subject:"Hard Problem not hard at all\?"

Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-23 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 5:16:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Apr 2013, at 20:41, smi...@zonnet.nl  wrote: 
>
> > Any "aesthetic phenomena" or for that matter anything else we   
> > experience is described by the known laws of physics which tells you   
> > what matters is the way information is processed. 
> > 
> > So, I'm not conviced there really exists a well defined problem here   
> > with consciousness. We're told by philosphers that there is a   
> > problem and for a long time I believed there was a problem but I've   
> > recently come to the conclusion that simply identifying   
> > computational states with experiences solves the problem. 
>
>
> This is a confusion between Bp & Bp & p. You are correct, from God's   
> eye view, but no machine can see that, and this will explain the mind- 
> body difficulty, but with a price: physics becomes a branch of   
> machine's bio-psycho-theology. But that's a nice price, as it makes   
> comp testable and thus scientific in the usual sense. 
>
> You cannot identify a computational state (a 3p relative notion), and   
> an experience (an 1p absolute notion). But, yes, from the truth point   
> of view, they will be equivalent (with some nuance, as a unique   
> computational state does not makes sense out of a computation, and   
> thus out of universal machine). Also, consciousness will be related to   
> infinities of computations. 
>

Consciousness is that which not only limits infinities, it replaces them. 
Universe rather than multiverse and gestalt wholes rather than ceaseless 
approximation. Vision allows us to see circularity, but a computer cannot 
conceive of circularity, it can only compare discrete values in a way which 
imitates circularity or continuity. The imitation is figurative however, 
not literal. The computer is not actually imitating continuity, any more 
than a flip book cartoon is imitating the natural flow of time awareness. 

It's interesting, Bruno, that you recognize the value of questions over 
answers, theories over physics, but with Bp & Bp & p, you are implicitly 
framing the 3p view as the Bp & p. I would think that you should agree with 
my view that the 3p view is a Bp within the total of all 1p. Belief is a 
type of awareness, as is physical interaction, but awareness itself can 
neither be a logical nor a physical agenda. No belief or physical substance 
can 'exist' without being held together by aesthetic sense of some kind.


Craig
 

>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
>
> > 
> > Saibal 
> > 
> > Citeren Craig Weinberg >: 
> > 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On Friday, April 19, 2013 6:59:28 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> It is whatever an algorithm is computing. All the information is   
> >>> in the 
> >>> computational state. If you have pain in your knee then exactly what 
> >>> you are experiencing must be unambiguously present in the   
> >>> computational 
> >>> state of your brain. 
> >>> 
> >> 
> >> Why would the computational state of your brain be associated with   
> >> any kind 
> >> of aesthetic phenomena though? That's Explanatory Gap. The Hard   
> >> Problem is 
> >> really about "why is there any such thing as aesthetic phenomena?" 
> >> 
> >> Craig 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> 
> >>> Saibal 
> >>> 
> >> 
> >> -- 
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> >> 
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> > 
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-23 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 22 Apr 2013, at 20:41, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

Any "aesthetic phenomena" or for that matter anything else we  
experience is described by the known laws of physics which tells you  
what matters is the way information is processed.


So, I'm not conviced there really exists a well defined problem here  
with consciousness. We're told by philosphers that there is a  
problem and for a long time I believed there was a problem but I've  
recently come to the conclusion that simply identifying  
computational states with experiences solves the problem.



This is a confusion between Bp & Bp & p. You are correct, from God's  
eye view, but no machine can see that, and this will explain the mind- 
body difficulty, but with a price: physics becomes a branch of  
machine's bio-psycho-theology. But that's a nice price, as it makes  
comp testable and thus scientific in the usual sense.


You cannot identify a computational state (a 3p relative notion), and  
an experience (an 1p absolute notion). But, yes, from the truth point  
of view, they will be equivalent (with some nuance, as a unique  
computational state does not makes sense out of a computation, and  
thus out of universal machine). Also, consciousness will be related to  
infinities of computations.


Bruno






Saibal

Citeren Craig Weinberg :




On Friday, April 19, 2013 6:59:28 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:


It is whatever an algorithm is computing. All the information is  
in the

computational state. If you have pain in your knee then exactly what
you are experiencing must be unambiguously present in the  
computational

state of your brain.



Why would the computational state of your brain be associated with  
any kind
of aesthetic phenomena though? That's Explanatory Gap. The Hard  
Problem is

really about "why is there any such thing as aesthetic phenomena?"

Craig




Saibal



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 22 Apr 2013, at 18:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Monday, April 22, 2013 10:05:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Apr 2013, at 13:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, April 22, 2013 4:56:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 21 Apr 2013, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > On Sunday, April 21, 2013 9:20:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > On 20 Apr 2013, at 23:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >
> >>
I agree, in theory, but that theory does not predict a universe in  
which anything is actually presented as a sensory experience.

Yes it does, through the logic of qualia. that is how it works (mainly  
the Bp & Dt & p) intensional varaint of Bp (Gödel's self-referential  
predicate).

A computation is a logical process

It is not. You need more than logic. You need some non logical axioms.

which, if it were truly substrate independent, would have no  
aesthetic qualities at all.

This what we ask you to provide an argument.

In reality however, that is not the case, and all computation  
supervenes eventually on some aesthetic presentation - either  
subjectively as cognition, or objectively as the positions of bodies  
relative to each other.

It is sufficient to
embed the map in the territory.

My entire point is that Comp does not give you any possibility of a  
territory. To the contrary, it demonstrates why territory is  
redundant.

On the contrary, the self-reference explains the rise of territories,  
topologies. Arithmetic, seen from inside, get complex structures, some  
sensible, some observable, some physical.

There will be a self-referential
point, which indicates its own localization. The same occur in
computer science, but is more technical to explain. It is what I have
studied and applied in the cognitive science.

It might be hard to explain it in computer science, but it's  
impossible to explain how it ever gets out of computer science. I  
don't doubt that self-reference provides a useful framework for  
analyzing and modeling cognition - the most useful model by far, but  
in all cases the idea of self-reference borrows on a pre-existing  
knowledge of self

No, the notion of self is well defined. See my amoeba planaria and  
dreaming machine paper. Or read a book on theoretical computer science.

to jump to the conclusion of awareness.

No, there is no jump. It is an non obvious reasoning, and it needs  
some semi-axiomatic of knowledge. But that exists and is rather  
standard and easy to motivate.

A blinking cursor may seem to us like a point of self-referential  
consciousness for a computer, but it's just a collection of  
automatic routines to orient us to the GUI.

Cognitive science is great once you already have cognition. I don't  
have a problem explaining our logical mind as a mixture of  
computation and non-computation which is heavy on the computation,  
but it only a small part of our overall consciousness, which is  
overwhelmingly aesthetic and trans-logical.

That's right, but that's a consequence of comp, not a problem.

>
>
>
>
>
> > All laws of geometry can be simulated computationally without
> > generating any physical lines, points, or shapes.
>
>
> No need to generate them.
>
> Then how do you explain all geometric appearances in the universe?

Two things: first there is already a lot of geometry in the
extensional possible relations among the numbers (that is usual math).
Then the *appearance* of geometrical and physical is explained by
computer science, with the qualia aspect explained by the logic of
self-reference.

Does computer science explain how geometric appearances can be  
generated without sense organs?

No problem with this, except the 1% of the qualia which has to  
remained non justifiable by any sound machine.

>
>
>
>
>
> > When does UDA generate geometry, why should it ever do that, and  
how

> > does it accomplish it?
>
> It is explained in sane2004, and that is the object of many posts
> here.
>
> I don't think so. I think that anything anyone has said here can
> give a single insight into why abstract computations could, would,
> or should ever clothe themselves in sensory experience of any kind,
> including geometry.

I hear but you don't provide any argument, other than statement of
primitiveness for the experience, which is what the (Bp & p) part of
the machine already say. But the machine can look inward and
understand that indeed, that true primitiveness feeling is a not a
proof of the primitiveness.

You can so that trick on arithmetic too though. You don't provide  
any argument, other than a statement of primitiveness for the non- 
experience of + and *.

No, that primitiveness can be proved.

There is no proof for that, it's just a feeling of true primitiveness.

Without assuming the + and * laws, we cannot derive them. They are  
necessarily primitive.

That feeling is sense,

It might be sense. That sense is called underst

Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-22 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Monday, April 22, 2013 2:41:58 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>
> Any "aesthetic phenomena" or for that matter anything else we 
> experience 

There isn't anything else we (or anything else) can experience besides 
aesthetic phenomena. 

> is described by the known laws of physics which tells you 
> what matters is the way information is processed. 
>

Information can only be processed in one way - anesthetically. It makes no 
difference whether information travels by electricity, optics, punch cards, 
or keyboards. Physics has no access to aesthetics whatsoever, and neither 
does information processing.

>
> So, I'm not conviced there really exists a well defined problem here 
> with consciousness. We're told by philosphers that there is a problem 
> and for a long time I believed there was a problem but I've recently 
> come to the conclusion that simply identifying computational states 
> with experiences solves the problem. 
>

Experiences can contain computation, but no computation can be experienced 
unless there already is an aesthetic participant. The identification of 
computational states with experience is arbitrary and doesn't explain 
anything as far as I can tell.

What must be explained are these five problems:

*1. Hard Problem* = Why is X presented as an experience?

(X = “information”, logical or physical functions, calcium waves, action 
potentials, Bayesian integrations, etc.)

*2. Explanatory Gap* = How and where is presentation accomplished with 
respect to X?

*3. Binding Problem* = How are presented experiences segregated and 
combined with each other? How do presentations *cohere*?

*4. Symbol Grounding* = How are experiences associated with each other on 
multiple levels of presentation? How do presentations *adhere*?

*5. Mind Body Problem* = Why do public facing presences and private facing 
presences seem ontologically exclusive and aesthetically opposite to each 
other?

My hypothesis solves or explains why each one of these problems are the 
result of assuming that the wrong set of phenomena (forms and functions) 
are fundamental. 

Craig

> Saibal 
>
> Citeren Craig Weinberg >: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Friday, April 19, 2013 6:59:28 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: 
> >> 
> >> It is whatever an algorithm is computing. All the information is in the 
> >> computational state. If you have pain in your knee then exactly what 
> >> you are experiencing must be unambiguously present in the computational 
> >> state of your brain. 
> >> 
> > 
> > Why would the computational state of your brain be associated with any 
> kind 
> > of aesthetic phenomena though? That's Explanatory Gap. The Hard Problem 
> is 
> > really about "why is there any such thing as aesthetic phenomena?" 
> > 
> > Craig 
> > 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Saibal 
> >> 
> > 
> > -- 
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
> > Groups "Everything List" group. 
> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, 
> > send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com . 
> > To post to this group, send email to 
> > everyth...@googlegroups.com. 
>
> > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. 
>
> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
>
>
>

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-22 Thread smitra

Any "aesthetic phenomena" or for that matter anything else we 
experience is described by the known laws of physics which tells you 
what matters is the way information is processed.


So, I'm not conviced there really exists a well defined problem here 
with consciousness. We're told by philosphers that there is a problem 
and for a long time I believed there was a problem but I've recently 
come to the conclusion that simply identifying computational states 
with experiences solves the problem.


Saibal

Citeren Craig Weinberg :




On Friday, April 19, 2013 6:59:28 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:


It is whatever an algorithm is computing. All the information is in the
computational state. If you have pain in your knee then exactly what
you are experiencing must be unambiguously present in the computational
state of your brain.



Why would the computational state of your brain be associated with any kind
of aesthetic phenomena though? That's Explanatory Gap. The Hard Problem is
really about "why is there any such thing as aesthetic phenomena?"

Craig




Saibal



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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-22 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Monday, April 22, 2013 10:05:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Apr 2013, at 13:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Monday, April 22, 2013 4:56:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 21 Apr 2013, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On Sunday, April 21, 2013 9:20:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > > 
> > > On 20 Apr 2013, at 23:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > > 
> > >> 
> > >> 
> > >> But what makes the laws of physics turn into physics? What makes 
> > >> physics follow the laws? 
> > > 
> > > Study UDA. It answers this precisely. Observability is lawful. I 
> > > gave the axioms, and shows them being theorem of arithmetic, once 
> > > comp is at the metatlevel. 
> > > 
> > > It's not enough that observability is lawful, 
> > 
> > Indeed. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > physical enactments must be identified as a pure consequence of law 
> > > - which it can't be. 
> > 
> > No it is too. 
> > 
> > Why do you assume so? What makes a map into a territory, and why   
> > would a map want to be one? 
>
>
> You don't need to make a map into a territory.

I agree, in theory, but that theory does not predict a universe in which 
anything is actually presented as a sensory experience. A computation is a 
logical process which, if it were truly substrate independent, would have 
no aesthetic qualities at all. In reality however, that is not the case, 
and all computation supervenes eventually on some aesthetic presentation - 
either subjectively as cognition, or objectively as the positions of bodies 
relative to each other.

> It is sufficient to   
> embed the map in the territory. 

My entire point is that Comp does not give you any possibility of a 
territory. To the contrary, it demonstrates why territory is redundant.

> There will be a self-referential   
> point, which indicates its own localization. The same occur in   
> computer science, but is more technical to explain. It is what I have   
> studied and applied in the cognitive science. 
>

It might be hard to explain it in computer science, but it's impossible to 
explain how it ever gets out of computer science. I don't doubt that 
self-reference provides a useful framework for analyzing and modeling 
cognition - the most useful model by far, but in all cases the idea of 
self-reference borrows on a pre-existing knowledge of self to jump to the 
conclusion of awareness. A blinking cursor may seem to us like a point of 
self-referential consciousness for a computer, but it's just a collection 
of automatic routines to orient us to the GUI. 

Cognitive science is great once you already have cognition. I don't have a 
problem explaining our logical mind as a mixture of computation and 
non-computation which is heavy on the computation, but it only a small part 
of our overall consciousness, which is overwhelmingly aesthetic and 
trans-logical.

>
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > All laws of geometry can be simulated computationally without 
> > > generating any physical lines, points, or shapes. 
> > 
> > 
> > No need to generate them. 
> > 
> > Then how do you explain all geometric appearances in the universe? 
>
> Two things: first there is already a lot of geometry in the   
> extensional possible relations among the numbers (that is usual math).   
> Then the *appearance* of geometrical and physical is explained by   
> computer science, with the qualia aspect explained by the logic of   
> self-reference. 
>

Does computer science explain how geometric appearances can be generated 
without sense organs? 

>
>
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > When does UDA generate geometry, why should it ever do that, and how 
> > > does it accomplish it? 
> > 
> > It is explained in sane2004, and that is the object of many posts   
> > here. 
> > 
> > I don't think so. I think that anything anyone has said here can   
> > give a single insight into why abstract computations could, would,   
> > or should ever clothe themselves in sensory experience of any kind,   
> > including geometry. 
>
> I hear but you don't provide any argument, other than statement of   
> primitiveness for the experience, which is what the (Bp & p) part of   
> the machine already say. But the machine can look inward and   
> understand that indeed, that true primitiveness feeling is a not a   
> proof of the primitiveness. 
>

You can so that trick on arithmetic too though. You don't provide any 
argument, other than a statement of primitiveness for the non-experience of 
+ and *. There is no proof for that, it's just a feeling of true 
primitiveness. That feeling is sense, and while the particular content of 
any given sense experience may not reflect every other without conflicts, 
the sense itself is all that we can ever have, and all that arithmetic can 
ever have. The sense itself is primary - it doesn't matter if it's + and * 
or matter and energy, space and time, etc, but it is all perception and 
participation first, last,

Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-22 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 22 Apr 2013, at 13:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Monday, April 22, 2013 4:56:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Apr 2013, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, April 21, 2013 9:20:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 20 Apr 2013, at 23:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> But what makes the laws of physics turn into physics? What makes
>> physics follow the laws?
>
> Study UDA. It answers this precisely. Observability is lawful. I
> gave the axioms, and shows them being theorem of arithmetic, once
> comp is at the metatlevel.
>
> It's not enough that observability is lawful,

Indeed.

> physical enactments must be identified as a pure consequence of law
> - which it can't be.

No it is too.

Why do you assume so? What makes a map into a territory, and why  
would a map want to be one?

You don't need to make a map into a territory. It is sufficient to  
embed the map in the territory. There will be a self-referential  
point, which indicates its own localization. The same occur in  
computer science, but is more technical to explain. It is what I have  
studied and applied in the cognitive science.

> All laws of geometry can be simulated computationally without
> generating any physical lines, points, or shapes.

No need to generate them.

Then how do you explain all geometric appearances in the universe?

Two things: first there is already a lot of geometry in the  
extensional possible relations among the numbers (that is usual math).  
Then the *appearance* of geometrical and physical is explained by  
computer science, with the qualia aspect explained by the logic of  
self-reference.

> When does UDA generate geometry, why should it ever do that, and how
> does it accomplish it?

It is explained in sane2004, and that is the object of many posts  
here.

I don't think so. I think that anything anyone has said here can  
give a single insight into why abstract computations could, would,  
or should ever clothe themselves in sensory experience of any kind,  
including geometry.

I hear but you don't provide any argument, other than statement of  
primitiveness for the experience, which is what the (Bp & p) part of  
the machine already say. But the machine can look inward and  
understand that indeed, that true primitiveness feeling is a not a  
proof of the primitiveness.

>
>> What would be the point of physics if this realm of Comp already
>> exists?
>
> It exists, like the prime number exists. What is the point of prime
> numbers? Not sure such question makes sense, but who knows.
>
> Prime numbers exist if you understand what you are looking for.

It exists even if you don't understand them. It is like the taxes.

The taxes are only a belief system until that belief system inspires  
people to direct the actions of their bodies toward enforcing it.  
The primeness of numbers is an analysis of counting, it need not  
have been discovered for the universe to be complete. Taxes need not  
have been invented for the universe to be complete. All that is  
needed for the universe is sensory perception and motor participation.

Terms like "universe", "sensory", "motor" and "participation" must be  
explained in a non circular way.

> So do words ending in the word 's'. There is a huge difference,
> however, in questioning the meaning of a pattern within a symbol
> system, and a completely arbitrary attachment of all of the physical
> phenomena in the universe to an abstract system. What Comp really
> does is push dualism halfway under the carpet, leaving only mind
> exposed and claiming body as an epiphenomena.

A body cannot be an epiphenomenon. That's does not make any sense. But
comp makes it into an epinoumenon, like ether, phlogiston, and other
superstition.

Ok, but how does that change Comp's failure to explain the specific  
aesthetic nature of that superstition?

Why should comp fails here, and also, a failure of a theory to explain  
something does not mean that the theory is false. It means that some  
job must be done.

Ether, phlogiston, and other superstitions are superstitions because  
they are subject to our imagination to give them any kind of  
definition . Shapes, colors, textures of superstitions are not  
agreed upon - with matter of course, universal agreement on the  
macrocosmic level is their defining quality.

There is no unanimity there, and unanimity is not an evidence of truth  
nor even plausibility.

> The question remains though, if all bodies can be simulated,

With comp bodies cannot be emulated by Turing machine. They can be
simulated at some substitution level on which yopu might bet. careful,
it is a very important nuance to grasp if you want to understand why
machine believes in some correct local way to matter and physical  
laws.

I don't think that its a nuance, it's obvious. I have designed video  
games on a computer before, so I have no problem understanding how  
an

Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-22 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Monday, April 22, 2013 4:56:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Apr 2013, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Sunday, April 21, 2013 9:20:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 20 Apr 2013, at 23:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> But what makes the laws of physics turn into physics? What makes   
> >> physics follow the laws? 
> > 
> > Study UDA. It answers this precisely. Observability is lawful. I   
> > gave the axioms, and shows them being theorem of arithmetic, once   
> > comp is at the metatlevel. 
> > 
> > It's not enough that observability is lawful, 
>
> Indeed. 
>
>
>
> > physical enactments must be identified as a pure consequence of law   
> > - which it can't be. 
>
> No it is too. 
>

Why do you assume so? What makes a map into a territory, and why would a 
map want to be one?

>
>
>
>
> > All laws of geometry can be simulated computationally without   
> > generating any physical lines, points, or shapes. 
>
>
> No need to generate them. 
>

Then how do you explain all geometric appearances in the universe?

>
>
>
>
> > When does UDA generate geometry, why should it ever do that, and how   
> > does it accomplish it? 
>
> It is explained in sane2004, and that is the object of many posts here. 
>

I don't think so. I think that anything anyone has said here can give a 
single insight into why abstract computations could, would, or should ever 
clothe themselves in sensory experience of any kind, including geometry.

>
>
>
>
>
> > 
> >> What would be the point of physics if this realm of Comp already   
> >> exists? 
> > 
> > It exists, like the prime number exists. What is the point of prime   
> > numbers? Not sure such question makes sense, but who knows. 
> > 
> > Prime numbers exist if you understand what you are looking for. 
>
> It exists even if you don't understand them. It is like the taxes. 
>

The taxes are only a belief system until that belief system inspires people 
to direct the actions of their bodies toward enforcing it. The primeness of 
numbers is an analysis of counting, it need not have been discovered for 
the universe to be complete. Taxes need not have been invented for the 
universe to be complete. All that is needed for the universe is sensory 
perception and motor participation.

>
>
> > So do words ending in the word 's'. There is a huge difference,   
> > however, in questioning the meaning of a pattern within a symbol   
> > system, and a completely arbitrary attachment of all of the physical   
> > phenomena in the universe to an abstract system. What Comp really   
> > does is push dualism halfway under the carpet, leaving only mind   
> > exposed and claiming body as an epiphenomena. 
>
> A body cannot be an epiphenomenon. That's does not make any sense. But   
> comp makes it into an epinoumenon, like ether, phlogiston, and other   
> superstition. 
>

Ok, but how does that change Comp's failure to explain the specific 
aesthetic nature of that superstition? Ether, phlogiston, and other 
superstitions are superstitions because they are subject to our imagination 
to give them any kind of definition . Shapes, colors, textures of 
superstitions are not agreed upon - with matter of course, universal 
agreement on the macrocosmic level is their defining quality.

>
>
>
>
> > The question remains though, if all bodies can be simulated, 
>
> With comp bodies cannot be emulated by Turing machine. They can be   
> simulated at some substitution level on which yopu might bet. careful,   
> it is a very important nuance to grasp if you want to understand why   
> machine believes in some correct local way to matter and physical laws. 
>

I don't think that its a nuance, it's obvious. I have designed video games 
on a computer before, so I have no problem understanding how an avatar 
detects collisions and behaves as if certain colored pixels are an immobile 
obstruction. But that's a cartoon. It is an automated picture which reminds 
us of our own experience of a body. The pixels on the screen are not 
detecting each other, nor are the numbers in the program, it is all 
incidental. The collisions are figurative and anesthetic, not literal and 
aesthetic. Switches are being opened and closed in memory which illuminates 
a monitor - that's all that is going on as far as anything is concerned 
except in the minds of programmers and audiences. It's a one dimensional 
representation, it has no wholeness.

It's confusing to say that Comp can't emulate bodies...so what makes bodies 
then and how can Comp claim to explain consciousness without explaining our 
consciousness of bodies? 

>
>
> > then why have bodies at all? 
>
> To talk and manifest our consciousness relatively to other persons. 
>

But why does that require a body? According to Comp, numbers are the only 
things that really ever are 'manifested', so what could it possibly mean 
for numbers to manifest as bodies or persons?

>
>
>
>
> > If anythi

Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 21 Apr 2013, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, April 21, 2013 9:20:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Apr 2013, at 23:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:




But what makes the laws of physics turn into physics? What makes  
physics follow the laws?


Study UDA. It answers this precisely. Observability is lawful. I  
gave the axioms, and shows them being theorem of arithmetic, once  
comp is at the metatlevel.


It's not enough that observability is lawful,


Indeed.



physical enactments must be identified as a pure consequence of law  
- which it can't be.


No it is too.




All laws of geometry can be simulated computationally without  
generating any physical lines, points, or shapes.



No need to generate them.




When does UDA generate geometry, why should it ever do that, and how  
does it accomplish it?


It is explained in sane2004, and that is the object of many posts here.







What would be the point of physics if this realm of Comp already  
exists?


It exists, like the prime number exists. What is the point of prime  
numbers? Not sure such question makes sense, but who knows.


Prime numbers exist if you understand what you are looking for.


It exists even if you don't understand them. It is like the taxes.



So do words ending in the word 's'. There is a huge difference,  
however, in questioning the meaning of a pattern within a symbol  
system, and a completely arbitrary attachment of all of the physical  
phenomena in the universe to an abstract system. What Comp really  
does is push dualism halfway under the carpet, leaving only mind  
exposed and claiming body as an epiphenomena.


A body cannot be an epiphenomenon. That's does not make any sense. But  
comp makes it into an epinoumenon, like ether, phlogiston, and other  
superstition.






The question remains though, if all bodies can be simulated,


With comp bodies cannot be emulated by Turing machine. They can be  
simulated at some substitution level on which yopu might bet. careful,  
it is a very important nuance to grasp if you want to understand why  
machine believes in some correct local way to matter and physical laws.





then why have bodies at all?


To talk and manifest our consciousness relatively to other persons.




If anything can be simulated as a number relation, then what's with  
all of the shapes and textures?


This is what is explained by computer science. Machines cannot avoid  
them. It follows from addition and multiplication, like the prime  
numbers.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-21 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Saturday, April 20, 2013 1:49:04 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Apr 20, 2013 at 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal 
> > wrote:
>
> >> The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody has 
>> clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the answer is 
>> expected to do.
>>
>> > The hard problem is only the antic mind-body problem, and what you say 
>> is that you don't understand it, as it happens frequently. UDA reduces that 
>> problem to the problem of justifying, by a FPI statistics, the belief in 
>> matter by some average relative universal machine/number. 
>>
>
> Yes exactly, that is a perfect example of what I just said:  The reason 
> nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody has clearly 
> explained exactly what the problem is or what the answer is expected to do.
>

That may be the reason why I do have an answer to the hard problem, because 
I have explained exactly what it is and what the answer is expected to do.

The Hard problem defined = Why is there any such thing as aesthetic 
experience, given a deterministic universe which has no plausible use for 
it?

The Hard problem solved = By pivoting the presumed figure-ground relation 
between mechanism and aesthetics, a deterministic universe can be easily 
derived from aesthetic principles, including, but not limited to, the 
quantitative aesthetics of arithmetic.

The value of the solution = A new synthesis of mind-body, physics and 
information in which sensory-motor participation is understood to be the 
primary element from which physics and information (aka matter-energy and 
space-time/geometry-arithmetic) are derived. Thus, we achieve a vast 
revolution in human understanding and can begin to progress in every aspect 
of human endeavor.

Craig 

>   John K Clark
>  
>

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-21 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Sunday, April 21, 2013 9:20:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Apr 2013, at 23:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, April 20, 2013 2:51:23 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 20 Apr 2013, at 17:56, meekerdb wrote: 
>>
>> > On 4/20/2013 2:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >> 
>> >> On 20 Apr 2013, at 05:26, meekerdb wrote: 
>> >> 
>> >>> On 4/19/2013 5:31 PM, John Clark wrote: 
>>  
>>  The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody   
>>  has clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the   
>>  answer is expected to do. 
>> >>> 
>> >>> I'm not so sure of the problem, but I'm pretty sure of the   
>> >>> solution.  When we can build AI robots that exhibit (including   
>> >>> reporting) intelligent and emotional responses similar to humans   
>> >>> and we can map between their AI and the function of brains in a   
>> >>> way that allows us to reliably adjust the behavior of AI robots   
>> >>> and/or humans - then we will have "solved" the problem, in the   
>> >>> practical sense that no one will care about it in general terms   
>> >>> but will discuss it in technical terms the way biologists discuss   
>> >>> protein production and messenger RNA and DNA error correction but   
>> >>> no longer discuss "what is life?". 
>> >> 
>> >> No this will not work. We must test the physical consequence of the   
>> >> belief that the brain can be truncated at a finite level. 
>> > 
>> > Sure. Not only will we build AI robots, but we will also use the   
>> > understanding we develop to modify brains and cure some mental   
>> > illness; which will entail learning the proper level of   
>> > substitution.  But it will all be inferred from behavior and reports   
>> > and mapping between AI and brain processes. 
>>
>> In part, as the pioneer of technological (local) immortality will take   
>> the first approximation. My point is more concrete, comp leads to   
>> testable observation in the physical world, indeed the laws of physics. 
>>
>> Comp gives the realm where the laws of physics evolves, a sort of many   
>> interfering 'matrix' which exists by the law of + and *. It is   
>> testable, with the classical theory of knowledge (not Theatetus,   
>> except that Theaetetus gives it when apply to sigma_1 complete   
>> provability). 
>>
>>
> But what makes the laws of physics turn into physics? What makes physics 
> follow the laws?
>
>
> Study UDA. It answers this precisely. Observability is lawful. I gave the 
> axioms, and shows them being theorem of arithmetic, once comp is at the 
> metatlevel.
>

It's not enough that observability is lawful, physical enactments must be 
identified as a pure consequence of law - which it can't be. All laws of 
geometry can be simulated computationally without generating any physical 
lines, points, or shapes. When does UDA generate geometry, why should it 
ever do that, and how does it accomplish it?
 

>
>
>
>
>
> What would be the point of physics if this realm of Comp already exists?
>
>
> It exists, like the prime number exists. What is the point of prime 
> numbers? Not sure such question makes sense, but who knows.
>

Prime numbers exist if you understand what you are looking for. So do words 
ending in the word 's'. There is a huge difference, however, in questioning 
the meaning of a pattern within a symbol system, and a completely arbitrary 
attachment of all of the physical phenomena in the universe to an abstract 
system. What Comp really does is push dualism halfway under the carpet, 
leaving only mind exposed and claiming body as an epiphenomena. The 
question remains though, if all bodies can be simulated, then why have 
bodies at all? If anything can be simulated as a number relation, then 
what's with all of the shapes and textures?

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>  
>
>>
>> > 
>> > Brent 
>> > "Perfection is attained not when there is no longer anything to add, 
>> > but when there is no longer anything to take away" 
>> >  --- A de Saint-Exupery 
>>
>> I prefer this quote than the preceding one. Looks like arithmetic is   
>> perfect, in that sense. All universal numbers! 
>>
>> Bruno 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> > -- 
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>> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. 
>> > 
>> > 
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>>
>>
>>
>>
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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-21 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Apr 2013, at 23:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, April 20, 2013 2:51:23 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Apr 2013, at 17:56, meekerdb wrote:

> On 4/20/2013 2:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 20 Apr 2013, at 05:26, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>> On 4/19/2013 5:31 PM, John Clark wrote:

 The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody
 has clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the
 answer is expected to do.
>>>
>>> I'm not so sure of the problem, but I'm pretty sure of the
>>> solution.  When we can build AI robots that exhibit (including
>>> reporting) intelligent and emotional responses similar to humans
>>> and we can map between their AI and the function of brains in a
>>> way that allows us to reliably adjust the behavior of AI robots
>>> and/or humans - then we will have "solved" the problem, in the
>>> practical sense that no one will care about it in general terms
>>> but will discuss it in technical terms the way biologists discuss
>>> protein production and messenger RNA and DNA error correction but
>>> no longer discuss "what is life?".
>>
>> No this will not work. We must test the physical consequence of the
>> belief that the brain can be truncated at a finite level.
>
> Sure. Not only will we build AI robots, but we will also use the
> understanding we develop to modify brains and cure some mental
> illness; which will entail learning the proper level of
> substitution.  But it will all be inferred from behavior and reports
> and mapping between AI and brain processes.

In part, as the pioneer of technological (local) immortality will take
the first approximation. My point is more concrete, comp leads to
testable observation in the physical world, indeed the laws of  
physics.


Comp gives the realm where the laws of physics evolves, a sort of many
interfering 'matrix' which exists by the law of + and *. It is
testable, with the classical theory of knowledge (not Theatetus,
except that Theaetetus gives it when apply to sigma_1 complete
provability).


But what makes the laws of physics turn into physics? What makes  
physics follow the laws?


Study UDA. It answers this precisely. Observability is lawful. I gave  
the axioms, and shows them being theorem of arithmetic, once comp is  
at the metatlevel.






What would be the point of physics if this realm of Comp already  
exists?


It exists, like the prime number exists. What is the point of prime  
numbers? Not sure such question makes sense, but who knows.


Bruno





Craig


>
> Brent
> "Perfection is attained not when there is no longer anything to add,
> but when there is no longer anything to take away"
>  --- A de Saint-Exupery

I prefer this quote than the preceding one. Looks like arithmetic is
perfect, in that sense. All universal numbers!

Bruno




>
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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-21 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Apr 2013, at 21:50, John Mikes wrote:


Brent and Bruno:
Brent I love you for your scientific self-consciousness:
"I'm not so sure of the problem, but I'm pretty sure of the solution."
That's the 'end' of all. Religions like it.

Here is what I see as the (hard problem) problem: people like to  
think in the mind-body restriction, as BODY only, considering the  
'mind' (?) only as expressions of the body. How about thought, i.e.  
ideational thinking - considered practically within measuring only  
our already available physical data? where do we get the "blue" mAmp  
for logical and the "red" mAmp for emotional disagreement? the  
yellow mAmp for "I forgot" and the purple mAmp for "yesterday I was  
hungry"? Do we differentiate btw. blood-surges as to pertinent to  
musical, or visual enjoyment/(un)aesthetics) - or else?
I would love to learn the solution for such distinctions using  
BODILY data.

I have a solution: I dunno.


No machines can know that. But this very fact is already know by  
Löbian machine.






Bruno:  "...it is just pseudo aristotelian religion."
I like your putting a NAME to my agnostic outburst, not necessarily  
all-agreeable for me (I don't like to go 'back' to the oldies).


Are you sure I was quoting you? I don't remember, and this astonishes  
me. Oh, I see the quote below. I was quoting J. Clark Aristotelian  
prejudice, not your agnosticism, which fit so remarkably with the  
universal machine position.





Even 'religion' (what I used a minute ago) is suspect since we have  
no proper identification for 'them' in wide ranges (I may call my  
'belief' in the infinite complexity as one). So is your comp-basis I  
suppose, or Brent's 'connectivity' (=mapping?) between  
(tissue?)brain functions and AS (oops: AI, what I miswrote is  
Artificial Stupidity). He may be right, of course, if we reduce our  
interest to the already knowable 'model' of the world. I don't go  
for such reductionism in thinking theoretically.


Nor does machines when they look inward enough.

Best,

Bruno






Regards

John M


On Sat, Apr 20, 2013 at 5:20 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 20 Apr 2013, at 05:26, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/19/2013 5:31 PM, John Clark wrote:

The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody  
has clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the answer  
is expected to do.


I'm not so sure of the problem, but I'm pretty sure of the  
solution.  When we can build AI robots that exhibit (including  
reporting) intelligent and emotional responses similar to humans and  
we can map between their AI and the function of brains in a way that  
allows us to reliably adjust the behavior of AI robots and/or humans  
- then we will have "solved" the problem, in the practical sense  
that no one will care about it in general terms but will discuss it  
in technical terms the way biologists discuss protein production and  
messenger RNA and DNA error correction but no longer discuss "what  
is life?".


No this will not work. We must test the physical consequence of the  
belief that the brain can be truncated at a finite level. If not, it  
is just pseudo aristotelian religion.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-20 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Saturday, April 20, 2013 2:51:23 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Apr 2013, at 17:56, meekerdb wrote: 
>
> > On 4/20/2013 2:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On 20 Apr 2013, at 05:26, meekerdb wrote: 
> >> 
> >>> On 4/19/2013 5:31 PM, John Clark wrote: 
>  
>  The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody   
>  has clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the   
>  answer is expected to do. 
> >>> 
> >>> I'm not so sure of the problem, but I'm pretty sure of the   
> >>> solution.  When we can build AI robots that exhibit (including   
> >>> reporting) intelligent and emotional responses similar to humans   
> >>> and we can map between their AI and the function of brains in a   
> >>> way that allows us to reliably adjust the behavior of AI robots   
> >>> and/or humans - then we will have "solved" the problem, in the   
> >>> practical sense that no one will care about it in general terms   
> >>> but will discuss it in technical terms the way biologists discuss   
> >>> protein production and messenger RNA and DNA error correction but   
> >>> no longer discuss "what is life?". 
> >> 
> >> No this will not work. We must test the physical consequence of the   
> >> belief that the brain can be truncated at a finite level. 
> > 
> > Sure. Not only will we build AI robots, but we will also use the   
> > understanding we develop to modify brains and cure some mental   
> > illness; which will entail learning the proper level of   
> > substitution.  But it will all be inferred from behavior and reports   
> > and mapping between AI and brain processes. 
>
> In part, as the pioneer of technological (local) immortality will take   
> the first approximation. My point is more concrete, comp leads to   
> testable observation in the physical world, indeed the laws of physics. 
>
> Comp gives the realm where the laws of physics evolves, a sort of many   
> interfering 'matrix' which exists by the law of + and *. It is   
> testable, with the classical theory of knowledge (not Theatetus,   
> except that Theaetetus gives it when apply to sigma_1 complete   
> provability). 
>
>
But what makes the laws of physics turn into physics? What makes physics 
follow the laws? What would be the point of physics if this realm of Comp 
already exists?

Craig
 

>
> > 
> > Brent 
> > "Perfection is attained not when there is no longer anything to add, 
> > but when there is no longer anything to take away" 
> >  --- A de Saint-Exupery 
>
> I prefer this quote than the preceding one. Looks like arithmetic is   
> perfect, in that sense. All universal numbers! 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
>
> > 
> > -- 
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google   
> > Groups "Everything List" group. 
> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,   
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>
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> > . 
> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. 
> > 
> > 
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-20 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 20 Apr 2013, at 19:49, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Apr 20, 2013 at 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that  
nobody has clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what  
the answer is expected to do.

> The hard problem is only the antic mind-body problem, and what you  
say is that you don't understand it, as it happens frequently. UDA  
reduces that problem to the problem of justifying, by a FPI  
statistics, the belief in matter by some average relative universal  
machine/number.

Yes exactly, that is a perfect example of what I just said:  The  
reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody has  
clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the answer is  
expected to do.

Do you believe that it is plausible that your brain might be Turing  
emulable? Then the problem consists in justifying the physical laws  
from number self-reference.

You can weaken the condition of Turing emulability, and you get  
corresponding problems, with harder and harder math.

There in no answer in science, only questions and theories which put  
light, and sometimes shadow, on what we can explore.

Bruno

  John K Clark

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-20 Thread John Mikes

Brent and Bruno:
*Brent* I love you for your scientific self-consciousness:
*"I'm not so sure of the problem, but I'm pretty sure of the solution."*
That's the 'end' of all. Religions like it.

Here is what I see as the (hard problem) problem: people like to think in
the mind-body restriction, as BODY only, considering the 'mind' (?) only as
*expressions of the body.* How about thought, i.e. ideational thinking -
considered practically within measuring only our already available physical
data? where do we get the "blue" mAmp for logical and the "red" mAmp for
emotional disagreement? the yellow mAmp for "I forgot" and the purple mAmp
for "yesterday I was hungry"? Do we differentiate btw. blood-surges as to
pertinent to musical, or visual enjoyment/(un)aesthetics) - or else?
I would love to learn the solution for such distinctions using *BODILY*data.
I have a solution: I dunno.

*Bruno:*  *"...it is just pseudo aristotelian religion."*
I like your putting a NAME to my agnostic outburst, not necessarily
all-agreeable for me (I don't like to go 'back' to the oldies).
Even 'religion' (what I used a minute ago) is suspect since we have no
proper identification for 'them' in wide ranges (I may call my 'belief' in
the infinite complexity as one). So is your comp-basis I suppose, or
Brent's 'connectivity' (=mapping?) between (tissue?)brain functions and AS
(oops: AI, what I miswrote is Artificial Stupidity). He may be right, of
course, if we reduce our interest to the already knowable 'model' of the
world. I don't go for such reductionism in thinking theoretically.

Regards

John M

On Sat, Apr 20, 2013 at 5:20 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 20 Apr 2013, at 05:26, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 4/19/2013 5:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody has
>>> clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the answer is
>>> expected to do.
>>>
>>
>> I'm not so sure of the problem, but I'm pretty sure of the solution.
>>  When we can build AI robots that exhibit (including reporting) intelligent
>> and emotional responses similar to humans and we can map between their AI
>> and the function of brains in a way that allows us to reliably adjust the
>> behavior of AI robots and/or humans - then we will have "solved" the
>> problem, in the practical sense that no one will care about it in general
>> terms but will discuss it in technical terms the way biologists discuss
>> protein production and messenger RNA and DNA error correction but no longer
>> discuss "what is life?".
>>
>
> No this will not work. We must test the physical consequence of the belief
> that the brain can be truncated at a finite level. If not, it is just
> pseudo aristotelian religion.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> Brent
>>
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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Apr 2013, at 17:56, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/20/2013 2:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Apr 2013, at 05:26, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/19/2013 5:31 PM, John Clark wrote:


The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody  
has clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the  
answer is expected to do.


I'm not so sure of the problem, but I'm pretty sure of the  
solution.  When we can build AI robots that exhibit (including  
reporting) intelligent and emotional responses similar to humans  
and we can map between their AI and the function of brains in a  
way that allows us to reliably adjust the behavior of AI robots  
and/or humans - then we will have "solved" the problem, in the  
practical sense that no one will care about it in general terms  
but will discuss it in technical terms the way biologists discuss  
protein production and messenger RNA and DNA error correction but  
no longer discuss "what is life?".


No this will not work. We must test the physical consequence of the  
belief that the brain can be truncated at a finite level.


Sure. Not only will we build AI robots, but we will also use the  
understanding we develop to modify brains and cure some mental  
illness; which will entail learning the proper level of  
substitution.  But it will all be inferred from behavior and reports  
and mapping between AI and brain processes.


In part, as the pioneer of technological (local) immortality will take  
the first approximation. My point is more concrete, comp leads to  
testable observation in the physical world, indeed the laws of physics.


Comp gives the realm where the laws of physics evolves, a sort of many  
interfering 'matrix' which exists by the law of + and *. It is  
testable, with the classical theory of knowledge (not Theatetus,  
except that Theaetetus gives it when apply to sigma_1 complete  
provability).





Brent
"Perfection is attained not when there is no longer anything to add,
but when there is no longer anything to take away"
 --- A de Saint-Exupery


I prefer this quote than the preceding one. Looks like arithmetic is  
perfect, in that sense. All universal numbers!


Bruno






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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-20 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Apr 20, 2013 at 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody has
> clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the answer is
> expected to do.
>
> > The hard problem is only the antic mind-body problem, and what you say
> is that you don't understand it, as it happens frequently. UDA reduces that
> problem to the problem of justifying, by a FPI statistics, the belief in
> matter by some average relative universal machine/number.
>

Yes exactly, that is a perfect example of what I just said:  The reason
nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody has clearly
explained exactly what the problem is or what the answer is expected to do.

  John K Clark

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-20 Thread meekerdb

On 4/20/2013 2:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Apr 2013, at 05:26, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/19/2013 5:31 PM, John Clark wrote:

The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody has clearly
explained exactly what the problem is or what the answer is expected to do.

I'm not so sure of the problem, but I'm pretty sure of the solution. When we can build
AI robots that exhibit (including reporting) intelligent and emotional responses
similar to humans and we can map between their AI and the function of brains in a way
that allows us to reliably adjust the behavior of AI robots and/or humans - then we
will have "solved" the problem, in the practical sense that no one will care about it
in general terms but will discuss it in technical terms the way biologists discuss
protein production and messenger RNA and DNA error correction but no longer discuss
"what is life?".

No this will not work. We must test the physical consequence of the belief that the
brain can be truncated at a finite level.

Sure. Not only will we build AI robots, but we will also use the understanding we develop
to modify brains and cure some mental illness; which will entail learning the proper level
of substitution. But it will all be inferred from behavior and reports and mapping
between AI and brain processes.

Brent
"Perfection is attained not when there is no longer anything to add,
but when there is no longer anything to take away"
--- A de Saint-Exupery

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-20 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Saturday, April 20, 2013 5:18:01 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Apr 2013, at 02:31, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody has 
> clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the answer is 
> expected to do.
>
>
> The hard problem is only the antic mind-body problem, and what you say is 
> that you don't understand it, as it happens frequently. UDA reduces that 
> problem to the problem of justifying, by a FPI statistics, the belief in 
> matter by some average relative universal machine/number. 
> Then the qualia are explained by the logic of self-reference, like the 
> quanta, but it leads to testable statictics on the quanta, so that we can 
> test the comp theory theory of consciousness.
>

I would disagree in the sense that your definition conflates the hard 
problem with the explanatory gap - which is hugely common and not a big 
deal unless you are getting very specific about it. I see the difference 
between my definition (which I think more or less reflects Chalmers 
original intent) and the mind/body problem, is that the Hard problem is 
just the aesthetic problem. Why does the mind have any aesthetic content to 
begin with? What are colors and flavors doing in a computer program, or 
neuronal interactions. Of course, there can never be an answer to that, in 
my opinion, because I see the question is upside down. The programs and 
neurons are only always within the aesthetic dream of the universe.

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>   John K Clark   
>
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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Apr 2013, at 05:26, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/19/2013 5:31 PM, John Clark wrote:


The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody  
has clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the  
answer is expected to do.


I'm not so sure of the problem, but I'm pretty sure of the  
solution.  When we can build AI robots that exhibit (including  
reporting) intelligent and emotional responses similar to humans and  
we can map between their AI and the function of brains in a way that  
allows us to reliably adjust the behavior of AI robots and/or humans  
- then we will have "solved" the problem, in the practical sense  
that no one will care about it in general terms but will discuss it  
in technical terms the way biologists discuss protein production and  
messenger RNA and DNA error correction but no longer discuss "what  
is life?".


No this will not work. We must test the physical consequence of the  
belief that the brain can be truncated at a finite level. If not, it  
is just pseudo aristotelian religion.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Apr 2013, at 02:31, John Clark wrote:



The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody  
has clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the answer  
is expected to do.


The hard problem is only the antic mind-body problem, and what you say  
is that you don't understand it, as it happens frequently. UDA reduces  
that problem to the problem of justifying, by a FPI statistics, the  
belief in matter by some average relative universal machine/number.
Then the qualia are explained by the logic of self-reference, like the  
quanta, but it leads to testable statictics on the quanta, so that we  
can test the comp theory theory of consciousness.


Bruno





  John K Clark

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-19 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:26:28 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 4/19/2013 5:31 PM, John Clark wrote: 
> > 
> > The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody has 
> clearly explained 
> > exactly what the problem is or what the answer is expected to do. 
>
> I'm not so sure of the problem, but I'm pretty sure of the solution. 

Then you are not a scientist.

>  When we can build AI 
> robots that exhibit (including reporting) intelligent and emotional 
> responses similar to 
> humans and we can map between their AI and the function of brains in a way 
> that allows us 
> to reliably adjust the behavior of AI robots and/or humans

If I am right, that will never happen. No non-human will ever have a human 
feeling or thought. Biologically or technologically enhanced humans - 
certainly. Augmented reality and diminished reality, spectacular extension 
of human intelligence - absolutely. I am optimistic about the increasing 
utility of technology - but I am not optimistic that Pinocchio will become 
a real boy. Pictures of water won't make plants grow either. Not because of 
any magic or specialness about biology or carbon or any horseshit you will 
accuse me of next, but simply because it is a category error to build an 
experience from the outside in. Experience comes from the inside out.

> - then we will have "solved" 
> the problem, in the practical sense that no one will care about it in 
> general terms but 
> will discuss it in technical terms the way biologists discuss protein 
> production and 
> messenger RNA and DNA error correction but no longer discuss "what is 
> life?". 
>

You are welcomed to think that if it makes you feel better.

Craig

>
> Brent 
>

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-19 Thread meekerdb


On 4/19/2013 5:31 PM, John Clark wrote:


The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody has clearly explained 
exactly what the problem is or what the answer is expected to do.


I'm not so sure of the problem, but I'm pretty sure of the solution.  When we can build AI 
robots that exhibit (including reporting) intelligent and emotional responses similar to 
humans and we can map between their AI and the function of brains in a way that allows us 
to reliably adjust the behavior of AI robots and/or humans - then we will have "solved" 
the problem, in the practical sense that no one will care about it in general terms but 
will discuss it in technical terms the way biologists discuss protein production and 
messenger RNA and DNA error correction but no longer discuss "what is life?".


Brent

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-19 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Friday, April 19, 2013 8:31:39 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody has 
> clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the answer is 
> expected to do.
>

Yeah, it's a big mystery. To you. Like Free Will. 

The context of the hard problem is David Chalmers differentiating the issue 
of describing the mechanics of how data is processed in the brain such that 
there is an aesthetic experience and the issue of what an aesthetic 
experience it - why it is, how it is. What possible reason would there be 
for data to turn into such a thing?

What specifically are you having trouble understanding about that? Easy 
problem is a somewhat facetious term, because of course the neuroscience of 
the human brain is incredibly daunting, but compared to the Hard problem, 
its just a matter patience and good science to progress steadily toward 
solving it. The Hard problem is much different because we don't have any 
idea where to begin. It's snarky to call it the Hard problem, because he 
really means that it appears to be an impossible problem. Why is this?

Craig

>
>   John K Clark   
>

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-19 Thread John Clark

The reason nobody has a answer to the hard problem is that nobody has
clearly explained exactly what the problem is or what the answer is
expected to do.

  John K Clark

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Re: Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-19 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Friday, April 19, 2013 6:59:28 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>
> It is whatever an algorithm is computing. All the information is in the 
> computational state. If you have pain in your knee then exactly what 
> you are experiencing must be unambiguously present in the computational 
> state of your brain. 
>

Why would the computational state of your brain be associated with any kind 
of aesthetic phenomena though? That's Explanatory Gap. The Hard Problem is 
really about "why is there any such thing as aesthetic phenomena?"

Craig
 

>
> Saibal 
>

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Hard Problem not hard at all?

2013-04-19 Thread smitra

It is whatever an algorithm is computing. All the information is in the 
computational state. If you have pain in your knee then exactly what 
you are experiencing must be unambiguously present in the computational 
state of your brain.


Saibal

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