Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On 17 Oct 2012, at 20:16, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/17/2012 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinbergwhats...@gmail.com wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. Richard Hi Richard, Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett and the materialist, try to deny its existence. Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of anything. This is equivalent with saying I will not do science, and coherent with your idea that 2+2=5. How so? You are requiring that *any* intersection of 1p truths to = a truthful 3p. This is wrong! I was not saying that. You might be doing poetry, or continental philosophy, but we can hardly appreciate it as such, as you present it as telling a truth, and worst, a truth possibly insulting or degrading for an infinity of possible creatures. Come on, Bruno, I am trying to met you halfway in your comp result! I was talking to Craig. Even a philosopher can only defend the *possibility* of a truth. I am defending truth but must be consistent with the fact that we can only *know* finite approximations of truth. In science we don't defend truth. We develop belief from observation and dialog, deduce new belief and test them until we change them. We don't defend truth but try to agree on some and to derive from there. I am not saying that defending truth can't be interesting, but it is another activity. Some scientist and some philosophers can ignore the difference, and that can be confusing, especially when we tackle on some hot point where many acts as if they knew the truth. The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public token views). This might be true, but does not makes invalid the existence of theories, and objective 3p hypotheses, (like Arithmetic or String theory, or comp in cognitive sciences, etc.). Sure, I agree but notice that your statement is of theories. We have to be able to falsify them with reference to multiple 1p content for them to be possible 3p. Sure. Comp makes arithmetic, as a TOE, falsifiable. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On 16 Oct 2012, at 14:29, Craig Weinberg wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. That is a form of idealism. It presuppose sense, so I find it very poor as I am interested in understanding sense (and matter). Withc omp we pressuppose only numbers and +, and *, and define computation in that theory, then the coupling consciousness+material- realities emerges naturally in a testable manner. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Assuming that we are infinite, with an infinity not recoverable by the first person indeterminacy. Bruno Craig On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward- directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced. All art and insight comes from such an experience. On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the universe is made up of quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex entities. He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to the realm of spin networks. This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non- computability, and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. Instead, I propose the following: 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward- directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. = Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/teYzjZJLGQoJ . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On 16 Oct 2012, at 14:55, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Roger, On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? No! The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. No! 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has already shown this! Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of Löb property. This is also available from http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/ Löb's Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own soundness without becoming inconsistent. I get only page not found. Bruno A slightly more technical discussion here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. I will! === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se... B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. Sure, but the integrity or wholeness of an individual mind is only subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure under consistent self-reference (which is what Löb's Theorem is all about.) But this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the symmetry somehow! IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced. All art and insight comes from such an experience. No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it straight from the Horse's mouth. http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking: In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines, circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited, instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead, via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect than the material world of our external experiences, but just as real. Exactly how the contact is made between the realms remains to be explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno's COMP program and I am desperately trying to find a solution. On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the universe is made up of quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex entities. He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to the realm of spin networks. The physical universe yes, he believes that... He has shown how one can derive a crude version of space-time using spin combinatorials. This
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 8:27:51 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2012, at 14:29, Craig Weinberg wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. That is a form of idealism. It presuppose sense, so I find it very poor as I am interested in understanding sense (and matter). You already are sense and matter. There is no better way to understand it. Sense is not ideal, it is concretely real - all around us, within us. If I want to compute something, I have to count. If it's a complex computation, I need to enslave an inanimate object - because it's so incredibly antithetical to our nature. Counting is what we do to put ourselves to sleep, to hypnotize. Counting blows out the candle of 1p sense to reveal the shadows cast between 1p experiences. Withc omp we pressuppose only numbers and +, and *, and define computation in that theory, then the coupling consciousness+material-realities emerges naturally in a testable manner. To quote you - That is a form of idealism. It pre-supposes arithmetic which I see clearly as a kind of sense - a feeling of augmentation or meta-augmentation in any particular context. It makes it completely circular as you smuggle consciousness in to begin with, but you don't recognize or acknowledge that you do. Instead of + and * just start with the entire canon of mathematics in the last 2000 years - what difference does it make? There is no more explanation for the appearance of * in the universe than there is for primitive matter. What's *? It's a sense-making relationship among concretely experienced ideas. It is a psychological mapping, not a causally efficacious metaphysical principle. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Assuming that we are infinite, with an infinity not recoverable by the first person indeterminacy. I don't think I'm assuming anything. I'm saying that if you can drive a bus down the street without a 50 foot tall inflatable flamingo tied to the roof, then producing giant inflatable birds are probably not going to be a priority in a universe made of bus drivers. Craig Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Rg7QrKMWvpEJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:05, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 8:33 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Roger, Philosophers such as Lucas, Hofstadter and Chalmers as well as Penrose and Godel suggest that consciousness may be due to incompleteness itself allowing for emergence... Seehttp://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf Richard Hi Richard, I only have one beef with your thesis, you over rely on a theory that has yet to have a single physically testable prediction! IMHO, it would be better to think of all that super- geometry as nothing more than beautiful mathematics until that day that we actually find a squark or photino. Hofstadter is 100% correct on Gödel. Lucas and Penrose are incorrect on Gödel. All details are in conscience and mechanism. In fact the löbian machine naturally refutes the Gödelian argument against mechanism. But, I am OK, for obvious reason for those who have studied sane04 or my older papers that incompleteness plays a major role in both the explanation of consciousness and its origin, and the explanation where the laws of physics come from (and are divided into sharable first person plural quanta, and the non sharable qualia). I use Solovay theorem, which gives the strongest precision possible on Gödel's incompleteness possible, as it characterize the logic of the true and provable self-reference (G) and the true but non provable self-referential statement (G*). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On 16 Oct 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinbergwhats...@gmail.com wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. Richard Hi Richard, Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett and the materialist, try to deny its existence. Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of anything. This is equivalent with saying I will not do science, and coherent with your idea that 2+2=5. You might be doing poetry, or continental philosophy, but we can hardly appreciate it as such, as you present it as telling a truth, and worst, a truth possibly insulting or degrading for an infinity of possible creatures. Even a philosopher can only defend the *possibility* of a truth. The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public token views). This might be true, but does not makes invalid the existence of theories, and objective 3p hypotheses, (like Arithmetic or String theory, or comp in cognitive sciences, etc.). Bruno Craig -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Da_L25jJo00J . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 11:14:01 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinbergwhats...@gmail.com wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. Richard Hi Richard, Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett and the materialist, try to deny its existence. Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of anything. This is equivalent with saying I will not do science, and coherent with your idea that 2+2=5. I think that this is doing science. I don't think that 2+2=5, I think that numbers divorced from concrete referents are not real. I don't believe in the universality of computation, but I do believe that where computation applies (rigid objects subject to control by recursive enumeration) that important pseudo 3p views of sense can be modeled. 1p can experience. 3p cannot. All 3p is experienced as a 1p reflection. You might be doing poetry, or continental philosophy, but we can hardly appreciate it as such, as you present it as telling a truth, and worst, a truth possibly insulting or degrading for an infinity of possible creatures. Haha. Any infinity of possible creatures who are insulted are cordially invited to auto-sodomize. Even a philosopher can only defend the *possibility* of a truth. I don't see the point of constantly inserting disclaimers in my words. What difference would it make? If I say 'I know this is the truth', does that relieve anyone of their duty to contemplate what I have said for themselves? You say all kinds of things as if they were true all of the time. Sometimes you take care to be polite and say that you don't have an opinion about COMP, or that such and such is true 'in the theory', but to me it makes no difference. I am perfectly capable of assessing whether what someone is saying is something that I should accept as fact without a second thought. I expect that treating others as less than that could be considered condescending. In the end it's all personal style and I don't see that it is helpful to spend time on. I could be wrong, but my point is always going to be 'assuming I'm right'. This is about exchanging ideas, no? Why formalize it any more than we need to? The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public token views). This might be true, but does not makes invalid the existence of theories, and objective 3p hypotheses, (like Arithmetic or String theory, or comp in cognitive sciences, etc.). The can be valid theories in a theoretical universe, but I don't see how they can be valid for this universe in which we actually live. I could be wrong of course, but someone would need to explain to me why. Craig Bruno Craig -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Da_L25jJo00J. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/rqRbfg_6EvcJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On 10/17/2012 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinbergwhats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. Richard Hi Richard, Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett and the materialist, try to deny its existence. Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of anything. This is equivalent with saying I will not do science, and coherent with your idea that 2+2=5. How so? You are requiring that *any* intersection of 1p truths to = a truthful 3p. This is wrong! You might be doing poetry, or continental philosophy, but we can hardly appreciate it as such, as you present it as telling a truth, and worst, a truth possibly insulting or degrading for an infinity of possible creatures. Come on, Bruno, I am trying to met you halfway in your comp result! Even a philosopher can only defend the *possibility* of a truth. I am defending truth but must be consistent with the fact that we can only *know* finite approximations of truth. The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public token views). This might be true, but does not makes invalid the existence of theories, and objective 3p hypotheses, (like Arithmetic or String theory, or comp in cognitive sciences, etc.). Sure, I agree but notice that your statement is of theories. We have to be able to falsify them with reference to multiple 1p content for them to be possible 3p. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced. All art and insight comes from such an experience. On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the universe is made up of quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex entities. He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to the realm of spin networks. This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability, and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. Instead, I propose the following: 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. = Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net javascript: 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/teYzjZJLGQoJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
Roger, Philosophers such as Lucas, Hofstadter and Chalmers as well as Penrose and Godel suggest that consciousness may be due to incompleteness itself allowing for emergence... See http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf Richard On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 7:48 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced. All art and insight comes from such an experience. On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the universe is made up of quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex entities. He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to the realm of spin networks. This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability, and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. Instead, I propose the following: 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. = Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. Richard On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced. All art and insight comes from such an experience. On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the universe is made up of quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex entities. He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to the realm of spin networks. This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability, and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. Instead, I propose the following: 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. = Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/teYzjZJLGQoJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
Hi Roger, On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? No! The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. No! 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has already shown this! Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of Löb property. This is also available from http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/ Löb's Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own soundness without becoming inconsistent. A slightly more technical discussion here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry%27s_paradox If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. I will! === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html%20 Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se... B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. Sure, but the integrity or wholeness of an individual mind is only subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure under consistent self-reference (which is what Löb's Theorem is all about.) But this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the symmetry somehow! IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html%20 One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced. All art and insight comes from such an experience. No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it straight from the Horse's mouth. http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking: In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines, circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited, instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead, via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect than the material world of our external experiences, but just as real. Exactly how the contact is made between the realms remains to be explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno's COMP program and I am desperately trying to find a solution. On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the universe is made up of quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex entities. He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to the realm of spin networks. The physical universe yes, he believes that... He has shown how one can derive a crude version of
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On 10/16/2012 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Hi Craig, I agree, you would have the zombie without sense. By definition! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On 10/16/2012 8:33 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Roger, Philosophers such as Lucas, Hofstadter and Chalmers as well as Penrose and Godel suggest that consciousness may be due to incompleteness itself allowing for emergence... Seehttp://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf Richard Hi Richard, I only have one beef with your thesis, you over rely on a theory that has yet to have a single physically testable prediction! IMHO, it would be better to think of all that super-geometry as nothing more than beautiful mathematics until that day that we actually find a squark or photino. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. Richard Hi Richard, Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett and the materialist, try to deny its existence. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:54:10 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. This post http://s33light.org/post/24159233874 talks about why I use the word sense. I am saying that the only thing that the universe can be reduced to which is irreducible is sense, and by that I really mean sense in every sense, but in particular sensation, intuition, subjective feeling, pattern recognition, and categorization or discernment. Craig Richard On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced. All art and insight comes from such an experience. On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the universe is made up of quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex entities. He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to the realm of spin networks. This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability, and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. Instead, I propose the following: 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. = Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/teYzjZJLGQoJ. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript:. To unsubscribe from this
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinbergwhats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. Richard Hi Richard, Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett and the materialist, try to deny its existence. Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of anything. The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public token views). Craig -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Da_L25jJo00J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On 10/16/2012 2:17 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinbergwhats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. Richard Hi Richard, Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett and the materialist, try to deny its existence. Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of anything. The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public token views). Craig I agree 100%. All 3p related concepts are abstractions constructed from many different 1p's. The idea of Reality is a good example of this and it is why I define Reality as what which is incontrovertible for some collection N (N 2) of observers that can communicate (or interact) in some meaningful way. Of course the word meaningful is a bit ambiguous... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 2:24:07 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/16/2012 2:17 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinbergwhats...@gmail.com wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. Richard Hi Richard, Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett and the materialist, try to deny its existence. Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of anything. The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public token views). Craig I agree 100%. All 3p related concepts are abstractions constructed from many different 1p's. The idea of Reality is a good example of this and it is why I define Reality as what which is incontrovertible for some collection N (N 2) of observers that can communicate (or interact) in some meaningful way. Of course the word meaningful is a bit ambiguous... I can't find the post where we were talking about simulation, but I was going to lay it out like this. I'm in the desert and I see a shiny patch in the distance. I can consider the shimmering patch many things: A. Under-Signifying Range of Sense: 1) A perceptually modeled representation of dynamic changing optical conditions based on photon collisions and retinal stimulation. 2) A correlate for neurological functions evolved to link reflection with the presence of life sustaining H2O. a) this condition is either validated by the presence of water of negated by its absence. b) the limitations of 2) commonly lead to false positives owing to the similarity of patterns between heat convection and reflection off of the surface of water. B. Signifying or Personal Range of Sense 1) maybe a mirage (simulation of water) 2) maybe water (which could be just as easily called a simulation of a mirage) C. Over-signifying or Super-personal Range of Sense 1) hope and salvation 2) punishment from God/trickery from the devil. 3) a dramatic point in the story Simulation, to me, arises in the personal range of sensemaking. In the lower ranges, simulation is not applicable (saccharine molecules do not simulate sucrose molecules, polymer resin doesn't simulate the cellulose of a tree, etc) and in the upper ranges, interpretation is already ambiguous and faith based. You can't have a simulated dark night of the soul, it is an experience that already defines itself as unique and genuine (even if it's a genuine experience of being tricked). Simulation then, is about the level of preference and (drumroll) Free Will. If something satisfies our expectation criteria of what it is intended to substitute for, then we say it is a simulation. The mirage is an example of how ephemeral and relative this really is. The mirage only passes for simulating water to us, at a distance. Probably don't see a lot of insects or plants fooled by convection optics. It's only a simulation in one sense or set of senses. This is why AI simulation will fail to generate human subjectivity, because it only looks like a human if you program it to play Jeopardy or chess or drive a car, etc. I agree with you that, in this regard, everything only has one best simulation and that is itself. Only one instantiation of something can fulfill all possible expectation criteria for interaction with that thing for an indefinite period. I'm not sold on simulation being especially useful as a cosmological feature, but I think that it has potential within this Personal Range, and the bi-simulation is part of that. The personal range is the primary range anyhow. The loss of voluntary participation in the sub-personal, super-personal, and impersonal ranges coincides with the decrease in the relevance of simulation, as the 'seems like' range of direct relation gives way to the 'simply is' range of indirect (second hand) perceptual inertia. Craig -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/9n-0Us1wpdsJ. To post to this group, send
Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
On 10/16/2012 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I agree 100%. All 3p related concepts are abstractions constructed from many different 1p's. The idea of Reality is a good example of this and it is why I define Reality as what which is incontrovertible for some collection N (N 2) of observers that can communicate (or interact) in some meaningful way. Of course the word meaningful is a bit ambiguous... I can't find the post where we were talking about simulation, but I was going to lay it out like this. I'm in the desert and I see a shiny patch in the distance. I can consider the shimmering patch many things: A. Under-Signifying Range of Sense: 1) A perceptually modeled representation of dynamic changing optical conditions based on photon collisions and retinal stimulation. 2) A correlate for neurological functions evolved to link reflection with the presence of life sustaining H2O. a) this condition is either validated by the presence of water of negated by its absence. b) the limitations of 2) commonly lead to false positives owing to the similarity of patterns between heat convection and reflection off of the surface of water. B. Signifying or Personal Range of Sense 1) maybe a mirage (simulation of water) 2) maybe water (which could be just as easily called a simulation of a mirage) C. Over-signifying or Super-personal Range of Sense 1) hope and salvation 2) punishment from God/trickery from the devil. 3) a dramatic point in the story Simulation, to me, arises in the personal range of sensemaking. In the lower ranges, simulation is not applicable (saccharine molecules do not simulate sucrose molecules, polymer resin doesn't simulate the cellulose of a tree, etc) and in the upper ranges, interpretation is already ambiguous and faith based. You can't have a simulated dark night of the soul, it is an experience that already defines itself as unique and genuine (even if it's a genuine experience of being tricked). Simulation then, is about the level of preference and (drumroll) Free Will. If something satisfies our expectation criteria of what it is intended to substitute for, then we say it is a simulation. The mirage is an example of how ephemeral and relative this really is. The mirage only passes for simulating water to us, at a distance. Probably don't see a lot of insects or plants fooled by convection optics. It's only a simulation in one sense or set of senses. This is why AI simulation will fail to generate human subjectivity, because it only looks like a human if you program it to play Jeopardy or chess or drive a car, etc. I agree with you that, in this regard, everything only has one best simulation and that is itself. Only one instantiation of something can fulfill all possible expectation criteria for interaction with that thing for an indefinite period. I'm not sold on simulation being especially useful as a cosmological feature, but I think that it has potential within this Personal Range, and the bi-simulation is part of that. The personal range is the primary range anyhow. The loss of voluntary participation in the sub-personal, super-personal, and impersonal ranges coincides with the decrease in the relevance of simulation, as the 'seems like' range of direct relation gives way to the 'simply is' range of indirect (second hand) perceptual inertia. Craig Hi Craig, It occurs to me that we can only gain information from simulations if we (as observers thereof) are within the simulacra itself in some way. For example, the moving playing on my TV screen is a simulation of a jet plane flying through the air and not the real thing but I am not the only possible viewer of that simulated jet plane. There are multiple observers possible and we are all within the same reality. It seems that for the bijective identity to hold between object and best possible simulation there can only be one observer of the simulation, the object itself, other wise there is the possibility of a distorted view of the object and thus the bijection fails This smells suspiciously like a definition of 1p! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
