>> and 0. Objectively there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that 
>> way.
>>
>>
>>>

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing



On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 5:14:33 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:

>
>
> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 12:19, Alan Grayson  a 
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 3:56:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 11:54, Alan Grayson  a 
>>> écrit :
>>>


 On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>
>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for 
 subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as 
 trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *
>>>
>>>  
>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what? 
>>> In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, 
>>> in 
>>> another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right, 
>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one 
>>> was 
>>> the "SAME OTHER world"?
>>>
>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee 
 [...]
>>>
>>>
>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with 
>>> probability.  
>>>
>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. *
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can have 
>>> 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so much. 
>>>  
>>>
>>
>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into existence. 
>> Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third trial, 
>> etc? 
>> Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME other worlds? 
>> Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these worlds. 
>> No 
>> probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of 
>> measurements 
>> exist in these other world. AG
>>
>  
> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The 
> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and 
> one 
> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different 
> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the 
> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different 
> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply. 
> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave 
> function, 
> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", and 
> yes, there is only one measurement in each. 
>
  
 *If there is only one measurement in each other world -- which has been 
 my claim throughout -- how can Born's rule be satisfied in the MWI? AG*

>>>
>>> Every world has a past... So if you do n experiments after n trials you 
>>> have 2^n number of worlds each having a past of n trials.
>>>
>>
>> *On the second trial and another splitting, what is the assurance that 
>> the new other world is the same as that created on the first splitting, so 
>> a sequence of measurement history exists? AG*
>>
>  

> It has the same past, if you say you'll do 9 trials in advance, then most 
> "worlds" after your 9 trials will have done 9 trials(without considering 
> ultra low probability worlds) and all nine worlds will share the same past 
> before any trials.
>

*So the assurance I seek is simply your claim that it is so? AG *

>
>>

  

> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum 
> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per 
> the 
> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds 
> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing 
> nothing about the other. So, in the "objective world" (the view from 
> outside the whole wave function as it were), no probability is involved. 
> But if you repeat this experiment many times, each version of you will 
> record an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction 
> of 
> what happens in the next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 
> 1 
> and 0. Objectively there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that 
> way.
>  
>
>>  
>>
>>> John K Clark   See my new list at  Extropolis 
>>> 
>>>
>> -- 

>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
 Groups "Everything List" group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 12:19, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 3:56:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 11:54, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
 wrote:

> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for
>>> subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as
>>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *
>>
>>
>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what?
>> In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, in
>> another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right,
>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one was
>> the "SAME OTHER world"?
>>
>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee
>>> [...]
>>
>>
>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with
>> probability.
>>
>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. *
>>
>>
>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can have 2
>>  meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so much.
>>
>
> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into existence.
> Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third trial, etc?
> Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME other worlds?
> Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these worlds. No
> probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of measurements
> exist in these other world. AG
>

 You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The
 worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and one
 way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different
 eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the
 consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different
 worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply.
 "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave function,
 so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", and
 yes, there is only one measurement in each.

>>>
>>> *If there is only one measurement in each other world -- which has been
>>> my claim throughout -- how can Born's rule be satisfied in the MWI? AG*
>>>
>>
>> Every world has a past... So if you do n experiments after n trials you
>> have 2^n number of worlds each having a past of n trials.
>>
>
> *On the second trial and another splitting, what is the assurance that the
> new other world is the same as that created on the first splitting, so a
> sequence of measurement history exists? AG*
>
It has the same past, if you say you'll do 9 trials in advance, then most
"worlds" after your 9 trials will have done 9 trials(without considering
ultra low probability worlds) and all nine worlds will share the same past
before any trials.

>
>
>>>
>>>
>>>
 That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum
 experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per the
 Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds
 are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing
 nothing about the other. So, in the "objective world" (the view from
 outside the whole wave function as it were), no probability is involved.
 But if you repeat this experiment many times, each version of you will
 record an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of
 what happens in the next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1
 and 0. Objectively there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way.


>
>
>> John K Clark   See my new list at  Extropolis
>> 
>>
> --
>>>
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>>> "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
>>>
>> To view this discussion on the web visit
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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing



On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 3:56:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:

>
>
> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 11:54, Alan Grayson  a 
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com 
 wrote:

> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for 
>> subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as 
>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *
>
>  
> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what? 
> In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, in 
> another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right, 
> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one was 
> the "SAME OTHER world"?
>
> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee 
>> [...]
>
>
> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with 
> probability.  
>
> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. *
>
>
> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can have 2
>  meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so much.  
>

 In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into existence. 
 Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third trial, etc? 
 Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME other worlds? 
 Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these worlds. No 
 probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of measurements 
 exist in these other world. AG

>>>  
>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The 
>>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and one 
>>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different 
>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the 
>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different 
>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply. 
>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave function, 
>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", and 
>>> yes, there is only one measurement in each. 
>>>
>>  
>> *If there is only one measurement in each other world -- which has been 
>> my claim throughout -- how can Born's rule be satisfied in the MWI? AG*
>>
>
> Every world has a past... So if you do n experiments after n trials you 
> have 2^n number of worlds each having a past of n trials.
>

*On the second trial and another splitting, what is the assurance that the 
new other world is the same as that created on the first splitting, so a 
sequence of measurement history exists? AG*

>
>>
>>  
>>
>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum 
>>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per the 
>>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds 
>>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing 
>>> nothing about the other. So, in the "objective world" (the view from 
>>> outside the whole wave function as it were), no probability is involved. 
>>> But if you repeat this experiment many times, each version of you will 
>>> record an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of 
>>> what happens in the next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 
>>> and 0. Objectively there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way.
>>>  
>>>
  

> John K Clark   See my new list at  Extropolis 
> 
>
 -- 
>>
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>>
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>>  
>> 
>> .
>>
>

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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 11:54, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
 On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

 *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for
> subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as
> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *


 I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what? In
 one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, in
 another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right,
 other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one was
 the "SAME OTHER world"?

 > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee [...]


 Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with
 probability.

 *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. *


 Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can have 2
  meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so much.

>>>
>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into existence.
>>> Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third trial, etc?
>>> Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME other worlds?
>>> Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these worlds. No
>>> probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of measurements
>>> exist in these other world. AG
>>>
>>
>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The
>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and one
>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different
>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the
>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different
>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply.
>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave function,
>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", and
>> yes, there is only one measurement in each.
>>
>
> *If there is only one measurement in each other world -- which has been my
> claim throughout -- how can Born's rule be satisfied in the MWI*
>
AG*G*
>

Every world has a past... So if you do n experiments after n trials you
have 2^n number of worlds each having a past of n trials.

>
>
>
>
>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum experiment
>> with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per the Born rule,
>> then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds are created.
>> You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing nothing about
>> the other. So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole
>> wave function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you repeat
>> this experiment many times, each version of you will record an apparently
>> random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens in the
>> next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. Objectively
>> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
 John K Clark   See my new list at  Extropolis
 

>>> --
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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing



On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>
>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for 
 subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as 
 trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *
>>>
>>>  
>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what? In 
>>> one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, in 
>>> another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right, 
>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one was 
>>> the "SAME OTHER world"?
>>>
>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee [...]
>>>
>>>
>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with 
>>> probability.  
>>>
>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. *
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can have 2
>>>  meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so much.  
>>>
>>
>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into existence. 
>> Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third trial, etc? 
>> Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME other worlds? 
>> Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these worlds. No 
>> probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of measurements 
>> exist in these other world. AG
>>
>  
> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The 
> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and one 
> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different 
> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the 
> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different 
> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply. 
> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave function, 
> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", and 
> yes, there is only one measurement in each. 
>
 
*If there is only one measurement in each other world -- which has been my 
claim throughout -- how can Born's rule be satisfied in the MWI? AG*

 

> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum experiment 
> with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per the Born rule, 
> then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds are created. 
> You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing nothing about 
> the other. So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole 
> wave function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you repeat 
> this experiment many times, each version of you will record an apparently 
> random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens in the 
> next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. Objectively 
> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way.
>  
>
>>  
>>
>>> John K Clark   See my new list at  Extropolis 
>>> 
>>>
>>

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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing



On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 1:04:07 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:

> On Wed, 27 Jan 2021 at 6:36 pm, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, January 26, 2021 at 9:27:43 AM UTC-7 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 15 Jan 2021, at 23:34, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>> Why not assume the wf applies only before the measurement? 
>>>
>>>
>>> That’s Bohr idea. But it means that measurement are no more describe by 
>>> QM, and this introduces a dualism in the the possible theory of mind that 
>>> you need to use. The élégance if the MWI is that QM applies to both the 
>>> observed and the observer, again, like it has to do assuming mechanism.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Or why not withhold judgement on a phenomenon not yet understood? 
>>> Instead you totally dismiss empirical evidence that no one ever observes a 
>>> split. AG
>>>
>>>
>>> We still observe the result predicted when accepting the superposed wave 
>>> going through all slit. The fact that we don’t feel the split is entirely 
>>> explained by the wave evolution and the self-duplication thought 
>>> experiment. Occam razor favours the simplest conceptual explanation, or we 
>>> add add as many “epicycle” to favour any interpretation, up to the super 
>>> determinism, which I take as an abandon of rationality…
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>> *Yeah, "entirely explained", except for the huge gorilla in the room. 
>> Where's the beef, I mean the energy to create those other worlds? Is it in 
>> the non-computable irrational numbers?  AG*
>>
>
> Another one! It’s a gorilla enclosure! 🦍🦍🦍
>

*Good News! Not the Second Coming of Jesus, but that there is only one copy 
of YOU even if the Cosmos is infinite in spatial extent and time. I don't 
have a rigorous argument, but IMO the density of irrationals in the reals 
is suggestive. No matter the  possible infinities of spatial extent and 
time, you'll never run out of irrationals, each one representing a Cosmos 
with different initial conditions, inclusive of constants. AG*

>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, January 15, 2021 at 1:18:53 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Fri, Jan 15, 2021 at 2:22 PM Alan Grayson  
 wrote:


> *> Why do you assume that the initial observer splits after initial 
> trial when it's not observed? AG *


 For heaven sake haven't you been listening?! Because that is the least 
 bizarre interpretation anybody can think of to explain the utterly bizarre 
 results observed from the two slit experiment. There is just no getting 
 around it, if Many Worlds isn't true then something even stranger must 
 be. 

 John K Clark

>

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>>> 
>>> .
>>>
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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing