Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Hi Brent, I have joined you last two posts, Le 31-août-07, à 17:55, Brent Meeker a écrit : Yes. I can accept that PA is a description of counting. But PA, per se, is not a description of PA. With your term: I can accept arithmetic is a description of counting (and adding and multiplying), but I don't accept that arithmetic (PA) is a description of arithmetic (PA). Only partially so, and then this is not trivial at all to show (Godel did that). Right. PA is description of arithmetic and Godel showed that part of PA could be described within PA. OK. And then PA can reason on PA (without any new axioms). Do you see why I think your objection was a non-sequitur? But then how do you distinguish arithmetic and Arithmetic? How to you distinguish a description of counting (like PA or ZF) and a description of a description of counting, like when Godel represents arithmetic in arithmetic, or principia mathematica *in* principia mathematica ... Yes, that's the question. If arithmetic is all that is provable from PA it is well defined. Sure. But Arithmetic isn't well defined. Why? It is just the set of arithmetical sentences which are satisfied in the structure (N, +, *). That set is not recursively enumerable (mechanically enumerable), but non RE sets abound in math. Do you accept that classical logic works on number? If yes, it is simple to define Arithmetic in naive set theory, as you can define it in formal set theory (ZF). Recall that arithmetical truth (Arithmetic) is even just a tiny part of mathematical truth. Analytical truth, second-order logic truth, etc... are vastly bigger. Most usual categories are still bigger, ... It's lots of different sets of propositions that are provable from PA+Something. Sure, and if that Something is sound, this gives sequences of approximation of Arithmetic. Arithmetic, the set of true arithmetical sentence is productive (like the set of growing functions I have described to Tom). It means that not only Arithmetic is not recursively enumerable, but it is constructively so! For each RE set W_i which is propose as a candidate for an enumeration of Arithmetic, you can find an element in Arithmetic (a true sentence) which does not belong to W_i. This is a version of incompleteness. If that Something is a Godel numbering scheme then there is a mapping between proofs and arithmetic propositions. I don't understand. The goal of a numbering scheme is to study what PA can say about PA, without adding any something to PA. It is different. In Peano Arithmetic, a number like 7 is usually represented by an expression like sss0 (or s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))). But in arithmetical meta-arithmetic, although the number 7 is still represented by sss0, the representing object sss0 will be itself represented by the godel number of the expression sss0, which will be usually a huge number like (2^4)*(3^4)*(5^4)*(7^4)*(11^4)*(13^4)*(17^4)*(19^5), where 4 is the godel number of the symbol s and 5 is the godel number of the symbol 0. Prime numbers are used so that by Euclid's fundamental theorem,I mean the uniqueness of prime decomposition of numbers (Euclid did not get it completely I know) we can associate a unique number to finite strings of symbols. In PA the symbols 0, + etc. make it possible to describe numbers and counting. Meta-PA is a theory in which you have to describe proofs and reasoning. Then it is not entirely obvious that a big part of Meta-PA can be described in the language of PA. But this doesn't make it the same thing as PA. It is functionnally isomorphe. Like a comp doppelganger. It is a third person self. PA cannot prove that PA is PA, but can bet on it correctly by chance. Then you can mathematically study what PA can prove on PA, or what a (correct) machine can prove about herself, from some correct third person description of herself. Don't confuse that third person self with the first person whose self has not even a name. This makes possible for PA to reason about its own reasoning abilities, and indeed to discover that IF there is no number describing a proof of a falsity THEN I cannot prove that fact, for example. This shows that wonderful thing which is that PA can, by betting interrogatively on its own consistency, infer its own limitation with respect to the eventually never completely and effectively describable Arithmetic (arithmetical truth). But it is this incompleteness and indescribability of Arithmetic which causes me to think that it doesn't exist. arithmetic (PA) is incomplete (provably so by us, as far as we are sound lobian machine), but it is describable, already by a simpler than us machine like ZF. Then ZF cannot define a notion of set theoretical truth. It is general: no sound machine M can ever describe or define his own global notion of M-truth. You can't infer from this that such notion are senseless.
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Sep 1, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The description itself is an algorithm written in symbols. Peano's axioms aren't an algorithm. Er..you're right here of course. I'm getting myself a bit confused again. Careful when thinking about these profound topics - it's easy to get oneself tied in knots. So lets try to get this right. What I should have said is that there are different levels of abstraction in one's descriptionsPeano's axioms are a mathematical description at a higher level of abstraction than a description of a computational procedure. Algorithms are computational procedures and aren't necessarily written in symbols. Writing the symbols might be an *instance* of an algorithmic process. As I type my computer is executing algorithms that are embodied in electronic processes. Well, there's the 'algorithm' itself (considered as a *static* data structure), and there's the algorithm considered in the sense you are talking about, as an implemented computational system or process. Again, more than one sense of mathematical terms. But again, you're right that in neither sense does the algorithm need to be written in symbols. Writing the symbols would a *physical* instance of a static description. So three senses of math here: (1) The platonic forms (which are timeless and not in space and time) (2) An actual implemenation of these forms in space-time (a *process* or computation) and (3) The symbolic representation of (2) - an algorithm as written on a peice of paper, described , drawn as diagram etc. You can see that the *process of counting* (2) is not the same as the description of counting (3). When you (Brent) engage in counting your brain runs the algorithm. But a description of this process is simply symbols written on a piece of paper. No, a description is Peano's axioms or some other axioms that describe the numbers and their relations. Yes, you're right, see above, I was a little confused at time of writing that. There's more than one level of description for math terms is what I meant to say. Of course all math has a descriptive component, but consider the possibility that platonic math forms do exist. Then of the sake of argument one needs to distinguish between *descriptions* of a thing and the thing itself. Peano's axioms are one kind of description...the kind that I thing do correspond to objectively existing platonic math forms. The second level of description would be a description of a computational procedure this level of description corresponds to well. computional procedures of course. Finally you have the third level of description which is of an algorithm considered as a static data structure and I don't think that this third level of description is objective, but would agree that it's simply a human DP Modelling concept. The symbols written on paper would be a *physical* instance of this third level of description. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 31, 6:21 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I *don't* think that mathematical properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I think they are properties *of the thing itself*. I agree with you. If you identify mathematical theories with descriptions, then the study of the description themselves is metamathematics or mathematical logic, and that is just a tiny part of mathematics. That seems to be a purely semantic argument. You could as well say arithmetic is metacounting. ? I don't understand. Arithmetic is about number. Meta-arithmetic is about theories on numbers. That is very different. Yes, I understand that. But ISTM the argument went sort of like this: I say arithmetic is a description of counting, abstracted from particular instances of counting. You say, no, description of arithmetic is meta-mathematics and that's only a small part of mathematics, therefore arithmetic can't be a description. Do you see why I think your objection was a non-sequitur? Brent aMeeker Mathematical concepts have more than one sense, is the point I think Bruno was trying to make. For instance consider algebra - there's *Categories* (which are the objectively existing platonic mathematical forms themselves) and then there's the *dynamic implementation* of these categories:the *process* of algebraic operations (like counting). But processes themselves (computations) are *not* equiavalent to the *descriptions* of these processes. The description itself is an algorithm written in symbols. So three senses of math here: (1) The platonic forms (which are timeless and not in space and time) (2) An actual implemenation of these forms in space-time (a *process* or computation) and (3) The symbolic representation of (2) - an algorithm as written on a peice of paper, described , drawn as diagram etc. You can see that the *process of counting* (2) is not the same as the description of counting (3). When you (Brent) engage in counting your brain runs the algorithm. But a description of this process is simply symbols written on a piece of paper. As to Godel, I agree with Bruno. The point is that there are *perfectly meaningful* mathematical questions expressed in the language of some formal system for which the answers can't be found within that system. This shows that math is bigger (extends beyond) any system as described by humans ; so math itself is objectively real and can't be just descriptive. If math were just descriptive, all meaningful math questions should be answerable within the human described system. --- PS Hee hee. This is getting easier and easier for me. My old opponents elsewhere are getting slower and slower. That's because they started from the 'bottom up' and are progressing more and more slowly as they try to go to higher levels of abstractions. (so they've run into a brick wall with the problem of 'reflection'). I, on the other hand, started at the very highest level of abstraction and my progress is getting faster and faster as I move down the levels of abstraction LOL.. (Note: The PS was just a digression - nothing to do with this thread or list). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Le 30-août-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: ? I don't understand. Arithmetic is about number. Meta-arithmetic is about theories on numbers. That is very different. Yes, I understand that. But ISTM the argument went sort of like this: I say arithmetic is a description of counting, abstracted from particular instances of counting. I guess you mean by arithmetic some theory, i.e. Peano Arithmetic (PA). I can agree that a theory like PA is a description of counting. But Peano Arithmetic is different from Arithmetical truth. OK? You say, no, description of arithmetic is meta-mathematics Yes. I can accept that PA is a description of counting. But PA, per se, is not a description of PA. With your term: I can accept arithmetic is a description of counting (and adding and multiplying), but I don't accept that arithmetic (PA) is a description of arithmetic (PA). Only partially so, and then this is not trivial at all to show (Godel did that). and that's only a small part of mathematics, therefore arithmetic can't be a description. PA can be considered as a description of counting. But PA is incomplete with respect to Arithmetic (with a big A). PA, like ZF, like any effective theory, (like ourselves with comp) can only describe a tiny part of Arithmetic. Do you see why I think your objection was a non-sequitur? But then how do you distinguish arithmetic and Arithmetic? How to you distinguish a description of counting (like PA or ZF) and a description of a description of counting, like when Godel represents arithmetic in arithmetic, or principia mathematica *in* principia mathematica ... It is different. In Peano Arithmetic, a number like 7 is usually represented by an expression like sss0 (or s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))). But in arithmetical meta-arithmetic, although the number 7 is still represented by sss0, the representing object sss0 will be itself represented by the godel number of the expression sss0, which will be usually a huge number like (2^4)*(3^4)*(5^4)*(7^4)*(11^4)*(13^4)*(17^4)*(19^5), where 4 is the godel number of the symbol s and 5 is the godel number of the symbol 0. Prime numbers are used so that by Euclid's fundamental theorem,I mean the uniqueness of prime decomposition of numbers (Euclid did not get it completely I know) we can associate a unique number to finite strings of symbols. In PA the symbols 0, + etc. make it possible to describe numbers and counting. Meta-PA is a theory in which you have to describe proofs and reasoning. Then it is not entirely obvious that a big part of Meta-PA can be described in the language of PA. This makes possible for PA to reason about its own reasoning abilities, and indeed to discover that IF there is no number describing a proof of a falsity THEN I cannot prove that fact, for example. This shows that wonderful thing which is that PA can, by betting interrogatively on its own consistency, infer its own limitation with respect to the eventually never completely and effectively describable Arithmetic (arithmetical truth). So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory with his intended model. Bruno PS The beginners should no worry. Most of what I say here will be re-explain, normally. Just be patient (or ask, or consult my work with some good book on logic). http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I said to Brent, Le 31-août-07, à 11:00, Bruno Marchal a écrit : So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory with his intended model. Brent, rereading your post I think there is perhaps more than one confusion. I cannot really be sure, because your wording arithmetic is ambiguous. Let me sum up by singling out three things which we should not be confused: 1) A theory about numbers/machines, like PA, ZF or any lobian machine. (= finite object, or mechanically enumerable objet) 2) Arithmetical truth (including truth about machine). (infinite and complex non mechanically enumerable object) 3) A meta-theory of PA (that is a theory about PA) (again a mechanically enumerable object) Only a meta-theory *about* PA, can distinguish PA and arithmetical truth. But then Godel showed that sometimes a meta-theory can be translated in or by the theory/machine. Rich theories/machine have indeed self-referential abilities, making it possible for them to guess their limitations. By doing so, such machines infer the existence of something transcendenting (if I can say) themselves. OK? Bruno I wonder how a machine actually does this. You see it's all about knowledge representation. Any machine has to be able to draw a distinction between a control class (its own internal reasoning processes) and a model class (the thing being modelled). But the actual class responsible for managing this distinction cannot itself be classified as either a control class or a model class. This is why I say that reflection (as in the case of self-referential machines) is really all *communication* - only the system is not communicating with an external user... *the system is communicating with itself*. That is to say, a class responsible for reflection is actually a VIEW class - it's *presenting* (symbolically) a slice of its own internal knowledge to itself. Thus does the problem of reflection entirely reduce to KR (knowledge representation) and ontology (assignation of designated meaning) to symbols. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Only a meta-theory *about* PA, can distinguish PA and arithmetical truth. But then Godel showed that sometimes a meta-theory can be translated in or by the theory/machine. But is the meta-theory *about* PA, itself classified as either PA or 'Arithmetical truth' ? The meta-theory itself (when enacted as a computation) cannot be classified as either, it seems to me. So it appears there's a third category which is neither arithmetic (descriptions) nor Arithemetic (platonic truth). And recognizing this third category is the solution to the puzzle of reflection OK! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Aug 31, 6:21 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I *don't* think that mathematical properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I think they are properties *of the thing itself*. I agree with you. If you identify mathematical theories with descriptions, then the study of the description themselves is metamathematics or mathematical logic, and that is just a tiny part of mathematics. That seems to be a purely semantic argument. You could as well say arithmetic is metacounting. ? I don't understand. Arithmetic is about number. Meta-arithmetic is about theories on numbers. That is very different. Yes, I understand that. But ISTM the argument went sort of like this: I say arithmetic is a description of counting, abstracted from particular instances of counting. You say, no, description of arithmetic is meta-mathematics and that's only a small part of mathematics, therefore arithmetic can't be a description. Do you see why I think your objection was a non-sequitur? Brent Meeker Mathematical concepts have more than one sense, is the point I think Bruno was trying to make. For instance consider algebra - there's *Categories* (which are the objectively existing platonic mathematical forms themselves) So you say. and then there's the *dynamic implementation* of these categories: the *process* of algebraic operations (like counting). But processes themselves (computations) are *not* equiavalent to the *descriptions* of these processes. Sure. Counting sheep and goats and adding them up isn't equivalent to Peano's axioms. Who said otherwise? The description itself is an algorithm written in symbols. Peano's axioms aren't an algorithm. Algorithms are computational procedures and aren't necessarily written in symbols. Writing the symbols might be an *instance* of an algorithmic process. As I type my computer is executing algorithms that are embodied in electronic processes. So three senses of math here: (1) The platonic forms (which are timeless and not in space and time) (2) An actual implemenation of these forms in space-time (a *process* or computation) and (3) The symbolic representation of (2) - an algorithm as written on a peice of paper, described , drawn as diagram etc. You can see that the *process of counting* (2) is not the same as the description of counting (3). When you (Brent) engage in counting your brain runs the algorithm. But a description of this process is simply symbols written on a piece of paper. No, a description is Peano's axioms or some other axioms that describe the numbers and their relations. As to Godel, I agree with Bruno. The point is that there are *perfectly meaningful* mathematical questions expressed in the language of some formal system for which the answers can't be found within that system. This shows that math is bigger (extends beyond) any system as described by humans ; so math itself is objectively real and can't be just descriptive. If math were just descriptive, all meaningful math questions should be answerable within the human described system. --- PS Hee hee. This is getting easier and easier for me. My old opponents elsewhere are getting slower and slower. Or they're just getting tired of dealing with unsupported assertions. Brent Meeker That's because they started from the 'bottom up' and are progressing more and more slowly as they try to go to higher levels of abstractions. (so they've run into a brick wall with the problem of 'reflection'). I, on the other hand, started at the very highest level of abstraction and my progress is getting faster and faster as I move down the levels of abstraction LOL.. (Note: The PS was just a digression - nothing to do with this thread or list). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 30-août-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: ? I don't understand. Arithmetic is about number. Meta-arithmetic is about theories on numbers. That is very different. Yes, I understand that. But ISTM the argument went sort of like this: I say arithmetic is a description of counting, abstracted from particular instances of counting. I guess you mean by arithmetic some theory, i.e. Peano Arithmetic (PA). I can agree that a theory like PA is a description of counting. But Peano Arithmetic is different from Arithmetical truth. OK? Yes. You say, no, description of arithmetic is meta-mathematics Yes. I can accept that PA is a description of counting. But PA, per se, is not a description of PA. With your term: I can accept arithmetic is a description of counting (and adding and multiplying), but I don't accept that arithmetic (PA) is a description of arithmetic (PA). Only partially so, and then this is not trivial at all to show (Godel did that). Right. PA is description of arithmetic and Godel showed that part of PA could be described within PA. and that's only a small part of mathematics, therefore arithmetic can't be a description. PA can be considered as a description of counting. But PA is incomplete with respect to Arithmetic (with a big A). PA, like ZF, like any effective theory, (like ourselves with comp) can only describe a tiny part of Arithmetic. Do you see why I think your objection was a non-sequitur? But then how do you distinguish arithmetic and Arithmetic? How to you distinguish a description of counting (like PA or ZF) and a description of a description of counting, like when Godel represents arithmetic in arithmetic, or principia mathematica *in* principia mathematica ... Yes, that's the question. If arithmetic is all that is provable from PA it is well defined. But Arithmetic isn't well defined. It's lots of different sets of propositions that are provable from PA+Something. If that Something is a Godel numbering scheme then there is a mapping between proofs and arithmetic propositions. It is different. In Peano Arithmetic, a number like 7 is usually represented by an expression like sss0 (or s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))). But in arithmetical meta-arithmetic, although the number 7 is still represented by sss0, the representing object sss0 will be itself represented by the godel number of the expression sss0, which will be usually a huge number like (2^4)*(3^4)*(5^4)*(7^4)*(11^4)*(13^4)*(17^4)*(19^5), where 4 is the godel number of the symbol s and 5 is the godel number of the symbol 0. Prime numbers are used so that by Euclid's fundamental theorem,I mean the uniqueness of prime decomposition of numbers (Euclid did not get it completely I know) we can associate a unique number to finite strings of symbols. In PA the symbols 0, + etc. make it possible to describe numbers and counting. Meta-PA is a theory in which you have to describe proofs and reasoning. Then it is not entirely obvious that a big part of Meta-PA can be described in the language of PA. But this doesn't make it the same thing as PA. This makes possible for PA to reason about its own reasoning abilities, and indeed to discover that IF there is no number describing a proof of a falsity THEN I cannot prove that fact, for example. This shows that wonderful thing which is that PA can, by betting interrogatively on its own consistency, infer its own limitation with respect to the eventually never completely and effectively describable Arithmetic (arithmetical truth). But it is this incompleteness and indescribability of Arithmetic which causes me to think that it doesn't exist. You are just betting on it. I look at it this way: objects = things we observe to exist. counting = a physical process associating objects arithmetic = propositions about counting Peano's axioms = a description of arithmetic PA+Godel = a description of proofs in PA meta-mathematics = description of PA+Godel and other math. . . meta^N-mathematics = description of meta^(N-1)-mathematics So, do I need Arithmetic? Brent Meeker So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory with his intended model. Bruno PS The beginners should no worry. Most of what I say here will be re-explain, normally. Just be patient (or ask, or consult my work with some good book on logic). http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Bruno Marchal wrote: I said to Brent, Le 31-août-07, à 11:00, Bruno Marchal a écrit : So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory with his intended model. Brent, rereading your post I think there is perhaps more than one confusion. I cannot really be sure, because your wording arithmetic is ambiguous. Let me sum up by singling out three things which we should not be confused: OK. I don't think I'm confused about them. 1) A theory about numbers/machines, like PA, ZF or any lobian machine. (= finite object, or mechanically enumerable objet) 2) Arithmetical truth (including truth about machine). (infinite and complex non mechanically enumerable object) Is this the set of all (countably infinite) true propositions about the natural numbers? Is the existence of this set a matter of faith? 3) A meta-theory of PA (that is a theory about PA) (again a mechanically enumerable object) Only a meta-theory *about* PA, can distinguish PA and arithmetical truth. But then Godel showed that sometimes a meta-theory can be translated in or by the theory/machine. Rich theories/machine have indeed self-referential abilities, making it possible for them to guess their limitations. Are there not infinitely many Godel numbering schemes. By doing so, such machines infer the existence of something transcendenting transcending (if I can say) themselves. OK? OK. Brent Meeker Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 30, 1:37 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 29-août-07, à 12:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Any scientific theory (including Darwin's) *is* more accurate when expressed in mathematical notation. You *can* draw a clear distinction between the language used to express mathematical concepts and the concept itself. OK. Pure math concepts themselves consist of: Formal Systems, Relations and Differential Equations.They are abstract concepts which are precisely defined Not necessarily Well OK I take back the part about 'precisely defined'. But it seems to me that all of mathematics can be classified after three different categories - that is - there is natural 'three-fold' division of mathematics. Threeness does seem to be fundamental to onotlogy at the deepest level doesn't it? ;) All of math is three things: At the most basic level - *Predicates*. At a some what higher, more general level of abstractrion - *Relations* (including categories and functions). Finally at the most general level, differential equations. Relations could be thought of as a special case of calculus, predicates in turn as a special case of relations. BUt the most power (greatest level of generality) seems to reside in analysis and calculus. Would you agree with this? Predicates are the intrinsic aspect of math, relations fromwelll... they are...asbtracted relational properties of predicates. Finally calulus seems the boundaries and limts (literally! no pun intended) for the math-scape in which predicates and relations reside. and it is provable matter to determine the equivalence (or not) of different symbolic representations of them. N. I hope I will be able to prove this in due time to David, but even if you limit yourself to one prrograming language, it is provable that you have no general tools to see if two different programs compute the same function. At some point this is important to notice. Mathematical reality kicks back! (This goes in your direction). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Sorry my mistake. But surely you can compare one specific instance of a program with another specific instance. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I *don't* think that mathematical properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I think they are properties *of the thing itself*. I agree with you. If you identify mathematical theories with descriptions, then the study of the description themselves is metamathematics or mathematical logic, and that is just a tiny part of mathematics. That seems to be a purely semantic argument. You could as well say arithmetic is metacounting. ? I don't understand. Arithmetic is about number. Meta-arithmetic is about theories on numbers. That is very different. Only, Godel has been able to show that you can translate a part of meta-arithmetic into arithmetic, but that is not obvious (especially at Godel's time when the idea of programming did not exist). Obvious or not the disctinction between metamathematics and mathematics is rather crucial. It is as different as the difference between an observer and a reality. After Godel, even formalists are obliged to take that distinction into account. We know for sure, today, that arithmetical truth cannot be described by a complete theory, only tiny parts of it can, and this despite the fact that we can have a pretty good intuition of what arithmetical truth is. But one would not expect completeness of descriptions. Why? After all complete theories exist (like the first order theory of real numbers for example). Incompleteness of ALL axiomatizable theories with respect to arithmetical truth has been an unexpected shock. Hilbert predicted the contrary. So the incompleteness of mathematics should count against the existence of mathematical Truth - as opposed to individual propositions being true. I don't understand. Incompleteness of a theory is understandable only with respect to some interpretation or model, that is notion of truth. I do follow Godel on this question. Doesn't it strike you as strange that arithmetic is defined by formal procedures, Only a *theory on* arithmetic or number is defined by formal procedure (and does constitute an abstract machine). but when those procedures show it to be incomplete, mathematicians resort to intuition justify the existence of some whole? Theology indeed! I don't understand. All mathematicians (except few minorities like ultrafinitists) accept the notion of arithmetical truth, which can be represented by the set of all true sentences of arithmetic (or to be even more specific, it can be represented by the set of godel numbers of the arithmetical sentences). But no theory at all can define constructively that set. That set is not recursively enumerable. No algorithm can generate it. A rich lobian machine, like a theorem prover for a theory of set like Zermelo-Fraenkel, can define that set, but still not generate it, and it can be proved that this remains true for all the effective extension (where an extension is effective when the extension is still an axiomatizable theory. So yes, arithmetical truth is a purely theological matter for a simple lobian machine like Peano Arithmetic, but is just simple usual math (despite non effectivity, but this you get once you accept classical logic) for a super-rich lobian machine like ZF. Although sometime you say correct thing in logic, I get the feeling that you miss something about incompleteness ... (to be frank). Are you aware that the set of true arithmetical sentences is a well defined set in (formal or informal) set theory, yet that it cannot be generated by any (axiomatizable) theory. (note: Axiomatizable theory = theory such that the theorems can be generated by a machine. You can take this as a definition, but if you know the usual definition of axiomatizable theory, then this is a consequence by a theorem due to Craig). I have to go. I will say more to David tomorrow. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I *don't* think that mathematical properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I think they are properties *of the thing itself*. I agree with you. If you identify mathematical theories with descriptions, then the study of the description themselves is metamathematics or mathematical logic, and that is just a tiny part of mathematics. That seems to be a purely semantic argument. You could as well say arithmetic is metacounting. ? I don't understand. Arithmetic is about number. Meta-arithmetic is about theories on numbers. That is very different. Yes, I understand that. But ISTM the argument went sort of like this: I say arithmetic is a description of counting, abstracted from particular instances of counting. You say, no, description of arithmetic is meta-mathematics and that's only a small part of mathematics, therefore arithmetic can't be a description. Do you see why I think your objection was a non-sequitur? Brent aMeeker Only, Godel has been able to show that you can translate a part of meta-arithmetic into arithmetic, but that is not obvious (especially at Godel's time when the idea of programming did not exist). Obvious or not the disctinction between metamathematics and mathematics is rather crucial. It is as different as the difference between an observer and a reality. After Godel, even formalists are obliged to take that distinction into account. We know for sure, today, that arithmetical truth cannot be described by a complete theory, only tiny parts of it can, and this despite the fact that we can have a pretty good intuition of what arithmetical truth is. But one would not expect completeness of descriptions. Why? After all complete theories exist (like the first order theory of real numbers for example). Incompleteness of ALL axiomatizable theories with respect to arithmetical truth has been an unexpected shock. Hilbert predicted the contrary. So the incompleteness of mathematics should count against the existence of mathematical Truth - as opposed to individual propositions being true. I don't understand. Incompleteness of a theory is understandable only with respect to some interpretation or model, that is notion of truth. I do follow Godel on this question. Doesn't it strike you as strange that arithmetic is defined by formal procedures, Only a *theory on* arithmetic or number is defined by formal procedure (and does constitute an abstract machine). but when those procedures show it to be incomplete, mathematicians resort to intuition justify the existence of some whole? Theology indeed! I don't understand. All mathematicians (except few minorities like ultrafinitists) accept the notion of arithmetical truth, which can be represented by the set of all true sentences of arithmetic (or to be even more specific, it can be represented by the set of godel numbers of the arithmetical sentences). But no theory at all can define constructively that set. That set is not recursively enumerable. No algorithm can generate it. A rich lobian machine, like a theorem prover for a theory of set like Zermelo-Fraenkel, can define that set, but still not generate it, and it can be proved that this remains true for all the effective extension (where an extension is effective when the extension is still an axiomatizable theory. So yes, arithmetical truth is a purely theological matter for a simple lobian machine like Peano Arithmetic, but is just simple usual math (despite non effectivity, but this you get once you accept classical logic) for a super-rich lobian machine like ZF. Although sometime you say correct thing in logic, I get the feeling that you miss something about incompleteness ... (to be frank). Are you aware that the set of true arithmetical sentences is a well defined set in (formal or informal) set theory, yet that it cannot be generated by any (axiomatizable) theory. (note: Axiomatizable theory = theory such that the theorems can be generated by a machine. You can take this as a definition, but if you know the usual definition of axiomatizable theory, then this is a consequence by a theorem due to Craig). I have to go. I will say more to David tomorrow. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 29, 1:10 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So are mathematics human creations (c.f. William S. Cooper, The Evolution of Logic). There is no sharp distinction between what is expressed in words and what is expressed in mathematical symbols. Darwins theory of evolution is no more accurately expressed in mathematical notation. Any scientific theory (including Darwin's) *is* more accurate when expressed in mathematical notation. You *can* draw a clear distinction between the language used to express mathematical concepts and the concept itself. Pure math concepts themselves consist of: Formal Systems, Relations and Differential Equations.They are abstract concepts which are precisely defined and it is provable matter to determine the equivalence (or not) of different symbolic representations of them. So Deutsch has an overly generous criterion for exist. Does he consider epicycles real because they were indispensable to Ptolemy's theory of the cosmos. I'd go with Dr. Johnson - it exists if I kick it and it kicks back. Deutsch uses exactly the example you just gave! Dr Johnson's critera ;). Read his book. Grammer doesn't match the criteria. Math does. It's easy to cut out English concepts say, and replace them with other modes of descriptions. I don't see scientists labriously trying refactor all their mathematical explanations to refer only to material observables. Actually a theory that dispenses with unobservables is usually considered preferable, by application of Occam's razor. No, occam's razor says pick the theory with the most explanatory power and the one that simplifies explanations the most. The quantity of observations versus unobservables is quite irrelevent. For example in Newtonian mechanics force was an important concept, but later it was dropped. So what is it's status now? It's still a mathematical concept - but according to Deutsch it's not part of reality. The concept hasn't been dropped just re-defined. Your argument, even if I agreed with it, would only justify counting as objectively real those mathematical concepts that appear in a true theory of reality - and unfortunately we never know which one that is. Brent Meeker We don't have to know to certainty, just base judgements on available evidence. At this point in the debate I guess we can just maintain our entrenched positions. It all boils down to realist verus non- realist philosophy. But I repeat my observation that as a purely pragmatic matter, non-realist positions are not helpful for the progress of science. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I *don't* think that mathematical properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I think they are properties *of the thing itself*. I agree with you. If you identify mathematical theories with descriptions, then the study of the description themselves is metamathematics or mathematical logic, and that is just a tiny part of mathematics. After Godel, even formalists are obliged to take that distinction into account. We know for sure, today, that arithmetical truth cannot be described by a complete theory, only tiny parts of it can, and this despite the fact that we can have a pretty good intuition of what arithmetical truth is. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Le 29-août-07, à 12:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Any scientific theory (including Darwin's) *is* more accurate when expressed in mathematical notation. You *can* draw a clear distinction between the language used to express mathematical concepts and the concept itself. OK. Pure math concepts themselves consist of: Formal Systems, Relations and Differential Equations.They are abstract concepts which are precisely defined Not necessarily and it is provable matter to determine the equivalence (or not) of different symbolic representations of them. N. I hope I will be able to prove this in due time to David, but even if you limit yourself to one prrograming language, it is provable that you have no general tools to see if two different programs compute the same function. At some point this is important to notice. Mathematical reality kicks back! (This goes in your direction). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I *don't* think that mathematical properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I think they are properties *of the thing itself*. I agree with you. If you identify mathematical theories with descriptions, then the study of the description themselves is metamathematics or mathematical logic, and that is just a tiny part of mathematics. That seems to be a purely semantic argument. You could as well say arithmetic is metacounting. After Godel, even formalists are obliged to take that distinction into account. We know for sure, today, that arithmetical truth cannot be described by a complete theory, only tiny parts of it can, and this despite the fact that we can have a pretty good intuition of what arithmetical truth is. But one would not expect completeness of descriptions. So the incompleteness of mathematics should count against the existence of mathematical Truth - as opposed to individual propositions being true. Doesn't it strike you as strange that arithmetic is defined by formal procedures, but when those procedures show it to be incomplete, mathematicians resort to intuition justify the existence of some whole? Theology indeed! Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
[EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev: (7) From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real. But there exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained in terms of finite physical processes. How can you prove that infinite sets exists? -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 28/08/07, David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits, but the circulatory system as a whole was something emergent and not at all obvious, in the same way that mind was emergent. Alternatively, a superintelligent being could claim that the mind was as obviously the result of brain activity as circulation was the result of cardiovascular activity. Isn't the obvious (and AFAICS unanswerable) argument against this that 'circulation' is merely a convenient shorthand for the specific set of underlying structures and processes, once these have been identified, even when this is not obvious a priori. One adds nothing *explanatorily* by applying the term to these processes, which stand by themselves for what is to be explained from the third-person perspective which fully suffices in this case. But I don't see how even a superintelligent being could convince us that first person subjective experience is by any direct analogy *explained* merely by being equated to certain third person activities of the brain, with nothing further remaining to be accounted for. IOW, even if we are inclined to accept on other grounds some sort of functional identity theory, we have made no further progress towards *explaining* the categorical uniqueness of the first person. I'm not sure what the answer is. Some philosophers like Dennett and Hofstadter claim that consciousness is simply a shorthand for the activity of certain complex systems, not immediately obvious because they are so complex. Maybe a thermostat has a protoconsciousness which is no more than a description of what a thermostat does, and it is no more possible to disentangle this quality from thermostat activity than it is possible to disentangle thermostat activity from thermostat activity. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 28, 6:31 pm, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev: (7) From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real. But there exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained in terms of finite physical processes. How can you prove that infinite sets exists? -- Torgny Tholerus Greg Cantor showed that they were indispensible for further progress in mathematics (See 'Cantor' or Rudy Rucker 'Infinity and the Mind' (1982). From (1) and (2) , (3) (reality of infinite sets) follows. But this is goes beyond what is necessery for the actual argument that subjective experiences are non-material. It was simply given as an example of a mathematical concept for which it is absolutely clear-cut that the concept cannot be explained in physical terms. All that is neccessery for the argument is the point made in (4) - that 'patterns' are not equivalent to specific physical properties and cannot be objectivity measured (Ray Kurzweil agrees with this conclusion - see his book). Then from the rest, the conclusion is proven subjective experiences are non-material. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 28/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits, but the circulatory system as a whole was something emergent and not at all obvious, in the same way that mind was emergent. Alternatively, a superintelligent being could claim that the mind was as obviously the result of brain activity as circulation was the result of cardiovascular activity. Alternatively a superintelligent being might be quick to castigate you for your stupidly and claim that I am right *sarcastic*. We have to look at the facts based on the information at hand, not 'what if'. You haven't answered the essential point, endorsed by one of the most respected scientists in the world, Ray Kurzweil. Kurzweil is a well-known populariser, but I don't know that he deserves to be called one of the most respected scientists in the world. This point is that there's an essential difference between specific physical properties (which can be objectively measured - as in the the exmaple of circulation), and subjective experiences, which are not reducible to specific physical properties (subjective experiences are a *mathematical pattern* , and the same pattern could be enacted on anything- you could have intelligent silicon, rocks, clouds or anything. Further thesse patterns cannot be directly objectively measured. If I would only make one essential argument here it is: It's known for a fact that there exist mathematical concepts (infinite sets) which are indispensible to our explanations of reality but which can't be explained in terms of any finite physical processes. This is as clear-cut proof of the existence of non-material properties as you're ever likely to see! Mathematical concepts simply are not replaceable with physical descriptions. And subjective experiences are precisely *mathemetical patterns*. There is this sense in which the pattern is something over and above the physical substrate of its implementation. Would you say that the mind is to the brain as squareness is to a square-shaped table? -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Aug 28, 12:53 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word fundamental. The base property seems to me more deserving of being called fundamental than the supervenient property. If you were to give concise instructions to a god who wanted to build a copy of our world you could skip all the information about values etc. confident in the knowledge that all this extra stuff would emerge as long as the correct physical information was conveyed; whereas the converse is not the case. [If the mental does not supervene on the physical this changes the particular example, but not the general point.] Refer the brief definition of property dualism referenced by the link Bruno gave: http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/mind/notes/supervenience.html Be careful to draw a distinction between 'substances' and 'properties'. I accept that the underlying *substance* is likely physical, but *properties* are what are super-imposed on the top of the underlying substance. The physical *substance* may be the base level, but the physical *properties* aren't. From the mere fact that aesthetic properties are *composed of* physical substances, it does not follow that aesthetic properties themselves are physical. Nor does it follow from the fact that physical substances are *neccessery* for aesthetic properties, that they are *sufficient* to fully specify aesthetic properties. Here's why: Complete knowledge of the physical properties of your brain cannot in fact enable you to deduce your aesthetic preferences without additional *non-physical* assumptions. That is because,as I agreed with Bruno (see my previous post), all the explanatory power of reason is *mathematical* in nature. In short, in order for you to know how a complete specification of your brain state was correlated with your aesthetic preferences, you would have to use your own *subjective experiences* as a calibrator in order to make the correlation (ie When brain state X, I feel/experience Y). And these subjective experiences are not themsleves physical, but, as I have explained again and again, *Mathematical* properties. There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be perfectly reproduced by anyone who has at hand all the relevant third person information, even if it can't be reproduced in his own mind. You can build a bat which will to itself feel like a bat if you know every scientific detail about bats and have appropriately capable molecular assemblers at your disposal. Yes of course. But your ability to do this would not enable you to determine what the bat was actually feeling solely from the physical facts alone. So you say. I'm not so sure. (If you put matter together the right way, I agree you will be able to create consciousness, but you won't be explain what type of consciousness is created solely from physical data). So the fact that subjective experience is entirely dependent on physical substances does not provide a sufficient explanation of subjective experience. physical necessity unless you are a substance dualist, since the usual definition of supervenience says that same brain state implies same mind state. (It isn't a matter of logical necessity because property dualism is logically possible.) In this sense, the mental properties' dependence on the physical properties is asymmetrical, which is why I say the physical properties are more fundamental. You might agree with this analysis but simply have a different definition of fundamental. I agree that mental properties are depedent on the physical substance. The physical substance might be what is fundmanetal. But physical *properties* are what emerge from the movements of the underlying substance. Huh? How does gravitational mass emerge from movement? And what does emerge mean? Futher there are other non-physical properties which appear as well - mathematical for example. Is being countable a physical or a mathematical property? As I see it, mathematical and logical properties are properties of our descriptions of the things. They are desirable properties for any predictive description because they avoid self-contradiction; something that would render a prediction meaningless, but would be fine for a poem. What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits, but the circulatory system as a whole was something
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 29, 4:20 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Thanks for spelling it out. (1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of reality. So are grammatical concepts. No they aren't. Grammatical concepts are human creations, which is precisely shown by the fact that they *can* be dispensed with and replaced with scientific concepts which give a more accurate description of reality. What does it mean for a concept to be real? I don't find the argument from indispenability convincing. It's like saying because we don't know how to describe something without words, the words are real things. Not really. According Deutsch's 'Critera For Reality' (ref: 'The Fabric Of Reality', David Deutsch) , an application of occam's razor says that something should be considered to 'objectively exist' if taking the concept out of our theory made the explanation more complex or impossible. (ie the concept can't be dispensed with without complications). Grammer doesn't match the criteria. Math does. It's easy to cut out English concepts say, and replace them with other modes of descriptions. I don't see scientists labriously trying refactor all their mathematical explanations to refer only to material observables. It's not even possible. And that's why mathematical concepts should be taken to be objectively real. And patterns cannot be objectively measured in the way that specific physical properties can (See Ray Kurweil 'The Singularity Is Near' for agreement of this). Appeal to authority? No, a reference to a more detailed explanation of the point (so I don't have to laboriously type the argument here). I don't think anyone ever doubted that subjective experiences are processes - and in that sense non-material. But that doesn't show that they can exist apart from the material. Or that the existence and evolution of the process cannot be elucidated by purely material descriptions. I could as well observe that all patterns of any kind are instantiated in material. Brent Meeker Indeed all scientific evidence indicates that subjective experiences are entirely dependent on the material. Be careful to respond only to what I actually said rather than what you thought I said. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 29, 4:03 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is
left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information
is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be
perfectly reproduced by anyone who has at hand all the relevant third
person information, even if it can't be reproduced in his own mind.
You can build a bat which will to itself feel like a bat if you know
every scientific detail about bats and have appropriately capable
molecular assemblers at your disposal.
Yes of course. But your ability to do this would not enable you to
determine what the bat was actually feeling solely from the physical
facts alone.
So you say. I'm not so sure.
Go back to our previous discussions. A complete material description
of something cannot be mapped to subjective experiences without using
knowledge about subjective experience. If you know that neurons X are
firing in way Y, for sure, the subjective experience is entirely
dependent on this process, but how do you know what subjective
experience this material process is actually causing? You can't know
without having knowledge of the *correlation* (mapping) between the
material procceses and subjective experience. And in using knowledge
of this correlation, you would be slipping in references to subjective
experience in your explanations. ('cheating' as it were).
I agree that mental properties are depedent on the physical
substance. The physical substance might be what is fundmanetal. But
physical *properties* are what emerge from the movements of the
underlying substance.
Huh? How does gravitational mass emerge from movement? And what does
emerge mean?
mass appears to be intrinsic to a physical thing itself (ie
*substance*), not a property resulting from physical processes.
'Emerge' simply means that properties are not intrinsic but are a
result of physical interactions and processes.
Futher there are other non-physical properties
which appear as well - mathematical for example.
Is being countable a physical or a mathematical property? As I see it,
mathematical and logical properties are properties of our descriptions of
the things. They are desirable properties for any predictive description
because they avoid self-contradiction; something that would render a
prediction meaningless, but would be fine for a poem.
being countable is of course of a mathematical property. And your
point here is at the heart of our disagreement. Because of the
argument from indispensability, I *don't* think that mathematical
properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I
think they are properties *of the thing itself*. Some kinds of
description (ie mathematical concepts) can't be dispensed with in our
explanations of reality. Therefore the simplest explanations is that
these concepts exist objectively.
This point is that
there's an essential difference between specific physical properties
(which can be objectively measured - as in the the exmaple of
circulation), and subjective experiences, which are not reducible to
specific physical properties
You keep asserting that, but exactly the same thing was said about life.
Yes, but I can explain exactly what the difference is in the case of
mind/brain. Mental properties are mathematical patterns. Physical
properties are not.
(subjective experiences are a
*mathematical pattern* , and the same pattern could be enacted on
anything- you could have intelligent silicon, rocks, clouds or
anything. Further thesse patterns cannot be directly objectively
measured.
Why can't such patterns be measured? If I create an intelligent computer,
why can't I follow it's operation?
You *can* measure the physical correlates of these patterns. But the
point that I (and David) had been making that the physical correlates
of these patterns are not the mathematical pattern (ie the mental
process) itself.
If I would only make one essential argument here it is:
It's known for a fact that there exist mathematical concepts (infinite
sets) which are indispensible to our explanations of reality but which
can't be explained in terms of any finite physical processes.
I don't think so. Infinities in physical theories are just convenient
approximations for something very big.
Brent Meeker
I would carefully read Rudy Rucker's 'book of Infinity. It is a
through rebutting of the idea that 'inifinites in physical theories
are just conveient approximations'. The whole of cantor's set theory
simply doesn't work without assuming that the infinities are things in
themselves. There is more than one kind of infinity.
It all comes down to perspective. The attempt to reduce everything to
material concepts would severely limit science. In fact most of
computer science couldn't be done. computer scientists don't talk in
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Aug 29, 4:20 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Thanks for spelling it out. (1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of reality. So are grammatical concepts. No they aren't. Grammatical concepts are human creations, which is precisely shown by the fact that they *can* be dispensed with and replaced with scientific concepts which give a more accurate description of reality. So are mathematics human creations (c.f. William S. Cooper, The Evolution of Logic). There is no sharp distinction between what is expressed in words and what is expressed in mathematical symbols. Darwins theory of evolution is no more accurately expressed in mathematical notation. What does it mean for a concept to be real? I don't find the argument from indispenability convincing. It's like saying because we don't know how to describe something without words, the words are real things. Not really. According Deutsch's 'Critera For Reality' (ref: 'The Fabric Of Reality', David Deutsch) , an application of occam's razor says that something should be considered to 'objectively exist' if taking the concept out of our theory made the explanation more complex or impossible. (ie the concept can't be dispensed with without complications). So Deutsch has an overly generous criterion for exist. Does he consider epicycles real because they were indispensable to Ptolemy's theory of the cosmos. I'd go with Dr. Johnson - it exists if I kick it and it kicks back. Grammer doesn't match the criteria. Math does. It's easy to cut out English concepts say, and replace them with other modes of descriptions. I don't see scientists labriously trying refactor all their mathematical explanations to refer only to material observables. Actually a theory that dispenses with unobservables is usually considered preferable, by application of Occam's razor. For example in Newtonian mechanics force was an important concept, but later it was dropped. So what is it's status now? It's still a mathematical concept - but according to Deutsch it's not part of reality. It's not even possible. And that's why mathematical concepts should be taken to be objectively real. Your argument, even if I agreed with it, would only justify counting as objectively real those mathematical concepts that appear in a true theory of reality - and unfortunately we never know which one that is. Brent Meeker And patterns cannot be objectively measured in the way that specific physical properties can (See Ray Kurweil 'The Singularity Is Near' for agreement of this). Appeal to authority? No, a reference to a more detailed explanation of the point (so I don't have to laboriously type the argument here). I don't think anyone ever doubted that subjective experiences are processes - and in that sense non-material. But that doesn't show that they can exist apart from the material. Or that the existence and evolution of the process cannot be elucidated by purely material descriptions. I could as well observe that all patterns of any kind are instantiated in material. Brent Meeker Indeed all scientific evidence indicates that subjective experiences are entirely dependent on the material. Be careful to respond only to what I actually said rather than what you thought I said. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Aug 22, 11:55 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word fundamental. The base property seems to me more deserving of being called fundamental than the supervenient property. If you were to give concise instructions to a god who wanted to build a copy of our world you could skip all the information about values etc. confident in the knowledge that all this extra stuff would emerge as long as the correct physical information was conveyed; whereas the converse is not the case. [If the mental does not supervene on the physical this changes the particular example, but not the general point.] Refer the brief definition of property dualism referenced by the link Bruno gave: http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/mind/notes/supervenience.html Be careful to draw a distinction between 'substances' and 'properties'. I accept that the underlying *substance* is likely physical, but *properties* are what are super-imposed on the top of the underlying substance. The physical *substance* may be the base level, but the physical *properties* aren't. From the mere fact that aesthetic properties are *composed of* physical substances, it does not follow that aesthetic properties themselves are physical. Nor does it follow from the fact that physical substances are *neccessery* for aesthetic properties, that they are *sufficient* to fully specify aesthetic properties. Here's why: Complete knowledge of the physical properties of your brain cannot in fact enable you to deduce your aesthetic preferences without additional *non-physical* assumptions. I don't know whether you're hair splitting or speaking loosely, but the above is off the point in a couple of ways. In the first place empirical science is inductive not deductive; so there is a trivial sense in which you can't deduce any empirical fact, such as someone's aesthetic preferences. More broadly you can deduce aesthetic preferences, though of course that takes a theory. A theory is non-physical, but it isn't necessarily an assumption - it may be very well supported inductively. In fact I can give and easy example of such deduction and I don't even need to directly observe your brain. I predict that you prefer the appearance of nude young women to that of nude young men. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 27, 6:45 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I don't know whether you're hair splitting or speaking loosely, but the above is off the point in a couple of ways. In the first place empirical science is inductive not deductive; so there is a trivial sense in which you can't deduce any empirical fact, such as someone's aesthetic preferences. More broadly you can deduce aesthetic preferences, though of course that takes a theory. A theory is non-physical, but it isn't necessarily an assumption - it may be very well supported inductively. In fact I can give and easy example of such deduction and I don't even need to directly observe your brain. I predict that you prefer the appearance of nude young women to that of nude young men. Brent Meeker Well yes, science is both deductive and inductive (with the deductive thought of as a special case of the inductive). Yes, you can infer aesthetic preferences from a theory, which doesn't have to be an assumptuion. You are off-topic though. The discussion was a debate over whether non-physical aspects (for instance aesthtics preferences) are entirely explainable in terms of physical aspects (ie particles, forces and fields). I've argued convincing that they aren't, since any level of non-physical description has to slip in non-physical components -ie subjective experiences about nude young woman ;) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Le 27-août-07, à 07:08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : On Aug 22, 10:14 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Comp is a short expression made for computationalism. Computationalism, which I called also digital mechanism is Descartes related doctrine that we are digitalisable machine. I make it often precise by defining comp to be the conjunction of Church Thesis and yes doctor. The yes doctor assumption is the bet that there is a level of description of yourself such that you would survive from some digital reconstruction of your body (the 3-person you) made at that level. From this I don't think it is entirely obvious that materialism (evn weak materialism, i.e. physicalism) fails. Er... Actually I was wrong here. Physicalism is a strong version of materialism. By weak materialism I mean the doctrine that substance exists in some primary way. Higher Animals and Aristotelian thinkers tend to believe in it, plausibly for Darwinian reasons. The opposite doctrine is counterintuitive, sure, and appears with Pythagorus and Plato (in Occident). Actually it is the main point that I try to convey, and it is the object of the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA). We don't have to postulate physical laws, if comp is true they have to emerge on even a tiny fragment of arithmetical truth. The UDA is not constructive (so, after UDA, it still could be that the shorter derivation of the physical laws from number is intrinsically not feasible). But then I show how computer science and mathematical paves the way of an actual short (but complex) derivation of at least the necessity of a quantum computer as an invariant of all universal machine neighborhood: this should provide a path from bit to qubits. The quantum uncertainty emerges from the fact that once a machine look at herself below her substitution level, she has to find trace of the entire set of computations going through its actual relative comp state. Sounds interesting. Under my version, remember, the primatives are Physical, But I don't follow you here. Even without comp I don't take the physical for granted. Science (including theology) appeared when human took some distance with naive realism, despite billions of year of evolution which programmed us to take seriously our local neighborhood. But you can understand intellectually that the existence of primary matter asks for an act of faith. I don't see that the existence of the material world is any more or less an act of faith than the existence of the mathematical world. So these same remarks could be applied to *comp*. Comp asks indeed for an act of faith, as any theory in which we want to believe in. But my point, the UDA point, is that if comp is correct, all appearance of matter, including the observation of measurement devices, has to be explained by pure number theoretical relations. With comp, the act of faith in matter is just *useless*, like the vital principle in 19th century biology, or the phlogistic and things like that. Nobody has ever prove that that exists, and the very old dream-metaphysical argument put a reasonable doubt that such a proof can vere been presented. Now, with comp, I pretend that matter is devoid of any explanation power. Even if you postulate the existence of matter, you will not been able to use it to justify any belief, be them on mind or even matter. But I let you study the UDA which is supposed to explain that. I think we need to draw a careful distinction between the *process* of reasoning itself, and the external entities that reasoning is *about* *(ie what it is that our theories are externally referencing). When you carefully examine what mathematics is all about, it seems that it is all about *knowledge* (justified belief). I don't see that at all. As a natural number realist I would say that 99,999... of arithmetical reality is independent of knowers and ofepistemologies. With comp, knowledge applies only to sophisticated observer themselves described by universal (and immaterial) machines, those capable to hold beliefs and to justified them. This is because math appears to be the study of patterns and when meaning is ascribed to be these patterns, the result is knowledge. So: so Math Meaningful Patterns Knowledge. Math has a big role for discovering and communicating knowledge (with and without comp), but this does not make math equivalent with knowledge. I define knowledge, of any entity, axiomatically by the modal logic S4. Since math appears to be equivalent to knowledge itself, it is no surprise that all explanations with real explanatory power must use (or indirectly reference) mathematics. That is to say, I think it's true that the *process* of reasoning redcues to pure mathematics. However, it does not follow that all the entities being *referenced* (refered to) by mathematical theories, are themselves
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
(stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word fundamental. The base
property seems to me more deserving of being called fundamental than
the supervenient property. If you were to give concise instructions to
a god who wanted to build a copy of our world you could skip all the
information about values etc. confident in the knowledge that all this
extra stuff would emerge as long as the correct physical information
was conveyed; whereas the converse is not the case.
[If the mental does not supervene on the physical this changes the
particular example, but not the general point.]
Refer the brief definition of property dualism referenced by the link
Bruno gave:
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/mind/notes/supervenience.html
Be careful to draw a distinction between 'substances' and
'properties'. I accept that the underlying *substance* is likely
physical, but *properties* are what are super-imposed on the top of
the underlying substance. The physical *substance* may be the base
level, but the physical *properties* aren't. From the mere fact that
aesthetic properties are *composed of* physical substances, it does
not follow that aesthetic properties themselves are physical. Nor
does it follow from the fact that physical substances are *neccessery*
for aesthetic properties, that they are *sufficient* to fully specify
aesthetic properties.
Here's why: Complete knowledge of the physical properties of your
brain cannot in fact enable you to deduce your aesthetic preferences
without additional *non-physical* assumptions. That is because,as I
agreed with Bruno (see my previous post), all the explanatory power of
reason is *mathematical* in nature. In short, in order for you to
know how a complete specification of your brain state was correlated
with your aesthetic preferences, you would have to use your own
*subjective experiences* as a calibrator in order to make the
correlation (ie When brain state X, I feel/experience Y). And these
subjective experiences are not themsleves physical, but, as I have
explained again and again, *Mathematical* properties.
There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is
left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information
is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be
perfectly reproduced by anyone who has at hand all the relevant third
person information, even if it can't be reproduced in his own mind.
You can build a bat which will to itself feel like a bat if you know
every scientific detail about bats and have appropriately capable
molecular assemblers at your disposal. I believe this is a matter of
physical necessity unless you are a substance dualist, since the usual
definition of supervenience says that same brain state implies same
mind state. (It isn't a matter of logical necessity because property
dualism is logically possible.) In this sense, the mental properties'
dependence on the physical properties is asymmetrical, which is why I
say the physical properties are more fundamental. You might agree with
this analysis but simply have a different definition of fundamental.
They have to be in there somewhere, since it appears that a particular
brain state is necessary and sufficient for a particular aesthetic
preference. In the same way, cardiovascular system activity is
necessary and sufficient for the circulation of the blood. The
difference between the two cases is that with circulation it is
obviously so but with mind it is not obviously so: we can imagine the
appropriate brain activity without mind but not the appropriate
cardiovascular activity without circulation. But maybe this is just a
problem with our imagination!
Ah, but there is a difference! In the example you gave, circulation
is *defined* by the specific physical characteristics of
cardiovascular activity. But the mind is *not* defined by specific
physical characteristics of the brain (this is the error that
philosopher John Searle keep making). In the example of circulation
you gave, you can take direct objective measurements of the physical
characteristics of cardiovascular activity. But as Ray Kurzweil
pointed out in his book 'The Singularity Is Near', you cannot take
direct objective measurements of a mind. That's because the workings
of a mind are not defined by any specific physical characteristics of
the system, but are *mathematical* properties ('patterns') as
explained by 'Functionalism'. Further, these mathematical properties
are not just fictions (words we use to explain things better) but
appear to be dispensable to our explanations of reality. These points
indicate a big and real difference between your example (circulation)
and mind/brain.
What
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 27/08/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits, but the circulatory system as a whole was something emergent and not at all obvious, in the same way that mind was emergent. Alternatively, a superintelligent being could claim that the mind was as obviously the result of brain activity as circulation was the result of cardiovascular activity. Isn't the obvious (and AFAICS unanswerable) argument against this that 'circulation' is merely a convenient shorthand for the specific set of underlying structures and processes, once these have been identified, even when this is not obvious a priori. One adds nothing *explanatorily* by applying the term to these processes, which stand by themselves for what is to be explained from the third-person perspective which fully suffices in this case. But I don't see how even a superintelligent being could convince us that first person subjective experience is by any direct analogy *explained* merely by being equated to certain third person activities of the brain, with nothing further remaining to be accounted for. IOW, even if we are inclined to accept on other grounds some sort of functional identity theory, we have made no further progress towards *explaining* the categorical uniqueness of the first person. David On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word fundamental. The base property seems to me more deserving of being called fundamental than the supervenient property. If you were to give concise instructions to a god who wanted to build a copy of our world you could skip all the information about values etc. confident in the knowledge that all this extra stuff would emerge as long as the correct physical information was conveyed; whereas the converse is not the case. [If the mental does not supervene on the physical this changes the particular example, but not the general point.] Refer the brief definition of property dualism referenced by the link Bruno gave: http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/mind/notes/supervenience.html Be careful to draw a distinction between 'substances' and 'properties'. I accept that the underlying *substance* is likely physical, but *properties* are what are super-imposed on the top of the underlying substance. The physical *substance* may be the base level, but the physical *properties* aren't. From the mere fact that aesthetic properties are *composed of* physical substances, it does not follow that aesthetic properties themselves are physical. Nor does it follow from the fact that physical substances are *neccessery* for aesthetic properties, that they are *sufficient* to fully specify aesthetic properties. Here's why: Complete knowledge of the physical properties of your brain cannot in fact enable you to deduce your aesthetic preferences without additional *non-physical* assumptions. That is because,as I agreed with Bruno (see my previous post), all the explanatory power of reason is *mathematical* in nature. In short, in order for you to know how a complete specification of your brain state was correlated with your aesthetic preferences, you would have to use your own *subjective experiences* as a calibrator in order to make the correlation (ie When brain state X, I feel/experience Y). And these subjective experiences are not themsleves physical, but, as I have explained again and again, *Mathematical* properties. There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be perfectly reproduced by anyone who has at hand all the relevant third person information, even if it can't be reproduced in his own mind. You can build a bat which will to itself feel like a bat if you know every scientific detail about bats and have appropriately capable molecular assemblers at your disposal. I believe this is a matter of physical necessity unless you are a substance dualist, since the usual definition of supervenience says that same brain state implies same mind state. (It isn't a matter of logical necessity because property dualism is logically possible.) In this sense, the mental properties' dependence on the physical properties is asymmetrical, which is why I say the physical properties are more fundamental. You might agree with this analysis but simply have a different definition of fundamental. They have to be in there somewhere, since it appears that a
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Aug 27, 6:45 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I don't know whether you're hair splitting or speaking loosely, but the above is off the point in a couple of ways. In the first place empirical science is inductive not deductive; so there is a trivial sense in which you can't deduce any empirical fact, such as someone's aesthetic preferences. More broadly you can deduce aesthetic preferences, though of course that takes a theory. A theory is non-physical, but it isn't necessarily an assumption - it may be very well supported inductively. In fact I can give and easy example of such deduction and I don't even need to directly observe your brain. I predict that you prefer the appearance of nude young women to that of nude young men. Brent Meeker Well yes, science is both deductive and inductive (with the deductive thought of as a special case of the inductive). Yes, you can infer aesthetic preferences from a theory, which doesn't have to be an assumptuion. You are off-topic though. The discussion was a debate over whether non-physical aspects (for instance aesthtics preferences) are entirely explainable in terms of physical aspects (ie particles, forces and fields). I've argued convincing that they aren't, since any level of non-physical description has to slip in non-physical components -ie subjective experiences about nude young woman ;) I don't find your arguments at all convincing. In fact I don't think you've even given an argument - just assertions. But in a rather trivial sense I agree with you. To explain Y in terms of X you have to include Y. So to explain subjective experiences, the explanation is bound to include them in the sense of saying, ...and that's the subjective experience. But the explanatory part, ..., can be entirely in terms of neuronal processes or natural selection and evolution or culture. There is no need for explanations to be all at one level. In fact, such explanations are often less useful than those that cross levels. To explain aesthetic preferences in terms of subjective sexual feeling toward parents, as Freud did, isn't very useful (even if it were true). How much more interesting to explain them in terms of dopamine and serotonin (if possible) or natural selection. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
David Nyman wrote: On 27/08/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits, but the circulatory system as a whole was something emergent and not at all obvious, in the same way that mind was emergent. Alternatively, a superintelligent being could claim that the mind was as obviously the result of brain activity as circulation was the result of cardiovascular activity. Isn't the obvious (and AFAICS unanswerable) argument against this that 'circulation' is merely a convenient shorthand for the specific set of underlying structures and processes, once these have been identified, even when this is not obvious a priori. One adds nothing *explanatorily* by applying the term to these processes, which stand by themselves for what is to be explained from the third-person perspective which fully suffices in this case. But I don't see how even a superintelligent being could convince us that first person subjective experience is by any direct analogy *explained* merely by being equated to certain third person activities of the brain, with nothing further remaining to be accounted for. IOW, even if we are inclined to accept on other grounds some sort of functional identity theory, we have made no further progress towards *explaining* the categorical uniqueness of the first person. David I think you're setting up an impossible standard of explaining. You're asking that it produce a certain feeling in you, and then you're speculating that after being given all the physics of conscious processes and even the ability to create a conscious person that you still won't get that feeling. But in fact, a little cocaine may very well give you that feeling, the feeling that everything is clear and understood by you. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think you're setting up an impossible standard of explaining. You're asking that it produce a certain feeling in you, and then you're speculating that after being given all the physics of conscious processes and even the ability to create a conscious person that you still won't get that feeling. But in fact, a little cocaine may very well give you that feeling, the feeling that everything is clear and understood by you. I don't know why you've reached this conclusion based on what I actually said. On the assumption that I would accept some sort of identity theory of physics and consciousness, I'm prepared (for the sake of argument) to accept that the same physics will produce the same consciousness. I merely pointed out that, given the irremediably third person nature of all explanation, this still must beg the question of why *any* third person process whatsoever should evoke first person experience, the qualitative nature of which has no analogy in physics or any other third person discourse. This is, as you rightly point out an impossible standard of explaining - it simply can't be met, by me or by anyone. This was my point in offering it in refutation of Stathis's proposal of the standard analogy equating the 'emergence' of subjective experience with some third person process like 'circulation'. Whereas a third person model of 'mind' may (for all I know) indeed be capable of being mapped to physics (pace Bruno), the subjective experience of such a mind, by its very nature, must perforce elude any direct third person categorisation. David David Nyman wrote: On 27/08/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits, but the circulatory system as a whole was something emergent and not at all obvious, in the same way that mind was emergent. Alternatively, a superintelligent being could claim that the mind was as obviously the result of brain activity as circulation was the result of cardiovascular activity. Isn't the obvious (and AFAICS unanswerable) argument against this that 'circulation' is merely a convenient shorthand for the specific set of underlying structures and processes, once these have been identified, even when this is not obvious a priori. One adds nothing *explanatorily* by applying the term to these processes, which stand by themselves for what is to be explained from the third-person perspective which fully suffices in this case. But I don't see how even a superintelligent being could convince us that first person subjective experience is by any direct analogy *explained* merely by being equated to certain third person activities of the brain, with nothing further remaining to be accounted for. IOW, even if we are inclined to accept on other grounds some sort of functional identity theory, we have made no further progress towards *explaining* the categorical uniqueness of the first person. David I think you're setting up an impossible standard of explaining. You're asking that it produce a certain feeling in you, and then you're speculating that after being given all the physics of conscious processes and even the ability to create a conscious person that you still won't get that feeling. But in fact, a little cocaine may very well give you that feeling, the feeling that everything is clear and understood by you. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
David Nyman wrote: On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think you're setting up an impossible standard of explaining. You're asking that it produce a certain feeling in you, and then you're speculating that after being given all the physics of conscious processes and even the ability to create a conscious person that you still won't get that feeling. But in fact, a little cocaine may very well give you that feeling, the feeling that everything is clear and understood by you. I don't know why you've reached this conclusion based on what I actually said. On the assumption that I would accept some sort of identity theory of physics and consciousness, I'm prepared (for the sake of argument) to accept that the same physics will produce the same consciousness. I merely pointed out that, given the irremediably third person nature of all explanation, this still must beg the question of why *any* third person process whatsoever should evoke first person experience, the qualitative nature of which has no analogy in physics or any other third person discourse. This is, as you rightly point out an impossible standard of explaining - it simply can't be met, by me or by anyone. This was my point in offering it in refutation of Stathis's proposal of the standard analogy equating the 'emergence' of subjective experience with some third person process like 'circulation'. Whereas a third person model of 'mind' may (for all I know) indeed be capable of being mapped to physics (pace Bruno), the subjective experience of such a mind, by its very nature, must perforce elude any direct third person categorisation. But my point is that you're insisting that explanation is something that you find satisfying. It's not that explanation fails in general, it fails subjectively for you. Every explanation can fail in that way on any subject. Now, most people would accept Stathis description of circulation of the blood as an explanation. But in the 1800's many people would have said, That's just a description. Why is it like that. You haven't really explained it. Newton didn't explain gravity, and neither did Einstein. They showed it conformed to a simple description and they showed how it acted. But they didn't give an intuitive feeling of gravity. So that's why I think you are asking too much of explanations; you have an intuititive double-standard. Brent Meeker The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves, --- William Shakespeare, in Julius Ceasar --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But my point is that you're insisting that explanation is something that you find satisfying. It's not that explanation fails in general, it fails subjectively for you. Every explanation can fail in that way on any subject. Well, it certainly fails for me at this point, but the question of whether it succeeds generally is moot. In this case in particular, are you - or some notionally normative generality - ready to accept pure third person discourse as an exhaustive basis for conscious experience? Don't you feel - in contrast to any other topic - that there is a categorical first person distinction (that is: the intrinsic nature of qualitative experience itself) that transcends the possible scope of extrinsic third person explanation? Can we confidently dismiss this from further speculation as mere intuitive prejudice? David David Nyman wrote: On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think you're setting up an impossible standard of explaining. You're asking that it produce a certain feeling in you, and then you're speculating that after being given all the physics of conscious processes and even the ability to create a conscious person that you still won't get that feeling. But in fact, a little cocaine may very well give you that feeling, the feeling that everything is clear and understood by you. I don't know why you've reached this conclusion based on what I actually said. On the assumption that I would accept some sort of identity theory of physics and consciousness, I'm prepared (for the sake of argument) to accept that the same physics will produce the same consciousness. I merely pointed out that, given the irremediably third person nature of all explanation, this still must beg the question of why *any* third person process whatsoever should evoke first person experience, the qualitative nature of which has no analogy in physics or any other third person discourse. This is, as you rightly point out an impossible standard of explaining - it simply can't be met, by me or by anyone. This was my point in offering it in refutation of Stathis's proposal of the standard analogy equating the 'emergence' of subjective experience with some third person process like 'circulation'. Whereas a third person model of 'mind' may (for all I know) indeed be capable of being mapped to physics (pace Bruno), the subjective experience of such a mind, by its very nature, must perforce elude any direct third person categorisation. But my point is that you're insisting that explanation is something that you find satisfying. It's not that explanation fails in general, it fails subjectively for you. Every explanation can fail in that way on any subject. Now, most people would accept Stathis description of circulation of the blood as an explanation. But in the 1800's many people would have said, That's just a description. Why is it like that. You haven't really explained it. Newton didn't explain gravity, and neither did Einstein. They showed it conformed to a simple description and they showed how it acted. But they didn't give an intuitive feeling of gravity. So that's why I think you are asking too much of explanations; you have an intuititive double-standard. Brent Meeker The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves, --- William Shakespeare, in Julius Ceasar --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
David Nyman wrote: On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But my point is that you're insisting that explanation is something that you find satisfying. It's not that explanation fails in general, it fails subjectively for you. Every explanation can fail in that way on any subject. Well, it certainly fails for me at this point, but the question of whether it succeeds generally is moot. In this case in particular, are you - or some notionally normative generality - ready to accept pure third person discourse as an exhaustive basis for conscious experience? Don't you feel - in contrast to any other topic - that there is a categorical first person distinction (that is: the intrinsic nature of qualitative experience itself) that transcends the possible scope of extrinsic third person explanation? Can we confidently dismiss this from further speculation as mere intuitive prejudice? I'm prepared to remain agnostic. There is no 3rd person explanation of consciouness that is anywhere near as complete as the explanation of gravity or life. Maybe when I see one I'll consider it as complete as I do the biochemical basis of life (which is not to say that *everything* is explained). What I'm not ready to do is to conclude that a 3rd person explanation is in principle impossible. I'm willing to entertain the possibility that the problem is my intuition rather than the form of explanation. Brent Meeker One cannot guess the real difficulties of a problem before having solved it. --- Carl Ludwig Siegel --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I'm prepared to remain agnostic. There is no 3rd person explanation of consciouness that is anywhere near as complete as the explanation of gravity or life. Maybe when I see one I'll consider it as complete as I do the biochemical basis of life (which is not to say that *everything* is explained). Might you perhaps then feel that what may fail of explanation may be categorically similar to the *fact* - as opposed to the mode - of existence in general? In Wittgenstein's terms: the mystery is *that*, rather than how, the world is. One cannot guess the real difficulties of a problem before having solved it. --- Carl Ludwig Siegel Indubitably true. David David Nyman wrote: On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But my point is that you're insisting that explanation is something that you find satisfying. It's not that explanation fails in general, it fails subjectively for you. Every explanation can fail in that way on any subject. Well, it certainly fails for me at this point, but the question of whether it succeeds generally is moot. In this case in particular, are you - or some notionally normative generality - ready to accept pure third person discourse as an exhaustive basis for conscious experience? Don't you feel - in contrast to any other topic - that there is a categorical first person distinction (that is: the intrinsic nature of qualitative experience itself) that transcends the possible scope of extrinsic third person explanation? Can we confidently dismiss this from further speculation as mere intuitive prejudice? I'm prepared to remain agnostic. There is no 3rd person explanation of consciouness that is anywhere near as complete as the explanation of gravity or life. Maybe when I see one I'll consider it as complete as I do the biochemical basis of life (which is not to say that *everything* is explained). What I'm not ready to do is to conclude that a 3rd person explanation is in principle impossible. I'm willing to entertain the possibility that the problem is my intuition rather than the form of explanation. Brent Meeker One cannot guess the real difficulties of a problem before having solved it. --- Carl Ludwig Siegel --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 28, 12:53 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word fundamental. The base property seems to me more deserving of being called fundamental than the supervenient property. If you were to give concise instructions to a god who wanted to build a copy of our world you could skip all the information about values etc. confident in the knowledge that all this extra stuff would emerge as long as the correct physical information was conveyed; whereas the converse is not the case. [If the mental does not supervene on the physical this changes the particular example, but not the general point.] Refer the brief definition of property dualism referenced by the link Bruno gave: http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/mind/notes/supervenience.html Be careful to draw a distinction between 'substances' and 'properties'. I accept that the underlying *substance* is likely physical, but *properties* are what are super-imposed on the top of the underlying substance. The physical *substance* may be the base level, but the physical *properties* aren't. From the mere fact that aesthetic properties are *composed of* physical substances, it does not follow that aesthetic properties themselves are physical. Nor does it follow from the fact that physical substances are *neccessery* for aesthetic properties, that they are *sufficient* to fully specify aesthetic properties. Here's why: Complete knowledge of the physical properties of your brain cannot in fact enable you to deduce your aesthetic preferences without additional *non-physical* assumptions. That is because,as I agreed with Bruno (see my previous post), all the explanatory power of reason is *mathematical* in nature. In short, in order for you to know how a complete specification of your brain state was correlated with your aesthetic preferences, you would have to use your own *subjective experiences* as a calibrator in order to make the correlation (ie When brain state X, I feel/experience Y). And these subjective experiences are not themsleves physical, but, as I have explained again and again, *Mathematical* properties. There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be perfectly reproduced by anyone who has at hand all the relevant third person information, even if it can't be reproduced in his own mind. You can build a bat which will to itself feel like a bat if you know every scientific detail about bats and have appropriately capable molecular assemblers at your disposal. Yes of course. But your ability to do this would not enable you to determine what the bat was actually feeling solely from the physical facts alone. (If you put matter together the right way, I agree you will be able to create consciousness, but you won't be explain what type of consciousness is created solely from physical data). So the fact that subjective experience is entirely dependent on physical substances does not provide a sufficient explanation of subjective experience. physical necessity unless you are a substance dualist, since the usual definition of supervenience says that same brain state implies same mind state. (It isn't a matter of logical necessity because property dualism is logically possible.) In this sense, the mental properties' dependence on the physical properties is asymmetrical, which is why I say the physical properties are more fundamental. You might agree with this analysis but simply have a different definition of fundamental. I agree that mental properties are depedent on the physical substance. The physical substance might be what is fundmanetal. But physical *properties* are what emerge from the movements of the underlying substance. Futher there are other non-physical properties which appear as well - mathematical for example. What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits, but the circulatory system as a whole was something emergent and not at all obvious, in the same way that mind was emergent. Alternatively, a superintelligent being could claim that the mind was as obviously the result of brain activity as circulation was the result of cardiovascular activity. -- Stathis Papaioannou Alternatively a superintelligent being might be quick to castigate you for your stupidly and claim that I am right *sarcastic*. We have to look at the facts based on the information at hand,
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 28, 5:18 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I don't find your arguments at all convincing. In fact I don't think you've even given an argument - just assertions. Here the points of a clear-cut argument. These are not 'just assertions': (1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of reality. (2) If something is indispensible to our explanation to the simplest (most likely) position is that the concept is objectively real (See David Deutch, 'Criteria for existence', 'Mathematical Platonism' and 'Argument From indispensibility') (3) From (1) and (2) mathematical concepts are objectively real. (4) There is an essential difference between specific objectively measurable concepts (as for instance in the case of 'circulation') and mental concepts. The difference is that mental processes are *patterns* (See 'Functionalism') and patterns don't rely on specific physical properties (for instance clouds, bricks, computers or anything) could all be conscious if they enacted the right pattern. So subjective experiences are *patterns*. And patterns cannot be objectively measured in the way that specific physical properties can (See Ray Kurweil 'The Singularity Is Near' for agreement of this). (5) Patterns are mathematical in nature. (6) Subjective experiences are patterns (from 4). Therefore subjective experiences are mathematical properties (from 5). (7) From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real. But there exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained in terms of finite physical processes. Therefore mathematical concepts cannot be reduced to material processes. They abstract (non- material) but objectively real things. (8) From (6) subjective experiences are mathematical properties. From (7) mathematical properties are abstract (non-material). Therefore subjective experiences are non-material properties. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 22, 10:14 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Comp is a short expression made for computationalism. Computationalism, which I called also digital mechanism is Descartes related doctrine that we are digitalisable machine. I make it often precise by defining comp to be the conjunction of Church Thesis and yes doctor. The yes doctor assumption is the bet that there is a level of description of yourself such that you would survive from some digital reconstruction of your body (the 3-person you) made at that level. From this I don't think it is entirely obvious that materialism (evn weak materialism, i.e. physicalism) fails. Actually it is the main point that I try to convey, and it is the object of the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA). We don't have to postulate physical laws, if comp is true they have to emerge on even a tiny fragment of arithmetical truth. The UDA is not constructive (so, after UDA, it still could be that the shorter derivation of the physical laws from number is intrinsically not feasible). But then I show how computer science and mathematical paves the way of an actual short (but complex) derivation of at least the necessity of a quantum computer as an invariant of all universal machine neighborhood: this should provide a path from bit to qubits. The quantum uncertainty emerges from the fact that once a machine look at herself below her substitution level, she has to find trace of the entire set of computations going through its actual relative comp state. Sounds interesting. Under my version, remember, the primatives are Physical, But I don't follow you here. Even without comp I don't take the physical for granted. Science (including theology) appeared when human took some distance with naive realism, despite billions of year of evolution which programmed us to take seriously our local neighborhood. But you can understand intellectually that the existence of primary matter asks for an act of faith. I don't see that the existence of the material world is any more or less an act of faith than the existence of the mathematical world. So these same remarks could be applied to *comp*. Nobody has ever prove that that exists, and the very old dream-metaphysical argument put a reasonable doubt that such a proof can vere been presented. Now, with comp, I pretend that matter is devoid of any explanation power. Even if you postulate the existence of matter, you will not been able to use it to justify any belief, be them on mind or even matter. But I let you study the UDA which is supposed to explain that. I think we need to draw a careful distinction between the *process* of reasoning itself, and the external entities that reasoning is *about* *(ie what it is that our theories are externally referencing). When you carefully examine what mathematics is all about, it seems that it is all about *knowledge* (justified belief). This is because math appears to be the study of patterns and when meaning is ascribed to be these patterns, the result is knowledge. So: so Math Meaningful Patterns Knowledge. Since math appears to be equivalent to knowledge itself, it is no surprise that all explanations with real explanatory power must use (or indirectly reference) mathematics. That is to say, I think it's true that the *process* of reasoning redcues to pure mathematics. However, it does not follow that all the entities being *referenced* (refered to) by mathematical theories, are themselves mathematical. It appears to me that to attempt to reduce everything to pure math runs the risk of a lapse into pure Idealism, the idea that reality is 'mind created'. Since math is all about knowledge, a successful attempt to derive physics from math would appear to mean that there's nothing external to 'mind' itself. As I said, there seems to be a slippery slipe into solipsism/idealism here. That's why I'm highly skeptical of your UDA. I think both yourself (Bruno) and (and you Max Tegmark!) need to carefully think through consider the implications of your postulate that all is math. If the implications seem to be pointing to something unscientific (ie Idealism/Solipsism) then this might indicate a serious problem with your postulates ;) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 22, 11:55 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
(stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word fundamental. The base
property seems to me more deserving of being called fundamental than
the supervenient property. If you were to give concise instructions to
a god who wanted to build a copy of our world you could skip all the
information about values etc. confident in the knowledge that all this
extra stuff would emerge as long as the correct physical information
was conveyed; whereas the converse is not the case.
[If the mental does not supervene on the physical this changes the
particular example, but not the general point.]
Refer the brief definition of property dualism referenced by the link
Bruno gave:
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/mind/notes/supervenience.html
Be careful to draw a distinction between 'substances' and
'properties'. I accept that the underlying *substance* is likely
physical, but *properties* are what are super-imposed on the top of
the underlying substance. The physical *substance* may be the base
level, but the physical *properties* aren't. From the mere fact that
aesthetic properties are *composed of* physical substances, it does
not follow that aesthetic properties themselves are physical. Nor
does it follow from the fact that physical substances are *neccessery*
for aesthetic properties, that they are *sufficient* to fully specify
aesthetic properties.
Here's why: Complete knowledge of the physical properties of your
brain cannot in fact enable you to deduce your aesthetic preferences
without additional *non-physical* assumptions. That is because,as I
agreed with Bruno (see my previous post), all the explanatory power of
reason is *mathematical* in nature. In short, in order for you to
know how a complete specification of your brain state was correlated
with your aesthetic preferences, you would have to use your own
*subjective experiences* as a calibrator in order to make the
correlation (ie When brain state X, I feel/experience Y). And these
subjective experiences are not themsleves physical, but, as I have
explained again and again, *Mathematical* properties.
They have to be in there somewhere, since it appears that a particular
brain state is necessary and sufficient for a particular aesthetic
preference. In the same way, cardiovascular system activity is
necessary and sufficient for the circulation of the blood. The
difference between the two cases is that with circulation it is
obviously so but with mind it is not obviously so: we can imagine the
appropriate brain activity without mind but not the appropriate
cardiovascular activity without circulation. But maybe this is just a
problem with our imagination!
Ah, but there is a difference! In the example you gave, circulation
is *defined* by the specific physical characteristics of
cardiovascular activity. But the mind is *not* defined by specific
physical characteristics of the brain (this is the error that
philosopher John Searle keep making). In the example of circulation
you gave, you can take direct objective measurements of the physical
characteristics of cardiovascular activity. But as Ray Kurzweil
pointed out in his book 'The Singularity Is Near', you cannot take
direct objective measurements of a mind. That's because the workings
of a mind are not defined by any specific physical characteristics of
the system, but are *mathematical* properties ('patterns') as
explained by 'Functionalism'. Further, these mathematical properties
are not just fictions (words we use to explain things better) but
appear to be dispensable to our explanations of reality. These points
indicate a big and real difference between your example (circulation)
and mind/brain.
I have to think about this further, but I have questions. As well as
the initial point I made about what deserves to be called fundamental
(perhaps a definition is called for?), I don't see why certain
categories are irreducible. For example, chemistry (physical
transformations) could be seen as a special case of what you call
mechanics (laws of the actions of forces), chiefly the electrostatic
force. Also, it would be helpful if you could describe the underlying
motivation and history of the model, or refer me to previous posts if
I've missed them.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Refer my model again:
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/mcrt-domain-model-eternity
The reason I don't think that categories in my model are reducible
across the *horizontal* axis is because of property dualism, as I have
explained. The reason I don't that that the categories in my model
are reducible across the *vertical* axis is because of the difference
in levels of abstraction (this may indeed have something to do with
Russell's emergence).
For instance, for
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Le 21-août-07, à 07:24, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote I thought I made it clear I wasn't trying reduce everything to physics. Yes. Nice. I did see that. I did just take the opportunity to criticize both those who believe math IS reducible to physics and those (like you up to now) who thinks that physics is NOT reducible to math To be precise, I do think physics is reducible, not exactly in math, but in machine theology (say); once we assume the comp hyp (see below).. Hmm. I doubt physics is 'derivable' from numer/computer theory (becuase of the property dualism I am advocating). But I don't think math is derivable from physics either. I need to study this UDA argument (which I'll get to in due course). Fair enough. Of course by admitting dualism, you already abandon comp. (I do nevertheless agree with some point you make here and there). Actually intersubjective agreement is similar to the first person plural notion of comp, and should comprise experimental physics, world sharing, etc. But it is just a form of objectivity, at some level. It's true I've recently settled on property dualism. But could you please explain exactly what you mean by *comp* so I can determine if there's a conflict? Comp is a short expression made for computationalism. Computationalism, which I called also digital mechanism is Descartes related doctrine that we are digitalisable machine. I make it often precise by defining comp to be the conjunction of Church Thesis and yes doctor. The yes doctor assumption is the bet that there is a level of description of yourself such that you would survive from some digital reconstruction of your body (the 3-person you) made at that level. From this I don't think it is entirely obvious that materialism (evn weak materialism, i.e. physicalism) fails. Actually it is the main point that I try to convey, and it is the object of the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA). We don't have to postulate physical laws, if comp is true they have to emerge on even a tiny fragment of arithmetical truth. The UDA is not constructive (so, after UDA, it still could be that the shorter derivation of the physical laws from number is intrinsically not feasible). But then I show how computer science and mathematical paves the way of an actual short (but complex) derivation of at least the necessity of a quantum computer as an invariant of all universal machine neighborhood: this should provide a path from bit to qubits. The quantum uncertainty emerges from the fact that once a machine look at herself below her substitution level, she has to find trace of the entire set of computations going through its actual relative comp state. I'm not sure where we disagree here. By 'explainable' I don't mean 'fully explainable' (since of course there are things like uncomputables which aren't comprehensible), I just meant that I think there do exist meta-explanations of reality (in the form of eternal conceptual schemes) at high enough levels of abstraction. I do agree with this. But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the possibility of comp. OK? Sorry, I meant to say in previous post that my version property is NOT quite the same as Chalmer's version. Nice. I find Chalmers incoherent, both on mind and matter. Again, Chalmer's apparently makes phenomenal properties primatives, but I do not. OK. I follow you here. Under my version, remember, the primatives are Physical, But I don't follow you here. Even without comp I don't take the physical for granted. Science (including theology) appeared when human took some distance with naive realism, despite billions of year of evolution which programmed us to take seriously our local neighborhood. But you can understand intellectually that the existence of primary matter asks for an act of faith. Nobody has ever prove that that exists, and the very old dream-metaphysical argument put a reasonable doubt that such a proof can vere been presented. Now, with comp, I pretend that matter is devoid of any explanation power. Even if you postulate the existence of matter, you will not been able to use it to justify any belief, be them on mind or even matter. But I let you study the UDA which is supposed to explain that. Teleological I don't understand how a teleological thing can be primitive. and Mathematical entities. 'phenomenal' properties are just a word we use to describe what are really mathematical properties. My version need not conflict with *comp*. It conflicts with the reversal matter/mind which follows when you take comp sufficiently seriously. You know Marc, I tend to agree with Russell Standish here. Property dualism can be seen as a form of emergentism. The property: 'Glass Half Fill' 'Glas Half Empty' can be said to emerge from the computation locally supported in some observer mind (person) through the observation of the glass. In that
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 21/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Here you are implicitly assuming that there is ONE fundamental level of reality only. Why do you keep making this assumption? Property Dualism says that there is more than one way to describe reality, and each way is no more or less fundamental than the other. I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word fundamental. The base property seems to me more deserving of being called fundamental than the supervenient property. If you were to give concise instructions to a god who wanted to build a copy of our world you could skip all the information about values etc. confident in the knowledge that all this extra stuff would emerge as long as the correct physical information was conveyed; whereas the converse is not the case. [If the mental does not supervene on the physical this changes the particular example, but not the general point.] Your motivations are not *caused* by the physical processes in your brain. Instead, I think it's more accurate to say that your motivations are *super-imposed* on top of these physical processes. But motivations, not being physical, can't cause physical changes (indeed they can exert no causal influence on the physical world at all). Nor are physical processes in any sense *causing* changes in your motivations.Of course since we know that our minds are dependent on the physical world, motivational states have to be *correlated* with the physical states. But correlation is not causation. Causation, and the relationship between causation and supervenience, is a philosophically very tricky subject. Physics only describes physical properties. Physics can give a complete explanation of the state changes in the *physical* properties of your brain, but these properties are all about particles, energy and fields. They are not about aesthetic preferences. The physical explanations cannot explain your aesthetic preferences. Where in the particles, energy and fields in your brain can you find aesthetic preferences? ;) They have to be in there somewhere, since it appears that a particular brain state is necessary and sufficient for a particular aesthetic preference. In the same way, cardiovascular system activity is necessary and sufficient for the circulation of the blood. The difference between the two cases is that with circulation it is obviously so but with mind it is not obviously so: we can imagine the appropriate brain activity without mind but not the appropriate cardiovascular activity without circulation. But maybe this is just a problem with our imagination! I postulate a three-fold property dualism - my proposed three ways to describe reality are *Physical, *Teleological and *Mathematical. You could describe the same reality in any one of these three ways, but I think its a mistake to say that any one of these ways is more or less fundmental than the others. It helps if you look at the diagram I posted - the physical concepts are all displayed in the left column , the teleological concepts are all in the middle column, and the mathematical concepts are all in the right column (concepts classified by subject area). The idea is that the concepts in one row are all on the same level- none is more or less fundamental than the others. Here's the diagram: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/mcrt-domain-model-eternity I have to think about this further, but I have questions. As well as the initial point I made about what deserves to be called fundamental (perhaps a definition is called for?), I don't see why certain categories are irreducible. For example, chemistry (physical transformations) could be seen as a special case of what you call mechanics (laws of the actions of forces), chiefly the electrostatic force. Also, it would be helpful if you could describe the underlying motivation and history of the model, or refer me to previous posts if I've missed them. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 21/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 20, 9:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with
the physics argument I gave above).
*Consider an agent with a set of motivations A
*Consider the transition of that agent to a different set of
motivations B (ie the agent changes its mind about something)
Question: Why did agent A transition from motivation set A to
motivation set B?
Assumption: The transition must be explicable
Conclusion: There must exist objective 'laws of value' which explain
why there was a transition from state A to state B.
And that argument (greatly fleshed out of course) basically proves
that that such objective principles exist, given only the assumption
that reality is explicable.
But surely the transition from A to B must be fully explained by the
laws of physics underlying physical transitions in the agent's brain,
or state transitions in an abstract machine.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
*sigh*. Only if Teleological explanations (discussions about agent
motivations) can be completely reduced to (replaced by) physical
explanations (discussions about physics). I don't think they can,
since I advocate 'property dualism'. I'm saying that you have three
different kinds of properties (Physical, Teleological, Mathematical)
which are correlated with each other (as science requires) but that
you cannot fully reduce mathematical and teleological explanations to
physical explanations.
IF you accept that teleological properties are not identical to
physical properties ('Property Dualism'), THEN my sketch of the
argument for the existence of objective laws of value holds. But
that's a very big 'if' of course.
Well, return to a concrete example. Yesterday, I thought red was the
best colour for my new car, but today I think blue is better. My
aesthetic values would seem to have changed. There must be some reason
for this, of course. At one level, the reason may be something such as
I now realise that blue is a better colour, or I don't want my car
to be the same colour as half the other cars in the street. But at a
more fundamental level than this, the reason is that physical changes
in my brain have caused me to change my mind. Perhaps there is an even
more fundamental level than this, such as mathematical Idealism, which
underpins physics, but this seems to me if anything yet another step
removed from calling the aesthetic values themselves fundamental.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 21, 10:31 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Well, return to a concrete example. Yesterday, I thought red was the best colour for my new car, but today I think blue is better. My aesthetic values would seem to have changed. There must be some reason for this, of course. At one level, the reason may be something such as I now realise that blue is a better colour, or I don't want my car to be the same colour as half the other cars in the street. But at a more fundamental level than this, the reason is that physical changes in my brain have caused me to change my mind. Perhaps there is an even more fundamental level than this, such as mathematical Idealism, which underpins physics, but this seems to me if anything yet another step removed from calling the aesthetic values themselves fundamental. -- Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text - Here you are implicitly assuming that there is ONE fundamental level of reality only. Why do you keep making this assumption? Property Dualism says that there is more than one way to describe reality, and each way is no more or less fundamental than the other. Your motivations are not *caused* by the physical processes in your brain. Instead, I think it's more accurate to say that your motivations are *super-imposed* on top of these physical processes. But motivations, not being physical, can't cause physical changes (indeed they can exert no causal influence on the physical world at all). Nor are physical processes in any sense *causing* changes in your motivations.Of course since we know that our minds are dependent on the physical world, motivational states have to be *correlated* with the physical states. But correlation is not causation. Physics only describes physical properties. Physics can give a complete explanation of the state changes in the *physical* properties of your brain, but these properties are all about particles, energy and fields. They are not about aesthetic preferences. The physical explanations cannot explain your aesthetic preferences. Where in the particles, energy and fields in your brain can you find aesthetic preferences? ;) I postulate a three-fold property dualism - my proposed three ways to describe reality are *Physical, *Teleological and *Mathematical. You could describe the same reality in any one of these three ways, but I think its a mistake to say that any one of these ways is more or less fundmental than the others. It helps if you look at the diagram I posted - the physical concepts are all displayed in the left column , the teleological concepts are all in the middle column, and the mathematical concepts are all in the right column (concepts classified by subject area). The idea is that the concepts in one row are all on the same level- none is more or less fundamental than the others. Here's the diagram: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/mcrt-domain-model-eternity --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Tue, Aug 21, 2007 at 11:23:01AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Here you are implicitly assuming that there is ONE fundamental level of reality only. Why do you keep making this assumption? Property Dualism says that there is more than one way to describe reality, and each way is no more or less fundamental than the other. Marc, how does your property dualism differ from the account of emergence I give in On Complexity and Emergence? (If indeed it does differ!). Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 22, 11:26 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Marc, how does your property dualism differ from the account of emergence I give in On Complexity and Emergence? (If indeed it does differ!). Cheers I've only given your text a quick skim so far. As far as I can tell, property dualism has got nothing to do with complexity and emergence. Property dualism is a rather subtle position in ontology. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather than just plain mysterious. Cheers On Tue, Aug 21, 2007 at 08:22:59PM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Aug 22, 11:26 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Marc, how does your property dualism differ from the account of emergence I give in On Complexity and Emergence? (If indeed it does differ!). Cheers I've only given your text a quick skim so far. As far as I can tell, property dualism has got nothing to do with complexity and emergence. Property dualism is a rather subtle position in ontology. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 22, 4:41 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather than just plain mysterious. Cheers The ida of property dualism is very simple: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism It just means that the same underlying reality can manifest itself as multiple properties. Let me give a couple of analogies (bear in mind that these are only analogies). Take a glass of water 50% fill. It has two properties: 'Glass Half Fill' 'Glas Half Empty' Same thing, two different properties. Look at the picture here: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/YoungGirl-OldWomanIllusion.html Same picture two different perspectives: 'Old Lady' 'Young Woman' -- Multiple perspectives of the same reality, all perspectives equally valid. Neither perspective is more fundamental than the others. Remember the rough analogies above and now move to my proposed real exmaple: 'Mathematical Description' 'Physical Description' 'Teleological Description' Multiple properties, same reality. All of these three kinds of descriptions are on the same level. Nothing is 'emerging' from anything. All three perspectives are equally real and no one of them is fundamental. That's it. Really simple. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Still sounds like emergence to me. On Tue, Aug 21, 2007 at 10:23:18PM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Aug 22, 4:41 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather than just plain mysterious. Cheers The ida of property dualism is very simple: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism It just means that the same underlying reality can manifest itself as multiple properties. Let me give a couple of analogies (bear in mind that these are only analogies). Take a glass of water 50% fill. It has two properties: 'Glass Half Fill' 'Glas Half Empty' Same thing, two different properties. Look at the picture here: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/YoungGirl-OldWomanIllusion.html Same picture two different perspectives: 'Old Lady' 'Young Woman' -- Multiple perspectives of the same reality, all perspectives equally valid. Neither perspective is more fundamental than the others. Remember the rough analogies above and now move to my proposed real exmaple: 'Mathematical Description' 'Physical Description' 'Teleological Description' Multiple properties, same reality. All of these three kinds of descriptions are on the same level. Nothing is 'emerging' from anything. All three perspectives are equally real and no one of them is fundamental. That's it. Really simple. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months. No. That's because after the terrible insults levelled at me by some... Surely not on this list! -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 20, 9:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months. No. That's because after the terrible insults levelled at me by some... Surely not on this list! -- Stathis Papaioannou Nah, nothing to do with this list, I'm talking about experiences on other lists. Enough to put a person off the web for life. Some real nasty minded creeps out there all right. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with the physics argument I gave above). *Consider an agent with a set of motivations A *Consider the transition of that agent to a different set of motivations B (ie the agent changes its mind about something) Question: Why did agent A transition from motivation set A to motivation set B? Assumption: The transition must be explicable Conclusion: There must exist objective 'laws of value' which explain why there was a transition from state A to state B. And that argument (greatly fleshed out of course) basically proves that that such objective principles exist, given only the assumption that reality is explicable. But surely the transition from A to B must be fully explained by the laws of physics underlying physical transitions in the agent's brain, or state transitions in an abstract machine. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Le 19-août-07, à 08:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : On Aug 19, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However, if I like red and you like blue, how do we decide which colour is objectively better? No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete information would agree with. Even in the restricted arithmetical Platonia, no observer can have complete information. But they good agree on many subsets of propositions. What they have to be are inert EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES, taking the form: 'Beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F G'. 'Liberty has abstract properties A B C D E F G' etc etc. None the less, as explained, these abstract specifications would still be amenable to indirect empirical testing to the extent that they could be used to predict agent emotional reactions to social events. You could make a similar claim for the abstract quality redness, which is associated with light of a certain wavelength but is not the same thing as it. But it doesn't seem right to me to consider redness as having a separate objective existence of its own; it's just a name we apply to a physical phenomenon. I don't agree that 'redness is just a name we apply to a physical phenomenon' (although I agree with you its not an objectively existing primative). I thought about these issues hard out for a long long long long long long LONG time before finally nailing 'em. Unfortunately the answers are not something I easily explain in short sentences on Internet messageboards ;) 'redness' is not a *thing* it's a *process* - as a phenomenal (subjective) quality it's a *mathematical* property associated with the running of an algorithm (or computation) . But this is NOT a *physical* property. The mathematical property (redness) is *attached to* (resides in, is dependent upon) the physical substrate implementing the algorithm giving rise to the subjective experience , but the mathematical property *per se* is not physical. It's abstract. It's really quite obvious in retrospect - physical properties involve energy, mathematical properties involve knowledge (meaningful patterns). Old David Chalmers was right about this one (see his 'property dualism'). The two properties just ain't the same and no amount of semantic trickery is going to reduce one to the other. Math is not physics. But a lot of people argues (incorrectly imo) that you can reduce math to physics. And I do agree that the concept of quantum information can be used to defend that idea (again, not convincingly imo). Actually I made a point (UDA) that if the brain (or whatever is necessary for consciousness to manifest itself) is a digitalizable entity, then it is just impossible that physics is not derivable---ontically and epistemologically---from number/computer science. Of course by admitting dualism, you already abandon comp. (I do nevertheless agree with some point you make here and there). Actually intersubjective agreement is similar to the first person plural notion of comp, and should comprise experimental physics, world sharing, etc. But it is just a form of objectivity, at some level. When saying: Any way, after absorbing all this knowledge my thoughts are clear, crisp and fully sane. We could infer (if you were serious saying that, which I doubt) that either you are not a machine (or not even a self-referentially correct entity) or that you are insane. I'm very very very very very very very very very very very very very confident I was right about it all A sentence like this one will rise doubt about your confidence 'm afraid. But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the possibility of comp. OK? I share nevertheless your platonism on some value (truth, justice, freedom, even beauty on which Plato, Plotinus and the greeks, and indians, have succeeded in changing my mind. I'm not sure I understand your notion of explanation, from previews posts. Physics, does not really explain, it does some genuine and quite wonderful compression of the data, but it presupposes somehow the mystery (existence, consistence, consciousness) by abstracting from the observer. Such an abstraction has been a brilliant and quite useful methodological simplifying idea, but it is just an error to abandon the search of a global picture of the world in which qualitative apprehension, by humans or machines, are taken seriously. Also, you take as axiom that reality is explainable, but taking into account we belongs to that reality, rises the fact that some feature of reality are not explainable by us. Despite we can bet on some negative (limitative) meta-explanation.
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete information would agree with. Even in the restricted arithmetical Platonia, no observer can have complete information. But they good agree on many subsets of propositions. Agreed. I should have said 'all observers with *sufficient* information'. 'redness' is not a *thing* it's a *process* - as a phenomenal (subjective) quality it's a *mathematical* property associated with the running of an algorithm (or computation) . But this is NOT a *physical* property. The mathematical property (redness) is *attached to* (resides in, is dependent upon) the physical substrate implementing the algorithm giving rise to the subjective experience , but the mathematical property *per se* is not physical. It's abstract. It's really quite obvious in retrospect - physical properties involve energy, mathematical properties involve knowledge (meaningful patterns). Old David Chalmers was right about this one (see his 'property dualism'). The two properties just ain't the same and no amount of semantic trickery is going to reduce one to the other. Math is not physics. But a lot of people argues (incorrectly imo) that you can reduce math to physics. And I do agree that the concept of quantum information can be used to defend that idea (again, not convincingly imo). But I agree with you here. I don't think math can be reduced to physics. I thought I was clear about this. I made it clear I thought mathematical properties are not the same as physical properties. Physical properties are about energy transfers, mathematical properties are about knowledge (meaningful patterns). Actually I made a point (UDA) that if the brain (or whatever is necessary for consciousness to manifest itself) is a digitalizable entity, then it is just impossible that physics is not derivable---ontically and epistemologically---from number/computer science. Hmm. I doubt physics is 'derivable' from numer/computer theory (becuase of the property dualism I am advocating). But I don't think math is derivable from physics either. I need to study this UDA argument (which I'll get to in due course). Of course by admitting dualism, you already abandon comp. (I do nevertheless agree with some point you make here and there). Actually intersubjective agreement is similar to the first person plural notion of comp, and should comprise experimental physics, world sharing, etc. But it is just a form of objectivity, at some level. It's true I've recently settled on property dualism. But could you please explain exactly what you mean by *comp* so I can determine if there's a conflict? But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the possibility of comp. OK? My 'property dualism' is quite the same as Chalmer's version. Chalmers apparently makes phenomal properties primatives. I don't do that. My 'primatives' are *Physical properties*, *Teleological Properties* and *Mathematical Properties*. I would then identity phenomal properties with mathematical properties. I think phenomenal properties are just a word we use to describe what are really mathematical properties. Again, please explain exactly what you eman by *comp*. I share nevertheless your platonism on some value (truth, justice, freedom, even beauty on which Plato, Plotinus and the greeks, and indians, have succeeded in changing my mind. I'm not sure I understand your notion of explanation, from previews posts. Physics, does not really explain, it does some genuine and quite wonderful compression of the data, but it presupposes somehow the mystery (existence, consistence, consciousness) by abstracting from the observer. Such an abstraction has been a brilliant and quite useful methodological simplifying idea, but it is just an error to abandon the search of a global picture of the world in which qualitative apprehension, by humans or machines, are taken seriously. Again, I thought I made it clear I wasn't trying reduce everything to physics. Also, you take as axiom that reality is explainable, but taking into account we belongs to that reality, rises the fact that some feature of reality are not explainable by us. Despite we can bet on some negative (limitative) meta-explanation. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - I'm not sure where we disagree here. By 'explainable' I don't mean 'fully explainable' (since of course there are things like uncomputables which aren't comprehensible), I just meant that I think there do exist meta-explanations of reality (in the form of eternal conceptual schemes) at high enough levels of abstraction. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 20, 9:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with
the physics argument I gave above).
*Consider an agent with a set of motivations A
*Consider the transition of that agent to a different set of
motivations B (ie the agent changes its mind about something)
Question: Why did agent A transition from motivation set A to
motivation set B?
Assumption: The transition must be explicable
Conclusion: There must exist objective 'laws of value' which explain
why there was a transition from state A to state B.
And that argument (greatly fleshed out of course) basically proves
that that such objective principles exist, given only the assumption
that reality is explicable.
But surely the transition from A to B must be fully explained by the
laws of physics underlying physical transitions in the agent's brain,
or state transitions in an abstract machine.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
*sigh*. Only if Teleological explanations (discussions about agent
motivations) can be completely reduced to (replaced by) physical
explanations (discussions about physics). I don't think they can,
since I advocate 'property dualism'. I'm saying that you have three
different kinds of properties (Physical, Teleological, Mathematical)
which are correlated with each other (as science requires) but that
you cannot fully reduce mathematical and teleological explanations to
physical explanations.
IF you accept that teleological properties are not identical to
physical properties ('Property Dualism'), THEN my sketch of the
argument for the existence of objective laws of value holds. But
that's a very big 'if' of course.
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Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 19-août-07, à 08:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the possibility of comp. OK? Sorry, I meant to say in previous post that my version property is NOT quite the same as Chalmer's version. Again, Chalmer's apparently makes phenomenal properties primatives, but I do not. Under my version, remember, the primatives are Physical, Teleological and Mathematical entities. 'phenomenal' properties are just a word we use to describe what are really mathematical properties. My version need not conflict with *comp*. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 19, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However, if I like red and you like blue, how do we decide which colour is objectively better? No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete information would agree with. What they have to be are inert EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES, taking the form: 'Beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F G'. 'Liberty has abstract properties A B C D E F G' etc etc. None the less, as explained, these abstract specifications would still be amenable to indirect empirical testing to the extent that they could be used to predict agent emotional reactions to social events. You could make a similar claim for the abstract quality redness, which is associated with light of a certain wavelength but is not the same thing as it. But it doesn't seem right to me to consider redness as having a separate objective existence of its own; it's just a name we apply to a physical phenomenon. I don't agree that 'redness is just a name we apply to a physical phenomenon' (although I agree with you its not an objectively existing primative). I thought about these issues hard out for a long long long long long long LONG time before finally nailing 'em. Unfortunately the answers are not something I easily explain in short sentences on Internet messageboards ;) 'redness' is not a *thing* it's a *process* - as a phenomenal (subjective) quality it's a *mathematical* property associated with the running of an algorithm (or computation) . But this is NOT a *physical* property. The mathematical property (redness) is *attached to* (resides in, is dependent upon) the physical substrate implementing the algorithm giving rise to the subjective experience , but the mathematical property *per se* is not physical. It's abstract. It's really quite obvious in retrospect - physical properties involve energy, mathematical properties involve knowledge (meaningful patterns). Old David Chalmers was right about this one (see his 'property dualism'). The two properties just ain't the same and no amount of semantic trickery is going to reduce one to the other. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 19, 9:25 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Marc, refers to a commonality averaged across many events and agents so apparently he has in mind a residue of consensus or near consensus. Correct. Color preferences might average out to nil except in narrow circumstances, e.g. Green people are bad. or Ferraris should be red. So objective really means intersubjective agreement among humans. If color preferences averaged to nil then there are no objective color preferences. My very definition of objective values implies that some preferences can't average to nil (or by definition, these preferences could not be objective). intersubjective agreement per se isn't exactly the same as *objective*. The intersubjective agreement is *implied by* the proposed objectiveness. That is, the intersubjective agreement was my proposed way to empirically test the objective preference hypothesis. I wonder how big a sample is needed though to qualify as objective? Everybody? including children? In a lot of the world women would be excluded from the count. What about animals? Good question. Finally, the proof that objective values exist is quite simple. Without them, there simply could be no explanation of agent motivations. So you would say that the actions of say a serial killer can only be explained by pointing to some aspect of his values that we share, e.g. sexual satisfaction? Not exactly. The *physical* actions of a serial killer have physical explainations. But If the serial killer clearly had teleological motives, then these motives require explanation (by the very nature of the scientific world view). And this implies the objective existence of platonically existing value preferences. You might, with great advances in neuroscience, infer what values an agent holds from the physical description. That would be explanation in one sense. In general there is no such thing as the explanation of something. An explanation must start with something you understand or accept and show how something you didn't understand follows. So there can be different explanations depending on where you start and the level of the thing to be explained. I agree that there's different kinds of explanations. That was exactly my point. I agree that 'you might, with great advances in neuroscience, infer what values an agent holds from the physical descriptions'. But this inference would NOT be a *telelogical explanation*, it would only be a *physical explanation*. Think levels of explanations. Physical properties invovle energy. Teleologial properties involve preferences and goals. There's a 'property dualism' here again. No amount of explanations involving energy transfer are going to give you explanations in terms of preferences and goals. You could show how the two sets of properties are correlated. But descriptions of correlations are not explanations. A *teleological explanation* requires you to explain why some social happening caused an agent to move from teleological state A to teleological state B. And no merely physical explaantion can possibly do this. The teleological properties of agents (their goals and motivations) simply are not physical. For sure, they are dependent on and reside in physical processes, but they are not identical to these physical processes. This is because physical causal processes are concrete, where as teleological properties cannot be measured *directly* with physical devices (they are abstract) . The whole basis of the scientific world view is that things have objective explanations. Here too objective means something like intersubjective agreement. The conservation laws of physics can be derived from invariance under change of point of view of the observer. Well, yeah, I sort of agree, but see the caveat I gave earlier. 'Objective' *implies* intersubjective agreement. Although the two terms are not the same, I agree that *in practice* (in terms of emperical realiy), intersubjective agreement is what objective means. Physical properties have objective explanations (the laws of physics). Teleological properties (such as agent motivations) are not identical to physical properties. But there's not as much intersubjective agreement as in physics either. Some actions are motivated by religous piety, some by biological hunger. There is certainly far less intersubjective agreement than in physics. That's why I emphaszied an 'averaging' across agents. Something like statistical rules across many events and agents. Something needs to explain these teleological properties. QED objective 'laws of teleology' (objective values) have to exist. In one sense of explanation, motivations are explicable by evolution. If your ancestors didn't love their children you wouldn't be here. Only, as you point out, in *one* sense of explanation. ;) What forms would objective
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months. Concerning objective values, as we have discussed in the past, I don't see any rational argument in support of their existence. For example if one has chosen to consider the elimination of the human species as a priority value (like some fundamentalist deep ecologists have written), there is just no way you or I can rationally persuade them of the contrary. Of course we _can_ try to persuade them not to act, but this does not have much to do with values. A value is something subjective. I have chosen my values and you have chosen yours, or probably our society has programmed us with these values and we find them good enough not to change them. A value is a mental and social construct, not something written in the laws of the universe. I find this position perfectly satisfying. Question: why do you _want_ to think that there are objective values? G. On 8/18/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do. They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of future states of matter. The descriptions of the future states of matter are *implied by* the laws of physics, but the laws of physics themselves are not the descriptions. You don't need to specify future states of matter to understand the laws of physics. By analogy, the objective laws of morality are NOT specifications of optimization targets. These specifications are *implied by the laws* of morality, but you can understand the laws of morality well without any knowledge of optimization targets. Thus it simply isn't true that you need to precisely specify an optimization target ( a 'goal') for an effective agent (for instance an AI). Again, consider the analogy with the laws of physics. Imperfect knowledge of the laws of physics, doesn't prevent scientists from building scientific tools to better understand the laws of physics. This is because the laws of physics are explanatory principles, NOT direct specifications of future states of matter. Similarly, an agent (for instance an AI) does not require a precisely specified goal , since imperfect knowledge of objective laws of morality is sufficient to produce behaviour which leads to more accurate knowledge. Again, the objective laws of morality are NOT optimization targets, but explanatory principles. The other claim of the objective value sceptics was that proposed objective values can't be empirically tested. Wrong. Again, the misunderstanding stems from the mistaken idea that objective values would be optimization targets. They are not. They are, as explained, explanatory principles. And these principles CAN be tested. The test is the extent to which these principles can be used to understand agent motivations - in the sense of emotional reactions to social events. If an agent experiences a negative emotional reaction, mark the event as 'agent sees it as bad'. If an agent experience a positive emotional reaction, mark the event as 'agent sees it as good'. Different agents have different emotional reactions to the same event, but that doesn't mean there isn't a commonality averaged across many events and agents . A successful 'theory of objective values' would abstract out this commonality to explain why agents experienced generic negative or positive emotions to generic events. And this would be *indirectly* testable by empirical means. Finally, the proof that objective values exist is quite simple. Without them, there simply could be no explanation of agent motivations. A complete physical description of an agent is NOT an explanation of the agent's teleological properties (ie the agent motivations). The teleological properties of agents (their goals and motivations) simply are not physical. For sure, they are dependent on and reside in physical processes, but they are not identical to these physical processes. This is because physical causal processes are concrete, where as teleological properties cannot be measured *directly* with physical devices (they are abstract) . The whole basis of the scientific world view is that things have objective explanations. Physical properties have objective explanations (the laws of physics). Teleological properties (such as agent motivations) are not identical to physical properties. Something needs to explain these teleological properties. QED objective 'laws of teleology' (objective values) have to exist. What forms would objective values take? As explained, these would NOT be 'optimization targets' (goals or rules of the form 'you should do X'). They couldn't be, because ethical rules differ according to culture and are made by humans. What they have to be are inert EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES, taking the form: 'Beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 19/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However, if I like red and you like blue, how do we decide which colour is objectively better? No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete information would agree with. What they have to be are inert EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES, taking the form: 'Beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F G'. 'Liberty has abstract properties A B C D E F G' etc etc. None the less, as explained, these abstract specifications would still be amenable to indirect empirical testing to the extent that they could be used to predict agent emotional reactions to social events. But I don't see how all observers with complete information, even if we further stipulate that they are perfectly rational, could agree on what we commonly call values. They would agree on matters of fact, including such facts as what a particular entity or group of entities considers beautiful, but whether they agree on what is beautiful is contingent on whether they happen to have the same taste. Broad consensus might be reached on certain values if we look at a single group such as humans, but that all goes out the window when the field is broadened to include every possible intelligent entity. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [SPAM] Re: Why Objective Values Exist
MG: 'It's really quite obvious in retrospect - physical properties involve energy, mathematical properties involve knowledge (meaningful patterns). Old David Chalmers was right about this one (see his 'property dualism'). The two properties just ain't the same and no amount of semantic trickery is going to reduce one to the other.' MP: It is not semantic trickery to assert that a _translation_ can be possible however. This is the problem when people talk and get hot under the collar about 'identity theory'. At its simplest level it is the difference between 1PV and 3PV. 3PV observation and analysis _may_ eventually turn up with objective criteria that establish universally consistent and reliable correlation between certain brain processes and certain reported phenomenal experiences - things like itching on certain parts of the body, hearing music, seeing bright colours, etc. I am not sure about experiencing redness per se, although that is not ruled out. It is conceivable that this type of facility could be useful in diagnosing locked-in consciousness. The key concept of course is _correlation_. Accurately *identifying* certain characteristic brain processes - in both relevant senses of identifying - is almost certainly what the future holds for us. Is this what you mean by *reducing* the experience though? If so I think it is a 'red herring'; being able to locate and accurately describe brain processes from/in 3PV cannot thereby diminish or encompass the experience of what it is like to be that process. NB: Old Chalmers ... --- He's not THAT old, surely! Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Aug 19, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However, if I like red and you like blue, how do we decide which colour is objectively better? No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete information would agree with. What they have to be are inert EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES, taking the form: 'Beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F G'. 'Liberty has abstract properties A B C D E F G' etc etc. None the less, as explained, these abstract specifications would still be amenable to indirect empirical testing to the extent that they could be used to predict agent emotional reactions to social events. You could make a similar claim for the abstract quality redness, which is associated with light of a certain wavelength but is not the same thing as it. But it doesn't seem right to me to consider redness as having a separate objective existence of its own; it's just a name we apply to a physical phenomenon. I don't agree that 'redness is just a name we apply to a physical phenomenon' (although I agree with you its not an objectively existing primative). I thought about these issues hard out for a long long long long long long LONG time before finally nailing 'em. Unfortunately the answers are not something I easily explain in short sentences on Internet messageboards ;) 'redness' is not a *thing* it's a *process* - as a phenomenal (subjective) quality it's a *mathematical* property associated with the running of an algorithm (or computation) . But this is NOT a *physical* property. The mathematical property (redness) is *attached to* (resides in, is dependent upon) the physical substrate implementing the algorithm giving rise to the subjective experience , but the mathematical property *per se* is not physical. It's abstract. It's really quite obvious in retrospect - physical properties involve energy, mathematical properties involve knowledge (meaningful patterns). Old David Chalmers was right about this one (see his 'property dualism'). The two properties just ain't the same and no amount of semantic trickery is going to reduce one to the other. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months. No. That's because after the terrible insults levelled at me by some I had to take a break to make absolutely certain that my arguments, theories (and java code) are all impeccable and unbeatable ;) And I'm very pleased to report that they now are. As you know, I've been studying computer science. A year in I'm fluent in java, object oriented technology, data and process modelling, UML, Systems Analysis etc etc. I make a decent system analysis and programmer, but I don't have much math talent. Kinda knew that already. Any way, after absorbing all this knowledge my thoughts are clear, crisp and fully sane. My theories cut with impossible speed and power now. I have come through my own 'existential crises' and all my basic contentions are proven correct. You can be sure that the fact I've shown up again means that I'm very very very very very very very very very very very very very confident I was right about it all. :D Concerning objective values, as we have discussed in the past, I don't see any rational argument in support of their existence. Ah yes, this old debate. I started out sure that objective values existed, I had a period of serious doubt, now I'm sure again :) Please carefully read my earlier posts in this threads. For example if one has chosen to consider the elimination of the human species as a priority value (like some fundamentalist deep ecologists have written), there is just no way you or I can rationally persuade them of the contrary. Of course we _can_ try to persuade them not to act, but this does not have much to do with values. Ah, you see, this *not* what I mean by 'objective values'. I was able to see how objective values could exist by carefully seperating out different levels of abstraction. As I explain, there are three levels of asbtraction: (1) An ethical rule itself (2) A goal and procedures for moving towards goal (the optimization target) (3) Platonic Ideals (1) and (2) are not objective. Only (3) is. And I don't think (3) takes the form of a value directly. It's a wholly abstract construction of the form: beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F G H I J K etc Look at the example above. No goal or ethical rule is specified here. It's simply an abstraction which could be applied to many possible situations. Rather like the laws of physics. It's certainly true that the ethical rules we make are human constructs. I agree with you there. But as I explain above, on a higher level of abstraction there can still be objective platonic ideals. I will try to explain this more fully later. Cheers --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Question: why do you _want_ to think that there are objective values? G. Here's my answer: I want to to think that there are objective values because I dislike the idea that important aspects of our (human) existence are inexplicable. And make no mistake, without objective values, aspects of the human condition *would* be simply inexplicable. Here's the argument, by analogy with physics: *Consider a physical object in state A. *Consider the transition of that object to state B. Question: What explains why the object transitioned from state A to state B? Assumption: The transition must be explicable. Conclusion: There exists objective physical laws which explain why there was a transition from state A to state B. -- Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with the physics argument I gave above). *Consider an agent with a set of motivations A *Consider the transition of that agent to a different set of motivations B (ie the agent changes its mind about something) Question: Why did agent A transition from motivation set A to motivation set B? Assumption: The transition must be explicable Conclusion: There must exist objective 'laws of value' which explain why there was a transition from state A to state B. And that argument (greatly fleshed out of course) basically proves that that such objective principles exist, given only the assumption that reality is explicable. As I explained, I don't regard ethical rules or goals *per se* as objective. They are human constructs. But at a deeper level of abstraction, there have to be general principles which explain such things as values. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
3PV observation and analysis _may_ eventually turn up with objective criteria that establish universally consistent and reliable correlation between certain brain processes and certain reported phenomenal experiences Of course. It appears from all scientific evidence that phenomenal experiences are completely dependent upon physical processes. But this does *not* establish that phenomenal experiences are *identical* to physical processes. From the fact that phenomenal experiences supervene upon physical processes, it does not follow that one is reducible to the other. I repeat: (1) Phenomenal properties are mathematical properties. Mathematical properties are not human fictions, but are objectively real things, since they are indispensable for our explaantions of reality. *Mathematical properties are about meaningful patterns (knowledge). *Physical properties are about energy transfers. *They are correlated but they're not the same thing. They're as different as milk and water. And any-one who can't see this is blind. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Why Objective Values Exist
Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do. They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of future states of matter. The descriptions of the future states of matter are *implied by* the laws of physics, but the laws of physics themselves are not the descriptions. You don't need to specify future states of matter to understand the laws of physics. By analogy, the objective laws of morality are NOT specifications of optimization targets. These specifications are *implied by the laws* of morality, but you can understand the laws of morality well without any knowledge of optimization targets. Thus it simply isn't true that you need to precisely specify an optimization target ( a 'goal') for an effective agent (for instance an AI). Again, consider the analogy with the laws of physics. Imperfect knowledge of the laws of physics, doesn't prevent scientists from building scientific tools to better understand the laws of physics. This is because the laws of physics are explanatory principles, NOT direct specifications of future states of matter. Similarly, an agent (for instance an AI) does not require a precisely specified goal , since imperfect knowledge of objective laws of morality is sufficient to produce behaviour which leads to more accurate knowledge. Again, the objective laws of morality are NOT optimization targets, but explanatory principles. The other claim of the objective value sceptics was that proposed objective values can't be empirically tested. Wrong. Again, the misunderstanding stems from the mistaken idea that objective values would be optimization targets. They are not. They are, as explained, explanatory principles. And these principles CAN be tested. The test is the extent to which these principles can be used to understand agent motivations - in the sense of emotional reactions to social events. If an agent experiences a negative emotional reaction, mark the event as 'agent sees it as bad'. If an agent experience a positive emotional reaction, mark the event as 'agent sees it as good'. Different agents have different emotional reactions to the same event, but that doesn't mean there isn't a commonality averaged across many events and agents . A successful 'theory of objective values' would abstract out this commonality to explain why agents experienced generic negative or positive emotions to generic events. And this would be *indirectly* testable by empirical means. Finally, the proof that objective values exist is quite simple. Without them, there simply could be no explanation of agent motivations. A complete physical description of an agent is NOT an explanation of the agent's teleological properties (ie the agent motivations). The teleological properties of agents (their goals and motivations) simply are not physical. For sure, they are dependent on and reside in physical processes, but they are not identical to these physical processes. This is because physical causal processes are concrete, where as teleological properties cannot be measured *directly* with physical devices (they are abstract) . The whole basis of the scientific world view is that things have objective explanations. Physical properties have objective explanations (the laws of physics). Teleological properties (such as agent motivations) are not identical to physical properties. Something needs to explain these teleological properties. QED objective 'laws of teleology' (objective values) have to exist. What forms would objective values take? As explained, these would NOT be 'optimization targets' (goals or rules of the form 'you should do X'). They couldn't be, because ethical rules differ according to culture and are made by humans. What they have to be are inert EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES, taking the form: 'Beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F G'. 'Liberty has abstract properties A B C D E F G' etc etc. None the less, as explained, these abstract specifications would still be amenable to indirect empirical testing to the extent that they could be used to predict agent emotional reactions to social events. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On 18/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do. They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of future states of matter. The descriptions of the future states of matter are *implied by* the laws of physics, but the laws of physics themselves are not the descriptions. You don't need to specify future states of matter to understand the laws of physics. By analogy, the objective laws of morality are NOT specifications of optimization targets. These specifications are *implied by the laws* of morality, but you can understand the laws of morality well without any knowledge of optimization targets. Thus it simply isn't true that you need to precisely specify an optimization target ( a 'goal') for an effective agent (for instance an AI). Again, consider the analogy with the laws of physics. Imperfect knowledge of the laws of physics, doesn't prevent scientists from building scientific tools to better understand the laws of physics. This is because the laws of physics are explanatory principles, NOT direct specifications of future states of matter. Similarly, an agent (for instance an AI) does not require a precisely specified goal , since imperfect knowledge of objective laws of morality is sufficient to produce behaviour which leads to more accurate knowledge. Again, the objective laws of morality are NOT optimization targets, but explanatory principles. The other claim of the objective value sceptics was that proposed objective values can't be empirically tested. Wrong. Again, the misunderstanding stems from the mistaken idea that objective values would be optimization targets. They are not. They are, as explained, explanatory principles. And these principles CAN be tested. The test is the extent to which these principles can be used to understand agent motivations - in the sense of emotional reactions to social events. If an agent experiences a negative emotional reaction, mark the event as 'agent sees it as bad'. If an agent experience a positive emotional reaction, mark the event as 'agent sees it as good'. Different agents have different emotional reactions to the same event, but that doesn't mean there isn't a commonality averaged across many events and agents . A successful 'theory of objective values' would abstract out this commonality to explain why agents experienced generic negative or positive emotions to generic events. And this would be *indirectly* testable by empirical means. This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However, if I like red and you like blue, how do we decide which colour is objectively better? Finally, the proof that objective values exist is quite simple. Without them, there simply could be no explanation of agent motivations. A complete physical description of an agent is NOT an explanation of the agent's teleological properties (ie the agent motivations). The teleological properties of agents (their goals and motivations) simply are not physical. For sure, they are dependent on and reside in physical processes, but they are not identical to these physical processes. This is because physical causal processes are concrete, where as teleological properties cannot be measured *directly* with physical devices (they are abstract) . The whole basis of the scientific world view is that things have objective explanations. Physical properties have objective explanations (the laws of physics). Teleological properties (such as agent motivations) are not identical to physical properties. Something needs to explain these teleological properties. QED objective 'laws of teleology' (objective values) have to exist. You could make a similar claim for the abstract quality redness, which is associated with light of a certain wavelength but is not the same thing as it. But it doesn't seem right to me to consider redness as having a separate objective existence of its own; it's just a name we apply to a physical phenomenon. What forms would objective values take? As explained, these would NOT be 'optimization targets' (goals or rules of the form 'you should do X'). They couldn't be, because ethical rules differ according to culture and are made by humans. What they have to be are inert EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES, taking the form: 'Beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F G'. 'Liberty has abstract properties A B C D E F G' etc etc. None the less, as explained, these abstract specifications would still be amenable to indirect empirical testing to the extent that they could be used to predict agent emotional reactions to social events. -- Stathis Papaioannou
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do. They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of future states of matter. The descriptions of the future states of matter are *implied by* the laws of physics, but the laws of physics themselves are not the descriptions. You don't need to specify future states of matter to understand the laws of physics. By analogy, the objective laws of morality are NOT specifications of optimization targets. These specifications are *implied by the laws* of morality, but you can understand the laws of morality well without any knowledge of optimization targets. Thus it simply isn't true that you need to precisely specify an optimization target ( a 'goal') for an effective agent (for instance an AI). Again, consider the analogy with the laws of physics. Imperfect knowledge of the laws of physics, doesn't prevent scientists from building scientific tools to better understand the laws of physics. This is because the laws of physics are explanatory principles, NOT direct specifications of future states of matter. Similarly, an agent (for instance an AI) does not require a precisely specified goal , since imperfect knowledge of objective laws of morality is sufficient to produce behaviour which leads to more accurate knowledge. Again, the objective laws of morality are NOT optimization targets, but explanatory principles. The other claim of the objective value sceptics was that proposed objective values can't be empirically tested. Wrong. Again, the misunderstanding stems from the mistaken idea that objective values would be optimization targets. They are not. They are, as explained, explanatory principles. And these principles CAN be tested. The test is the extent to which these principles can be used to understand agent motivations - in the sense of emotional reactions to social events. If an agent experiences a negative emotional reaction, mark the event as 'agent sees it as bad'. If an agent experience a positive emotional reaction, mark the event as 'agent sees it as good'. Different agents have different emotional reactions to the same event, but that doesn't mean there isn't a commonality averaged across many events and agents . A successful 'theory of objective values' would abstract out this commonality to explain why agents experienced generic negative or positive emotions to generic events. And this would be *indirectly* testable by empirical means. This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However, if I like red and you like blue, how do we decide which colour is objectively better? Marc, refers to a commonality averaged across many events and agents so apparently he has in mind a residue of consensus or near consensus. Color preferences might average out to nil except in narrow circumstances, e.g. Green people are bad. or Ferraris should be red. So objective really means intersubjective agreement among humans. I wonder how big a sample is needed though to qualify as objective? Everybody? including children? In a lot of the world women would be excluded from the count. What about animals? Finally, the proof that objective values exist is quite simple. Without them, there simply could be no explanation of agent motivations. So you would say that the actions of say a serial killer can only be explained by pointing to some aspect of his values that we share, e.g. sexual satisfaction? A complete physical description of an agent is NOT an explanation of the agent's teleological properties (ie the agent motivations). You might, with great advances in neuroscience, infer what values an agent holds from the physical description. That would be explanation in one sense. In general there is no such thing as the explanation of something. An explanation must start with something you understand or accept and show how something you didn't understand follows. So there can be different explanations depending on where you start and the level of the thing to be explained. The teleological properties of agents (their goals and motivations) simply are not physical. For sure, they are dependent on and reside in physical processes, but they are not identical to these physical processes. This is because physical causal processes are concrete, where as teleological properties cannot be measured *directly* with physical devices (they are abstract) . The whole basis of the scientific world view is that things have objective explanations. Here too objective means something like intersubjective agreement. The conservation laws of
